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But with him I didn’t know how to get out. I never 
know how to get out. One guy is battier than the 
other and I don’t know how to get out. My trouble is 
I get very passionate and ecstatic. It takes me a long 
time to get disillusioned with the whole unreality of  
everything. I guess I was still loving people taking an 
interest in me the way he took an interest in my anti-
Semitism. Yeah, he did take over from Jesus. He was 
going to purify me like the church. I need it black 
and white, I guess. There’s really very little that is 
black and white, and I realize that the whole world is 
nothing but gray areas, but these mad dogmatic 
people, they’re kind of  protection, you know? 
   Philip Roth, Operation Shylock  
  
Introduction 
Perceptions, judgments, desires, hopes, fears, memories, loves, desires, 
and many other similar, familiar denizens of  our mental life—though 
profoundly distinct on other counts—can all be characterized in 
terms of  one most general feature: they all are instances of  
intentionality or, in other words, they all possess intentional 
properties.  
 The terms intentional and intentionality are well-known to be 
confusing. They are close to the word intention, with its familiar 
meaning (“I had the intention to buy chocolate but finally decided 
against it”), and intentions in that sense also instantiate intentional 
properties. The former pair, however, has a strictly technical meaning 
that is distinct from the familiar meaning of  intention. Indeed, by 
saying that each element of  the above list—and many more—are 
intentional, we do not mean that each is an intention in the familiar 
sense of  the word. We mean, rather, that each of  them is an instance 
of  this capacity of  the mind to be about something. Pierre Jacob 
clarifies the issue in his entry “Intentionality” for the Stanford 
Encyclopedia of  Philosophy:  
Why is intentionality so-called? …in its philosophical usage, the 
meaning of  the word ‘intentionality’ should not be confused with the 
ordinary meaning of  the word ‘intention.’ As the Latin etymology of  
‘intentionality’ indicates, the relevant idea of  directedness or tension 
(an English word which derives from the Latin verb tendere) arises 
from pointing towards or attending to some target. (Jacob 2014) 
Despite some dissident eliminativists (Quine 1960; Churchland 1981) 
and instrumentalists (Dennett 1987), a very large majority of  
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philosophers are intentional realists, i.e., they endorse the thesis that 
the phenomenon of  intentionality is real, or that intentionality is a 
genuine feature of  reality, and not a remnant of  a bygone era to be 
surpassed by neuroscience or a mere useful fiction. For reasons that 
should become clear in the upcoming pages, we shall assume 
intentional realism as a default position. Whatever else we human 
beings can be said to be, we are definitely also are creatures that must 
be described in intentional terms.  
 But what exactly is intentionality? We know it is the capacity of  
the mind to be about something. But what does “to be about 
something” mean? Already at this early stage, intentional realists tend 
to vastly disagree. Schematizing, we might divide the intentional 
realist group into two camps. Some intentional realists are reductive 
realists: they believe that intentionality is real but that it can, or even 
must, be reduced to something else—presumably to causal or causal-
informational phenomena. As such, then, to be about something means 
to instantiate causal or causal-informational patterns of  some sort. In 
the well-known words of  Jerry Fodor: 
If  the semantic and the intentional are real properties of  things, it 
must be in virtue of  their identity with (or maybe of  their 
supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither intentional 
nor semantic. If  aboutness is real, it must be really something else. 
(Fodor 1987: 97) 
On the other hand, some intentional realists are non-reductive realists, 
i.e., they believe that intentionality is not only real but also a 
fundamental feature of  reality. Hence, according to this second group, a 
theory of  intentionality—i.e., a theory of  what it means for 
something to be about something—must appeal to irreducible 
intentional properties and must be given by means of  an irreducibly 
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intentional vocabulary. As John Searle, himself  a proponent of  non-
reductionism, puts it: 
Any attempt to reduce intentionality to something non-mental will 
always fail because it leaves out intentionality. (Searle 1992: 51) 
What does it mean, exactly, to leave intentionality out? What exactly 
are these properties that are irreducibly intentional? What exactly is 
this intentional vocabulary? Answering these questions is a task that 
lies ahead of  us.  
 There is, however, a related but distinct axis around which we 
can distinguish between different kinds of  intentional realists: 
namely, the role that consciousness is supposed to play in a theory of  
intentionality. On the one hand, separatists believe that consciousness 
and intentionality are completely separable problems. On the other 
hand, inseparatists believe that consciousness and intentionality do 
not constitute separate problems but are rather, in one way or 
another, deeply intertwined.  
 Like intentionality, consciousness is also a confusing term, with 
different more or less related meanings. Its relevant meaning here is 
phenomenal consciousness, which is standardly captured in Thomas 
Nagel’s turn of  phrase, what-it-is-likeness (Nagel 1974). In other words, 
to be the bearer of  a phenomenally consciousness mental state is to 
be the bearer of  a mental state such that there is something it is like 
for its bearer to be in that state. By ostension, there is nothing it is 
like, strictly speaking, to be taller than 160 cm. There is, however, 
something it is like to perceive something red, to drink red wine, or to 
feel pain.  
 This second axis is related to the first one in complex ways. 
Indeed, ignoring separatism for the time being (we shall discuss 
separatism in Chapter 1, §3), we can distinguish between two kinds 
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of  proponents of  inseparatism: reductionist and non-reductionist 
separatists. Reductionist inseparatists believe that consciousness and 
intentionality do not constitute separate problems because there is an 
explanatory route from intentionality to consciousness. That is, they 
believe that consciousness can be reduced to intentionality and that 
intentionality can, in addition, be reduced to something more basic. 
This general idea can be implemented in different ways. One involves 
a higher-order theory according to which consciousness results from 
a two-layered structure in which a higher-order mental state is about a 
first-order one (Rosenthal 1986; Carruthers 2002). It can also be 
implemented in an intentionalist theory according to which the 
phenomenal properties of  consciousness are accounted for in terms 
of  the properties of  representational contents (Drestke 1995; Tye 
1995).  
 Non-reductionist inseparatists take a very different perspective 
on the relation between consciousness and intentionality. They 
believe that these two phenomena cannot be separated because we 
need consciousness to understand the phenomenon of  intentionality. 
Some claim that we need consciousness to understand intentionality 
because not all, but at least one kind of  intentional properties, i.e., 
those characterizing mental instances of  intentionality, must be 
explained in terms of  consciousness. Another group claims that we 
need consciousness to understand intentionality because there is only 
one kind of  intentionality—and it is conscious.  
 The debates we address in this dissertation are conceived as 
taking place within a rather restricted context. We shall be concerned 
about the debates that occur between intentional realists who are 
proponents of  a non-reductionist kind of  inseparatism and, in 
particular, of  the thesis that intentionality is essentially conscious—
or, as we shall put the claim, that a proper theory of  intentionality is a 
theory of  intentional experiences. 
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 From this perspective, the debate about the nature of  
intentionality can be characterized as follows. We know from our 
first-person perspective that we are the bearers of  intentional 
experiences. This is a piece of  knowledge we all possess pre-
theoretically simply by living the kind of  lives we all live, i.e., the lives 
of  conscious and intentional beings. There is, however, a certain 
number of  theoretical questions about intentional experiences. The 
task of  a theory of  intentionality is to answer them. In this 
dissertation, we try to answer mainly one of  them: What are the 
concepts that a description of  such experiences that take seriously 
the way these experiences are given to us phenomenologically as well 
as the way we routinely talk about them should fundamentally use?  
 We shall conceive of  a theory of  intentional experiences as a 
theory that aims to provide an interpretation of  what we shall call the 
fundamental intentional schema (FIS). The FIS is a schema that 
characterizes each and every instance of  intentionality: namely, “x is 
about y.” The notion of  an interpretation of  that schema shall be 
important at two levels. First, there is much disagreement over what 
the little word “about” which is featured in this schema really means. 
Second, intentional experiences are not exhausted by being instances 
of  that schema. On the contrary, as we shall see, they also instantiate 
other features. An adequate theory of  intentionality should therefore 
be able to make the nature of  the FIS intelligible and to account for 
these main features of  intentionality. It is this task we call an 
interpretation of  the schema.  
 Chapter 1, returns to consider further details of  some of  the 
main ideas introduced above. In particular, it discusses and defends 
the idea that a theory of  intentionality should be conceived as a 
theory of  intentional experiences. It then turns to a discussion of  the 
FIS and to six main features of  intentionality that an adequate 
interpretation of  the FIS should account for. The next five chapters 
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discuss four possible interpretations of  that schema. These options 
can be characterized in different ways. We shall essentially appeal to 
three different distinctions:  
a) Literal vs non-literal interpretation of  the FIS: As we 
shall see in more details along the way, we conceive of  a 
literal interpretation of  the FIS as an interpretation that 
cashes it out irreducibly in terms of  the idea that for an 
intentional experience to be about something is for it to 
have something it is about or, to use a technical term, for 
it to have an intentional object. This shall rely on the 
intuition that the way intentional experiences are give to 
us as well as the way we talk about them speaks in favor 
of  fundamentally treating intentional experiences as 
intentionally directed upon intentional objects.  
b) Re l a t i o n a l v s n o n - r e l a t i o n a l u n d e r l y i n g 
metaphysical nature of  intentionality: By “underlying 
metaphysical nature of  intentionality” we do not mean 
the nature of  intentional properties themselves but 
rather the nature of  the overall phenomenon of  
intentionality, of  which the existence of  intentional 
properties is one central aspect. The distinction is then 
between theories of  intentionality that do and theories 
of  intentionality that do not in some way appeal 
fundamentally to the notion of  a relation to account for 
the existence of  intentional experiences.  
c) Relational vs non-relational intentional properties: 
Intentional properties are those in virtue of  which an 
intentional experience can be said to be about something 
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(and those for which the engineering level should 
purportedly be able to account). The distinction, 
basically, is between theories of  intentionality that do 
and theories of  intentionality that do not conceive of  
about as denoting a relation between an experience and 
what it is about.  
In Chapter 2 and its sequel, Chapter 3, we discuss a first model of  
intentionality—the intentional object model (IOM)—according to 
which an adequate interpretation of  the FIS is a literal one that 
conceives both of  the underlying metaphysical nature of  
intentionality and of  the nature of  intentional properties as relational. 
As we shall see, however, the defense of  these two claims requires the 
endorsement of  a problematic theory—Meinongianism—which we 
discuss and ultimately reject in Chapter 3.  
 Chapter 4 considers a second model of  intentionality—the 
content model (CM)—according to which an adequate interpretation 
of  the FIS is a non-literal one that conceives of  the underlying 
metaphysical nature of  intentionality as relational but that rejects the 
claim that intentional properties themselves are relational.  
 Chapter 5 considers a third model of  intentionality—
adverbialism—according to which an adequate interpretation of  the 
FIS is a non-literal one which denies both that the underlying 
metaphysical nature of  intentionality and that the nature of  
intentional properties are relational.   
 Chapter 6, finally, considers a fourth model of  intentionality—
polyadism—according to which an adequate interpretation of  the 
FIS is a literal one that denies both that the underlying metaphysical 
nature of  intentionality and the nature of  intentional properties are 
relational.  
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 As such, then, the present dissertation can be regarded as an 
exploration into the plausibility of  the perennial claim, already 
present in authors like Brentano and Husserl, that an adequate theory 
of  intentional experiences should irreducibly described them in terms 
of  the notion of  intentional object. In particular, we shall try to put 
into perspective and highlight the importance of  the following thesis, 
recently defended by Tim Crane (Crane 2013): 
(T0) A theory of  intentional experiences true to the 
phenomenological facts must irreducibly make use of  the 
notion of  intentional object but this does not entail, contrary 
to the Meinongian tradition, that intentional experiences must 
be conceived as relations to intentional objects.  
Chapter 1: Intentional Experiences 
The answer, my friend, is blowin' in the wind, 
The answer is blowin' in the wind. 
     (Bob Dylan) 
1.Introduction 
The overall aim of  this chapter is to provide background for the 
upcoming chapters. It is divided into two main parts, each of  which 
addresses a particular issue. The first issue might be put as follows: 
What should a theory of  intentionality be a theory of? The second 
issue concerns what direction a theory of  intentionality should take 
once a specific answer to the above question has been given.   
 With respect to the first question, we shall try to provide some 
reasons in favor of  the claim that a theory of  intentionality should be 
a theory of  intentional experiences, i.e., of  conscious episodes that 
are about something or that have a certain subject matter. This view 
possesses a strong and distinguished pedigree in some philosophical 
circles. It is a starting point for the phenomenological tradition, 
inspired by Franz Brentano and founded by Edmund Husserl. It has 
also recently been rediscovered in contemporary analytic philosophy 
of  mind, despite decades of  debate dominated by the idea that a 
theory of  intentionality should be couched in non-conscious terms. 
We believe that, like all true pieces of  philosophy, it is a claim that 
transcends traditions.  
 This claim is a very substantial one. We shall not, however, try 
to provide a thorough and exhaustive case for it. What shall interest 
us in the upcoming chapters is what follows about the nature of  
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intentionality once this fundamental thesis is in place. Our aim will be 
first to expound the view that the proper target of  a theory of  
intentionality are intentional experiences. We will then substantiate 
the view by discussing two objections and a series of  replies. Finally, 
we turn to our second question and address the question of  what 
shape a theory of  intentionality conceived as a theory of  intentional 
experiences should take.  
 The detailed plan of  the chapter is the following. First, section 
2 spells out what we take to be the main distinction between theories 
of  intentionality which maintain that it is a non-conscious 
phenomenon and theories which maintain that it is essentially a 
conscious one. As we shall see, the key idea here is the one of  
“appearance”, i.e., the idea that things sensorily and cognitively 
consciously appear to us somehow, and that this constitutes the core 
of  intentionality. We claim that this feature alone is sufficient to set 
apart intentional experiences as the proper domain of  a theory of  
intentionality. 
 Second, we examine two objections, a strong one and a weak 
one, against the claim that a theory of  intentionality should be a 
theory of  intentional experiences. The first one rests on the general 
claim that consciousness cannot be intentional. This objection will be 
discussed in section 3. We shall see that there are good reasons to 
think that this argument is unwarranted. The second objection turns 
on the more restricted claim that an important subset of  intentional 
states—i.e., cognitive ones—are not conscious. This objection is 
discussed in section 4. Replies to these two objections by Charles 
Siewert, Galen Strawson, and Uriah Kriegel are then discussed.  
 Third and finally, having made our case for the claim that a 
theory of  intentionality should be a theory of  intentional experiences, 
we turn to the question of  the general shape that a theory of  
intentionality should take. We argue that it should provide an 
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interpretation of  a fundamental intentional schema that is common 
to all instances of  intentionality, and that it should do so such that it 
can account for six main features of  intentionality. What form such 
an interpretation should take is then discussed in detail in the 
upcoming chapters. 
2. Appearances 
2.1 Consciousness and Representation 
What is a theory of  intentionality a theory of? Well, clearly enough, it 
is a theory of  the phenomenon of  intentionality or, to put it in 
different words, it is a theory of  the property of  being intentional. 
However, only a superficial glimpse at the recent literature on 
intentionality would be required to reveal that very different things 
have been deemed “intentional,” and, hence, that different 
phenomena have been taken as instances of  intentionality.  
 Let us start by imagining a primitive creature that possesses the 
evolutionary selected function of  representing its environment. It is, 
say, an immobile creature that lives on the dark bottom of  an ocean 
which can, however, reach out for prey when it detects a presence in 
its vicinity. It is probably not very good at it and is not very 
discriminative and, hence, it sometimes grabs a piece of  crap floating 
around or merely stabs in the dark. Still, it seems legitimate to 
describe this creature as being a bearer of  some states that have the 
evolutionary selected function of  representing its environment as 
being some way—states that have content that we may describe as 
There-is-prey-over-there content or something similar.   
 A very plausible theory of  this capacity might take it as relying 
on some causal relations between the creature and its environment. 
These relations, admittedly, have been there from the start and might 
not always have been assigned the function they now have, but 
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evolution has produced its effect and the creature is now endowed 
with some kind of  sensory apparatus and some kind of  primitive 
mind, and it can, as a result, bear representational states whose 
function it is to detect the presence of  food in the vicinity.  
 For instance, let us imagine that our primitive creature detects 
the presence of  prey by means of  a sensory apparatus that is sensitive 
to chemical changes induced by the presence of  other organisms in 
its vicinity. Presumably, the causal-chemical relation between our 
primitive creature and its prey must have pre-existed the emergence 
of  the organism’s capacity to gather information about its 
environment via this causal chain. Evolution then selected this 
particular relation as a sufficiently reliable and effective relation for 
tracking the presence of  food and assigned to it a particular 
representational function. Like all functions—and contrary to mere 
causal chains—however, it sometimes misfires such that the creature 
sometimes misrepresents its environment. 
 Interestingly, the situation of  this primitive creature is very 
much like that of  many artifacts engineers have been building over 
the ages. Take the example of  a primitive speedometer. Whenever a 
vehicle is in motion, there is a natural relation between the speed the 
speedometer indicates and the number of  times the wheels of  the 
vehicle complete a full turn over a set period of  time. For instance, let 
us stipulate that, if  an unspecified vehicle V is in motion at a speed 
of  20 km/h, then its wheels complete three full turns per second. 
This, admittedly, is a causal relation that obtains de facto when the 
vehicle is in motion. Imagine next an engineer to whom has been 
assigned the task of  creating a device that indicates the speed of  the 
car at each moment. Quickly enough, he discovers this already 
existing relation between the vehicle and its wheels and sets himself  
to use it to complete the task he has been assigned. To do this, he 
realizes that he must create a device that extracts information about 
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the speed of  V by using this preexisting relation between the vehicle 
and the number of  times its wheels complete a full turn in a set 
period of  time. 
 The completion of  this project would give birth to a 
speedometer: a device that assigns to the relation obtaining de facto 
between the car and its wheels the function of  gathering information 
about the car’s speed. Note, however, that here again there is no 
guarantee that the speedometer will always be successful in the 
completion of  its function. It might malfunction in extreme 
meteorological conditions or simply break. It would, however, still 
have the function that the engineer assigned to it: indicating speed.  
 The case of  our primitive creature and that of  the 
speedometer are of  course very different. The speedometer is an 
artifact while the creature is a naturally evolved being. As such, the 
assignment of  the representational function to the preexisting causal 
relation in the case of  the primitive creature is a naturally evolved 
one. In the case of  the speedometer, on the other hand, the function 
is assigned conventionally by an engineer. Still, there is a close kinship 
between the two cases. Both use natural relations to which functions 
have been assigned to represent states of  the world. 
 Fred Dretske, one of  the most important participants in the 
debate over the nature of  intentionality in the 20th century, defends 
the idea of  such a kinship between the case of  our primitive creature 
and that of  the speedometer. As he puts it in “The Nature of  
Thought”: 
In the case of  artifacts (like instruments, diagrams, gauges, and 
language), the functions that convert an otherwise eligible event or 
condition (one that can carry the relevant information) into a 
representation come from us. They are conventional in the same way 
all symbols are conventional. We determine what the function of  
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these artifacts will be and, hence, whether they will produce 
representations and, if  so, of  what. Since thought is not 
conventional, at least not in this way, the functions that convert 
otherwise eligible internal events and conditions in the nervous 
system into representations (and, hence, thoughts) are natural, not 
conventional. Just as they give the heart a certain blood-pumping 
function, evolutionary histories give various sense organs their 
information-providing function – thereby making our experience of  
the world, the product these organs produce by way of  performing 
their function, a (sensory) representation of  the world. (Dretske 
2000: 234-235) 
Many details about Dretske’s theory should be filled in. What 
interests us here, however, is the following general idea it embodies: 
Representation is a naturally evolved phenomenon that can be found 
in very primitive creatures and that has a general structure—the 
assignment of  representational functions to pre-existent causal 
relations—that is spread across all kinds of  representational systems, 
both natural and artifactual, independently of  their level of  
complexity. Accordingly, representation is a completely natural 
phenomenon in the sense of  a phenomenon that is explicable entirely 
in terms of  scientific categories (physical, biological, and 
evolutionary) without the mention of  consciousness. Given this 
theory, the only important difference between the various kinds of  
representational systems is their natural or artifactual character. Other 
differences such as, say, the fact that some representational systems 
are systems of  conscious creatures, are at best epiphenomenal. The 
idea that intentionality is something distinct from representation 
understood in that sense is then wrongheaded.  
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 Such a general view of  the nature of  intentionality is crisply 
summarized by Galen Strawon in his paper, “Intentionality and 
Experience”: 
Many present-day philosophers quickly start talking about 
experienceless entities like robots and pictures, computers and books, 
when they talk about intentionality, claiming that such things can be 
in intentional states or "have’ intentionality even if  they are not 
mental beings. This is extremely startling to those unfamiliar with the 
current debate, but the link is made as follows. First, we naturally say 
that such experienceless or non-mental entities are about or of  
things, or are in states that are about or of  things. Second, it has 
come to seem natural to say that the problem of  intentionality is 
nothing other than the problem of  how natural phenomena can be 
about things or of  things. Intentionality is thus equated with 
aboutness-or-ofness, which I will call aboutness for short, and the 
conclusion that non-mental entities can have intentionality follows 
immediately. (Strawson 2008: 257) 
Such a general picture is seducing but, as Strawson points out, it 
might seem “extremely startling”—and perhaps even dubious . For 1
instance, a philosopher of  a different temperament might consider 
Dretske’s theory and be surprised that it does not really take into 
account the fact that some creatures are not only bearers of  
representational states but are also conscious creatures. And this 
overlooked fact, our philosopher might claim, should impact the 
 Note that Strawson is making his claim in terms of  a artifacts like robots and 1
pictures, and not in terms of  a primitive creature like us. However, as we 
stipulated that our creature is not conscious, the only relevant difference 
between robots and our creature is their artifactual nature, which is irrelevant for 
the point made here. 
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general theory of  representation and, in particular, of  intentionality 
in ways that people like Dretske have staunchly remained oblivious to.  
 Our philosopher might reason as follows. Imagine for the sake 
of  argument that our primitive creature, though not too primitive to 
have low-level representational states, nonetheless is too primitive to 
have conscious states. That is, its sensory detectors detect the 
presence of  prey, treat this information, and send it to some central 
nervous system under the form of  an internal representation that 
encodes information which is then used by the creature to react in a 
certain way but, intuitively enough, the creature is conscious at no 
point in that process. Of  course, our philosopher might not challenge 
the claim that this fact is sufficient to reasonably say that this creature 
is able to represent its environment.  . Still, she might point out, this 2
does not entail that this creature is such that its environment appears 
to it somehow. In other words, it does not entail that this creature 
undergoes experiences that are about its environment—e.g., 
experiences of  the dark and cold landscape of  the deep sea or 
experiences of  being presented with different kinds of  strange fishes 
and sea slugs—that is, experiences that we, conscious human beings, 
would presumably undergo if  we were to occupy its situation. And 
this very fact, our philosopher might claim, makes a huge difference. 
 According to our philosopher, hence, Dretske might be right 
that there is a rather well-spread natural phenomenon that we may 
call “representation” and that consists essentially in some 
evolutionarily selected systems tracking information or something 
along these lines. But, our philosopher might go on, this does not yet 
mean that all kinds of  representations are properly described in these 
 Referring back to the above quote, Strawson would say ‘“have aboutness” but 2
we shall rather choose to use the term “represent” for reasons that shall become 
obvious in the remaining of  this chapter.  
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terms. Whenever consciousness kicks in, our philosopher might 
claim, something different appears: namely, experiences that are such 
that they make a world appear to a subject. And this, admittedly, is a 
much different phenomenon than that of, say, a primitive creature 
representing its environment in a completely non-conscious way. In 
fact, our philosopher could say, this could well amount to the 
difference between representation and intentionality proper.  
2.2 Blindsight and Appearances 
The empirical condition of  blindsight can be helpfully used to drive 
this point home. Blindsighters are subjects who have suffered damage 
to the primary visual cortex and that, as a result, fail to visually 
experience anything in certain portions of  their visual field. Visually 
confronted with a certain object—e.g., a tennis ball—blindsighters 
report that they do not see anything. However, when asked to guess 
what they have been visually confronted with, their answers are 
correct at a rate significantly above chance and they also demonstrate 
some reliable level of  success at interacting with objects they report 
not seeing—for example, catching a tennis ball they report not 
seeing.  
 The general conclusion to be drawn from cases of  blindsight is 
that blindsighters are functionally similar to normally sighted people 
despite the fact that they report not seeing anything. This, admittedly, 
should be accepted by everyone. It is not a theoretical statement but a 
mere report of  the behavior of  people who suffer from blindsight. 
This said, however, one might wonder: What is the more specific 
conclusion to draw from cases of  blindsight? 
 The general situation over the more specific interpretation of  
blindsight is well-summarized by Charles Siewert in the following 
passage: 
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To say that such subjects have “blindsight” is to say that in one sense 
they do see the relevant stimulus, and in another they do not. Thus in a 
sense they see something, and in a sense they are blind to it. How 
could this be so? Well, first, consider a specifically visual sense of  
“look” in which no object in a pitch dark room looks any way at all to 
a person. Second, interpret “see” in such a way that a person cannot 
be rightly said to see something that looks to her no way at all. Then, 
regarding blindsight, we say: in this sense, the blindsighter correctly 
denies seeing the stimulus, even though she correctly discriminates it 
(in verbal judgments, in movement) because retinal stimulation from 
it triggers activity in what’s left of  her visual system. So in a sense 
she’s blind to the stimulus—it doesn’t look any way to her— and in 
another she sees it. For the kind of  discrimination she does have 
could also be regarded as a kind of  “seeing.” (Siewert 2013: 241-242) 
According to Siewert, cases of  blindsight can be interpreted in two 
different ways. That is, one can choose to individuate perceptual 
states either phenomenally or non-phenomenally. If  one chooses to 
individuate perceptual states phenomenally, then blindsighters cannot 
be said to see anything even though they might be said to be able to 
gather information about their environment in some way. If, on the 
other hand, one chooses to individuate perceptual states non-
phenomenally—e.g., in pure causal-functional terms—then 
blindsighters can be said to see a stimulus. 
 Which of  these two is the correct way to individuate 
perceptual states? As a matter of  fact, we do not need at this point to 
side with either option. Indeed, we can remain neutral with respect to 
the question of  the proper individuation conditions of  the perceptual 
state while still consistently making another distinct and substantial 
claim about appearances: Namely, that whatever is the true claim to 
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make about blindsighters, it remains true that they fail to be 
perceptually appeared to in any way.  
 Now, about this difference, one could say either of  two things. 
First, that it marks no real difference between normal and 
blindsighters. Or, alternatively, that it marks a substantial distinction 
between normal sighters and blindsighters. Namely, the first ones do 
not only gather information about their environment in a way that 
allow them to interact with it in a way that relies on this information. 
Additionally, they also are appeared to somehow and this, our 
philosopher might claim, marks the distinction between 
representation and intentionality proper.  
2.3 Generalization 
Can we now say something more general about the difference 
between non-conscious and conscious representation? A helpful and 
systematic distinction is offered by Colin McGinn in the following 
passage:  
I doubt that the self-same kind of  content possessed by a conscious 
perceptual experience, say, could be possessed independently of  
consciousness; such content seems essentially conscious, shot 
through with subjectivity. This is because of  the Janus-faced 
character of  conscious content: it involves presence to a subject, and 
hence a subjective point of  view. Remove the inward-looking face of  
[conscious] and you remove something integral… (McGinn 
1988/1997: 300) 
In this passage, McGinn expresses the claim that, though different 
kinds of  things can be said to be bearers of  representational states, 
something peculiar occurs in the case of  conscious representational 
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states. In such cases, he says, the content of  these intentional states is 
Janus-faced: on the one hand, it makes, as in the case of  non-
conscious representation, a claim as to a way the world is (e.g, There is 
prey over there); on the other hand, it also presents this way the world is, 
or could be, to a conscious subject. In other words, in such cases, a 
conscious subject is appeared to somehow. 
 Can we then generalize this claim to all intentional states? Our 
philosopher would likely continue. Indeed, he would point out that 
not all representational states are sensory ones and that, besides 
perceptions, we also are bearers of  representational states of  a non-
sensory kind that may be regrouped under the umbrella term 
“thoughts” and that might also be said to be appearances. For 
instance, one may not only undergo a visual experience as of  being 
presented with a tennis ball but also, e.g., as of  judging something 
about it (“It is a tennis ball”), imagining something about it (“I 
wonder what it smells like”), remembering something about it (“I 
have seen this tennis ball before”), or reasoning about it (“This tennis 
ball is a contingent being, it must then have a cause distinct from 
itself ”). What about these kinds of  representational states, our 
philosopher might ask? Are they also experiences as of  being 
appeared to somehow, though cognitively rather than sensorily? In 
other words, should we claim that there are not only sensory 
intentional experiences but also cognitive ones? 
 At this point, our philosopher may make two complementary 
points: an historical one, and a systematic one. The historical point is 
that many philosophers have believed that there is such a thing as 
cognitive phenomenology.  The systematic point is that there is a very 3
simple argument in favor of  the existence of  cognitive 
 Cf., for instance, the discussion of  the historical roots of  the debate over 3
cognitive phenomenology in Soldati 2008 and Siewert 2011.
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phenomenology: we know, from our own first-person perspective, 
that we undergo experiences of  thinking pretty much all the time 
from the moment we wake up until we fall asleep—one might even 
point out that even falling asleep does not really suffice to free us 
from the grip of  cognitive phenomenology, as many dreams are shot 
through with words and thoughts. These two claims put together, our 
philosopher might claim, give us a prima facie argument in favor of  the 
claim that there is indeed cognitive phenomenology.  
 We shall return to this issue below, but let us admit for the 
sake of  the present discussion that our philosopher is correct. What 
kind of  consequences should we draw from this? Some philosophers 
believe that the consequences are far reaching. That is, the difference 
between non-conscious and conscious representation is so important 
that it is a mistake to believe that both can be analyzed under the 
single heading of  a general theory of  representation. Accordingly, we 
should delineate clearly between a theory of  intentionality—namely, 
a theory of  intentional experiences—and a theory of  non-conscious 
representation. Galen Strawson, for instance, writes as follows: 
Some think it obvious that only mental entities or states or events in 
mental entities can be intentional or have intentionality; others are 
prepared to ascribe intentionality—intentionality, no less—to things 
that no ordinary person wishes to call mental. I take intentionality to 
be an essentially mental and indeed essentially experiential 
(conscious) phenomenon. This is terminologically unorthodox in 
present-day analytic philosophy, and I adopt it not so much because 
it’s simply correct in the English that I speak but because I think it 
offers the best way to put things when trying to get a clear general 
view of  the phenomenon of  intentionality and, more broadly, the 
phenomenon of  one thing’s being about another. (Strawson 2008: 
258) 
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If  Strawson is correct, then we have a clear answer to our initial 
question: a theory of  intentionality should be a theory of  intentional 
experiences. Such a theory would be distinct from a theory of  non-
conscious representation, as it would be concerned with a particular, 
distinctive, set of  questions such as the following:  
• What features, if  any, unify the class of  intentional 
experiences? 
• What are the basic concepts needed to provide an adequate 
description of  these features? 
• What differentiates and what unifies sensory and cognitive 
appearances? 
• What exactly is phenomenally conscious in an intentional 
state—its content, its mode, or something additional? 
• How many k inds of  sensor y and non-sensor y 
phenomenology are there? 
• What is the relation between the phenomenal character of  an 
intentional state and the determination of  its semantic 
aspects, i.e., it having an intentional object and/or an 
intentional content? 
The thesis that there are intentional experiences of  both sensory and 
cognitive kinds and that these experiences constitute the proper 
object of  a theory of  intentionality has often but not always been 
objected to. This raises an important dialectical question: Who must 
bear the burden of  proof? Is it those who agree that our philosopher 
is correct or those who disagree?  
 The answer to this question is likely to shift from context to 
context. In the context of  early 20th century phenomenology, the 
burden of  proof  would clearly have been on the one who disagrees. 
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In the context of  post-Rylian and post-Quinian 20th century analytic 
philosophy, the burden of  proof  would undoubtedly be on the 
shoulders of  our philosopher. Nowadays, the burden of  proof  
depends on where and for whom you voice the concerns of  our 
philosopher.  
 Our take shall be rather opinionated. In the course of  the next 
chapters, we shall take the point of  view of  this philosopher whose 
view we have been expounding in this section. That is, we shall 
explore the consequences of  the claim that a theory of  intentionality 
should be a theory of  intentional experiences. More precisely, we 
should explore the question of  the foundations of  a theory of  
intentional experiences, i.e., what are the most general and basic 
concepts one must use to describe intentional experiences? 
 We shall not, however, assume it wildly merely on the basis of  
the above prima facie arguments. The two next sections discuss some 
ways some authors have disagreed with our philosopher and try to 
make a slightly stronger case in her favor. Our aim, however, is not to 
prove our philosopher right, as this would require much more room 
that we shall allow to the issue. The aim, rather, is to clarify how 
much is loaded in the claim that a theory of  intentionality is a theory 
of  intentional experiences and, incidentally, to shift the burden of  
proof  to the shoulders of  those who deny that a theory of  
intentionality should be a theory of  intentional experiences.  
 We shall focus on two particular objections against this claim: a 
strong and a weak one. The stronger objection amounts to the denial 
that there can be intentional experiences of  whatever kind. The 
weaker objection, on the other hand, does not deny that there are 
intentional experiences; it claims instead that the identification of  
intentionality with such experiences overreaches, as not all kinds of  
intentional states can be said to be experiences. We start in the next 
section with the strong objection and then turn in §4 to the weak one. 
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3. There Are No Intentional Experiences 
3.1 The Separatist Objection 
The nature of  the mind is generally considered to be constituted by 
the existence of  two phenomena: intentionality and consciousness. 
Separatism is a standard view in the philosophy of  mind that is realist 
about both of  them. It endorses, however, a particular thesis about 
their relation. Indeed, according to separatism, intentionality and 
consciousness are not only jointly exhaustive; they are also mutually 
exclusive: whatever is phenomenal is not intentional and whatever is 
intentional is not phenomenal. The strong objection is an offspring 
of  separatism.  
 At the core of  separatism lies a particular conception of  
consciousness according to which conscious states are purely 
phenomenal, i.e., there is something it is like to have them but they 
have no intentional features—they are silent about the way the world 
is, or could be. Such purely phenomenal states are called sensations or 
raw feels, the latter label supposedly elucidating the nature of  these 
conscious states: they are raw, primitive sensations that absolutely lack 
any trace of  intellectual sophistication. About them, Gilbert Ryle 
famously writes that,  
…from the mere inventory of  the contents [the stream of  
consciousness] there would no possibility of  deciding whether the 
creature that had these sensations was an animal or a human being; 
an idiot, lunatic, or a sane man; much less whether he was an 
ambitious and argumentative philologist or a slow-witted but 
industrious magistrates’ clerk. (Ryle 1949: 195) 
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This constitutes a fundamentally democratic conception of  
consciousness, according to which all kinds of  conscious being share 
the same feature in the same way, independently of  where they are 
located on the scale of  cognitive complexity and intelligence. This 
conception of  consciousness is generally captured ostensively by 
means of  pointing to some paradigmatic examples of  allegedly pure 
phenomenal states such as feelings of  pain and pleasure, sensations 
of  color such as phenomenal redness, and moods such as elation or 
depression. To feel a pain, for instance, is said to be just this: to 
undergo an unpleasant feeling of  a certain intensity that might be 
localized but is not, strictly speaking, about that location. The pain I 
now feel in my back is in my back but is not about my back. It is just a 
raw feeling of  pain.  
 The claim that consciousness is essentially a matter of  raw 
feels is a substantial thesis with important consequences. Some of  the 
main consequences can be found on the following list:  
a) Raw feels are not conceptual. To experience redness, hence, 
neither requires nor amounts to applying the concept “being red” 
to something. Of  course, experiences of  redness may play a role 
in the acquisition of  the concept of  redness, but in all cases they 
fall short of  being constitutive of  the concept, as not all 
creatures that experience redness have the concept of  being red 
and, possibly, not all creatures that possess the concept of  
redness have phenomenal consciousness. 
b) Raw feels do not have content. In other words, they do not make 
a claim about the world, i.e., do not claim, veridically or not, that 
something is some way. As Ryle puts it:  
We can make mistakes of  observation, but it is nonsense to speak 
of  either making or avoiding mistakes in sensation; sensations can 
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neither be correct or incorrect, veridical or non-veridical. They are 
neither apprehensions nor misapprenhesions. Observing is finding 
out, or trying to find out, something, but having a sensation is 
neither finding out, nor trying to find out, nor failing to find out, 
anything. (Ryle 1949: 195)  
Note that this second property must be distinguished from the 
first one insofar as some philosophers have promoted the idea of  
a non-conceptual form of  content. 
c) Raw feels cannot constitute the content of  an intentional state 
such as belief  without recourse to a process of  interpretation. 
Indeed, since they are not conceptual and do not have content, 
and since beliefs require at least something content-like, there is 
no raw feel that could directly be put to use in an intentional state 
like a belief. At best, raw feels can cause someone to form a 
belief  the content of  which is the result of  an interpretation of  
raw feels; 
d) The relation that obtains between raw feels and intentional states, 
if  any, is at best a purely contingent one of  accompaniment. In 
other words, if  the bearer of  some kind of  intentional states feels 
some way in conjunction with being the bearer of  that 
intentional state, then the two events are at best contingently 
related and there is no constitutive relation that holds between 
them. 
This last feature is central to separatism’s treatment of  cases of  
blindsight. We discussed above the question of  whether the 
individuation conditions of  perception should be functional or 
phenomenal. According to separatism, the answer is obvious: 
blindsighters fail to enjoy the characteristic phenomenology that 
accompanies the occurrence of  perceptual states in normally sighted 
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persons. But this phenomenology is a mere raw feel—not an element 
that plays a constitutive role in the individuation of  a perceptual state. 
Normally sighted persons and blindsighters can then be perceptually 
individuated along the same lines. Charles Siewert summarizes the 
view: 
The phenomenal character of  an experience, some might say, is its 
“raw feel”—to have phenomenal experience is merely to have 
“sensations” of  one sort or another; to have a mind with 
intentionality, or to have “mental representations”—that is something 
else altogether. (Siewert 1998: 217) 
This conception of  consciousness as raw feels can be used to 
formulate the strong objection against the claim that a theory of  
intentionality is essentially a theory of  intentional experiences. It can 
be formulated under the form of  a reductio ad absurdum along the 
following lines: 
1) To be the bearer of  an intentional state is to undergo a 
certain intentional experience; 
2) Experiences are exhausted by their phenomenal features; 
3) Phenomenal features are mere sensations or raw feels; 
4) Hence, there cannot be intentional experiences; 
5) Hence, to be the bearer of  an intentional state cannot be to 
undergo a certain intentional experience.  
Premise 1) is assumed for reductio. 2) is taken here as a definition of  
experiences and is then true by definition. 3), then, is without surprise 
the key premise of  the argument. So far, however, we have merely 
discussed its content, not the reasons that might be advanced in its 
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favor. We shal l mention two kinds of  such reasons: 
phenomenological and methodological.  
 First, one might try to defend 3) on a phenomenological basis. 
That is, one might claim that it is a phenomenally obvious fact about 
phenomenally conscious mental states that they cannot be about 
anything. Pains, for instance, are not properly described as 
experiences in which something appears in some way. Of  course, we 
do say things such as, “This is painful,” when we inadvertently put 
our hands in contact with a burning hot surface. But this does not 
mean that our experience of  pain is about something. It can either 
amount to a second-order commentary on the experience itself  
(“This experience of  pain is painful”) or to a demonstrative reference 
to the cause of  the experience which, strictly speaking, is not painful 
at all. From then on, one might just generalize this point to all 
instances of  consciousness. And, moreover, if  doubts are raised 
about particular cases, one might always recur to the above-
mentioned thesis of  accompaniment to explain away the fact that 
some cases of  phenomenal consciousness might seem to be 
intentional.  
 A second route is the following methodological one. True 
enough, consciousness is one of  the most baffling features of  reality. 
We simply do not know where it comes from or how to explain it, 
especially within the physicalist mindset of  contemporary philosophy. 
Accordingly, one might see methodological virtue in endorsing a view 
like separatism, which allows one to investigate the phenomena of  
intentionality and consciousness separately and does not render a 
theory of  intentionality hostage to the epistemic veil behind which 
consciousness stands. In other words, one might endorse 3) with the 
aim of  pursuing a divide-and-conquer strategy.  
 One might distinguish between two different versions of  this 
methodological strategy: a strong and a weak one. According to the 
Chapter 1  43
strong strategy, the isolation of  consciousness constitutes a prelude 
to its elimination pure and simple. Indeed, the most radical way to 
deal with a theoretical troublemaker is simply to claim that there is no 
such thing in the first place. This, however, amount to a strategy 
stronger than that of  separatism, which is realist about both 
intentionality and consciousness.  
 The weaker strategy does not regard isolation as a prelude to 
elimination but, rather, as prelude to the confinement of  a theoretical 
troublemaker to a form of  epiphenomenalism which holds that 
consciousness is real but that does not really play any substantial role. 
Consciousness, accordingly, would be the mental equivalent of  our 
tailbone: a feature that is real but that we could well do without. As 
Charles Siewert summarizes the general take of  separatism on 
consciousness: 
Confining differences in the character of  conscious experience to a 
supposed realm of  brute, unintelligent sensation can lead one to take 
a rather dim view of  consciousness. For once this is totally 
dissociated from intentionality (and thus from intelligence, and 
character—or even from what makes us importantly different from 
reptiles), it may well begin to seem odd to say that we are conscious 
in this sense, and of  questionable significance—so much that we may 
begin to doubt that we are, and seek somehow to dispose of  this 
irksome philosophical peculiarity that has nothing to do with the 
main business of  the mind. (Siewert 1998: 218) 
We now possess both an argument against the claim that a theory of  
intentionality should essentially be a theory of  intentional experiences 
and reasons for its key premise. In the next section, we shall see how 
one can resist separatism by arguing for the claim that, in the words 
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of  Charles Siewert, “our lives are full of  phenomenal sensory 
features that are also intentional features” (Siewert 1998: 219).  
3.2 Siewert’s Rejoinder 
We might summarize the gist of  Siewert’s rejoinder against the 
separatists’ objection as follows: bad phenomenological description 
makes for a dim view of  consciousness. Indeed, according to Siewert, 
the main problem with premise 3) is that it widely under-describes 
the phenomenal character of  perceptual states. The treatment that 
must be offered against separatism is then a phenomenological 
treatment, i.e., we must describe more carefully the phenomenology 
of  perceptual states to make the point that phenomenal 
consciousness goes at least in some instances beyond mere raw feels.  
 Siewert's starting point in this endeavor is the following 
stipulation about the phenomenal character of  perceptual states:  
The phenomenal character of  vision is how it seems for me for it to 
look some way or other—for example, the way it seems to me for it to 
look as if  something has a certain color, or shape. And its seeming to 
me certain ways for it to look as if  something is, for example, red, or 
yellow, or X-shaped, or O-shaped, is my possession of  various 
phenomenal features. (Siewert 1998: 219 – italics added) 
Two important remarks are in order about this quote. First, as already 
mentioned, it constitutes a stipulation. This stipulation, however, 
possesses a specific ground, as it originates in the phenomenological 
observation that the expression, to look some way or other, constitutes a 
much more adequate descriptive tool to report the phenomenology 
of  vision that the vocabulary of  raw feels. Accordingly, what 
blindsighters lack is not a shot of  raw feels but, rather, an appearance 
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of  a certain way the world looks to normally sighted persons. In 
other words, it is not just that their perceptual states fail to feel some 
way but, rather, that their environment fails to look some way to 
them.  
 This stipulation might of  course be contested. But it seems 
hard to see how it could be contested on phenomenological grounds. 
What is required is an objection that is focused against following such 
a phenomenological stipulation. Such an objection could either be 
motivated by methodological remarks such as those offered above in 
favor of  premise 3) or by a general suspicion against 
phenomenological descriptions. The first reason, however, looks 
suspiciously like separatism bootstrapping itself. The second one, on 
the other hand, is simply too strong.  
 Second, the general property of  “looking some way or other” 
can be factored in more fine-grained look-types, i.e., types of  
phenomenal characters associated with visual perception. These 
types, moreover, are rather rich and cover not only colors but, at least 
minimally, also things like shapes. They also differ from each other 
significantly. Looking red differs from looking yellow, and looking X-
shaped differs from looking O-shaped . In other words, these 4
phenomenal types are distinctive. As Siewert puts it, 
The phenomenal features here invoked differ from one another, 
since the way it seems to me for it to look as if  there’s something red, 
differs from the way it seems to me for it to look as if  there’s 
something yellow, both of  which differ in turn from the way it seems 
 For dialectical reasons, Siewert limits itself  to lower-order properties like 4
shapes and colors but once in place, the view can naturally be extended to also 
cover higher-order properties, such as, e.g., looking like a tennis-ball.  
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to me for it to look as if  there’s something X-shaped, while each of  
these also differs from the way it seems to me for it to look as if  
there’s something O-shaped. To have such differing phenomenal 
features is to have experience with differences in its phenomenal 
character. (Siewert 1998: 219) 
On the basis of  these two quotes, we can now formulate the first 
premise of  Siewert’s rejoinder: that the phenomenal character of  
vision is not a matter of  tokening some raw feels but, rather, of  how 
it seems for something to look some way or other.  
 According to Siewert, however, if  this premise is to serve as 
the basis of  an argument against 3), it must be complemented by the 
further claim that this rich perceptual phenomenology is not the 
result of  an act of  interpretation. That is, one does not start with a 
raw phenomenology that, after a stage of  interpretation, can be 
associated with a certain color or a certain shape. On the contrary, the 
fact that a certain conscious mental state has a certain phenomenal 
character, that it looks some way or other, is a basic fact about that 
mental state: one that obtains without the need of  any kind of  
interpretation.  
 Here, Siewert draws a helpful distinction between perception 
and linguistic understanding. It is a plausible assumption about the 
meaning properties of  sentences that they are not intrinsic properties 
of, e.g., written marks on paper. For instance, the sentence, “Snow is 
white,” means that snow is white only under the interpretation that the 
string of  ink marks that compose the sentence, “Snow is white,” 
actually means that snow is white. The case of  perception seems 
rather different. Indeed, it is not the case that we first token some raw 
feel that is then interpreted and that ends up to be the phenomenal 
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character of, say, seeing a tennis ball . On the contrary, whatever 5
phenomenal character a perceptual state possesses, it possesses it 
immediately, i.e., without the recourse to an interpretative step.  
 Siewert’s next premise will now get us to the topic of  
intentionality. The question of  giving a definition of  intentionality is 
premature, but we can at least agree with Siewert that being 
assessable for accuracy is a sufficient condition for something to be 
intentional (Siewert 1998: 220). Indeed, intentional states have many 
different features. A central one, however, is the fact that at least 
some intentional states possess semantic features—that is, features in 
virtue of  which they can be assessed for truth, accuracy, and related 
notions. Take, for instance, my belief  that Obama wears black socks. 
This belief  represents a condition, namely that Obama wears black 
socks, such that, if  this condition obtains, then my belief  turns out to 
be true.  
 Siewert’s idea is then to apply this sufficient condition for 
intentionality to the phenomenal character of  vision just described. 
Take, for instance, my perceptual state of  seeing that there is a tennis 
ball in front of  me. How should we describe its phenomenal 
character? According to Siewert, we shall say—minimally—that it 
looks to me as if  there is a furry, yellow ball in front of  me. 
Decisively, this phenomenal content of  my perceptual state 
constitutes a certain condition: i.e. that there is a furry, yellow ball  in 
front of  me such that if  this condition obtains, then my perceptual 
state turns out to be accurate. In other words, my instantiating this 
phenomenal character seems to be sufficient for the claim that I am 
the bearer of  a perceptual intentional state. As Siewert puts it, 
 Note that we do not imply here that the tennis ball is seen as a tennis ball. 5
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First, consider some instance of  its seeming to you as it does for it to 
look as if  something is shaped and situated in a certain way, such as 
its seeming to you just as it does on a given occasion for it to look as 
if  there is something X-shaped in a certain position. If  it seems this 
way to you, then it appears to follow that it does look to you as if  
there is something X-shaped in a certain position. If  this is right, 
then its seeming this way to you is a feature in virtue of  which you 
are assessable for accuracy—that is to say, it is an intentional feature. 
For, from what we have said, if  it seems to you as it does for it to 
look this way, then, if  it is also the case that there is something X-
shaped in a certain position, it follows that the way it looks to you is 
accurate… And the fulfillment of  this added condition does not 
secure this consequence by furnishing the attributed phenomenal 
feature with an interpretation. If  it is correct to think assessment for 
visual accuracy follows in this manner from its seeming to one as it 
does to us for it to look as if  things are shaped and situated in certain 
ways—then we should say that enormously many visual phenomenal features 
are intentional features. For if  you are normally sighted, then for most 
of  the time you have your eyes open, you will have some intentional 
phenomenal feature, and which such feature you will have will 
change with the way shape, position, and size visually seem to you. 
(Siewert 1998: 221) 
According to Siewert, then, the instantiation of  at least some 
phenomenal features, such as those of  vision, are sufficient to be 
assessable for accuracy, and this, in turn, is sufficient for the claim 
that at least some experiences—perceptual ones—are intentional. 
The strong objection against the thesis that a theory of  intentionality 
should essentially be a theory of  intentional experiences is then 
wrongheaded.  
Chapter 1  49
4. There Is No Phenomenal Character of  Thought 
4.1 What Conscious Thoughts? 
We shall now turn to the weaker objection: namely, that there are no 
intentional experiences of  a cognitive kind. Importantly, the 
endorsement of  this second objection is compatible with Siewert’s 
rejoinder. Indeed, there is no direct route from the endorsement of  
the claim that at least some instances of  sensory phenomenology are 
intentional to the claim that there are cognitive intentional 
experiences. What is required to take this additional step is a decisive 
change of  perspective with respect to the nature of  consciousness. It 
is one thing to take on board the claim that consciousness is 
essentially a sensory phenomenon and to disagree about the extent to 
which the sensory can be intentional; it is another thing to take on 
board the claim that some instances of  consciousness are non-
sensory—i.e., that there is, as it is standardly called, “cognitive 
phenomenology”—and that these are intentional.  
 The additional step that is required to move from the position 
made accessible by the endorsement of  Siewert’s objection against 
separatism to the generalized claim that intentionality is essentially a 
matter of  intentional experiences is the rejection of  what Galen 
Strawon calls, “the remarkable view” (Strawson 2011: 289): namely, 
the claim that, 
…the subject matter of  phenomenology (the completely general 
study of  the experiential character of  experience) is nothing more 
than sense/feeling experience… (Strawson 2011: 289) 
The debate over the rejection of  the remarkable view is complex and 
cuts deep. As already mentioned, the existence of  consciousness is 
considered the most difficult problem of  philosophy of  mind—
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maybe of  philosophy itself—and the recognition of  the existence of  
a non-sensory kind of  phenomenology is far from a neutral 
philosophical step within that debate. Theories of  consciousness 
standardly come in two kinds: those that seek to explain 
consciousness in terms of  a relation to something and those that 
consider that being conscious is an intrinsic property of  a mental 
state, i.e., one that it possesses not in virtue of  standing in a relation 
to something. There is, however, a strong opposition to cognitive 
phenomenology from the relational side of  the debate (cf., inter alia, 
Carruthers & Veillet 2011; Tye and Wright 2011). Indeed, it seems 
prima facie more difficult to find a relatum for cognitive experiences 
than for sensory ones—imagine, for instance, how weird it would be 
to claim that cognitive phenomenology is grounded in our relations 
to propositions. Hence, if  the recognition of  the existence of  
consciousness already is an important philosophical step, the 
recognition of  cognitive phenomenology is a further substantial one. 
Hence the importance of  making the view explicit in prevision of  the 
next chapters.  
 Let us start at the beginning. Does it not seem strange to claim 
that there are no experiences of  a cognitive kind? Does this not 
amount to denying the obvious? Are not we all the time overwhelmed 
by such experiences? 
Our conscious lives are not limited to perception, bodily sensation, 
and affect. With the possible exceptions of  moments in which one is 
immersed in physical exercise, musical performance, or some form 
of  meditation, the stream of  consciousness is routinely punctuated 
by episodes of  conscious thoughts. We deliberate about what to have 
for lunch, we remember forgotten intentions, we consider how best 
to begin a letter or end a lecture, and puzzle over the meaning of  a 
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friend’s remark and the implications of  a newspaper headline. (Bayne 
and Montague 2011:1) 
Not convinced? Consider, additionally, the all-too-familiar following 
example. Someone is lying on her bed at night, in the darkness and 
silence of  her bedroom, troubled by a string of  thoughts and unable 
to fall asleep. Someone in that situation would be hard pressed to 
deny that her thoughts are not conscious. Indeed, in such a context 
of  sensory deprivation, what, if  not conscious thoughts, could be 
responsible for keeping her awake? Hence, can we not just agree on 
the existence of  intentional experiences of  a cognitive kind on the 
basis of  overwhelming first-person evidence? 
 Proponents of  the weak objection, however, beg to differ. 
They do not deny that what is keeping our poor sleeper awake are 
instances of  consciousness. But they certainly deny that these 
instances of  consciousness are instances of  cognitive 
phenomenology, i.e., instance of  thoughts being non-sensorily 
phenomenally conscious. We shall, however, distinguish between two 
strategies they can pursue to make their case.  
 According to a first strategy, there is no need to postulate a 
phenomenology proprietary of  thoughts because thoughts are 
conscious but not phenomenally conscious. According to such a view, 
consciousness is not a unitary phenomenon; hence, it is not 
exhausted by phenomenal features. Phenomenal consciousness itself  
might be a unitary, strictly sensory, phenomenon, but that does not 
mean that all consciousness is phenomenal. There is, on the one 
hand, phenomenal consciousness and, on the other hand, non-
phenomenal consciousness, and the latter is characteristic of  
thoughts.  
 The second strategy is more familiar. It echoes the strategy 
applied by separatism to the case of  visual perception. As we saw 
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above, according to separatism, we can distinguish between the 
intentional and the phenomenal aspects of  perception and treat them 
as entirely separate. As we shall now see, such a strategy can also be 
applied to the case of  thoughts. Proponents of  this second strategy 
therefore do not need to deny that thoughts lack phenomenal 
character. They merely have to claim that whatever phenomenal 
character thoughts may exhibit, it is purely sensory. It is not, they 
claim, the content of  the thought itself  that is conscious. Rather, 
conscious thoughts are imbued by phenomenal traits such as inner 
speech and visual imagery, and these are purely sensory. Accordingly, 
someone bothered by conscious thoughts as she is trying to fall 
asleep is not strictly speaking troubled by conscious thoughts. Rather, 
she is trouble by thoughts accompanied by some kind of  sensory 
phenomenology. We shall discuss these two strategies in more detail 
in the two upcoming sub-sections.  
4.2 Thoughts Are Only Access Conscious 
What is the most minimal characterization one could give of  the 
notion of  conscious thoughts? One way to put the matter is the 
following, widely simplified, one. Imagine that the mind is a device 
that essentially treats information. Most of  this treatment is non-
conscious. A great part of  it, moreover, is bound to remain non-
conscious. For instance, one cannot verbally report some of  the 
information treatment done by one’s visual system. Not all such 
information treatment, however, is bound to remain non-conscious. 
Indeed, instances of  it give rise to mental states—e.g., beliefs—that 
can be verbally reported and used in reasoning. For instance, staring 
at my computer screen, I cannot report the inner workings of  my 
perceptual system. But I can report that there is a computer in front 
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of  me and use that proposition in reasoning such as, “There is a 
computer in front of  me; hence, there is something in front of  me.”  
 One would be hard pressed to deny that this distinction—
between some information treatment that is bound to remain non-
conscious and some that does not—captures at least part of  the 
notion of  conscious thoughts. What is characteristic of  it, however, 
and what accounts for its minimalism, is the fact that it does not 
mention anything like phenomenal consciousness. It merely describes 
what the mind is doing: namely, separating information poised for 
report and use in reasoning from information that is not. And, while 
doing this, it remains completely silent about how it feels like to have 
a mind. It is therefore able to capture at least part of  the notion of  
conscious thoughts in a way that is independent of  phenomenal 
consciousness. Thus, one may be willing to use this minimal notion 
of  conscious thoughts to argue against the claim that a theory of  
intentionality should essentially be a theory of  intentional 
experiences. Indeed, a great part of  intentional states, thoughts, 
would in this case not be identifiable with experiences: i.e., 
phenomenally conscious states.  
 This very minimal account just sketched of  how thoughts can 
be conscious can be regarded as a simplified version of  an idea 
proposed by Ned Block: namely, that thoughts are conscious in the 
sense of  being “access-conscious”—a kind of  consciousness that is 
not phenomenal. Intuitively expressed, the idea of  access-
consciousness is that some mental states have the property of  being 
accessible to the language module of  the brain or of  being put in use 
to rationally control our behavior. For instance, if  I judge that the 
door is closed, I can verbally report my judgement by uttering the 
sentence, “The door is closed.” Similarly, the mental equivalent of  
this sentence can be used to rationally control my behavior—e.g., to 
launch the intention of  opening the door before going through it. 
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Block’s claim is that these elements, which characterize access 
consciousness—being accessible to the language module of  the brain 
or being put in use to rationally control our behavior—are sufficient 
to capture what we mean when we say that we are the bearers of  
conscious episodes of  thinking.  
 Ned Block’s original formulation of  the distinction is put 
slightly more technically:  
A state is access-conscious… if, in virtue of  one's having the state, a 
representation of  its content is (1) inferentially promiscuous…, that 
is, poised for use as a premise in reasoning, (2) poised for rational 
control of  action, and (3) poised for rational control of  speech… 
These three conditions are together sufficient, but not all necessary. I 
regard (3) as not necessary (and not independent of  the others), 
because I want to allow that non-linguistic animals, for example 
chimps, [access] conscious states. I see [access]-consciousness as a 
cluster concept, in which (3)—roughly, reportability—is the element 
of  the cluster with the smallest weight, though (3) is often the best 
practical guide to [access]-consciousness. (Block 1985: 231) 
If  we come back to the example of  someone trying to fall asleep but 
bothered by a string of  thoughts, the proponent of  the access 
consciousness argument would claim that this person is troubled by 
the fact that some mental states possess a disposition that is 
constantly triggered, somewhat overflowing one’s mind with access-
conscious thoughts. There is no need, hence, to claim that these 
troubling thoughts are phenomenally conscious. They do not 
constitute intentional experiences.  
 There is, however, a major problem with this proposal since, as 
many authors have remarked, an important point about access 
consciousness as conceived by Block is that it is a dispositional 
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property. Indeed, as Block puts it, it is sufficient to be “poised” to be 
access conscious. Being accessed, hence, is not necessary. One might 
wonder, however, how could something be conscious and not 
occurrent? That seems indeed stretching the word “consciousness” 
far beyond its legitimate application. 
 Moreover, in order for this proposal to work, proponents of  
access consciousness should be able to show that access 
consciousness is independent of  phenomenal consciousness, i.e., that 
something can be access-conscious independently of  it being 
phenomenally conscious. According to Block, such a justification can 
be offered by pointing to states that are access conscious but not 
phenomenally conscious. He gives two such examples.  
 He regards the first one as contentious, but it is particularly 
clear. Imagine a robot computationally identical to a human being, 
endowed with a visual apparatus, a silicon brain, and a language 
module. Plausibly, this robot could be access-conscious while failing 
to be phenomenally conscious. According to Block, however, it is 
disputable whether such robots actually are possible, in a strong, 
conceptual, sense of  possibility. He then proposes a less contentious 
example.  
 His second, less problematic, example amounts to the coining 
of  a hypothetical condition called “superblindsight” (Block 1985: 
233). Superblindsight is supposed to be a brain impairment similar to 
blindsight except that subjects can not only guess but also reliably 
know what they are visually in contact with. According to Block, 
patients who suffer from superblindsight are patients for whom it 
makes sense to distinguish between, “just knowing and knowing on the 
basis of  a visual experience” (Block 1985: 233).  
 One might wonder whether there really are such things as 
superblindsighters. We need not, however, worry about this issue, as 
some authors, such as Uriah Kriegel, have localized the weakness of  
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Block’s notion of  access consciousness at some other place. Indeed, 
according to Kriegel, we have strong reasons to deny that access 
consciousness is independent of  phenomenal consciousness. Indeed, 
if  access-consciousness is a dispositional property, then it must have 
a categorical basis. And, according to Kriegel, the best candidate for 
such a basis is phenomenal consciousness. As such, access-
consciousness and phenomenal consciousness might well be 
considered conceptually distinct, but the route for attributing access-
consciousness independently of  phenomenal consciousness is barred. 
As Kriegel puts it, 
When a mental state is access-conscious, it must also have a 
categorical property in virtue of  which it is access-conscious. The state’s 
disposition to be freely used in personal-level cognition cannot be a 
brute matter. There must be an explanation why the state is thus 
poised, an explanation appealing to non-dispositional properties that 
account for the state’s disposition… The reason why a mental state is 
poised for the subject’s free use in personal-level reasoning and 
action control, it is reasonable to suppose, is that the subject is 
already aware of  it. Once the subject is aware of  the state, she can 
freely make use of  it in her deliberate reasoning and action control. 
Thus the state’s free usage to those ends can be explained in terms of  
its subjective character or for-me-ness. (Kriegel 2009: 39)  
What Kriegel refers to as “for-me-ness” is a specific property of  
phenomenal character, that he sees as having two components, a 
qualitative and a subjective one. This distinction, however, does not 
matter much for us here. What matters is the idea that access and 
phenomenal consciousness cannot be strictly independent insofar as, 
according to this weaker interpretation, access consciousness gets 
explained in terms of  some aspects of  phenomenal consciousness. 
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This, however, does not entail that all instances of  phenomenal 
consciousness are instances of  access consciousness. Accordingly, the 
possibility of  these two kinds of  consciousness being conceptually 
independent therefore remains open. 
 To sum up, a first strategy to support the strong objection 
appeals to a distinction between two kinds of  consciousness: a 
phenomenal one and a non-phenomenal one—the latter of  which is 
access consciousness. However, as qualified by Block, access 
consciousness is merely dispositional and there are good reasons to 
believe that its categorical basis is nothing but phenomenal 
consciousness itself. As such, then, the notion of  access 
consciousness does not seem sufficient to explain the fact that there 
are conscious episodes of  thinking.  
4.3 Thoughts and Sensory Phenomenology 
In this section, we shall turn to a second strategy to account for the 
existence of  conscious episodes of  thinking—a strategy reminiscent 
of  Separatism’s treatment of  perceptual experiences discussed above. 
The gist of  this strategy is to clearly separate between the cognitive 
and the phenomenal elements of  a conscious episode of  thinking 
and to claim that the latter elements can be accounted for in terms of  
a sensory phenomenology that accompanies the cognitive elements 
of  the state instead of  being a constitutive element of  it.  
 The dialectic of  this section is slightly different than that of  
the former, and we shall therefore begin by clarifying it. We first 
consider a standard argument in favor of  cognitive phenomenology. 
This argument, as we shall see, takes the form of  an inference to the 
best explanation and concludes that we are committed to cognitive 
phenomenology. We shall then see how one may claim that this 
adbuctive inference is unwarranted as the facts pointed to in the 
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argument by the proponents of  cognitive phenomenology can 
alternatively be explained by appealing to sensory phenomenology 
alone. We then see how the proponents of  cognitive phenomenology 
can react to this objection.  
 4.3.1 The Argument from Phenomenal Contrast 
Most arguments in favor of  cognitive phenomenology take the form 
of  an inference to the best explanation. That is, a certain 
phenomenon is said to routinely occur and it is then claimed that the 
best explanation we possess for the occurrence of  this phenomenon 
is the existence of  cognitive phenomenology. Opponents then 
propose an alternative explanation of  the facts put forward by the 
proponents of  cognitive phenomenology and object to their 
conclusion. The facts that we shall discuss now concern so-called 
phenomenal contrasts. The general idea is the following. Two 
numerically distinct experiences are said to possess different overall 
phenomenal characters. It is then argued that the two experiences 
share the very same sensory phenomenology.  From this it is 
concluded that there must be a non-sensory kind of  phenomenology 
that accounts for their difference in phenomenal character.  
 Galen Strawson proposes a much-discussed argument along 
these lines in his book Mental Reality (Strawson 1994). Imagine two 
persons, Jacques (a monoglot Frenchman) and Jack (a monoglot 
Englishman) listening to the news in French and hearing the 
following sentence: “Bob Dylan a obtenu le Prix Nobel de 
littérature.” According to Strawson, Jacques and Jack undergo 
different experiences. Jacques undergoes an experience as of  
understanding the propositional content that Bob Dylan won the 
Nobel Prize of  literature while John undergoes a mere auditory 
experience as of  listening to a string of  words that he cannot 
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decipher. According to Strawson, however, Jacques and Jack are 
confronted with exactly the same auditory stimulus and then must 
undergo the very same sensory experience. Whatever phenomenal 
difference there is between them must then be accounted for in 
terms of  a non-sensory kind of  phenomenology: a cognitive 
phenomenology. As Strawson puts it,  
It is certainly true that Jacques’s experience when listening to the 
news is very different from Jack’s. And the difference between the 
two can be expressed by saying that Jacques, when exposed to the 
stream of  sound, has what one may perfectly well call “an experience 
(as) of  understanding“ or “an understanding-experience”, while Jack 
does not. Unlike Jack, Jacques automatically and involuntarily takes 
the sounds as signs, and indeed as words and sentences, that he 
automatically and involuntarily understands as expressing certain 
propositions and as representing reality as constituted in certain ways. 
As a result, Jacques’s experience is quite different from Jack’s. And the 
fact that Jacques understands what is said is not only the principal 
explanation of  why this is so, it is also the principal description of  
the respect in which his experience differs from Jack’s. (Strawson 
1994: 5) 
We may rephrase this point in the terminology of  appearances. 
According to Strawson, Jacques and Jack are sensorily appeared to in 
the same way. If  Jacques was able to bracket entirely his 
understanding of  the language in such a way that he was able to pay 
attention only to the physical properties of  the sounds he hears, then 
he would be appeared to in just the same way as Jack. But upon 
hearing the same sounds, Jacques, contrary to Jack, also is appeared 
to cognitively, i.e., as he listen to the news, he is aware of  the sounds 
he hears as having meaning and expressing a proposition. For 
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instance, hearing the sentence, “Bob Dylan a obtenu le Prix Nobel de 
littérature,” makes him cognitively appeared to as if  the proposition 
that Bob Dylan got the Nobel Prize in literature is true.   
 According to the opponents of  cognitive phenomenology, 
however, contrast arguments of  this kind are inconclusive. The fact 
brought to the table—i.e., the experiential difference between Jacques 
and Jack—does not significantly raise the likelihood of  there being 
non-sensory phenomenology. Indeed, according to them, it is 
possible to provide an alternative explanation of  these facts that is 
just as good and that does not appeal to the existence of  cognitive 
phenomenology.  
 Their main argumentative line is that the sensory 
phenomenology of  contrast cases is under-described by proponents 
of  cognitive phenomenology. They claim, for instance, that the claim 
that Jacques and Jack share the same sensory phenomenology is 
unwarranted. Jacques’ understanding of  French, for instance, might 
influence his perception of  the sentence, “Bob Dylan a obtenu le 
Prix Nobel de littérature.” This may occur on two different levels. 
First, his perception of  the sentence might be altered by his 
understanding of  French, e.g., his ability to syntactically parse this 
sentence in the correct way might cause him to undergo a slightly 
different sensory experience. Second, his understanding of  the 
sentence might be the cause of  a change in his overall sensory 
experience: upon understanding that sentence, he might feel joy, or 
deception, or surprise—emotions, that admittedly, have a sensory 
component. According to the opponents of  cognitive 
phenomenology, a combination of  such elements is sufficient to 
explain the experiential difference between Jacques and Jack.  
 An important point in this rejoinder concerns the fact that 
one’s understanding of  a sentence might affect the phenomenal 
character. One might wonder whether this does not already commit 
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us to the recognition of  the existence of  cognitive phenomenology. 
Opponents of  cognitive phenomenology, however, beg to differ. 
They assert that it is one thing to claim that understanding a sentence 
can influence one’s overall phenomenology but that it is an altogether 
different matter to claim that understanding a sentence is a 
constitutive part of  the overall phenomenal character of  a conscious 
episode. One’s conceptual abilities might, for instance, be crucial to 
shaping one’s sensory experience, but this does not yet amount to the 
claim that concepts are phenomenally conscious. On the contrary, we 
might distinguish between the causal and the constitutive 
contribution that concepts make to phenomenal character and the 
opponents might object to the proponents of  cognitive 
phenomenology that what they take to be a constitutive contribution 
is in fact a mere causal one.  
 Carruthers and Veillet write the following about the role that 
concepts play in visual perception: 
… there is every reason to think that concepts do their work in 
perception unconsciously, in interactions with incoming 
nonconceptual representations within the visual system before any 
representations become conscious… So the contribution made by 
concepts to one’s perceptual phenomenology can be merely causal 
even if  there isn’t any time differential discernible within phenomenal 
experience itself. (Carruthers & Veillet 2011: 40) 
The idea of  this passage is the following. It is obvious that the 
phenomenal character of  a visual experience of  watching a bird is 
different before and after learning that this bird is, say, a bluejay. 
Indeed, before acquiring the capacity to visually recognize bluejays, 
one sees a bluejay merely as a bird with beautiful shades of  blue but 
does not see it as a bluejay. Once one has acquired the conceptual 
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ability to apply the concept “bluejay,” however, one may see the exact 
same bird as a bluejay. According to Carruthers and Veillet, however, 
it is a mistake to think this means that, after concept acquisition, a 
new layer of  non-sensory phenomenal character gets added to one’s 
overall phenomenal character, i.e., a bluejay cognitive phenomenology. 
Rather, they claim that the concept “bluejay”, once acquired, interacts 
at a non-conscious level with the sensory manifold of  visual 
experience in such a way that the visual experience is differently 
structured, and hence feels different, before and after acquisition of  
the concept.  
 Carruthers and Veillet speak in the above quote only of  visual 
perception, but they are confident that their model can be extended 
to apply to thoughts as well. In the case of  Jacques and Jack, the 
conceptual abilities Jacques manifests in his understanding of  French 
might be said to non-consciously structure his experience such that 
his sensory experience feels different than Jack’s. In the words of  
Strawson, the opponents can generalize their claim that concepts play 
a merely causal role because, “sub-experiential operation[s] structure 
the form of  our attention in certain ways” (Strawson 2011: 302). 
 Let us take stock. In light of  these remarks, it appears that 
phenomenal contrast arguments such as that offered above by 
Strawson are not strong enough to place the burden of  proof  on the 
shoulders of  the opponents of  cognitive phenomenology. Indeed, it 
does not seem that the elements pointed by Strawson alone are 
strong enough to significantly raise the likelihood of  there being 
cognitive phenomenology. We must then dig deeper to reach our aim 
and turn to better arguments in favor of  cognitive phenomenology in 
the currently booming literature on the subject. We shall now turn to 
two such arguments: one by Uriah Kriegel and one by Galen 
Strawson.  
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 As we shall see, the two arguments use different strategies. 
Kriegel’s strategy might reasonably be called an isolation strategy, as 
he mounts a hypothetical case of  phenomenal contrast that aims to 
isolate the contribution of  cognitive phenomenology from sensory 
inputs. Strawson’s strategy, on the other hand, might rather be called a 
sufficiency strategy. That is, he provides phenomenological 
descriptions of  cognitive experiences that have a level of  detail so 
overwhelming that the sensory strategy clearly appears to be 
insufficient. We present each strategy in turn.  
 4.3.2 Kriegel’s Isolation Strategy 
In his recent book, The Varieties of  Consciousness, Uriah Kriegel 
(Kriegel 2015) proposes a thought experiment aimed to isolate the 
contribution cognitive phenomenology adduces to the mental life of  
a hypothetical subject. The argument starts with the following 
characterization of  phenomenal properties: 
For any mental property F, F is a phenomenal property iff  there is a 
rationally warranted appearance (to a sufficiently reflective but 
otherwise normal actual subject) of  a distinctive (e.g., empirical and 
nonderivative) explanatory gap between F and physical properties. 
(Kriegel 2015: 53) 
Let us unpack this bi-conditional a bit. It is generally admitted that 
the existence of  conscious phenomena raises concerns for 
physicalism, giving rise to what Kriegel calls a certain, “distinctively 
philosophical anxiety” (Kriegel 2015: 48). The case is well-known: we 
have trouble understanding how something like phenomenal 
consciousness could be explained within the boundaries of  a 
physicalist theory. Pain does not seem to be reducible to a 
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functionalist analysis because, even though we may distinguish input 
conditions and behavioral outputs characteristic of  pain, what 
constitutes the nature of  pain—its being painful—eludes such a 
functional characterization. Similarly, how the painful character of  
pain could emerge from the agitation of  some neurons is a fact that 
we simply cannot wrap our minds around. This mysterious character 
of  consciousness can be best captured by imagining an ideal reasoner 
who knows all the physical facts and all the phenomenal facts. Who is 
then able to understand how the latter can be explained in terms of  
the former? Admittedly, there is something here that simply seems to 
elude even the most complete understanding. This creates what Joe 
Levine has famously called an “explanatory gap.” (Levine 1983) .  6
 According to Kriegel, we may distinguish between two main 
kinds of  reactions to the mention of  such an explanatory gap 
between the physical facts and phenomenal ones. One can either 
dismiss the notion as unwarranted—as, say, the prejudice of  a certain 
philosophical tradition or a social construct or whatever. 
Alternatively, one can recognize it as rationally warranted, while duly 
noting that this does not entail the further step of  accepting that 
there is indeed a gap in reality between physical and conscious facts. 
 Note that if  the coining of  the concept of  “explanatory gap” is rather recent, 6
the fundamental idea is already to be found in the writings of  William James 
more than a century ago, as he writes: “According to the assumptions of  this 
book, thoughts accompany the brain’s workings, and those thoughts are 
cognitive of  realities. The whole relation is one in which we can only write down 
empirically, confessing that no glimpse of  an explanation of  it is yet in sight. 
That brains should give rise to a knowing consciousness at all, this is the one 
mystery which returns, no matter of  what sort the consciousness and and of  
what sort the knowledge may be. Sensations, aware of  mere qualities, involve the 
mystery as much as thoughts, aware of  complex system, involve it.” (James 
quoted in Kim 2006: 221)
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Kriegel assumes that the explanatory gap of  phenomenal 
consciousness is rationally warranted.  
 Second, an explanatory gap can either be derivative or non-
derivative. As an example of  a derivative explanatory gap, Kriegel 
mentions the problem of  free will. Phyiscalism is incompatible with 
free will but it clashes with the best evidence we have for 
libertarianism, namely experiences as of  acting freely. There is then 
an explanatory gap between physicalism and free will. According to 
Kriegel, however, in such a case the existence of  an explanatory is 
merely derivative on the existence of  consciousness. The existence of  
consciousness itself, on the other hand, creates a non-derivative 
explanatory gap. 
 Third, the explanatory gap of  consciousness is an empirical 
one, i.e., it concerns what we may call the concrete fabric of  the 
world. It is an explanatory gap about properties and states of  
concrete entities: us. As such, it can be distinguished from other 
explanatory gaps, such as that between the physical and the 
normative, as the normative does not seem to be a feature of  the 
physical but, in Kriegel words, of  something that lies “beyond 
it” (Kriegel 2015: 51).  
 His characterization of  phenomenal properties in place, 
Kriegel mounts a thought experiment that aims to make explicit that 
there is a rationally warranted appearance of  a distinctive non-
derivative explanatory gap between cognitive phenomenal properties 
and physical facts. The thought experiment comes in two parts. In the 
first part, we are asked to imagine a series of  partial zombies, i.e., 
subjects that lack some particular phenomenology. We are asked to 
imagine different kinds of  perceptual zombies—e.g., visual or 
auditory—who lack the distinctive phenomenology of  the perceptual 
modality at stake in each case, while still conserving the ability to 
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track information about their environment. These zombies can, 
mutatis mutandis, be modeled on actual cases of  blindsight.  
 Second, we are asked to imagine a different kind of  partial 
zombie: namely, an algedonic one—i.e., a subject that lacks any kind 
of  phenomenology associated with pleasure and pain. Here again we 
possess an empirical case upon which imagination can get its grip: 
namely, congenital analgesia, a condition that is characterized by a 
congenital incapacity to feel pain. The case can then imaginatively be 
extended to pleasure.  
 Third, we are asked to imagine an emotional zombie: that is, a 
subject who lacks any kind of  phenomenology characteristic of  
emotional episodes such as fear, anger, or love. Extreme forms of  
autism can serve here as the imaginative basis for such a zombie. As 
Kriegel points out, some people who suffer from autism report 
experiencing only a restricted set of  emotions. We can then extend 
the case to a subject who is congenitally lacking in any kind of  
emotion.  
 These different kinds of  partial zombies are supposed to cover 
the full extent of  sensory phenomenology: perceptual, algedonic, and 
emotional phenomenology. On the basis of  the imagination of  these 
three partial zombies, Kriegel then asks us to operate an imaginative 
synthesis of  all these different partial zombies to imagine a sensory 
zombie, i.e., a subject who would lack all kinds of  sensory 
phenomenology. As he puts it, 
Having now conceived in separation partial zombies with sensory, 
algedonic, and emotional deficits, or rather lacunas, we may perform 
another act of  imaginative synthesis and envisage a person lacking all 
these phenomenologies at once. This person enjoys no sensory 
phenomenology, no algedonic phenomenology, and no emotional 
phenomenology. (Kriegel 2015: 55) 
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Zoe is the name of  the subject who gets imagined as the result of  
this imaginative synthesis. Kriegel then goes on to fill up some crucial 
details about her. In particular, she is a mathematical genius who 
spends her days trying to prove mathematical propositions from a 
given set of  axioms. The substantial question about Zoe is this: How 
should we describe her mental life? 
 According to Kriegel, despite the fact that Zoe lacks any kind 
of  sensory phenomenology, we should still be able to say things 
about her:  
Often she struggles to find the solution of  some problem—she feels 
stuck, if  you will. But sometimes a nice thing happens next: suddenly 
“the coin drops” and she can see, so to speak, how the solution must 
go. Often on those occasions, a sudden intellectual gestalt shift 
makes Zoe realize what the missing element is, which results in a sort 
of  affectively neutral upheaval of  thought – a greater vivacity in her 
thinking. These victorious moments are very distinctive, and Zoe 
remembers many of  them. Thus Zoe’s mental life has its own inner 
rhythm, with new beginnings, stretches of  inner flow, slowed down 
by occasional struggling and feeling stuck, often eventually punctured 
by breakthroughs of  sudden insight and then starting over with a 
new mathematical problem. At the same time, this life is exhausted 
by intellectual or cognitive activities: thinking, considering, judging, 
realizing, intuiting, remembering, and so on. Importantly, they do not 
involve phenomenal experiences of  satisfaction or frustration, 
though some underlying satisfaction- and frustration-characteristic 
processing does take place. (Kriegel 2015: 56) 
The point of  this description of  Zoe’s mental life is to show that, 
though she entirely lacks any kind of  sensory phenomenology, we 
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can still imagine her undergoing phenomenal changes. Her mental life 
might be greatly impoverished in comparison to that of  normal 
subjects, but she still undergoes phenomenal episodes, though not of  
a sensory kind. As Kriegel puts it, her mental life possesses its “own 
inner rhythm”, as there are moments when she feels (non-sensorily) 
stuck and moments when there is a breakthrough as, for instance, 
when she realizes what should be her next inferential move in a 
certain proof. And since, by stipulation, she does not undergo any 
kind of  sensory experiences, these experiences must be ones with a 
proprietary, non-sensory kind of  phenomenology.  
 In other words, Kriegel’s claim is that even if  there is no room 
in such a scenario for a rationally warranted appearance of  an 
explanatory gap between some sensory phenomenal state and some 
physical state, there is room for a rationally warranted appearance of  
an explanatory gap between a cognitive phenomenal state and some 
physical state. Indeed, how could we make sense of  the kind of  
experiential breakthroughs just mentioned that Zoe sometimes goes 
through solely in terms of  some neurons firing in her brains? There 
is here, as in the standard cases of  instances of  sensory 
phenomenology, an explanatory gap as to how the former could be 
nothing more than the latter. As Kriegel puts it, 
Having imagined Zoe’s mental life, we may ask ourselves whether 
there is a rational appearance of  the right explanatory gap for it. It 
seems that there obviously is. Consider an episode of  sudden 
realization of  how a proof  must go. It is entirely natural to be deeply 
puzzled about how this episode could just be nothing but the 
vibration of  so many neurons inside the darkness of  the skull. 
(Kriegel 2015: 58) 
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This argument is, of  course, not without difficulties. In particular, 
one may well doubt whether a subject like Zoe is really conceivable. 
Issues about conceivability are, of  course, very complex and we 
cannot enter here into a discussion of  modal epistemology. We may, 
however, mention two points. The first is that Zoe does not seem to 
constitute a logical impossibility. That is, one may agree that Zoe’s 
case is difficult to imagine, but its conception does not seem to 
infringe any logical laws. The second point is that Zoe’s argument 
seems to sensibly shift the burden of  proof  to the shoulders of  the 
opponents of  cognitive phenomenology. Indeed, they must now 
provide us with a good explanation of  why a case such as Zoe’s 
should be metaphysically impossible. As such, then, we can conclude 
that Kriegel’s Zoe argument is successful for the general aim pursued 
in this chapter.  
 4.3.3 Strawson’s Sufficiency Strategy 
Let us now turn to Strawson’s stronger argument. It starts with the 
simple observation that thoughts are often “extraordinarily 
interesting” (Strawson 2011: 299). Strawson, however, puts a specific 
gloss on this claim, i.e., one experiences some thoughts as more or less 
interesting. The thought that one should always wear black socks, for 
instance, is experienced as completely dull. The thought that drugs—
in particular meta-amphetamines—played an important and often 
overlooked role in the acts of  barbarism committed by the Waffen SS 
in the Second World War is interesting. The first example does not 
sharpen our attention, and we quickly move on to other matters after 
having grasped its content. The latter example, on the other hand, 
strikes us an intrinsically interesting and important; it challenges our 
understanding of  what happened during the Second World War and 
of  the conditions that made such horrendous and despicable events 
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possible such that, having grasped its propositional content, we 
become focussed on it, on its plausibility, importance, and 
consequences, and quickly get lost in the intrinsic interestingness of  
such an episode of  thinking, pondering over it for long minutes.  
 This is not a wild assertion or a stipulation. This simply is a 
plain fact about the way we experience our life as thinking creatures. 
According to Strawson, it can be used to mount a challenge for the 
opponent to cognitive phenomenology. Indeed, according to these 
opponents, the claim that some thoughts are experienced as 
extraordinarily interesting must be explained in terms that appeal to 
sensory phenomenal features alone. As Strawson puts it, 
If  one wants to give anything like a full account of  the experiential or 
lived character of  our experience in merely sense/feeling terms, one 
has to be able to be able to explain, in those terms alone, how the 
experience of  looking at a piece of  paper with a few marks on it, or 
of  hearing  three small sounds, can male someone collapse in dead 
faint. (Strawson 2011: 299) 
According to Strawson, however, such a project cannot be successful. 
It can be demonstrated that any kind of  sensory phenomenology will 
always fall short of  being sufficient to account for the fact that 
thoughts are often experienced as interesting. Cognitive 
phenomenology must be taken on board to explain this fact. Here is 
why.  
 Let us admit for the sake of  argument that the opponent’s 
view is correct: all phenomenology, including that of  finding a certain 
thought interesting, is sensory phenomenology. How should one then 
describe a specific instance of  finding a thought interesting? 
Presumably, one non-consciously understands the content of  a 
certain thought and, soon afterward, tokens a certain feeling of  
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interest. The content of  the thought, presumably, causes the feeling 
of  interest but is not constitutive of  it. The content is not 
phenomenally conscious; the feeling it causes is. 
 Sensory phenomenal characters are standardly rather rich. In 
the realm of  the phenomenal character of  colors, for instance, we 
can unproblematically distinguish a certain determinable-determinate 
structure in which the most general determinable might be 
“phenomenal character of  color” and from which we can then 
distinguish a huge variety of  determinates such as, e.g., “phenomenal 
red,” “phenomenal blue,” or “phenomenal indigo.” This accounts for 
the important variety of  color experiences we can undergo. And, 
moreover, the explanation of  why there is such a variety of  color 
experiences is an easy one: the grounds of  their distinctions are 
sensory ones. Indigo is sensorily different from purple red, and this 
explains their experiential difference.  
 The case of  the sensory feeling of  interest, on the other hand, 
must be different. On the one hand, it might also have some second-
order properties. It could, for instance, be more or less intense and 
this, presumably, would explain the difference between the fact that 
some thoughts are experienced as interesting and some as 
extraordinarily interesting. It could also be more or less central to 
one’s particular episode. For instance, one might be thinking about 
contemporary Russia while eating a cheese fondue and have one’s 
overall phenomenal experience be centrally focused on the wonderful 
taste of  the cheese and more peripherally centered on the content of  
one’s thoughts. On the other hand, however, the feeling of  interest 
would be dramatically poor in comparison with other sensory 
phenomenal characteristics. Indeed, that feeling is bound to remain 
“generic” or “monotonic” (Strawson 2011: 300) because we cannot 
distinguish such a rich structure in its sensory basis, i.e., either marks 
on papers or sounds.  
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 The problem for such a feeling of  interest, however, is that 
there is a huge variety in how we experience our thoughts as 
interesting. Our cognitive life does not amount to a graph where a 
curve of  generic interest goes up and down as our mind processes 
different kinds of  non-conscious thoughts. On the contrary, we 
experience our thoughts as interesting in a huge variety of  ways.  
 Now, truly enough, we could distinguish between different ways 
for thoughts to be interesting and individuate this feeling of  interest 
more finely.  This, however, could be done only by appealing to the 
content of  thoughts as being constitutive of  their phenomenal 
character—and this simply amounts to a recognition of  cognitive 
phenomenology. In sum, then, we can conclude that sensory 
phenomenology is not sufficient to account for the fact that some 
thoughts are extraordinarily interesting.  
5. Intermediate Conclusion 
The main aim of  the first part of  this chapter was to introduce the 
idea that a theory of  intentionality should be a theory of  intentional 
experiences. We proceeded in three steps. First, we made an intuitive 
case for the claim, trying to highlight the fact that there is an 
important different between two kinds of  representations: those that 
are conscious and those that are not. This difference was claimed to 
be important enough to provide us with a rationale for reserving the 
word intentionality for this sub-kind of  representations that are 
conscious. Conscious representations are appearances, both of  a 
sensory and of  a cognitive kind, and this sets them apart from non-
conscious ones. We might then reserve the word intentionality for a 
theory of  intentional experiences.  
 Second, we considered a general, strong, objection against this 
fundamental claim. The gist of  the objection is that the phenomenal 
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cannot be intentional and, hence, that there cannot be intentional 
experiences of  any kind whatsoever. We then presented an argument by 
Charles Siewert against this claim and concluded that this objection is 
inconclusive.  
 Third, we considered a less general, weaker, objection against 
our fundamental claim. The gist of  this objection is that there cannot 
be intentional experiences of  a cognitive kind. We considered three 
rejoinders to this objection. The first one is a simple phenomenal-
contrast argument. We determined that it is likely to be too weak for 
our aim. We then turned to two recent arguments and concluded that 
they are strong enough to place the burden on the shoulders of  the 
opponent to cognitive phenomenology.  
 From this we can conclude the following. The claim that a 
theory of  intentionality should be a theory of  intentional experiences 
requires that there are intentional experiences of  both a sensory and 
a cognitive kind. As such, it is a rather strong claim. As we saw, 
however, there is much in its favor. In any case, the above pages 
should have been sufficient to put the burden of  proof  on the 
shoulders of  those who would deny that this is what a theory of  
intentionality should be about. 
 In the next section, we turn to another topic: granted that a 
theory of  intentionality should be a theory of  intentional experiences, 
what general shape should a theory of  intentionality take? We argue 
that it should aim at the interpretation of  a general intentional 
schema that characterizes all intentional experiences. This 
interpretation, moreover, must be such that it accommodates six 
main features of  intentionality.  
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6. Intentionality and the Fundamental Intentional Schema  
As we learned from the first part of  this chapter, a theory of  
intentionality should be conceived as a theory of  intentional 
experiences. The question we shall now tackle is how to conceive of  
the problem of  intentionality when intentionality is conceived as 
essentially an experiential matter.  
 The plan of  the section is the following. In a first sub-section, 
we distinguish between two levels at which one can pursue the 
discussion over a theory of  intentionality—a constitutive and an 
engineering level—and make clear that we shall position ourselves at 
the constitutive one. A second sub-section introduces what we call 
the fundamental intentional schema (FIS). Its aim is to capture the 
greatest common factor in all kinds of  intentional experience. We 
then introduce the idea that a theory of  intentionality qua theory of  
intentional experiences should aim to provide an interpretation of  
this schema. In a third sub-section, finally, we discuss six properties 
of  intentional states that an adequate interpretation of  the FIS 
should be able to account for.  
6.1 Engineering vs Constitutive Levels 
A theory of  intentionality can be pursued at two different levels: a 
“constitutive” level, on the one hand, and an “engineering” level, on 
the other—to use labels proposed by Michael Luntley (Luntley 1999: 
7–8). The constitutive level can be characterized  as a theory of  
intentional experiences as such. That is, it is an account of  how we 
should describe them, of  the minimal set of  concepts required to 
describe them, and of  the different relations that exist between these 
concepts. It is, then, a blend of  phenomenological and conceptual 
reflections.   
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 The engineering level is rather different. Indeed, once the 
constitutive task has been completed, one might well wonder how a 
theory of  intentionality as characterized at the constitutive level is 
engineered, i.e., how a subject that has a body and a mind ends up 
being an intentional subject? In recent history of  philosophy, the 
engineering level has essentially been identified with the task of  
providing a naturalistic account of  intentionality, i.e., an account of  
how the fundamental concepts of  intentionality can be implemented 
within the causal order of  the world. The account inspired by 
Dretske, which we glossed over at the beginning of  this chapter, 
constitutes, among other candidates, an attempt to flawlessly integrate 
intentionality within the causal order.  
 This dissertation, however, is concerned only with the 
constitutive level. The main reason is the following. There is no good 
reason to get into the engineering task before one has a good grasp 
of  the constitutive task. And, as we shall see, there are reasons to 
think that we have not yet reached a sufficient understanding of  it. 
This fact shall enjoin us to formulate a principle that presides over 
the relation between the constitutive task and the engineering task. 
We shall call it, in a distinctly Helvetic fashion, the Principle of  One-
Sided Neutrality. The gist of  this principle is that we should refrain 
from importing considerations that pertain to the engineering task 
within the constitutive task. In other words, we should not make the 
constitutive shape of  a theory of  intentionality such that it makes the 
completion of  the engineering task easier to complete.  
 There are two related reasons that speak in favor of  the 
endorsement of  this principle. First, it is a sound policy to wait until 
the constitutive task has been fully completed before we turn to the 
engineering task. Second, it is already to presuppose much about the 
nature of  intentionality to claim that the engineering task can be 
completed in a way that would suit the taste of  contemporary 
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naturalism. It is not, however, that we oppose contemporary 
naturalism. It is, rather, that we take it to be wiser to complete the 
constitutive task in a way that remains neutral with respect to the 
general issue of  whether intentionality is a naturalizable 
phenomenon.   
 In the next sub-section, we turn to consider what we take 
should be the core of  a constitutive theory of  intentionality qua 
theory of  intentional experiences, what we call the Fundamental 
Intentional Schema.  
6.2 The Fundamental Schema 
From where should we start our inquiry into the constitutive nature 
of  intentionality? We suggest that our starting point should be with 
what we call the Fundamental Intentional Schema (FIS). What do we 
mean by this? We mean that, at an acceptable level of  generality, we 
can group together all instances of  intentionality as instances of  a 
single, fundamental, schema, and that to give a philosophical theory 
of  intentionality is essentially to understand the philosophical 
intricacies that lie behind this schema. Let us unpack these two 
claims.  
 The fundamental schema is the admittedly not very impressive 
following one: 
 Fundamental Intentional Schema (FIS): x is about y.  
To begin with, this schema is a schema and, as such, it is not 
supposed to mean anything on its own. Rather, it is taken to be an 
abstraction of  instances of  intentionality that aims to capture what 
they all have in common at a fundamental level. How do we arrive at 
it? Well, is it not an obvious, phenomenologically accessible fact that 
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all intentional experiences are about something? Is it not an obvious 
fact that they all have what Tim Crane calls, “an object… a subject 
matter… a topic” (Crane 2013: 7)? Intentional experiences are 
essentially those experiences through which we take a perspective on 
the world—i.e., through which we think, judge, perceive, and so on. 
All these experiences are about something—this is what they all have 
in common, their most fundamental commonality.  
 This fact, one might observe, is directly reflected in the surface 
grammar of  intentional sentences such as, “I am thinking about 
Obama”. That said, one might also observe that not all intentional 
sentences do share such a surface grammar. Indeed, a great deal of  
intentional states are described by means of  sentences formed out of  
a that-clause, such as, “I resent the fact that Obama will soon be out 
of  office”. Grammar, however, is not the judge we must resort to. 
Indeed, despite the fact that a sentence like the latter does not feature 
a surface grammar that directly mirrors the fundamental intentional 
schema, there is no reason to doubt that intentional states reported 
by such sentences can also be taken as instances of  the fundamental 
schema, for it is clear that the thought that Obama will soon be gone 
is about something: it has a subject matter or a topic. Hence, there is 
little doubt that it is an instance of  something that is about 
something else. What exactly is it about, one might ask? Obama, or 
the fact that Obama will soon be out of  office are the answers that 
come to mind. Nevertheless, we shall have to wait until Chapter 2 
and the clarification of  the notion of  intentional object to answer this 
question in a satisfactory manner.  
 At this point, one might wonder why it is precisely this schema 
that we take as fundamental or, alternatively, why we choose to 
formulate it in these terms. Why not choose an alternative 
formulation, such as, e.g., “x is presented with y”? As we see the 
matter, the FIS is formulated in these terms to assure us a maximal 
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level of  generality. Indeed, some philosophers distinguish between 
kinds of  intentional states such as, for instance, presentations and 
representations. Everyone should agree, however, that all kinds of  
intentional states have something in common. Our suggestion is that 
they all are instances of  the FIS.   
 The fundamental intentional schema looks deceptively simple. 
This surface simplicity, however, hides the philosophical perplexities 
it contains. The FIS might reveal something about the fundamental 
nature of  intentionality, but it certainly does not exhaust it. 
Endorsement of  the FIS is not endorsement of  a theory of  
intentionality. It is, rather, endorsement of  intentionality qua 
philosophical problem. The task of  a theory of  intentionality should 
hence be to understand what exactly it means for an intentional 
experience to be about something and what the conceptual 
commitments that applications of  the FIS carry with them are, either 
explicitly or implicitly. The rest of  this chapter points to what we take 
to be six main features of  intentionality. 
6.3 Six Main Features of  Intentionality 
The following six features quickly emerge from reflection on the 
fundamental intentional schema and its different instances. The claim, 
however, is neither that these six features exhaust the constitutive 
nature of  intentionality nor that all instances of  intentionality 
instantiate all of  them. It is, rather, that a theory of  intentionality that 
fails to adequately capture all of  them will turn out to be inadequate. 
The constitutive task of  a theory of  intentionality can then be 
understood as the task of  providing a philosophical interpretation of  
the FIS such that it can account for these six main features.  
 As we shall see, however, different theories of  intentionality 
might account for these features in different ways. Some features 
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might be accounted for merely derivatively—that is, as following 
from some more basic features of  intentionality. Some other features, 
on the other hand, might be considered fundamental. In introducing 
the features, however, we make no claim as to their derivative or non-
derivative nature. These issues shall be addressed in the next chapters.  
 6.3.1 Aboutness 
The first of  these features we shall call “aboutness”. It concerns what 
we may call the essence of  intentionality: namely, the fact that 
intentional states are about things. One’s belief  that Francis is a 
sheep, for instance, is a belief  that is about Francis. This seems easy 
enough, but, as we shall see in later chapters, there is a great deal of  
room for philosophical hair-splitting as to what we mean exactly by 
“being about something.”  
 At this point, however, we shall merely point to the 
strangeness of  aboutness itself. Let us call the instantiation of  a 
property by something a state. Some states, however, are more 
puzzling than others, and intentional states—namely, the 
instantiation by an intentional being of  intentional properties—have 
a quite unique and fantastic feature: they are not only constituents of  
the world but are also about it. This makes intentional states quite a 
fascinating topic. What, exactly, separates them from the rest of  the 
non-intentional states? What are their most fundamental features? 
These are some of  the fundamental questions raised by the existence 
of  aboutness as the central feature of  intentional state.  
 The pervasiveness of  the slogan, “intentionality is aboutness,” 
is in this respect deceitful. Indeed, to claim that intentionality is 
aboutness merely amounts to naming the problem. What must be 
understood is the meaning of  the little word about, and, consequently, 
what exactly it means for an intentional experience to be about 
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something. In this sense, the claim that all instances of  intentionality 
are instances of  the FIS is not an explanation of  intentionality. It 
merely points to what must be explained. And aboutness is the most 
fundamental of  all the features of  intentionality that must be 
accounted for.  
 6.3.2 Aspectuality 
Imagine you are standing in front of  a statue in a museum. Eyes 
opened, you are enjoying a visual experience as of  being presented 
with that statue. Note, however, that though you enjoy a visual 
experience as of  being presented with a three-dimensional object, 
you do not have visual access to the object in its entirety. Rather, you 
have visual access only to those aspects of  the statue that are present 
in your perceptual field. The back of  the statue, for instance, remains 
hidden to your senses.  
 This simple example illustrates the following idea: sensory 
access to an object by means of  perceptual intentionality is always 
access to aspects of  an object and never to an object in its entirety. 
Perceptual intentionality, in other words, always occurs from a certain 
point of  view: namely, the point of  view, to be characterized 
spatiotemporally, that your eyes occupy at a given time. That 
perceptual intentionality always occurs from a certain point of  view 
and that what can be experienced from that point of  view always 
depends on that point of  view is an instance of  what we shall call 
aspectuality.  
 Aspectuality, however, though it is probably most easily 
exemplified in the case of  perception, is not unique to perceptual 
intentionality. It is, rather, a feature that pervades all instances of  
intentionality. Take the following simple example: John believes that 
Phosphorus is a star. This belief  is about something, namely 
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Phosphorus. Now, as a matter of  facts, Phosphorus and Hesperus 
are one and the same thing. Does this entail that John also believes 
that Hesperus is a star? No, granted that John is ignorant of  the fact 
that Hesperus and Phosphorus are one and the same thing, there is 
no inference that goes from one belief  to the other.  
 What is this example supposed to show? Since Phosphorus 
and Hesperus are one and the same thing, then if  John’s belief  is 
about Phosphorus it should be also about Hesperus. But the fact that 
the above-mentioned inference does not go through speaks against 
this claim. In fact, what the failure of  this inference shows us is that 
John’s belief  is not about Phosphorus simpliciter. It is about 
Phosphorus qua Phosphorus and, for instance, not about 
Phosphorus qua Hesperus. That is, John’s belief  about Phosphorus 
indeed is about Phosphorus, but it is about it only under a certain 
aspect: what we may call the “Phosphorus” aspect, to the exclusion 
of  other aspects, such as, for instance the “Hesperus” aspect.  
 The situation here seems to be completely parallel to the 
perceptual case. When one thinks about something, one must be 
bound to think about that thing only under a certain aspect, e.g., as 
Phosphorus or as Hesperus. We cannot, of  course, speak here of  
points of  view in the literal sense used in the perceptual case. That 
one is able to think about something only under a certain aspect is 
hence not always to be understood as a function of  one’s location in 
space and time. The idea, rather, is that just as there are physical 
points of  view, there also are purely mental points of  view from 
which one directs thoughts at the world.  
 With the introduction of  aspectuality we introduce a particular 
kind of  problem for the FIS. Indeed, aspectuality, unlike aboutness, 
cannot be read off  the FIS. Rather, it surfaces upon analysis of  
instances of  it. This speaks in favor of  the FIS needing unfolding, or 
interpretation, to get a fuller understanding of  intentionality. What, in 
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the light of  aspectuality, this unfolding should look like is a task for a 
constitutive account of  intentionality. 
 6.3.3 Semantic Normativity 
Intentional states can be said to be normative in more than one sense. 
There are, for instance, normative relations that obtain between 
intentional states. A perceptual state as of  being presented with a 
tennis ball, for instance, might be said to stand in a certain normative 
relation with the belief  that there is a tennis ball in one’s vicinity. The 
relation is normative in the sense that the latter provides a reason for 
the former. This, however, is not the sense of  intentional states being 
normative that we are interested in.  
 The kind of  normativity of  intentional states that interests us 
is more basic. We are interested merely in the idea that some 
intentional states can be evaluated semantically. The notion of  
semantic evaluation is here to be understood as an umbrella term that 
covers several criteria of  evaluation that correspond to several kinds 
of  intentional states.  
 Judgments, for instance, are commonly said to aim at truth. To 
judge that p is to judge that p is true. As such, then, a judgment that p 
can be semantically evaluated as true or false. If  p is true, then one’s 
judgment that p is true, and otherwise false. Desires, on the other 
hand, are commonly said to aim at satisfaction. To desire that p is to 
desire that p be satisfied. If  p is satisfied, then one’s desire is satisfied, 
and otherwise dissatisfied. Truth and satisfaction, hence, are two 
instances of  the kinds of  semantic norms that can be applied to 
instances of  intentionality.  
 That said, not all instances of  intentionality seem to be 
semantically evaluable. Merely thinking about Obama, for instance, is 
not semantically evaluable insofar as there is no room for something 
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to go wrong in one’s thinking about Obama. Accordingly, semantic 
normativity is a central feature of  intentionality, common to most, 
but not all instances of  intentionality.  
 Now, once again, semantic normativity is not a feature of  
intentionality that can simply be read off  the FIS. It is a feature that 
we discover as we analyze instances of  intentionality. It is also a 
feature that makes intentionality even more mysterious. Indeed, 
where does this normativity come from? Is it a fundamental feature 
of  intentionality? And what relation does it share with the other 
features of  intentionality? These, again, are questions for a 
constitutive theory of  intentionality.  
 6.3.4 Intentional Identity 
Limit cases set aside, the domain of  what we can bear intentional 
states about is a domain of  shared things. In other words, we can 
generally think about the same things. If  John thinks about Obama 
and Sam thinks about Obama, then both think about the same 
person. This is the feature we shall call intentional identity.  
 Identity, however, is a complex word. John and Sam, for 
instance, drive identical cars. However, we do not mean by this that 
they share a numerically identical car. We mean, rather, that they each 
possess a distinct token of  a same type of  car. In other words, their 
cars are not numerically but qualitatively identical. What about 
thoughts? In the case of  thoughts, the two notions of  identity seem 
to apply. If  both John and Sam think about Obama as Obama, then it 
seem that they both token a thought of  a same type: an Obama-
thought that is about the same person, namely Obama. Which sense 
of  identity is the one at play in “intentional identity”? 
 The answer to this question is, as we shall see later, not neutral. 
What seems to be intuitive enough, however, is that there is one 
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sense of  intentional identity that is non-negotiable. It is the one that 
we at least sometimes think about numerically identical things. If  both 
John and Sam think about Obama, then they are thinking about a 
numerically identical person. Numerical intentional identity is a non-
negotiable feature of  intentionality. If  we lose it, we face solipsism: a 
view that no sane philosopher would willingly endorse.  
 The problem with numerical intentional identity is how far it 
can be stretched. As we shall see, when combined with some further 
features of  intentionality, the idea that we can think about 
numerically identical things is an idea that we might have to give up at 
least in some cases. 
 6.3.5 Generality 
The second variable of  the fundamental intentional schema, “x is 
about y,” can sometimes be filled up by an indefinite noun phrase, as 
in the sentence, “I desire a beer.” To desire something certainly is an 
instance of  intentionality: to desire something is to hold a desire 
about something. Quite strangely, however, it may be that something 
one is intentionally directed upon is nothing in particular: one does 
not desire any particular beer but just a beer, whichever beer it is. 
This is the penultimate feature we shall be concerned with: generality.  
 To get the gist of  generality, compare instances of  the 
fundamental intentional schema with other schemas, such as, for 
instance, “x shakes hands with y.” As it appears, it is impossible for 
this schema to have instances in which one is shaking hands with no 
one in particular. Of  course, one may say, “John is shaking hands 
with a man,” but in this context the indefinite noun phrase, a man, 
works as a referential expression that indicates that the identity of  the 
man with whom John shakes hands is either unknown or irrelevant. 
This, however, is not equivalent to the claim that John is not shaking 
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hands with no one in particular. Whenever a hand is shaken, it is a 
particular hand of  a particular person that gets the shake. The 
intentional schema, hence, seems to possess instances that set it apart 
from different, though very similar, ones.  
 This raises some important and puzzling questions about the 
metaphysical nature of  what lies behind the fundamental intentional 
schema. On the one hand, “x is about y” looks very much like, say, “x 
is shaking hands with y”. On the other hand, there are ways to satisfy 
the fundamental intentional schema that are ruled out for similar, 
though non-intentional, schemas. This is likely to leave one 
wondering about the metaphysics of  what lies behind the 
fundamental intentional schema. How exactly we should then 
interpret the fundamental intentional schema so that it can account 
for generality without losing sight of  what makes instances of  the 
FIS that instantiate generality intentional is a further desideratum for 
a constitutive account of  intentionality. 
 6.3.6 Non-Existence 
The last major feature of  intentionality we shall be concerned with, 
non-existence, is probably the one that has been the most discussed 
by theorists of  intentionality. Indeed, independently of  one’s 
theoretical outlook on intentionality, non-existence constitutes a 
puzzling phenomenon.  
 The problem can be formulated as follows. Intentionality as 
characterized by the fundamental intentional schema naturally seems 
to be a relation: One thinks about something, one shakes hands with 
someone—both things seem to be instances of  a relational schema. 
Moreover, it seems more than plausible that a relation, like any 
predication, either monadic or polyadic, is a determination of  what 
exists. That my desk is white is a determination of  my desk, which 
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exists or has being. Shaking hands, similarly, is a determination of  
that portion of  reality composed of  a pair of  human beings that 
exist. And, following Malebranche, where there is no desk or no 
human being, there cannot be any such determinations: “nothingness 
has no properties” (Malebranche 1997: 10). Hence if  intentionality is 
a relation, then, mutatis mutandis, the same should be also true of  
intentionality.  
 At this point, however, things start to go askew. What seems to 
be true of  desks and hands shaking does not mesh well with what we 
would like to say about intentionality. Indeed, about the claim that 
intentionality is a relation—understood as a determination of  reality 
or of  what exists—Michael Dummett writes the following in the 
French edition of  his book, The Origins of  Analytic Philosophy:  
This brings up the evident objection that a genuine mental act could 
exist even without any object in reality: I can fear, or rejoice of, 
something purely, and, in particular, I can be the victim of  a 
hallucination or any other sensory illusion. All these examples, 
however, keep the characteristic of  intentionality, because a 
perceptual or auditory illusion does not consist in seeing or hearing 
without seeing or hearing anything. To possess this characteristic, it is 
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to be directed upon an object; but, by hypothesis, in that case, there 
is no object. (Dummett 1991: 47—own translation from the French)   7
The idea is the following: Intentionality has many features that makes 
it look like it is a relation. This claim, however, must face the 
objection that an intentional state that is about some x could exist 
and remain pretty much the same whether or not x exists. That is, if  
intentionality is a relation, it seems to be a relation that is a 
determination of  a pair of  things of  which only one must exist; or, 
alternatively, a relation that is a determination of  an amputated pair 
of  things—i.e., a pair that, paradoxically, is made of  only one thing. 
 Let us take an example. Imagine, for instance, that I am going 
down the unlit corridor of  an old alpine hotel. I distinguish a form in 
the dark that seems to walk towards me. This causes in me an acute 
episode of  fear. This fear, moreover, is intentional, i.e., it is fear 
directed towards that form walking towards me. Now, as it happens, 
 The editorial history of  Dummett’s The Origins of  Analytic Philosophy is, to put it 7
mildly, rather circumvoluted. The basis of  the text was a series of  lectures given 
in English at the University of  Bologna. The lectures were then translated into 
German and  published  by Suhrkamp under the title Ursprünge der analytischen 
Philosophie. A French translation of  the German translation of  the 
English original (sic) was then published in France by Gallimard in 1991. The 
lectures were then published in their original English, but only after a substantial 
revision by Dummett, with noticeable alterations to the original text translated 
and published in German and French. This explains why the above quote is my 
own translation of  the following passage of  the French edition: “Cela suscite 
l’objection évidente qu’un authentique acte mental pourrait exister même sans 
objet dans la réalité: je peux avoir peur ou me réjouir de quelque chose de 
purement imaginaire, et surtout je peux être victime d’une hallucination ou de 
tout autre illusion sensorielle. Cependant ces exemples conservent la 
caractéristique de l’intentionnalité, car une illusion de la vue ou de l’ouïe ne 
consiste pas à voir et entendre simplement sans rien voir ou entendre. Posséder 
cette caractéristique, c’est être orienté vers un objet; mais, par hypothèse, dans ce 
cas il n’y a pas d’objet.” (Dummett 1991: 47)
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nothing was walking towards me. What seemed to be there was in 
fact a mere shadow produced by the light of  the moon shining 
through the window at the end of  the corridor. Should we infer from 
this that I in fact was not the bearer of  an intentional state of  fear? 
Or that my intentional state of  fear, despite appearances, was not in 
fact about anything? As Dummett points to, it seems natural, though 
paradoxical, to claim that in such cases I simply underwent an 
episode of  fear directed upon something that in fact did not exist.  
 The problem of  non-existence, then, seems to face the theory 
of  intentionality with the following problem: If  intentionality is 
indeed a relation, then it seems to be a special kind of  relation—one 
that, contrary to other relations, is not a determination whose relata 
need all exists. If  this is the case, however, one might well wonder, 
first, how relations can obtain between relata that belong to different 
ontological realms: existence and non-existence. Second, one might 
well wonder what it means to say that a relation is, for at least one of  
its half, is a determination of  something that does not exist.  
 On the other hand, one might reject the claim that 
intentionality is a relation. This would prevent one from having to 
settle the weird metaphysical questions just sketched. But what must 
one then do with the initial pressure to treat intentionality as a 
relation? If  I can fear something that does not exist, this does not 
prevent my fear from being about that thing. How then can one 
reject the claim that intentionality is a relation and nonetheless 
respect these appearances? Either choosing one side of  this 
disjunction or fending it off  with a third alternative constitutes 
another part, if  not the main part, of  a constitutive theory of  
intentionality.  
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7. Conclusion 
The overall aim of  this chapter was two-fold: first, expound the view 
that a theory of  intentionality should be conceived as a theory of  
intentional experiences, and, second, introduce our basic assumption 
about what shape a theory of  intentional experiences should take.  
 With respect to the first aim, we defended the thesis that a 
theory of  intentionality should be a theory of  intentional experiences 
against two main objections: the general objection that the 
phenomenal cannot be intentional, and, second, the more restricted 
objection that there cannot be cognitive intentional experiences. As 
we concluded, these two objections are unwarranted. 
 With respect to the second aim, we distinguished between two 
levels at which a theory of  intentionality can be pursued: a 
constitutive and an engineering level. We made clear that the level at 
which a theory of  intentional experiences should be located foremost 
is the constitutive one. We then introduced the idea that the main aim 
of  such a constitutive theory of  intentionality should be to provide 
an interpretation of  what we call the Fundamental Intentional 
Schema (FIS): a schema that characterizes all instances of  
intentionality at a maximal level of  generality. We finally introduced 
six main features of  intentionality that an adequate interpretation of  
the FIS should be able to account for.  
 In the upcoming chapters, we turn to the issue of  providing an 
adequate interpretation of  the FIS. The discussion is structured as 
follows. Chapters 2, 3, and 4 discuss two models that try to 
implement the idea that the underlying metaphysical nature of  
intentionality is relational. Chapters 5 and 6 then turn to two further 
models that deny this claim. The next chapter addresses a first kind 
of  relational theory we call The Intentional Object Model.  
Chapter 2: The Intentional Object 
Model 
Every mental phenomenon is directed toward an 
object. This thesis sums up such undeniable facts as 
that there is no idea which is not an idea of  something 
or other, that there is no desire which is not the desire 
for something or other, that there is no belief  which is 
not the belief  in something or other, that there is no 
seeing which is not the seeing of  something or other, 
and so on. Once pointed out, the thesis of  
intentionality is a truism. But its philosophical 
ramifications, as we shall see, are monumental.  
    (Grossmann 1984: 33) 
1. Introduction 
In the previous chapter, we introduced two fundamental ideas. First of  
all, a theory of  intentionality should be conceived as a theory of  
intentional experiences. Secondly, a theory of  intentionality conceived as 
a theory of  intentional experiences should essentially amount to an 
adequate interpretation of  what we called the fundamental intentional 
schema (FIS). This chapter starts down the path of  providing such an 
interpretation.  
 In terms of  their general structure, the upcoming chapters discuss 
two different families of  theories of  intentionality: those that argue that 
the underlying metaphysical nature of  intentionality is relational and 
those that claim otherwise. This chapter focuses on a first relational 
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theory that we have deemed the intentional object model (IOM). The 
discussion of  the IOM then continues in Chapter 3, which considers 
some of  the IOM’s philosophical and logical consequences.  
 The general idea behind the claim that intentionality’s underlying 
metaphysical nature is relational is that to be the bearer of  an intentional 
state essentially involves standing in a relation to something. As we shall 
see, however, this idea can be implemented in different ways. In 
particular, this claim should not be identified with the claim that 
aboutness itself  is a relation. The two claims are conceptually distinct, 
and the claim that aboutness itself  is a relation represents only one 
means of  cashing out the intuitive idea that intentional states are about 
things. 
 In this chapter, we concentrate on the main tenets of  the IOM. 
The IOM makes use of  two fundamental ideas. First of  all, it relies on 
the idea that aboutness itself  is a relation. In other words, the underlying 
metaphysical nature of  intentionality is that of  a relation, and this 
relation is precisely the one of  being about something. If  I think about 
Obama, for instance, then I stand in a relation to Obama, the relation of  
“being about.” Secondly, the relata of  this relation are intentional 
objects. Hence, if  I stand in “being about” relation to Obama, then 
Obama is the intentional object of  my intentional state of  thinking about 
him. These two claims form the conceptual foundations of  a theory of  
intentionality, according to the IOM. We shall see exactly how and why 
the IOM articulates them, and we will also explore how they must be 
completed for the IOM to be able to account for the six main features 
of  intentionality introduced in the second part of  the previous chapter.  
 The chapter is structured as follows: we begin by discussing the 
idea of  a relation itself  and then present the main arguments in favor of  
the claim that the FIS’s fundamental nature is relational. Secondly, we 
detail how the IOM conceives of  intentional relations and intentional 
objects, and formulate a first interpretation of  the IOM, the basic IOM 
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schema. Thirdly, we point to the fact that this schema is too basic to 
account for the six features of  intentionality we identified in the previous 
chapter and then complement it as necessary. As we shall see, however, 
some of  these features place pressure on the IOM to endorse disputed 
theoretical commitments. We then turn to this issue in the next chapter, 
describing these commitments in more details as well as some of  their 
logical implications. That chapter also raises some objections against 
both these theoretical commitments and the IOM in general.  
2. What is a Relation? 
What is a relation? Basically, relations are a certain type of  properties, 
namely, polyadic properties. This characterization, however, only brings 
us to the next question: What are properties? We shall assume that 
properties are ways of  characterizing particulars, that is, features that 
numerically distinct particulars can share and by which they can be 
grouped. Sam, for instance, is a human being, and so is Linda. Hence, 
there is a property that Sam and Linda share and in virtue of  which they 
can be grouped, along with many others, as humans.  
 We have here a set of  notions that are illuminated in terms of  
each other. A particular is something that can have a property, while a 
property is an element that characterizes a particular and that forms a 
criterion for grouping different particulars together. We shall not say 
much more about either of  these notions. In particular, this thesis does 
not address the perennial question of  the nature of  properties. Rather, 
what we require is a metaphysics that allows us to utilize these notions. 
However, we shall remain agnostic about which particular theory it is. 
 We shall distinguish between two kinds of  properties. On the one 
hand, monadic properties, such as “being human” in the previous 
example, play a specific role: characterizing particulars. That is, they allow 
us to enumerate the characteristics of  a specific particular, e.g., Sam, and 
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permit us to state what properties this particular shares in common with 
other particulars.  
 We do not, however, always aim at characterizing and describing 
single particulars. Indeed, sometimes our objective is to provide 
characterizations and descriptions focused on how particulars interact 
with each other. For instance, imagine that John slams his door. One 
could then describe John as satisfying the monadic property, “slams a 
door (x).” We might have reason, however, to describe John’s slamming 
his office door not in terms of  a monadic property but, rather, in terms 
of  the following dyadic relation: “Slams(x, y)”, where John can be 
substituted for x and his office door for y.  
 In that respect, an interesting idea is that not only particulars but 
also n-tuples of  particulars can have certain characteristics and, hence, 
that numerically distinct n-tuples of  individuals can be grouped in virtue 
of  sharing certain characteristics. For instance, the ordered pairs {John, 
John’s office door} and {Linda, Linda’s office door} can both be 
characterized in terms of  the same relation: “Slams (x, y).” Note, 
however, that the idea here is not merely that n-tuples themselves can 
have properties, which is certainly true but unimportant at this point. It 
is, rather, the idea that there are genuine and interesting ways to ascribe 
characteristics to particulars not only on their own but also with respect 
to the way they interact with each other. 
 Let us take a further example. Sam is 1.75 m tall, and John is 1.80 
m tall. These are characteristics that they possess individually and in 
virtue of  which they can be grouped with other individuals with whom 
they share the same height. However, taken as the ordered pair <Sam, 
John>, Sam and John also possess further characteristics that they 
cannot be taken to have when considered separately. Namely, that pair, 
along with many other similar pairs, can be characterized as one in which 
the first member is shorter than the other. 
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 By means of  this example, we can then clarify two important ideas 
mentioned above. First of  all, it is individuals, not n-tuples of  individuals, 
that instantiate relations. Indeed, it is not the n-tuple <Sam, John> itself  
that is “shorter than.” Rather, it is Sam who is shorter than John. 
However, this characteristic does not hold true for Sam on his own. It is 
a characteristic of  Sam as a member of  the n-tuple comprised of  Sam 
and John. Moreover, it is not simply Sam and John as a pair that matters 
for it to be true that Sam is taller than John. It is the ordered pair 
composed of  Sam and John, in that order. In other words, the ordered 
pair <Sam, John> makes the true the relation “x is taller than y,” while 
the ordered pair <John, Sam> makes it false. Order, then, matters for 
relations.  
 Secondly, the idea of  interaction was used above to speak of  the 
relation between John and his office door. The example involving John 
and Sam, however, allows us to see that “interaction” should not be 
interpreted too literally when discussing relations. As we use the term, 
forming an n-tuple is sufficient for things to interact with each other. If  
Sam is shorter than John, this fact alone does not mean that Sam and 
John interact in any strong sense of  the word. In fact, Sam and John 
might live on different continents, never have met, and even fully ignore 
each other’s existence. Yet, the proposition that Sam is shorter than John 
would still be true. Why should we call this an interaction, then? We do 
need not to but the idea is intuitive, and it is hopefully more helpful than 
damaging. 
 Particulars and properties can be structured into a hierarchy. At 
level 0 are particulars. These are not properties but they can instantiate 
them. At level 1 are properties of  particulars, and they are thus called 
first-order properties. John, a level-0 entity, can then instantiate the 
property of  being tall, which is a level-1 property. Properties themselves, 
however, can also instantiate properties. The property of  being tall, for 
instance, instantiates the property of  being a measurement property. 
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Being a measurement property, however, is not the kind of  property that 
an individual can instantiate. Thus, such properties must belong to a 
different level, level-2. Level-2 hence, contains properties of  properties, 
or second-order properties, and so on. This hierarchical conception does 
not play too much of  a role in this chapter, but it does reappear in later 
chapters and should thus be kept in mind. 
 Properties of  all kinds, however, are generally taken to present the 
following intuitive, key feature: A predication cannot be true unless that 
of  which it is predicated exists. This trait of  properties does play a role 
in this chapter. As Malebranche states, “nothingness has no 
properties.” (Malebranche 1997: 10) If  the red fairy flying around my 
computer screen does not exist, then she cannot be flying. Applied to the 
type of  properties of  which we are currently focusing—relations—this 
motto yields the following: If  at least one of  the relata of  a relation does 
not exist, then that relation cannot obtain. If  John fails to exist, then 
Sam cannot be shorter than him. As Uriah Kriegel puts it: 
…just as we do not think that a monadic property can be instantiated in 
the absence of  a particular that instantiates it, so we should not think 
that a relation could be instantiated in the absence of  particulars that 
instantiate it. (Kriegel 2007: 311) 
  
As we shall later see, this claim, which we shall call the “Malebranche 
principle,” is central to the relational conception of  intentionality, as 
some theories of  intentionality, such as the IOM, are bound to deny it. 
For the time being, however, we shall not enter into a debate about its 
plausibility, as the next chapter tackles this issue.  
 Now that we know a bit more about relations, how should we 
interpret the idea that intentionality is a relation? Of  course, we cannot 
yet express this idea too precisely, as this would force us to make certain 
theoretical choices we would like to reserve for later. We can, however, 
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roughly express the gist of  the idea as follows: As we saw, intentionality 
can be characterized as the mind’s capacity to be about things. The idea 
that intentionality is a relation is thus simply the notion that this capacity 
is relational. In other words, to think about something is to interact with 
it in the metaphorical sense mentioned above. As we shall see, the entity 
to which we stand in relation can be that very thing we are intentionally 
directed upon as in the IOM. On the other hand, it could be something 
else that we are not intentionally directed upon but that permits us to 
explain what it is that we are thinking about, as in the content model, 
which we discuss in Chapter 4.  
 Taking a bit of  distance, we might describe the general outlook of  
a relational conception of  intentionality as follows  : Take the case of  
John thinking about Obama. What shall we say about it? Here is, in very 
broad terms, how relational theories of  intentionality conceive of  this 
fact. First of  all, it is true of  the plurality of  things that constitute what 
we call reality that two of  them, John and Obama, are to be found 
among them. They also are interacting in a very specific and rather low-
key way: The first thinks about the second. In other words, this is not a 
feature of  John taken in isolation. Instead, it is a feature of  John as part 
of  an n-tuple that also contains, at least, Obama. This seems fair enough. 
Described in this manner, the existence of  intentionality would just be 
another platitude about reality: there are particulars (first platitude); these 
particulars have characteristics (second platitude); and particulars interact 
with one another in an ordered way (third platitude). Intentionality, then, 
would then just be a particular kind of  instance, or set of  instances, of  
the third platitude. This, of  course, is a very schematic way of  putting 
things and the question, of  course, is how much of  this simple idea will 
survive once we plunge ourselves into the messy reality of  intentionality.  
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3. Relational Intentionality 
In the preceding section, we introduced the general concept of  relations 
and quickly sketched one methodological reason for treating 
intentionality as a relation. Namely, regarding intentionality as a relation 
would constitute a crucial step towards treating intentionality as a 
philosophical platitude. However, additional arguments also support the 
claim that intentionality is a relation. In this section, we briefly present 
four additional reasons: a grammatical one, a phenomenological one, an 
epistemic one, and, finally, an inferential one.  
3.1 Grammatical Relationality 
A first kind of  reason that seemingly supports the idea that intentionality 
does possess an underlying relational structure has two components. 
First, the FIS unifies all instances of  intentionality. Indeed, despite the 
fact that not all sentences used to describe intentional states share a 
transitive grammatical structure, a bit of  reflection shows that all 
sentences used to describe intentional states, including those that possess 
an intransitive grammatical strucure, nonetheless describe states that are 
instances of  the FIS.  Take, for instance, the following two examples: 
(1) John thinks about Obama. 
(2) John thinks that Obama is American.  
Despite of  the fact that, grammatically speaking, (1) is a transitive 
sentence and (2) is an intransitive one, it nonetheless makes sense to 
claim that both describe intentional states that are instances of  the FIS, 
namely “x is about y.” Indeed, both (1) and (2) are about something, 
namely, Obama.  
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 The second step is simply to observe that the FIS does possess a 
transitive grammatical structure that instantiates a dyadic relational 
schema. From then on, one could conclude that there is reason to infer 
that the schema’s underlying metaphysical nature is also relational. As 
Reinhardt Grossmann puts it: 
Consider, for example, the sentence ‘I see a tree’ and compare it with the 
sentence “A is greater than B.” The first sentence seems to mention 
three things—namely, a person, a tree, and a mental act of  seeing. But so 
does the second; it, too, seems to mention three things, namely A, B, and 
the relation of  being greater than. This similarity between sentences about 
(two-term) relations and sentences about mental acts is rather striking. In 
fact, it is so striking that it all but forced upon philosophers the view that 
mental acts are in some sense relational. (Grossmann 1965: 39) 
This reason, however, can at best be a prima facie one. Indeed, if  there is 
no outright reason to believe that grammatical and metaphysical 
structures always take separate ways, there also is no general ground to 
trust that grammatical reasons are conclusive reasons. Philosophers and 
linguists alike are often prone to remind us that we use expressions such 
as, “Let’s accept this premise for the argument’s sake,” without there 
being anything like “the argument’s sake”. Hence, the claim can at best 
be that unless one is presented with defeaters that argue against the claim 
that the grammar and the metaphysics of  the FIS go hand in hand, one 
is justified to believe that this is the case.  
3.2 Phenomenological Relationality 
The previous reason was purely grammatical. One could complement it 
with the phenomenological observation that it is not only the FIS’s 
grammar that speaks in favor of  the claim that intentionality is a relation. 
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Additionally, the phenomenology of  instances of  the FIS also does so. 
Graham Priest, for instance, claims that:  
… when one fears something, one has a direct phenomenological 
experience of  a relation to the object of  the fear. (Priest 2005: 57-58) 
This second reason, just like the first one, is a prima facie one. That is, 
there is no reason to definitively doubt the data of  experience. 
Nonetheless, one may be forced, when presented with defeaters, to duck 
them in favor of  other considerations.  
3.3 Epistemic Relationality  
It seems hard to truly disbelieve that reality is somehow within our 
cognitive reach. That is, it seems difficult to truly disbelieve that we, at 
least sometimes, truly perceive, and judge of, mind-independent things 
that we can reach through intentional states like perceptions and 
judgments. The question, however, is how can intentional states allow us 
to thus reach reality? According to some philosophers, the best 
explanation is that intentionality is a relation. For instance, Reinhardt 
Grossmann writes: 
To assume that mental acts involve relations to such mind-independent 
entities as trees and chairs, is to account for the fact that the mind can 
reach out and make contact with what is not mental. It would account 
for the apparent fact that we can know not only our own minds but also 
the world around us. Any other view can either cannot explain this 
obvious fact or must deny it outright. As has often been noted, realism, as 
opposed to idealism, stands or falls with the relational view of  mental acts. 
(Grossmann 1965: 40) 
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As Grossmann constructs it, his argument for epistemic relationality is 
directed against idealists or skeptics who claim either that there is no 
mind-independent reality of  which we can have knowledge or, 
alternatively, that if  there is such a reality, it would always remain beyond 
our reach. According to Grossmann, the realist answer to these 
challenges is to straightforwardly argue that intentionality is a relation.  
 Nevertheless, that argument can be, and has been, constructed in 
different ways A first way—one that seems to be pointed at by 
Grossmann in the above quote—, would appeal to epistemic relationality 
in the form of  a transcendental argument that would go somehow as 
follows:   
1) The mind can reach out and make contact with what is non-
mental. 
2) The mind could not reach out and make contact with what is 
non-mental if  intentionality were not a relation. 
3) Hence, intentionality is a relation.  
Under the assumption that 1) is bedrock, the substantial premise of  this 
argument is, of  course, 2). According to 2), it is a conceptually or 
metaphysically necessary condition for our minds to be able to reach out 
for the world that we construct intentionality as a relation. The same 
conclusion, however, can be defended by a weaker kind of  argument, 
namely, an abductive one. Such a line of  reasoning would flow as 
follows:  
4) The mind can reach out and make contact with what is non-
mental. 
5) The best explanation for the fact that the mind can reach out 
and make contact with what is non-mental is that intentionality 
is a relation. 
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6) Hence, intentionality is a relation.  
This second version is, of  course weaker, than the first. Indeed, the fifth 
premise does not make it impossible, either conceptually or 
metaphysically, for the mind to be able to reach out to the world without 
intentionality being a relation. It merely claims that the likeliest 
underlying theory of  intentionality that would allow us to account for 
this fact would be a relational one.  
 This third reason seems much stronger than the first two. Indeed, 
neither the transcendental argument nor the abductive one delivers mere 
prima facie reasons. They seem to deliver much stronger reasons, as what 
is at stake in their conclusions is much more substantial than grammar or 
phenomenology. Indeed, as Grosmann emphasizes, some philosophers 
have claimed that our ability to mentally reach out to the world is what is 
at stake in the claim that intentionality is a relation. 
3.4 Inferential Relationality 
The last reason we should mention appeals to the idea that intentional 
subjects sometimes perform inferences about intentional experiences by 
means of  using sentences that describe such intentional experiences. 
More precisely, it appeals to the idea that the best way to give a theory of  
the validity of  these inferences is to cash out the underlying metaphysics 
of  intentional states in relational terms.  
 Let us, for instance, have a look at the two following sentences: 
(1) John thinks about Obama.  
(2) Sam thinks about Obama. 
These two sentences are descriptions of  intentional states, those of  John 
and Sam. Theorists of  intentionality commonly posit that these two 
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sentences can also constitute the premises of  a syllogism whose 
conclusion would be: 
  
 (3) Hence, there is something about which both John and Sam think. 
Such a syllogism can, of  course, also occur in the case of  so-called 
propositional attitudes. For example: 
(4) John thinks that Obama is American. 
(5) Sam thinks that Obama is American. 
(6) Hence, there is something that both John and Sam think. 
Theorists of  intentionality then face the task of  accounting for the 
intuition that these inferences are instances of  a valid schema. It is here 
that relationality kicks in. Indeed, both (1)–(3) and (7)–(9) seem to be 
instances of  the following schema: 
(7) T(a, b) 
(8) T (c, b) 
(9) ∃(x) T(a, x) & T(c, x) 
Granted that first-order classical logic governs the schema (7)–(9) and its 
instances, the soundness of  each instance of  this schema requires that 
the individual constants a, b, and c be well-defined. Only under this 
condition can then Existential Generalization—namely, the rule of  
inference that says that from a sentence of  the form F(a) one can infer 
that ∃(x) F(x)—be applied to yield the conclusion. 
 The claim made by this argument, however, is not that conceiving 
of  intentionality as a relation is the only way to account for the validity 
of  these inferences. Rather, if  our aim is to account for the validity of  
these inferences in a literal way and within the boundaries of  classical 
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logic, then relationality is the appropriate choice. This outcome, however, 
is not arbitrary. Indeed, it seems that any inferential schema that would 
account for these inferences’ validity in a way that would appeal to a 
logical form remote from the one proposed in (7)-(9) would result in a 
theory of  inference that would be too complex to account for the fact 
that intentional subjects sometimes do perform inferences such as (1)-(3) 
and 7)-9) in a casual and correct way. 
 This argument is also interesting, because it can be, and has been, 
used to argue in favor of  other theses than the one that intentionality is a 
relation and thus lies at the center of  a theoretical nexus. In particular, 
this argument has been used to support the existence of  propositions 
(see, e.g., Schiffer 2003, chap. 1). Indeed, if  (i) the inference (7)-(9) is 
valid, (ii) classical logic is assumed, and (iii) intentionality really is a 
relation, then it can be argued that (iv) propositions must exist to serve 
as the relata of  intransitive intentional verbs. 
3.5 Summary 
The first two models of  intentionality that we are going to examine, the 
IOM and the CM, are relational models of  intentionality. In this section, 
the goal was to put forward some reasons why theorists of  intentionality 
have supposed that the underlying metaphysics was indeed relational. 
Besides the methodological claim that a relational conception of  
intentionality would make of  intentionality a kind of  philosophical 
platitude, this section distinguished between four additional reasons of  
different force and inspiration, namely: a grammatical one, a 
phenomenological one, an epistemic one, and an inferential one. In the 
remainder of  this chapter, we turn to the first implementation of  the 
idea that intentionality is a relation, namely, the IOM. 
4. The Basic Intentional Object Model 
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If  the arguments presented in the preceding section are correct, then 
intentionality indeed is a relation. This claim, however, is a minimal one 
that merely tells us about the underlying metaphysical nature of  
intentionality. In contrast, it does not tell us what kind of  relation 
intentionality is or its relata are. This section explores how the IOM 
answers these two questions. The first sub-section deals with the nature 
of  the relation, while the second sub-section addressees the nature of  
the relata.  
4.1 Being About  
If  the arguments of  the preceding section are on the right track, then 
intentionality possesses an underlying relational metaphysical nature. 
That said, one might wonder about the exact metaphysical shape of  that 
relational nature. This question might appear trivial. Indeed, one may 
simply infer from the FIS and the data in support of  it that the 
metaphysical structure of  this relation is the following: “Being about(x, 
y).” This, we take, is an adequate rendering of  how the IOM conceives 
of  the intentional relation and we shall call it thesis (T1): 
(T1) The relation underlying the metaphysical nature of  
intentionality is the one of  ‘being about’; 
However, as this chapter and the next one will make clear, this thesis is 
very far from being philosophically trivial.  
 A first important point is that conceiving of  the intentional along 
such lines is not trivial insofar as, as mentioned above, many intentional 
states are described in terms of  sentences that do not instantiate a 
transitive surface grammar. Take the following examples: 
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 (1) John thinks about Obama. 
 (5) John fears that Obama will soon be out of  office. 
According to the IOM, both (1) and (5) are instances of  the intentional 
relation conceived as “being about (x, y).” This might be obvious in the 
case of  (1), while the case of  (5) requires some reflection. Indeed, 
according to the IOM, the fact that (5) does not instantiate a surface 
grammar close to the one of  the relation of  (1) does not prevent 
intentional states like (5) from being instances of  the relation “Being 
about (x, y).” Indeed, according to the IOM, (5) is about something, just 
like (1) is. Namely, it is about Obama. According to the IOM, this is an 
obvious phenomenological fact. Intentional states like (5) are about or 
present something just like intentional states such as (1). 
 A second important point is that, thus conceived, the intentional 
relation is a determinable one. That is, intentional experiences are 
instances of  being about something, but we can nonetheless distinguish 
between different kinds of  intentional experiences, such as: mere 
thoughts, judgements, desires, hopes, and so forth. The idea is that all of  
these kinds of  experiences are instances of  a determinable intentional 
relation, the one of  being about something. As Husserl puts it: 
Intentional experiences have the peculiarity of  directing themselves in 
varying fashion to presented objects, but they do so in an intentional 
sense. An object is “referred to” or “aimed at” in them, and in 
presentative or judging or other fashion. This means no more than that 
certain experiences are present, intentional in character and, more 
specifically, presentatively, judgingly, desiringly or otherwise intentional. 
(Husserl 2001: 98).  
A third important point is that by conceiving of  the intentional relation 
as the “being about” one, the IOM considers that this feature of  
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intentionality that we earlier called “aboutness” is fundamental. That is, 
aboutness is directly built into the intentional relation and cannot be 
derived from other, more fundamental features of  intentionality. Again, 
as Husserl explains:  
If  [an intentional] experience is present, then, eo ipso and through its own 
essence (we must insist), the intentional 'relation' to an object is achieved, 
and an object is 'intentionally present'; these two phrases mean precisely 
the same. (Husserl 2001: 98)  
We understand this short passage from Husserl as follows: Intentional 
experiences are such that the fact that they have aboutness, conceived in 
terms of  the “being about” relation, is a trait that intentional experiences 
have in virtue of  their essence. That is, there is no need to infer 
aboutness from a further feature of  intentionality. It is there right from 
the start. If  an experience is intentional, then it is eo ipso an instance of  
the “being about” relation. 
 To sum up this first sub-section, we have claimed that the IOM 
conceives of  the relational structure underlying the FIS as the 
determinable relation of  “being about.” According to the IOM, both an 
analysis of  the FIS’s surface grammar and phenomenological 
observations support this claim. Crucially, the IOM considers that 
aboutness is a built-in, fundamental, feature of  intentionality. In the next 
sub-section, we shall turn to the question of  how the IOM conceives of  
the relata of  the relation of  “being about.”  
4.2 Intentional Objects 
Our second question concerns the relata of  the intentional relation. The 
IOM makes two central claims in that respect. First, it states that 
intentional experiences must be irreducibly described in terms of  the 
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concept of  an intentional object and that instances of  this concept serve as 
the relata of  the intentional relation. In other words, for an intentional 
experience to be an instance of  the relation of  “being about” is for it to 
be about an intentional object. The second claim posits that intentional 
objects are schematic objects, that is, objects of  a kind whose nature is 
exhausted by their satisfying a schema. We shall discuss each of  them in 
this sub-section.  
 Let us start by trying to grasp the fundamental picture underlying 
the claim that intentional experiences must be irreducibly described in 
terms of  the notion of  an intentional object. Getting this initial idea 
right will turn out essential to understanding much of  what follows, 
which is to say, both the IOM and the evaluation of  its alternatives. In 
the first chapter, we claimed that intentional experiences are appearances. 
How, however, should we think of  appearances? An appearance, we shall 
assume, is an appearance of something to a consciousness. Opening my 
eyes, I am visually appeared as if  I am in my office. Similarly, thinking 
about Obama, I am cognitively appeared as if  I am thinking about 
Obama. The ways we are appeared to in such experiences convey, in a 
first approximation at least, what our intentional experiences are of. 
 This first point shall be common ground to all theories of  
intentional experiences. The question, however, is how one should 
explain what is meant by the claim that the ways we are appeared to 
convey what our intentional experiences are of. In other words, what 
does it mean for an appearance to be of something? What does it mean 
to say that when I think about Obama, I am cognitively appeared as if  I 
am thinking about Obama? According to the IOM, that an appearance is 
of something means that a certain object or topic is presently occupying 
the focal point of  a certain stretch of  my conscious life. Whatever that is 
thus occupying this focal point is called an intentional object.  
 It is essential to clearly understand the strategy of  the IOM at this 
point. Presumably, when I am thinking about Obama, then Obama 
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himself, the man in the flesh, is what I am thinking about. Accordingly, 
the IOM is not saying that when I am thinking about, e.g., Obama, I am 
not related to Obama himself  but to a different entity, an intentional 
object that is numerically distinct from Obama. Rather, the IOM 
stipulates that we call whatever we are thinking about an intentional 
object. For instance, if  I am thinking about Obama, the man in the flesh, 
then he is the intentional object of  my intentional experience. The 
notion of  an intentional object therefore does not denote a particular 
kind of  thing. Rather, it intends to capture a certain commonality among 
intentional experiences: They all are about something, i.e., they all have 
an intentional object. This is the core content of  the thesis (T2): 
(T2) The relata of  the relation of  “being about” are intentional 
experiences (or their bearers) and intentional objects. 
Since the word “object” has more than one meaning, it might help to 
belabor this point a bit further to prevent any misunderstanding. As Tim 
Crane points out (Crane 2014: 115), a prominent use of  the word 
“object” treats it as synonymous with the words “thing” or “entity,” 
meaning something like “physical particular,” e.g., things like trees, tables, 
chairs, boats, and so on. This, however, is emphatically not the meaning 
of  the word “object” at work in the expression “intentional object.” 
According to the IOM, an intentional object is not—or not only—a 
physical particular that one is thinking about. Some examples of  
intentional experiences make this obvious: 
 (6) John is impressed by Gödel’s first incompleteness theorem. 
 (7) John wonders whether justice is an objective value. 
 (8) John believes that World War II ended in 1957. 
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Each of  these examples are indisputable examples of  intentional 
experiences. Each of  them, however, plausibly fails to be about an object 
in the sense of  a physical particular. According to the IOM, what we 
shall conclude from this is the negative claim that “object,” in the 
expression “intentional object,” is not synonymous with “physical 
particular.”  
 What, however, is the IOM’s positive claim about the meaning of  
the word “object” as occurring in the expression “intentional object?” 
One might get to it by pointing to other contexts of  use of  the word 
“object,” like in the expression “object of  attention.” As Jerry Valberg 
remarks (Valberg 1992), in such a context, the word “object” cannot be 
replaced by “thing” or “physical particular.” Indeed, many more things 
beyond physical particulars can be the objects of  our attention. In the 
expression “object of  attention,” the word “object” hence seems to 
serve as shorthand for the longer expression “whatever our attention is 
focused on.” In other words, objects of  attention seem to be schematic 
objects in the sense that an object of  attention is whatever can be 
substituted for the second variable in the schema “x focuses her 
attention on y.” 
 The role of  the word “object” in the expression “intentional 
object” is very close to its role in the expression “object of  attention.” 
Indeed, as Crane notes: 
This is the key to the idea that being an intentional object is not being 
any kind of  thing. For ‘intentional object’ in this respect (unsurprisingly) 
is like ‘object of  attention’ rather than ‘physical object.’ (Crane 2014: 115)  
We can express this point in a general way: Like objects of  attention, 
intentional objects are schematic objects in the sense that their 
conditions of  individuation are schematic ones, i.e., for something to be 
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an intentional object just is for that thing to play a certain substitutive 
role in an intentional schema, presumably the FIS.  
 A direct consequence of  the fact that intentional objects are 
schematic objects is that there is no metaphysically substantial kind 
“intentional object,” i.e., objects that have, as constitutive part of  their 
nature, the property of  being an intentional object. As Alberto Voltolini 
puts it: 
Intentional objects are simply objects qua objects of  thought, i.e., targets 
of  intentional states. Thoughts can be directed at concreta of  any kind, 
as well as at abstracta of  any kind – individuals as well as events, 
numbers as well as fictional entities. This situation requires that 
intentional objects must be schematic entities, i.e., items which, unlike the 
above kinds of  entities, have no particular intrinsic nature. (Voltolini 
2006: 436) 
The exact contours of  this idea are not easy to grasp, so let us try to 
unpack it a bit. An object’s nature is understood here as a general nature, 
i.e., what makes it the case that a certain object can be individuated as a 
token of  a certain type T. If  John is, e.g., a human being, then there is a 
set of  properties that constitutes John’s nature qua human being. Now, 
the claim at stake is that whatever nature something that happens to be 
an intentional object has, it does not at all depend on that thing being an 
intentional object—that an object is being thought about does not 
determine its nature. In other words, whatever the nature of  something 
that happens to be an intentional object, this nature is determined 
completely independently of  its status as an intentional object—or, 
wholly independently of  the context of  it being the object of  an 
experience. In that sense, an intentional relation leaves the nature of  an 
intentional object untouched. 
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 Consequently, according to the IOM, intentional objects are 
neither a special kind of  object nor is the nature of  something affected 
as a direct result of  someone thinking about it . Intentional objects are 8
nothing but objects of  intentional experiences, where this is not taken as 
meaning that they constitute a kind of  object but, rather, that they play a 
role in the individuation of  an experience. Metaphorically speaking, an 
intentional object is everything upon which a conscious gaze, either 
sensory or cognitive, falls.  
 If  needed, this claim can be further complemented by the 
observation that the attribution of  the property “being an intentional 
object” to something cannot be the result of  a discovery. That is, one 
cannot inquire about an object and discover that it is an intentional 
object. That one is thinking about it is sufficient for the property of  
being an intentional object to belong to that object. Moreover, regardless 
of  whether that property dawns on that object at some point, it remains 
completely untouched. Its nature is always determined separately from 
the intentional relation.  
 Thus far, the dialectic has run as follows: Each intentional 
experience has an intentional object, and this object can belong to any 
possible metaphysical category. Hence, an intentional object, like all 
objects, can have a nature, but this nature is determined outside of  the 
intentional relation. Being an intentional object is therefore not a 
 The distinction between direct and indirect here means the following. Of  8
course, someone can think about something and, as a result, substantially affect 
it but one cannot do this through the mere power of  one’s thought. Rather, one 
needs to think about that thing and act upon it in some way in order to change 
it. For instance, looking at a stack of  wood-planks, one may think about a 
certain chair to make out of  them and might, as a result, build such a chair. That 
said, one needs to perform a certain number of  actions in addition to thinking 
about the chair in order to build it. This also applies to the distinction between 
thinking something and putting that thought into words so as to produce an 
effect on someone, e.g., the formation of  a belief. 
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constituent of  an object’s nature. Objects qua intentional objects are 
merely schematic objects.  
 However, the issue gains an additional layer of  complexity when 
we consider the fact that attributing a single intentional object to 
intentional experiences seems to be rather arbitrary. Indeed, intentional 
experiences are complex beasts. For instance, it often happens that we 
are not merely thinking about, say, Obama but, rather,  thinking about 
Obama in some way. Right now, for instance, I am thinking that Obama 
will soon be out of  office. What, then, is the intentional object of  my 
experience? Is it Obama? Is it the fact that Obama will soon be out of  
office? Is it the property of  being soon out of  office? What would 
constitute a faithful description of  how I am appeared to in such a case? 
 Any restricted answer to that question will seem arbitrary. Assume, 
for the sake of  the argument, that in the case of  thinking that Obama 
will soon be out of  office, the intentional object of  that experience is the 
fact that Obama will soon be out of  office. Is it not obvious that this 
experience is also about Obama and the property of  being out of  office? 
The only way to resolve this problem is to refuse to identify the 
intentional object of  this intentional state with any of  the candidates we 
have mentioned. Rather, the intentional object of  an experience is the 
overall correlate of  the experience.  
 In his paper “Intentional Objects,” Crane compares the notion of  
intentional object with another notion pregnant in the phenomenological 
tradition, the one of  a “world” (Crane 2014: 117). The idea here is that 
each intentional subject has a world. This claim, however, is not a 
metaphysical one; it is not a plea for a radical form of  relativism, in 
which each subject lives in its own reality. The idea, rather, is that though 
intentional subjects target the very same reality, this reality can be 
disclosed differently to different subjects—or, for that matter, to the 
same subjects at different times. The idea, then, is not that one 
experiences a different world, conceived as, for instance, a different 
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mereological sum of  things. Instead, one experiences different features 
of  the same mereological sum, disclosing different worlds at different 
times. In that sense, an intentional subject a pointing out some features 
of  a perceptual scene to an intentional subject b is a way for a to make 
her world accessible to b. By doing this, however, a is not giving the keys 
of  a different world to b. She is, rather, making b sensitive to certain 
features of  a world we all share. This is the content of  the thesis (T3): 
(T3) Intentional objects are the overall correlates of  intentional 
experiences, i.e., the intentional object of  a particular experience is 
the world, in the phenomenological sense of  that word, as it is 
disclosed by a particular intentional experience. 
An intentional object, in that sense, can be identified with the totality 
that is disclosed in a particular experience. In the example discussed 
above, Obama himself, the fact that Obama will soon be out of  office, 
and the property of  being out of  office are all elements of  the world that 
is disclosed to me as I undergo the experience of  thinking that Obama 
will be out of  office. They are the overall correlate of  that experience—
its intentional object.  
 The idea, then, is not that we use the concept of  an “intentional 
object” to individuate objects in any metaphysically substantial sense; the 
individuation conditions of  intentional objects, in that sense, are merely 
schematic, as defined above. The idea, rather, is that the IOM uses it to 
individuate experiences in a substantive way. Namely, the IOM uses it to 
claim that there at least some experiences such that we cannot say what 
these experiences are without mentioning that they have an intentional 
object, in the stipulated sense indicated in this sub-section.  
 On the basis of  this exposition of  theses (T1)-(T3), we shall now 
formulate a first interpretation of  the FIS and put it to the test of  the 
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five main features of  intentionality discussed in the previous chapter. We 
shall then see that an additional thesis needs to be added. 
  
4.3 The Basic IOM Schema 
We now wish to bring together the observations from the previous two 
sub-sections in order to formulate a first interpretation of  the FIS, as 
conceived by the IOM. We call this initial interpretation the basic IOM 
schema. It is basic, because it stems from preliminary reflections on the 
intentional relation. As such, it already aims to account for the first of  
intentionality’s main features, aboutness. However, it remains to be seen 
whether this basic schema can also account for the other primary 
features of  intentionality that we previously distinguished.  
 The basic schema is the following:  
Basic IOM schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x stands in the 
relation of  ‘being about’ with an intentional object y.” 
Is this schema too basic to permit the IOM to account for the other main 
features of  intentionality? The following section addresses that question.  
5. Is the Basic IOM Schema too Basic? 
In the previous section, we introduced the IOM’s two central ideas: (i) 
the intentional relation is the relation of  “being about,” and (ii) the relata 
of  this relation are intentional objects. Taken together, these two ideas 
yielded the basic IOM schema. We now explore the following question: 
Can the basic IOM schema account for the main features of  
intentionality that we introduced in the previous chapter? This section 
addresses each of  those features in turn.  
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5.1 The IOM and Aboutness 
The first feature of  intentionality requiring an explanation is 
undoubtedly the most central feature of  intentionality: namely, 
aboutness. As mentioned, aboutness is that feature by virtue of  which 
intentional states can be said to be about things. As we saw above, the 
IOM treats this feature as a fundamental and primitive one, as it cashes 
out the underlying relational nature of  intentionality in terms of  the 
“being about” relation. An intentional state, then, has aboutness merely 
by virtue of  being an instance of  that relation.  
 This appeal to primitiveness is based on phenomenological 
grounds. Indeed, according to the IOM, phenomenological experiences 
harbor a most salient phenomenological trait: They are about something, 
in the specific sense that they stand in the relation of  “being about” with 
an intentional object. Moreover, this relation is established on the basis 
of  their essence. Husserl, for instance, is particularly explicit on this 
point: 
We take intentional relation, understood in purely descriptive fashion as 
an inward particularity of  certain experiences, to be the essential feature 
of  ‘psychical phenomena’ or ‘acts’, seeing in Brentano’s definition of  
them as ‘phenomena intentionally containing objects in themselves’ a 
circumscription of  essence, whose ‘reality’ (in the traditional sense) is of  
course ensured by examples. Differently put in terms of  pure 
phenomenology: Ideation performed in exemplary cases of  such 
experiences – and so performed as to leave empirical-psychological 
conception and existential affirmation of  being out of  account, and to 
deal only with the real phenomenological content of  these experiences – 
yields us the pure phenomenological generic Idea of  intentional experience 
or act, and of  its various pure species. (Husserl 2001: 96).  
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According to Husserl, first of  all, the intentional relation can be 
understood in “purely descriptive fashion,” that is, as a matter of  the way 
our experiences are given to us. This particularity is not, however, 
common to all experiences. We have access to this particularity of  some 
experiences, he claims, by means of  a “circumscription of  essence,” that 
is, by means of  seeing what invariantly belongs to an experience by 
undetarking a series of  variation on it. For instance, one may take an 
intentional experience and make it vary along several lines without losing 
its intentional nature. According to Husserl, however, what would make 
it fall outside of  the intentional boundaries would be the removal of  its 
instantiation of  the intentional relation.  
 According to Husserl, moreover, it is also a fact accessible through 
inward examination of  our intentional experiences that they must be 
described by the notion of  intentional object as described above: 
Intentional experiences have the peculiarity of  directing themselves in 
varying fashion to presented objects, but they do so in an intentional 
sense. An object is ‘referred to’ or ‘aimed at’ in them (ist in ihnen ‘gemeint,’ 
auf  ihn ist ‘abgezielht’), and in presentative, or judging, or other fashion. 
This means no more than that certain experiences are present, 
intentional in character and, more specifically, presentatively, judgingly, 
desiringly, or otherwise intentional. (Husserl, LU, V, §11) 
It is important, however, not to read too much into that claim. From that 
perspective, the English translation of  “gemeint” as “referred to” is 
misleading, as not all instances of  something that is “gemeint” are 
instances of  reference. Put in our terms, Husserl’s claim essentially 
concerns the meaning of  the word “about.” As he makes clear, 
moreover, this “circumscription of  essence” is a purely 
phenomenological matter. That is, it is a claim about the way that 
experiences are given to us, not a claim about the way that experiences 
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may, say, relate us to something. As such, then, the claim that aboutness 
is a relation to an intentional object and that we come to know this fact 
through phenomenological inquiry is not about reference, understood 
here as the relation that may obtain between singular terms and existing 
things. In other words, this claim is not one about the specific 
mechanism of  reference implemented by intentional states. It is, rather, a 
claim about the meaning of  the word “about,” understood as 
characterizing the fundamental feature of  intentionality. 
 That said, however, critics of  the IOM might allege that this is 
precisely one of  the features that makes the IOM difficult to accept. 
Indeed, they might struggle to accept that there is such a fundamental 
relation of  being about that cannot be explained in more fundamental 
terms. In other words, detractors might not concede that reality has an 
irreducible feature, the nature of  which is to be about other things, in a 
way that is not explainable in other terms. We next turn to two lines of  
answer against this critique.  
 First of  all, it is not clear why a descriptive account of  aboutness 
cannot be explanatory. Of  course, it is may not be explanatory in the 
same sense than, say, reduction to more fundamental concepts is, but it 
might nonetheless be an acceptable explanation of  aboutness to be told 
that it is a relational feature that is invariably present in any intentional 
experience and that it constitutes its essence.  
 Secondly, one might also appeal to the principle of  neutrality 
between the constitutive and the engineering task introduced in the 
previous chapter. The constitutive level has been described as a theory 
of  intentionality as such. That is, it primarily focuses on the different 
concepts needed to describe the phenomenon of  intentionality and the 
various relations between them. The IOM’s claim regarding aboutness is 
a constitutive claim in the strict sense. It might have some incidence on the 
engineering level, but this is not yet an argument against it per se. Of  
course, if  two accounts are completely equivalent at the constitutive level 
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but one of  them simplifies the engineering task, then this counts as an 
argument against the account stuck at the constitutive level. However, as 
mentioned, this requires two accounts that are equivalent at the 
constitutive level, and the IOM’s analysis of  aboutness indicates that this 
is precisely what is not available. According to the IOM, a correct 
description of  intentional experiences is one in terms of  the notion of  
intentional object, and of  intentional experiences being relations to 
them. 
5.2 The IOM and Aspectuality 
The second feature requiring an explanation is aspectuality. By this, we 
mean that intentional states always contain a certain embedded point of  
view. Consequently, what an intentional state is about is never targeted 
from, to use Nagel’s famous expression, “the view from 
nowhere.” (Nagel 1986) Rather, such a state is always targeted from a 
certain point of  view, the one occupied by the intentional subject. As we 
saw, moreover, this notion of  point of  view can either be taken 
somewhat literally, as in the case of  perception, or more metaphorically, 
as in the case of  cognitive acts. 
 In Chapter 1, we used examples to demonstrate the existence of  
aspectuality as a feature of  intentional states. Let us examine one more as 
a reminder. We start with the following two instances of  intentionality: 
 (9) John is thinking about Phosphorus. 
 (10) John is thinking about Hesperus. 
Aspectuality is that feature by virtue of  which (9) and (10) are said to be 
different intentional states. Indeed, even though (9) and (10) are 
intentional states that are about the same thing, since “Phosphorus” and 
“Hesperus” are co-referential terms, it is nonetheless the case that (9) 
Chapter 2  119
and (10) are different intentional states. This is made clear by the 
possibility for John to regard (9), but not (10), as a correct description of  
his mental life. That is, if  John ignores that “Phosphorus” and 
“Hesperus” are co-referential, then he may well deny thinking about 
Hesperus while assenting to thinking about Phosphorus.  
 Aspectuality poses a problem for the IOM. Indeed, we claimed 
earlier that the IOM asserts that intentional objects are merely what an 
intentional subject is thinking about, as determined from the outside of  
the intentional relation. From this, it follows that what John is thinking 
about is the same thing in (9) and (10), namely, that thing to which both 
“Phosphorus” and “Hesperus” refer. In other words, taken as instances 
of  the basic IOM schema, there simply cannot be a difference between 
(9) and (10), because the terms of  the intentional relation are exactly the 
same in both cases. Hence, this schema, which says that intentionality is 
an unmediated relation between an intentional experience—or its bearer
—and an intentional object, cannot account for aspectuality.  
 According to the IOM, aspectuality demonstrates that there is no 
such thing as an intentional state that is about an intentional object as 
such, that is, an intentional object in its entirety, exhaustively, and with all 
of  its aspects present at the same time. On the contrary, an intentional 
object is always intended under a certain aspect. Venus, for instance, can 
be intended  either as Phosphorus or as Hesperus, but it cannot be 
intended as such. As Tim Crane puts it: 
So, at its most general, the idea of  aspectual shape is just the idea that 
there is no such thing as a thought about, or an awareness of, an object as 
such—that there is no such thing as what we might call ‘bare’ presentation 
of  an object. (Crane 2001: 20) 
The challenge for the IOM is thus to modify the basic IOM schema to 
make it strong enough to be able to account for this idea. The question is 
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what needs to be added to that first interpretation of  the FIS to permit 
the IOM to account for aspectuality. Basically, what seems to be needed 
is a way to implement a fundamental distinction between two things, 
namely: (i) an object as it is, or as such; and (ii) an object as it is intended 
or presented. Indeed, according to the IOM, it is beyond question that 
John is thinking about the same thing in both (9) and (10), namely, that 
thing to which “Phosphorus” and “Hesperus” both refer. Nevertheless, 
it also seems unmistakably clear that this very same thing is intended 
differently in (9) and (10). Subsequently, what is needed is a means of  
accounting for this distinction.  
 At this point, one might wonder whether the notion of  intentional 
objects itself  really is insufficient to account for the idea of  an “object as 
intended.” That is, one might speculate as to whether one could simply 
answer that John is thinking about different intentional objects in (9) and 
(10). Note, first of  all, that this would not lead to a means of  accounting 
for the above distinction between (i) and (ii); instead, it would conflate 
the two. Secondly, it should be obvious that such a way out would be 
incompatible with the above characterization of  intentional objects. 
Indeed, as we defined it, intentional objects are merely what they are 
from outside of  the intentional relation. In other words, this solution 
would simply not work, because it claims that the intentional relation 
gives rise to a new kind of  object, namely, objects as intended. This is 
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incompatible with the IOM’s understanding that intentional object are 
determined from outside of  the intentional relation . 9
 According to the IOM, the mistake committed by this proposal is 
that it believes that a new kind of  object, distinct from our common-
sense worldly objects, objects as intended, must be introduced to deal 
with this feature. According to the IOM, there is another, less 
problematic way to account for aspectuality. This approach is to 
distinguish, for each intentional state, between two different things: (i) its 
intentional object, namely, what it is about; and (ii) its intentional 
content, namely, the particular way or aspect under which it intends its 
intentional object.  
 In the case of  the example just discussed, the IOM then claims 
that we must differentiate between two things. On the one hand, there is 
that thing to which both “Phosphorus” and “Hesperus” refer and that 
would constitute the intentional object of  the intentional experience in 
both cases. On the other hand, there is the particular way John is 
thinking about this thing in (9) and (10), that is, the intentional content 
of  these states. The intentional object is what transcends the intentional 
state and what it points to, while the intentional content is, in 
metaphorical terms, the specific configuration of  the mind as it intends 
an intentional object or the specific way a certain object appears, 
 Note that some accounts of  intentionality that we will not discuss in these 9
pages have proposed to treat intentional objects in just that way. Franz 
Brentano’s account of  intentionality in his Psychology from an Empirical Standpoint, 
for instance, is sometimes interpreted in that way (cf., inter alia, Chrudzimski 
2014). Such accounts, however, should be avoided because, first, they do not 
respect the phenomenological fact that what are intentionally directed upon are 
objects themselves, and not objects specially designed to be the relata of  the 
intentional relation. And, second, such accounts must be able to give us a theory 
of  the relation between the intended objects, as we may call them, and 
transcendent, real-world, objects. This, however, constitutes an unnecessary 
difficulty. 
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sensorily or conceptually, in an experience. In the case of  (9) and (10), 
John can intend the same object while his mind is in two different 
configurations, the “Phosphorus” one in (9) and the “Hesperus” one in 
(10). 
 The idea of  a “configuration of  the mind” is highly metaphoric 
but it is, hopefully, intuitive. The general idea is that there might be 
different ways to do the same thing, i.e., different ways to think about the 
same thing. This idea should of  course be made much more precise. In 
particular, much should be said about its diversity. Indeed, it is likely that 
different kinds of  intentional states, such as purely sensory and purely 
cognitive ones, have different kinds of  contents. It is also likely that the 
an intentional subject’s degree of  sophistication—i.e., whether it is a 
human or non-human intentional subject, whether it is an infant or an 
adult, and so on—do play a key role in the individuation conditions of  
these configurations. What is important, however, is to point to the fact 
that, according to the IOM, the introduction of  intentional contents 
does not amount to the introduction of  a new kind of  objects, in the 
sense of  a new kind of  things that intentional states are about. Indeed, 
intentional contents are not what intentional states are about. Rather, 
they are about intentional objects, but there are different ways of  being 
about the same intentional object. 
 This introduces an important modification to our above 
discussion of  the conditions of  individuation of  intentional experiences. 
We said that intentional experiences are individuated in terms of  what 
they are about, i.e., their intentional object. However, the existence of  
aspectuality demonstrates that this cannot be the full story. Indeed, 
according to the IOM, two distinct experiences—thinking about 
Phosphorus and thinking about Hesperus—will be individuated as 
tokens of  different kinds of  experiences. But this could not be the case 
if  intentional experiences were individuated solely in terms of  their 
intentional objects, as these two experiences are about the very same 
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thing, namely, that to which “Phosphorus” and “Hesperus” co-refer. 
What the introduction of  the notion of  intentional content reveals, 
according to the IOM, is that intentional experiences must be 
individuated more finely than by their intentional object. They must be 
conjointly individuated by their intentional object and their individual 
contents. Thinking about Phosphorus and thinking about Hesperus are 
tokens of  dissimilar kinds of  experiences. Despite the fact that they are 
about the same thing, they are tokens of  different types of  intentional 
contents—a Phosphorus content and a Hesperus content. 
 We now clarify four additional points about the notion of  content. 
While some of  these are very general and should apply to any notion of  
content, others concern the IOM’s specific means of  implementing that 
notion.  
 First of  all, the general idea of  intentional content is not 
proprietary to the IOM. The way that the IOM conceives of  intentional 
content is certainly original, but the idea that something like a notion of  
content should be introduced for a theory of  intentionality to be capable 
of  accounting for aspectuality is not unique to the IOM. Each notion of  
content, however, must face the same worry. In a nutshell, intentional 
objects and intentional contents are conceptually distinct notions, but we 
do not possess expressive means for properly distinguishing between 
them. This may give rise to some difficulties in getting a firm grip on the 
distinction.  
 For instance, when asked about the intentional object of  (9), 
Phosphorus is a correct answer. But Phosphorus would also be a correct 
answer if  one inquired about its intentional content. This, of  course, does 
not mean that we have provided the same answer in both cases. An 
intentional content is not, apart from exceptional cases in which one is 
thinking about intentional contents, an intentional object. At this point, 
philosophy hits the barriers of  language. Even though there is a 
conceptual distinction between intentional objects and intentional 
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contents, this distinction is clothed in an air of  ineffability. Horgan, 
Graham, and Tienson summarize this point as follows: 
The object of  an intentional attitude qua intentional object cannot be 
identified independently of  the content. It can only be identified from 
the inside, as it were, the content. (Horgan, Graham & Tienson 2009: 
521) 
This point is not new. Commenting on Frege’s distinction between sense 
and reference, which is very close to that between intentional object and 
intentional content, Michael Dummett underscores the difficulty of  
stating what the sense of  a proper name would be: 
It has become a standard complaint that Frege talks a great deal about 
the senses of  expressions, but nowhere gives an account of  what 
constitutes such a sense. This complaint is partly unfair: for Frege the 
sense of  an expression is the manner in which we determine its 
reference, and he tells us a great deal about the kind of  reference 
possessed by expressions of  different types, thereby specifying the form 
that the senses of  such expressions must take. It is true enough, 
however, that he says practically nothing about what the senses of  
different expressions consist in; and this is a legitimate ground of  
complaint. Indeed, even when Frege is purporting to give the sense of  a word or 
symbol, what he actually states is what its reference is; and, for anyone who has not 
clearly grasped the distinction between sense and reference, this fact makes his hold on 
the notion of  sense precarious. The sense of  an expression is the mode of  
presentation of  the referent: in saying what the referent is, we have to 
choose a particular way of  saying this, a particular means of  determining 
something as the referent. In a case in which we are concerned to 
convey, or stipulate, the sense of  an expression, we shall choose that 
means of  stating what the reference is which displays the sense: we might 
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borrow here a famous pair of  terms from the Tractatus, and say that, for 
Frege, we say what the referent is, and thereby show what its sense is. 
(Dummett 1973: 227 – italics added) 
The same remark applies to the distinction between intentional objects 
and intentional contents. One cannot state what the intentional object of  
a certain intentional act is except in a certain way. There is no neutral or 
absolute way to state what is the intentional object of  a certain 
intentional experience. Hence, one must always pick a particular means 
of  identifying the intentional object. By stating what the object is, one 
thereby shows under what intentional mode this intentional object is 
thought about. 
 The second point concerns the specific way that the IOM cashes 
out the notion of  content. That is, according to the IOM, an intentional 
content is the way in which a certain intentional object is presented. 
Hence, the notion of  intentional content is defined in terms of  the 
notion of  an intentional object. The idea, however, is not that the former 
concept can replace the latter concept. Instead, the notion of  intentional 
content complements the notion of  intentional objects. In other words, 
according to the IOM, to fully individuate an intentional state, one must 
not only identify what the object is about, i.e., its intentional object, but 
also state its intentional content, i.e., the way one intends a certain 
intentional object. As Tim Crane puts it: 
I need this distinction [between intentional object and intentional 
content] because neither directedness nor aspectual shape on their own is 
enough to characterize what I mean by the subject’s perspective on the 
world. Directedness on an object alone is not enough because there are 
many ways a mind can be directed on the same intentional object. And 
aspectual shape alone cannot define intentionality, since an aspect is by 
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definition the aspect under which an intentional object (the object of  
thought) is presented. (Crane 2001: 29) 
Formally speaking, the distinction betwee intentional objectsand 
intentional contents is then treated as the addition of  a term to the 
intentional relation, which becomes a triadic relation. In other words, 
intentional experiences are no longer conceived as dyadic relations that 
obtain between intentional experiences, or their bearers, and intentional 
objects. Rather, they are triadic relations that obtain between intentional 
subjects, intentional contents, and intentional objects. An intentional 
object, hence, is intended by an intentional subject under a certain 
aspect, as captured by the notion of  content. 
 Thirdly, a central distinction between intentional objects and 
intentional contents concerns the way that we access them. In other 
words, what is appeared to us in an intentional experience, what the 
experience is about—its direct object, to use a grammatical label—is its 
intentional object. In short, awareness of  intentional objects is a direct 
kind of  awareness. It is a matter of  being aware of  something. 
Intentional contents, on the other hand, are not routinely presented to 
the intentional subject in such a way. That is, according to the IOM, 
when one thinks about an intentional object, this object appears to the 
subject. However, intentional experiences do not feature additional 
appearances of  intentional contents.  
 Of  course, one could be presented with an intentional content. 
This, however, is an ambiguous claim. On the one hand, one could be 
presented with an intentional content in the sense of  being intentionally 
directed upon that content, i.e., if  one turns an intentional content into 
an intentional object. On the other hand, however, one must recognize a 
second sense in which one could be presented with an intentional 
content. That is, by being about an intentional object, an intentional 
experience is an appearance, sensory or cognitive, of  an intentional 
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object. Admittedly, however, an intentional experience also constitutes an 
implicit or indirect appearance of  an intentional content.  
 That is, since one cannot be intentionally directed upon something 
but under some aspect, then for each intentional experience, an 
intentional object is presented under some aspect. The intentional object, 
however, is not presented as distinct from the aspect under which it is 
presented. From the point of  view of  the intentional subject, there is 
only one thing one is presented with: the intentional object as it is 
presented. That is, one is presented with an intentional content, but one 
is not intentionally directed onto that content. In other words, one is 
intentionally directed through that content but is not intentionally 
directed upon it. By being intentionally directed through a content, 
hence, one is indirectly presented with it. As John Tienson puts it: 
There can, of  course, be presentations of  content, but such 
presentations can only be indirect, as the content through which such 
and such object is presented. (Tienson 2013: 486) 
Explicit or direct awareness of  an intentional content can then occur as 
one realizes that the structure of  intentional states distinguishes between 
intentional objects and intentional contents. At that point, one can 
hypostatize intentional contents and turn them into intentional objects.  
 Fourthly and finally, one may choose to discharge this notion of  
“configuration of  the mind,” or content, in different ways. However, at 
minimum, what accounts for this idea of  configuration should make 
room for the notion that contents are non-transparent. By transparent 
contents we mean the idea that if  a same intentional object O can be 
presented by two different contents C and C’, then it is impossible for an 
intentional subject to ignore that C and C’ actually present the very same 
intentional object. Transparent contents, in other words, wear their 
intentional object on their sleeve. But if  intentional contents were indeed 
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transparent, we could not use them to account for cases like the that of  
(9 and (10). In other words, the notion of  content must allow an 
intentional subject to ignore that two distinct contents present the very 
same object.  
 In summary, introducing the notion of  intentional content 
permits the IOM to offer a second interpretation of  the FIS. This 
interpretation accounts for both aboutness and aspectuality. This second, 
more complex interpretation is as follows:  
IOM schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x stands in the relation 
of  ‘being about’ to an intentional object y, and for some content 
C, C presents y to x.”  
Having introduced this second interpretation, the next-subsection 
evaluates how it fares with respect to the remaining of  the features of  
intentionality we introduced in Chapter 1.  
5.3 The IOM and Semantic Normativity 
Semantic normativity is the feature of  intentionality according to which 
at least some intentional states can be evaluated as meeting, or failing to 
meet, a certain semantic norm. The notion of  content again plays an 
important role in explaining the existence of  semantic normativity.  
 Indeed, each intentional object that is being thought about is 
being thought about in a certain way, as captured by the notion of  
content. There is, however, no reason to think that contents always 
match intentional objects’ features. That is, there is no justification for 
believing each way of  thinking about an object indicates how that object 
really is. In that sense, some contents can be, for example, false or 
inaccurate. According to the IOM, this explains semantic normativity’s 
existence.  
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 Take the following case. Walking by night on the streets of  
Fribourg, John sees at a certain distance something he takes to be a fox. 
He then forms the belief  that there is a fox in front of  him. At it 
happens, however, what John takes to be a fox is, in fact, nothing but a 
piece of  trash lying on the sidewalk. The content of  his intentional state 
thus presented its intentional object in an inaccurate manner. Namely, 
the piece of  trash in front of  him is not a fox, even though it was 
presented to John as such. The idea, then, is that the IOM possesses the 
resources to account for semantic normativity in terms of  the notion of  
content. 
5.4 The IOM and Intentional Identity 
Intentional identity is that feature by virtue of  which we can say that we 
are thinking about a shared world. That is, it permits us to say that we are 
thinking about the same thing. According to the IOM, this feature is, at 
least at first glance, quite easy to grasp. Indeed, two intentional subjects 
can be said to be thinking about the same thing only if  they are thinking 
about the same intentional object. Moreover, granted that the nature of  
intentional objects is determined from the outside of  the intentional 
relation, then nobody’s thinking impinges on what anyone thinks about. 
There is then no obstacles to the claim that we can think about the same 
things. As we shall see in the next chapter, moreover, a strength of  the 
IOM is that it can extends this treatment of  intentionality to cases in 
which non-existence kicks in.   
5.5 The IOM and Generality 
We can think about many different kinds of  things. In other words, we 
can have intentional objects of  many kinds. A problem, however, is that 
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there seems to be more kinds of  intentional objects than kinds of  things. 
Generality is an instance of  this problem. Let us take the following 
example: 
(11) John desires a beer.  
According to the IOM, this instance of  intentionality amounts to the 
claim that a relation of  “being about,” under the determining guise of  
desire, obtains between one of  John’s experiences (or John himself), an 
intentional object, and an intentional content that presents the object in 
some way. The problem at hand, however, concerns the nature of  the 
intentional object. Indeed, what kind of  intentional object is “a beer?” 
And how can it satisfy John’s desire? 
 The problem can be expressed more precisely as following. 
Following the letter of  the IOM, it seems that (3) should be analyzed as 
following: “Desires (John, a beer, [a beer] ),” where “a beer” is treated as 10
an individual constant referring to a particular element of  the domain. 
This, however, raises two problems. First, it does not seem that there is 
anything in the domain that corresponds to “a beer.” That is, there 
certainly are many particular beers that exist but it does not seem as if  a 
general, or indefinite, beer also exists in addition to these. Particular 
instances of  beer are are all the beers that there are. Second, it seems 
mistaken to interpret John as needing a particular indeterminate thing to 
satisfy the desire as expressed in (1). That is, only a determinate beer 
would satisfy John’s desire. It is just that there is no particular beer that is 
required for his satisfaction, or, as we may put it, the identity conditions 
of  a particular beer do not figure in the conditions of  satisfaction of  his 
desire. A such, it seems that applying naively the IOM schema to 
instances of  generality creates troubles for the IOM.  
 Square contents denote the intentional content of  the state. 10
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 Can the IOM account for generality in some other way? As 
Chapter 6’s discussion of  a non-relational version of  a theory that 
irreducibly describe intentional experiences in terms of  the notion of  
intentional object will make clear, there might be a way to simply accept 
at face value the following conjunction: (i) the intentional object of  (11) 
is literally a beer and (ii) there is no such thing as an indeterminate beer. 
The relational version of  the IOM, however, must find another answer. 
This solution should not result in the postulation that indeterminate 
objects serve as the semantic value of  indefinite noun phrases, such as “a 
beer.” As mentioned above, this would simply fail to deliver the right 
conditions of  satisfaction of  John’s desire.  
 Thus, the only way out for the IOM is to look for a relatum that is 
determinate and nonetheless possesses the necessary properties required 
to yield suitable conditions of  satisfaction for an instance of  
intentionality such as John’s desire in (11). According to the IOM, this 
can be done by endorsing the claim that (11) is a description of  John’s 
intentional experience that is elliptic for the one that John’s desire is, in 
fact, about the existential fact that he has beer. Accordingly, (11) would 
then amount to the following: 
 (12) John desires that he has a beer.  
According to the IOM, this would allow us to claim both that John’s 
desire has a relata of  a determinate nature, namely an existential fact and 
not an indeterminate beer, and that John’s desire would be satisfied just 
in case he is handed any particular beer and not an indeterminate object. 
This is achieved in virtue of  the fact that the fact that John has a beer 
has a the following logical form: ∃(x) Beer (x) & Has (John, x). That fact 
would then obtain just in case its existentially quantified part gets a 
witness – that is, any witness that meets the requirements of  being a 
beer. 
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 At this point, one might fear the IOM getting out of  its track and 
committing itself  to a conceptual analysis with problematic 
phenomenological consequences. However, some phenomenological 
observations support this claim about the logical form of  an intentional 
experience expressed by means of  indefinite expressions. Imagine Henry 
sees a specific ice cream—let us call it Creamy—in someone’s hand. 
Creamy looks delicious, and Henry forms the desire to eat it. That is, he 
forms the desire to eat the very ice cream he sees in someone’s else 
hands, Creamy, and not anything else. Compare this desire with another 
one: namely, Henry’s desire to eat any ice cream, although formed upon 
seeing Creamy in someone else’s hand. This latter desire is not one for 
Creamy itself  but, rather, for anything relevantly similar to it. In other 
words, Henry does not want to grab Creamy out of  someone else’s hand 
and eat it but, rather, wants to acquire a numerically distinct ice-cream 
for himself.  
 Now, it is natural enough to describe the first of  these desires as 
being about a particular ice cream: namely, Creamy. But what about the 
second? Does it seem natural to describe it as a desire for a particular, yet 
indefinite, thing? We could plausibly deny this claim by saying that 
desires expressed with indefinites are primarily about oneself, that is, 
about facts obtaining about oneself, rather than about indeterminate 
things. For instance, if  Henry desires to have ice cream, then 
phenomenologically speaking it seems much more plausible that he 
desires that the fact that he has ice cream obtains rather than that he 
desires a particular, though indefinite, ice cream.  
  If  these remarks are correct, then generality does not constitutes 
a problem for the IOM. It is not, however, completely unproblematic. 
Indeed, unless one believes that all facts, including future ones, exist at all 
times, understanding Henry’s desire for ice cream as a desire for the 
existential fact of  having ice cream seems to be comprehending it as a 
desire for a fact that does not (yet) obtain. Accordingly, this analysis of  
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indefinites delivers the IOM both the relationality and the semantic 
indefiniteness for which it longs. However, by way of  compensation, it 
commits the IOM to the claim that there are non-obtaining facts to 
which we can stand in relation. In other words, according to the IOM, 
the problem of  indefinites collapses into the problem of  non-existence. 
This is the issue that the next sub-section will address.  
5.6 The IOM and the Problem of  Non-Existence 
The last feature that we shall discuss is non-existence, namely, the fact 
that intentional states can be about things that exist as much as they can 
be about things that do not exist. Consequently, by virtue of  non-
existence, it follows that for anything that we can think about, that thing 
either does or does not exist. This is a mere fact about intentionality. 
 The IOM, however, cashes out this fact in a particular way. 
Indeed, when conjoined with the general application of  the IOM 
schema, the claim that we can think about things that do not exist yields 
the thesis that some intentional objects do not exist. Accordingly, the 
IOM does not simply claim that we can think about things that do not 
exist. It also states that there are things that do not exist, and that we can 
stand in the “being about” relation to them.    
  This constitutes a difficult challenge. Indeed, it forces the IOM to 
give us an acceptable account of  the literal truth of  the claim that “there 
are things that do not exist, and that we can stand in the ‘being about’ 
relation to them.” This challenge, however, constitutes the main point of  
disagreement between the IOM and its adversaries. These latter claim 
that this requires the IOM to endorse a Meinongian theory of  objects 
that, to use Karel Lambert’s phrase, cannot “keep the line between 
fantasy and philosophy.”(Lambert 1983: 1) 
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 In the next chapter, we discuss in some details Meinongianism and 
develop some main lines of  criticism against it. We shall then have to 
suspend our evaluation of  the IOM up to this point.  
6. Conclusion 
In the second chapter, we covered the following ground: First, we 
discussed some reasons for treating intentionality as a relation. Second, 
we offered a first, basic, interpretation of  the FIS according to which for 
an intentional experience to be about something essentially is for it to 
stand in the determinable “being about” relation to an intentional object. 
Third, we inquired as to whether this first interpretation of  the FIS was 
strong enough to account for the six features of  intentionality identified 
in Chapter 1. We saw that if  it could account for aboutness to some 
degree, it could not account for aspectuality. We then proposed a second, 
slightly more complex, interpretation of  the FIS, which we called the 
IOM schema. This second interpretation differed from the first in that it 
introduced a third relata—intentional contents—to the intentional 
relation. Fourth, we inquired whether this second interpretation was 
strong enough to account for intentionality’s other features. The results, 
however, were mixed. Indeed, as we saw, this second interpretation 
stumbles on the problem of  non-existence. Indeed, since the IOM 
schema asserts that all instances of  intentionality are relations to 
intentional objects, it follows from non-existence that some instances of  
intentionality are relations to non-existent intentional objects. This, 
however, is a substantial claim and a final evaluation of  the IOM must be 
postponed until after our investigation of  the Meinongian claims that: (i) 
there are objects that do not exist, and (ii) we can stand in relation to 
them. The next chapter takes up these questions.  
Chapter 3: Meinongianism 
A relational account of  the intentionality of  mental 
acts, however, runs immediately into the problem of  
nonexistent objects. This problem arises because the 
nature of  the relation clashes with the nature of  
intentionality. Relations seem to require existing terms, 
while mental acts can intend nonexistent objects and 
circumstances. Can these two features be reconciled? I 
do not think so.  
    (Grossmann 1984: 45)  
1. Introduction 
Some intentional experiences are about things that do not exist. This 
simply is a fact about intentionality. However, coupled with the claim 
that all instances of  intentionality are instances of  the IOM schema 
introduced in the previous chapter, this fact yields the following 
substantial conclusion: Some intentional states are relations to non-
existent intentional objects. This conclusion commits the IOM to the 
truth of  the following two theses: 
(i) Some intentional objects do not exist; and:  
(ii) Non-existent intentional objects can be the relata of  the 
relation of  “being about.”  
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Let us assume that the IOM schema correctly captures the nature of  
intentionality and that the following is true: “John thinks about Pegasus.” 
From this, (i) can be inferred as follows:  
1) John thinks about Pegasus; 
2) Pegasus does not exist; 
3) Hence, some intentional object about which John is thinking does 
not exist.  
The second thesis, on the other hand, simply follows from the claim that 
intentionality is a relation. That is, if  (a) intentionality is a relation, (b) the 
statement “John thinks about Pegasus” is true, and (c) Pegasus does not 
exist, then (d) it follows that there is a relation that obtains between John 
and Pegasus, despite the fact that Pegasus does not exist. This, however, 
contradicts the intuitive principle that only things that exist can have 
properties and stand in relation to each other—what we, in Chapter 2, 
referred to as “Malebranche principle”.  
 Being committed to (i) and (ii), the IOM now faces the challenge 
of  explaining why they are true. In other words, the IOM must be able 
to philosophically defend both (i) and (ii). In this chapter, we shall 
discuss the standard means of  achieving this, namely, the endorsement 
of  Meinongianism, a body of  doctrine initiated by the Austrian 
philosopher Alexius Meinong and later developed by a series of  
followers including, Richard Routley (Routley 1980), Terence Parsons 
(Parsons 1980), and, more recently, Graham Priest (Priest 2005) and 
Francesco Berto (Berto 2013). 
 We shall not, however, aim at faithfully interpreting the historical 
Meinong himself. Nor shall we attempt to discuss any possible version 
of  Meinongianism—a task for an inquiry of  its own. Rather, we shall 
present a general overview of  the main tenets of  Meinongianism, which 
will allow us to cover if  not all, at least most, versions of  it.  
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 The chapter is divided into two parts: an expository and a critical 
one. The expository part is composed of  four sections, each introducing 
one main tenet of  Meinongianism. We first clarify the notion of  
nonexistence as understood by Meinongians before turning to three 
central Meinongian metaphysical principles: (a) the principle of  
indifference, (b) the principle of  independence, and (c) the 
characterization principle. In the critical part, we discuss two kinds of  
objections, inconclusive and conclusive ones. While the inconclusive 
objections are not sufficient to dismiss Meinongianism, they nonetheless 
allow us to better grasp its nature and commitments. From the 
conclusive objections, however, we can conclude that the endorsement 
of  Meinongianism has problematic consequences that one should rather 
avoid. Moreover, since the IOM is bound to endorse Meinongianism to 
be able to account for the above theses (i) and (ii), this creates 
insuperable difficulties for its interpretation of  the FIS.  
2. Non-Existence 
In this section, we introduce Meinongianism in general terms by means 
of  four theses, (T4)-(T7). We start with the general thesis of  
Meinongianism, which can be expressed as follows: 
(T4) Not all objects about which we can know truths and be 
intentionally directed upon exist, and some of  them do not exist at 
all. 
What kind of  theory is Meinongianism? That is, what kind of  thesis is 
(T4) expressing? This is a complex question, and Meinongians 
themselves are not united in their answers to it. Does Meinongianism 
amount to an ontological theory, or is it something else altogether? That 
is, is Meinongianism encouraging us to substantially augment our 
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ontology? Or, in contrast, is Meinongianism, or at least some versions of  
it, compatible with a rather frugal ontology?  
 If  the first is the case, then Meinongianism can be said to defend 
the claim that we are ontologically committed to more things that those 
that exist. In other words, when ontologists compile the complete list of  
the kinds of  things that there are, they must take into account not only 
those things we know to exist, like mountains, tables, and chairs, but also 
those kinds of  things that do not exist, of  which, for instance, the green 
dragon hovering around the room which I am currently hallucinating is 
an instance.  
 If  the second is the case, however, then Meinongianism is not a 
theory of  interest to practitioners of  ontology—or at least not for the 
exact same reasons. That is, when Meinongians say that there are things 
like the green dragon I am now hallucinating, they are not saying that 
expressions like “there is” or “there are,” when utilized to express claims 
like, “there is a green dragon hovering around the room right now,” are 
used in the same sense as when used to express claims like, “there are 
mountains in Switzerland.”  
 Our take on these two possible options should be rather 
opinionated. There is, in fact, a fundamental problem with interpreting 
Meinongianism as an ontological theory. Ontology is virtually universally 
defined as the theory of  what has being, and Meinongianism—at least in 
its original form—recommends countenancing not only what exists, in 
any possible sense of  the word, but also what does not exist, in the 
strong sense of  not possessing any kind of  positive ontological status at 
all—neither existence, being, nor anything else. Hence, interpreting de 
facto Meinongianism as an ontological theory seems uncharitable. If  this 
is correct, then Meinong is not making an ontological claim when 
summarizing his view in a famous passage of  “The Theory of  Objects,” 
saying:  
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Those who like paradoxical modes of  expressions could very well say: 
“There are objects of  which it is true that there are no such 
objects.” (Meinong 1960: 83) 
Rather, under this interpretation, Meinong is pointing to the fact that the 
two occurrences of  the quantifier “There are” are not used in the same 
sense. The first one is used in a non-ontological way, while the second is 
used in an ontological way.  
 Nevertheless, if  Meinongianism is not an ontological theory, what 
else could it be? Our interpretative starting point is that Meinongianism 
should be interpreted as a theory of  quantification. In particular, 
Meinongianism amounts to a theory of  absolutely unrestricted 
quantifiers and their domain. From the Meinongian perspective, and 
contrary to a common doctrine discussed below, quantification does not 
constitute the premises of  an ontological theory, i.e., a theory about what 
possess any kind of  positive ontological status .  11
 First, what is the difference between a restricted and an 
unrestricted quantifier? Quantifiers range over a certain domain. 
Moreover, this domain can either be the overall domain of  quantification 
or a contextually restricted portion of  it. Restricted quantifiers are thus 
those quantifiers that we use to range over a contextually restricted 
portion of  the overall domain, while unrestricted quantifiers range over 
absolutely everything.  
 Take the following example of  restricted quantification: Within 
the context of  a party, someone says, “All the beer has been drunk.” 
This person’s statement is true. It is, however, compatible with the fact 
 We shall use the notion of  a positive ontological status in order to remain 11
neutral with respect to the distinction between being and existence, endorsed by 
some Meinongian, such as Meinong himself, but rejected by others, such as 
Routley (1980) and Priest (2005), as this distinction shall not play any important 
role for us. 
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that there is more beer available to purchase at the supermarket. That 
speaker, however, is not contradicting herself  by both saying that all the 
beer has been drunk and that not all the beer has been drunk. Rather, her 
first use of  the quantifier is contextually restricted to that sub-part of  the 
overall domain of  quantification which is the party. When restricted to 
that portion of  the domain, her assertion is correct, but when that 
contextual restriction is lifted, it turns out to be false.  
 What about unrestricted quantifiers? Another interpretation of  
the sentence, “All the beer has been drunk,” is available. Namely, 
someone could utter it with the aim of  asserting that not only has the 
party run out of  beer but also the entire universe has gone dry, down to 
the very last drop. Thus, unlike restricted quantifiers, unrestricted 
quantifiers are not contextually restricted to a certain portion of  the 
whole domain of  quantification. Absolutely everything falls within their 
range, e.g., every single drop of  beer.  
 According to the interpretation we will defend here, 
Meinongianism is to be understood as a theory of  absolutely unrestricted 
quantification. It is a theory about what such quantifiers can quantify 
over, and consequently, it indicates what sentences can be regarded as 
true. In particular, Meinongianism countenances the claim that the 
boundaries of  our overall domain of  quantification are not constituted 
by the boundaries of  our ontology. There is, on the one hand, that to 
which we are ontologically committed. On the other hand, there is that 
over which we can quantify .  12
 That we are not interested in interpreting the historical Meinong should be 12
obvious here as Meinong does not frame his theory within a formal logic 
apparatus. However, what we mean here is that this is what Meinong does mean 
once we do express his view from within such a framework. Or, better 
expressed, what Meinong does mean about quantification in a vernacular 
language and its best translation into a formal language. 
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 What is the underlying motivation behind Meinongianism? The 
answer to this question is multipronged, but a key impetus behind it 
stems from the fact that quantificational expressions in the vernacular 
clearly and abundantly quantify over both existent and non-existent 
things. Among many possible examples, the following two natural 
language sentences certainly are grammatically well-formed, commonly 
regarded as true, and at least intuitively, quantify over things that do not 
exist (although, as we shall see in §3.7.2, anti-Meinongians have 
contested this intuition):  
 (1) Some things do not exist. 
 (2) Not everything exists.  
On top of  that, there also seems to be a range of  predicative operations 
on domains that do not seem to presuppose existence, such as: 
 (3) Pegasus does not exist.  
and, granted that Pegasus does not exist:  
 (4) Pegasus has wings. 
Some interpretations of  the nature of  quantifiers, moreover, treat these 
as mere devices of  generalization. Hence, if  (3) and (4) are true, we can 
infer that some things do not exist and that some non-existent things 
have wings.  
 Of  course, all of  these claims are open to refutation. 
Nevertheless, according to Meinongianism, there is no way but to take 
them as our starting point. Indeed, according to Meinongianism, we 
must take these facts as a sign that the overall domain over which we can 
quantify is not equivalent to the domain of  things that possess a positive 
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ontological status. Whatever the most generous ontology countenances, 
it would still be incomplete in terms of  the things over which we can 
quantify and predicate. Quantification and ontology drift apart and, 
hence, the former is by no means a safe guide to the latter.  
 Such an account is far from trivial. It flatly contradicts Quine’s 
famous, and now standard, claim made in the opening of  his landmark 
paper, “On What There Is”: 
A curious thing about the ontological problem is its simplicity. It can be put 
in three Anglo-Saxon monosyllables: “What is there?” It can be answered, 
moreover, in a word—“Everything”—and everyone will accept this answer 
as true. (Quine 1953: 1) 
Indeed, according to Meinongianism, it is not the case that everything is 
there if, like Quine, we understand the question “What is there?,” as an 
ontological one. Indeed, not everything exists and, hence, it is not the 
case that everything is there in Quine’s sense. Indeed, according to 
Meinongianism, the “overall inventory of  what there is,” to use an 
expression coined by Alberto Voltolini (Voltolini 2006: ix)—the domain 
of  absolutely unrestricted quantification—contains both things that exist 
and things that do not exist. Existence, therefore, does not constitute the 
outside border of  the things over which we can quantify, as Quine has it. 
Rather, it is a genuine property that can discriminate between things we 
quantify over. In other words, according to Meinongianism, when we say 
“everything” in a purely unrestricted way we are not, pace Quine, giving 
an answer to an ontological question but, rather, pointing to everything 
that can be quantified over, either existing or not.  
 But what exactly does our overall domain of  quantification 
contain if  not the full extent of  the ontologist’s list? Is there a systematic 
way to determine what it comprises? According to Meinongianism, there 
is an answer to these questions, but it is not one which we can reach 
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through any standard kind of  inquiry, i.e., either an empirical or a 
metaphysical investigation. On the contrary, to answer that question we 
need a completely different kind of  theory which Meinong himself  calls 
a “theory of  objects.” As he puts it in his most famous essay:  
If  we remember how metaphysics has always been conceived as 
including in its subject matter the farthest and the nearest, the greatest 
and the smallest alike, we may be surprised to be told that metaphysics 
cannot take on such a task [of  being a theory of  objects]. It may sound 
strange to hear that metaphysics is not universal enough for a science of  
Objects… For the intentions of  metaphysics have been universal (a fact 
which has often been disastrous to its success). Without doubt, 
metaphysics has to do with everything that exists. However, the totality 
of  what exists, included what existed and will exist, is infinitely small in 
comparison with the totality of  Objects of  knowledge. This fact easily 
goes unnoticed, probably because the lively interest in reality which is 
part of  our nature tends to favor that exaggeration which finds the non-
real a mere nothing – or, more precisely, which finds the non-real to be 
something for which science has no application or at least no application 
of  any worth. (Meinong 1960: 79)  
In this passage, Meinong is very explicit. There is, according to him, 
something that deserves to be called a “theory of  objects” and whose 
domain is broader than metaphysics itself, which is only concerned with 
what exists. The totality of  what exists, however, is infinitely small in 
comparison to the totality with which the theory of  objects is concerned. 
Indeed, the theory of  objects addresses a significantly larger domain of  
Meinongian unrestricted quantification. As Meinong puts it, this domain 
contains everything that can be an object of  knowledge. The following thesis 
encapsulates this idea: 
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(T5) The nature of  our overall domain of  quantification must be 
determined by a separate kind of  science, a theory of  objects, 
whose concern is not everything that exists but, rather, everything 
that can be an object of  knowledge.  
“Knowledge” is a rather big word and upon getting acquainted with 
(T5), one might justifiably take it to be pretty crazy. However, one should 
not be fooled by Meinong’s usage of  the expression “object of  
knowledge.” Indeed, he does not mean that one can gain substantial 
knowledge from a theory of  objects—that is, knowledge of  the type one 
could gain regarding things that possess any sort of  positive ontological 
status. Rather, the kind of  knowledge relevant to (T5) is, as he puts it, 
“utterly lacking in natural interest” (Meinong 1960: 82). To put it in other 
words, what he means by “object of  knowledge” is loosely equivalent to 
“something that can be thought about.” However, he eschews the purely 
psychological talk and is adamant to couch his theory in epistemic terms 
because he takes it that thinking is, in some admittedly strange way, a way 
to acquire knowledge of  what is in our domain of  quantification anyway. 
His use of  an epistemically charged language is explained by the fact that 
to know something about objects in a way that is utterly lacking in 
natural interest is, according to Meinong, still knowledge of  mind-
independent and public objects.  
 Indeed, according to Meinong, what is to be found in the most 
general domain of  quantification does not depend on us in any sense. 
On the contrary, the content of  this most general domain is determined 
completely independent of  us, and it is up to the theory of  objects to 
discover what exactly this most general domain contains. That said, it is 
true that the starting point of  historical Meinongianism lies in the theory 
of  intentionality, as Meinong subscribes to the IOM and takes it for 
granted that there must be some objects that do not exist. Indeed, as he 
noted at the beginning of  ‘The Theory of  Objects’: 
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That knowing is impossible without something being known, and more 
generally, that judgments and ideas or presentations (Vorstellungen) are 
impossible without being judgments about and presentations of  something, is 
revealed to be self-evident by a quite elementary examination of  these 
experiences. (Meinong 1960: 76–emphasis added) 
It would be a mistake, however, to interpret Meinong as inferring his 
distinctively Meinongian theory from his theory of  intentionality. There 
might be, of  course, genetic reasons related to intentionality that led him 
to develop his theory of  objects, but it would be a mistake to interpret it 
as dependent upon his theory of  intentionality. On the contrary, 
according to Meinong, that non-existent objects play a role in the theory 
of  intentionality is just a particular instance of  a much more general fact 
that goes beyond intentionality. This is the fact that, completely 
independently of  us, some things do not exist.   
 In other words, Meinongianism is neither an ontological theory 
nor a theory of  intentionalia, i.e., of objects that would have to be added to 
the overall inventory of  what there is merely to serve as the relata of  a 
sub-class of  intentional experiences: namely, those that are about things 
that do not exist. From a systematic point of  view, it is instead the other 
way around. It is because a proper understanding of  the domain of  
unrestricted quantification allows for non-existent objects in a 
completely mind-independent way that there can be non-existent 
intentional objects. As Meinong claims a few pages later in “The Theory 
of  Objects”: 
If  we were now to maintain the aforementioned subjectivity of  sense-
qualities, we could speak of  the object of  a presentation of  blue only in 
the sense of  something which is a capacity of  that presentation, from 
which reality withholds, as it were, the opportunity for its realization…
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However, I cannot conceal from myself  at present the fact that it is no more 
necessary to an Object that it be presented in order not to exist than it is for it to 
exist. (Meinong 1960: 83–emphasis added) 
Hence, a theory of  objects is concerned with what Meinong calls “the 
object taken as such and in general” (Meinong 1960: 78), and taken as 
such, an object is not mind-dependent. The object taken as such is as 
independent of  the mind as any other commonsensical object. Also, the 
object as such is not an object understood in an ontological sense, i.e., an 
object to which we are ontologically committed. Rather, it is an object 
that is there independently of  us, upon which we can be intentionally 
directed, about which we can know things in Meinong’s non-substantial 
use of  that verb, and, finally, of  which we can assert, or deny, a positive 
ontological status. Accordingly, Meinong maintains that such an object is 
not yet an of  concern for ontology. This leads us to the following 
important thesis, to which we shall return in the next section: 
(T6) The target domain of  a theory of  objects are mind-
independent—and, especially, intentionality-independent—objects 
about which we can think and of  which we can gain knowledge 
prior to the determination of  their ontological status.  
Accordingly, contrary to a widespread misunderstanding, Meinong’s 
account does not collapse into that put forward by the young Russell, 
who believed for awhile that everything over which we can quantify and 
about which we can think and talk, existent or not, must have some form 
of  being. As Russell asserts in the Principles of  Mathematics: 
Whatever may be an object of  thought, or may occur in any true or false 
proposition, or can be counted as one, I call a term. This, then, is the 
widest word in the philosophical vocabulary. I shall use as synonymous 
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with it the words unit, individual and entity. The first two emphasize the 
fact that every term is one, while the third is derived from the fact that 
every term has being, i.e. is in some sense. A man, a moment, a number, a 
class, a relation, a chimaera, or anything else that can be mentioned, is 
sure to be a term; and to deny that such and such a thing is a term must 
always be false. (Russell 2010: 44-45) 
In this passage, Russell claims that any constituent of  a proposition must 
possess some kind of  being. In contrast, Meinong strictly rejects this 
doctrine. As he puts it: 
Instead of  deriving the being of  an Object from the being of  an 
Objective… it would be better to conclude from the facts with which we 
are concerned that…the being of  an Objective is not by any means 
universally dependent upon the being of  its Object. (Meinong 1960: 85) 
Meinong’s notion of  an “objective” corresponds to the Russellian notion 
of  a proposition, i.e., objectives are what can be asserted. However, 
Meinong is very clear: He thinks that an objective, such as Pegasus does not 
exist, can be a true and existent objective, even if  all the constituents of  
this objective do not exist. Indeed, he thinks that the being of  an 
objective is not universally dependent upon the being of  the object with 
which an objective is concerned. Hence, Meinong’s doctrine is different 
from Russell’s. Not everything over which we can quantify and about 
which we can talk must have some king of  being.  
 Finally, we claimed above that, according to Meinong, the task of  
a theory of  objects is to discover the elements of  its domain. Moreover, 
we also stated that the methodology of  a theory of  objects was neither 
the one of  empirical sciences nor the one of  metaphysics. How, then, 
should Meinongianism proceed? Meinong’s answer is straightforward: we 
should employ an axiomatic method. That is, we should work our way 
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towards some self-evident axioms and derive valid conclusions from 
them—among which, Meinong was adamant, will follow the sound basis 
for the truth of  Meinongianism. In other words, according to 
Meinongianism, a theory of  objects can deliver a systematic answer 
regarding the nature of  our overall domain of  quantification. This 
constitutes the final preliminary thesis:  
(T7) The theory of  objects axiomatically determines the nature of  
our overall domain of  quantification. 
In the next section, we turn to the three main axioms of  a Meinongian 
theory of  objects: the principle of  indifference, the principle of  
independence, and the principle of  characterization. In the second part 
of  the chapter, we will evaluate the consistency of  these axioms with 
other independently plausible metaphysical and logical principles.  
3. The Principle of  Indifference 
The principle of  indifference is arguably the most fundamental axiom 
governing the theory of  objects. It pertains to the nature of  objects. We 
shall not try to give a sophisticated definition of  what Meinong means by 
nature. Instead, we shall merely adopt the following superficial 
characterization: A thing’s nature is that which makes a thing what it is. 
Any property that makes something that which it is constitutes part of  
its nature. By ostension: Possessing the property of  a human being 
makes me what I am and is hence part of  my nature. By comparison, 
being currently seated in the library does not make me what I am and 
hence is not part of  my nature.  
 The principle of  independence can be taken as an elucidation of  
the above (T6):  
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(T6) The target domain of  a theory of  objects are mind-
independent and intentionality independent entities as they are 
accessible to us prior to the determination of  their ontological 
status. 
Indeed, what does it mean that there are objects accessible to us prior to 
the determination of  their ontological status? Meinong cashes out this 
idea as follows: Each object has a nature. This nature, moreover, is 
always determined Außersein—literally, beyond being. In other words, we 
have a strictly a priori, rational, access to the nature of  things, prior to and 
independently of the determination of  their ontological status. By virtue of  
this fact, we can be intentionally directed upon each of  them and know 
truths about them. The most general domain of  quantification can hence 
be identified with the totality of  objects whose nature is determined 
Außersein.  
 To have a nature determined Außersein, however, is not to have a 
peculiar, deflated kind of  being. Rather, it is a condition under which we 
can determine what our overall domain of  quantification contains. Note, 
however, that by determining what there is Außersein, we do not gain 
substantial knowledge about the world, understood as the sum of  what 
does possess a positive ontological status. We only acquire non-
substantial knowledge about the content of  our overall domain of  
quantification. Hence, a theory of  objects is not an a priori inquiry into 
reality, conceived as the province of  ontology. It is something distinct 
from, and even prior, to that.  
 Indeed, if  the principle of  indifference is true, then it is therefore 
false that, as Russell claims in the above quote, whatever is spoken or 
thought about needs to have being. There is no need for anything to 
have any kind of  being to be thought about and be an object of  
knowledge. In fact, from a Meinongian perspective, it is actually the 
converse that is true: Any statement that pertains to the ontological 
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status of  an object requires that this object has been thought about prior 
to the determination of  its ontological status. As Meinong elucidates: 
Blue or any object whatsoever is somehow given prior to our determination 
of  its being or non-being, in a way that does not carry any prejudice to its non-being. 
We could also describe the situation from its psychological side in this 
way: if  I should be able to judge that a certain object is not, then I 
appear to have had to grasp the Object in some way beforehand, in order 
to say anything about its non-being, or more precisely, in order to affirm 
or to deny the ascription of  non-being to the Object. (Meinong 1960: 
84–emphasis added) 
Meinong's principle of  indifference is admittedly radical. As we shall see, 
however, it is not unprecedented. Presenting one of  its ancestors will 
provide it with some legitimacy and also help us to clarify what is unique 
to Meinong’s understanding of  the doctrine of  indifference. Thus, we 
shall first approach this principle through a brief  excursus via one of  its 
illustrious predecessors, Kant’s doctrine of  natures as exposed in his 
famous discussion of  the ontological argument in the Critique of  Pure 
Reason. After having visited these Kantian origins, we shall return to 
Meinongianism and to its radical understanding of  the doctrine of  
indifference.  
  
3.1 The Kantian Origins of  the Principle of  Indifference 
As is it well-known, the ontological argument tries to define God into 
existence. As the most perfect being, he must possess all perfections, i.e., 
all positive properties. Subsequently, he must exist. The key premise of  
this argument is that existence is a first-order property like any other. 
This claim, however, has been long contested by philosophers and, 
especially, by Kant.  
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 The point is not that existence does not work, grammatically 
speaking, like a first-order property. Indeed, from a grammatical point of  
view, “Obama speaks” and “Obama exists” seem to be of  the same 
breed: They are subject-predicate sentences. The point, rather, is that the 
similarity between existence and other properties does not extend 
beyond surface grammar. In other words, the claim is that even though 
existence might have the grammatical appearance of  a perfectly standard 
first-order predicate, this fact does not yet prove that it is one. 
 The 17th century French philosopher Pierre Gassendi formulated a 
first possible objection to the claim that existence is a standard first-
order property. He argues that existence is not a property but rather the 
pre-condition for having properties (see Persnyk 1998, chap. 2). 
Accordingly, an ontological argument that treats existence as a property 
would be mistaken on the grounds of  a blunt error of  category. The 
problem is not merely that existence is treated as a standard first-order 
property but, rather, that it is treated as a property at all.  
 Kant offers a second possible reaction to the claim that existence 
is a property. In the Critique of  Pure Reason, he famously claims that the 
ontological argument is a failure because whatever existence really is, it is 
not, in any case, a real property (Kant 2007). Hence, God cannot be 
defined into existence in terms of  possessing by definition the property of  
existence. 
 Kant characterizes the notion of  a real property as that which 
determines or characterizes an individual. In other words, according to 
Kant, a property is real if  its instantiation by an object tells us something 
about the kind of  thing that it is. For instance, the instantiation of  the 
property “being square” determines a particular and tells us something 
about the kind of  thing it is: a square thing. Hence, “being square” is a 
real property. Kant, however, denies that existence is such a real 
property, i.e., he refutes that existence tells us something about the 
determinations of  an object. It might work grammatically as a property, 
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but it does not play the role of  determining an object, and so it is not a 
real property. According to Kant: 
“Being” is obviously not a real predicate; that is, it is not a concept of  
something which could be added to the concept of  a thing. It is merely 
the positing of  a thing, or of  certain determinations, in themselves . 13
Logically, it is merely the copula of  a judgment. The proposition, “God 
is omnipotent”, contains two concepts, each of  which has its object—
God and omnipotence. The small word ‘is’ adds no new predicate, but 
only serves to posit the predicate in its relation to the subject. If, now, we 
take the subject (God), with all its predicates (among which is 
omnipotence), and say, “God is”, or, “There is a God”, we attach no new 
predicate to the concept of  God, but only posit the subject in itself  with 
all its predicates, and indeed posit as being an object in relation to my 
concept. (Kant B627|A599) 
Let us break this passage into two parts. In the first part, up to: ‘…God 
and omnipotence,’ Kant is making a point about the logical structure of  
predicative propositions. As he sees the matter, they are comprised of  
three things: two concepts, God and omnipotence, related by a copula, 
“is.” The role of  the copula is only to attribute the second concept to 
the first. Furthermore, it does not attribute a second property to God, 
namely, existence. Accordingly, if  we were to suppress the second 
concept, leaving us with, “God is,” we would not be left with a 
 Here, we modify the Kemp Smith translation to follow the one of  Markus 13
Weigelt which, we contend, follows more closely the German original: “Es ist 
bloß die Position eines Dinges, oder gewisser Bestimmungen an sich selbst.” 
Indeed, to translate this sentence as Kemp Smith does as: “It is merely the 
positing of  a thing, or of  certain determinations, as existing in themselves,” is to 
add the unjustified presupposition that to posit a thing, or a certain 
determination, is to pose it as existing. 
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predication of  existence but with a subject, “God,” a copula, “is,” and a 
missing second concept. In other words, “God is,” according to Kant, is 
an incomplete predicative proposition which awaits of  a concept to 
which to relate the concept of  God.  
 In the second part of  the passage, Kant then uses this observation 
to support the claim that whatever the predicate of  existence is doing, it 
cannot attribute a real, determining, property. Rather, saying “God is” or 
“God exists” amounts to taking the concept of  God as it has been 
antecedently determined and, as Kant puts it, “posit[ing]” it, with all of  
its predicates. Thus, if  existence might be said to function grammatically 
as a predicate, it does not constitute a real predicate.  
 Part of  the difficulty in this passage is interpreting exactly what 
Kant means by the act of  positing a subject or positing an object in 
relation to a concept. One approach is to read Kant as asserting that 
existence claims are not about particulars but about concepts. In other 
words, asserting that God exists does not amount to asserting of  God 
himself  that he exists but, rather, that the individual concept of  God has 
an instance.  
 One way to support this interpretation is by supplementing this 
first passage with a second one, located just a few paragraphs down:  
Through whatever and through however many predicates I may think a 
thing (even in thoroughly determining it), nothing is added to it if  I go 
on to say that the thing is. Otherwise, what exists would not be the same 
as was thought in the concept, but would be more; and I could not say 
that the exact object of  my concept exists. Even if  I were to think in a 
thing all reality, except one, that one missing reality would not be 
supplied by my saying that so defective a thing exists, but it would exist 
with the same defect with which I thought it – for otherwise what exists 
would be different from what I thought. (Kant B628, 629|A600, 601) 
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In this passage, Kant seems to be saying that we must distinguish 
between two things: the determination of  the nature of  a thing and the 
determination of  its ontological status. The first is a matter of  thinking 
what is “in the concept,” while the second amounts to asserting that 
some existent object corresponds to that concept. However, existence 
cannot be found among those properties that determine the nature of  
something. Indeed, if  this was the case, then we could not say that an 
antecedently determined nature has an instance, since asserting its 
existence would simply further determine its nature. 
 Of  course, this interpretation is controversial, but it does not 
seem to completely lack textual evidence (for a different—and much 
more thorough and expert—interpretation of  Kant’s view on existence, 
see Rosefeldt 2011). It can be summarized as follows:  
1) A property is defined as that which characterizes or determines 
an object;  
2) We can think, i.e., have general or individual concepts, of  things 
that do not exist; 
3) If  it is assumed that existence is a determining predicate, then 
any concept of  a thing that does not exist cannot have an 
instance, because an attribution of  existence would not result in 
the positing of  an antecedently determined object but in an act 
of  further determination;  
4) Hence, existence is a not a real predicate.  
Ultimately, this may or may not be Kant’s position . It is one, however, 14
with textual evidence. Moreover, it is one that allows us to draw an 
 At least some of  Kant’s interpreters understood him that way, such as 14
Jonathan Bennett, who writes: “According to Kant, every existence statement 
says about a concept that it is instantiated, rather than saying about an object 
that it exists.” (Bennett 1974: 231)
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important contrast with Meinong. Also, even if  its conclusion is merely 
negative, it is nonetheless strong enough not only to reject the 
ontological argument but also Gassendi’s view, as mentioned above. That 
is, if  this argument is sound, then it is possible for there to be fully 
determined natures of  things that do not exist. Kant puts forward his 
own view of  the matter in terms of  concepts: There can be a fully 
determined concept of  something without there being any instance of  
that concept. Pegasus, for instance, can have a fully determined nature, in 
the sense of  there being a fully determined individual concept of  
Pegasus, independently of  any consideration of  his ontological status. 
 Hence, Kant seems to be adhering to some form of  a principle of  
indifference, i.e., there can be a thing’s nature, understood as a fully 
determined concept of  that thing, independently of  the existence of  
something with that nature. There can be a concept of  Pegasus—or, for 
that matter, of  God—independently of  the attribution of  any kind of  
positive ontological status to that which it is a concept of. In that sense, 
Kant agrees with Meinong that the nature of  a thing is indifferent to its 
existence. Meinong’s own principle of  indifference, however, is much 
more radical than the one we just attributed to Kant. The next sub-
section makes this clear. 
3.2 Meinong’s Radical Understanding of  the Doctrine of  
Indifference 
Meinong’s view is conceptually related to that of  Kant, but it is 
distinctively stronger. The following passage summarizes Meinong’s own 
view about nature’s indifference to being:  
…neither being nor non-being can belong essentially to the object in 
itself… This may also be expressed in the following less engaging and also 
less pretentious way, which is in my opinion, however, a more 
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appropriate one: the object is by nature independent to being. (Meinong 
1960: 86–emphasis added) 
Meinong’s view on the principle of  indifference amounts thus to the 
following: by nature, objects are independent to being and non-being. 
We can think about them and know their nature independently of  their 
possessing any kind of  positive ontological status, as their nature is 
determined Außersein. As such, an object that is the subject matter of  the 
Meinongian theory of  objects is an instance of  what Routley calls a 
“pure object” (Routley 1980: 857).  
 A first striking difference between Kant and Meinong with respect 
to the doctrine of  indifference concerns the level at which Meinong 
locates his principle of  indifference. According to Meinong, it is objects 
that may not exist and have nature and not, as in Kant’s view, concepts 
that may not have instances. This is a major difference that underlines 
the distinction between a theory of  concepts à la Kant and a theory of  
objects à la Meinong. According to Meinong, the principle of  
indifference does not only mean that there can be concepts of  things 
that do not exist. Rather, there can be objects just like any others—that 
is, objects with natures, including objects of  thought and knowledge—
that simply do not exist. For Meinong, this follows from the fact that for 
any object, the determination of  its nature occurs Außersein, that is, prior 
to and independently of  the determination of  its ontological status. 
 Among the objects whose natures are determined Außersein, 
Meinong thinks that we can make a three-fold distinction. First of  all, 
there are objects that actually have a positive ontological status, i.e., that 
have either the property of  existence or the property of  subsistence. 
Secondly, there are objects that neither exist nor subsist but could do so. 
And, finally, there are objects that can neither exist nor subsist. Indeed, 
according to Meinong, an “absurd object,” as he calls it (Meinong 1960: 
86), such as Mill’s round square or Twardowski’s steel cannon made of  
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wood, can be said to have a nature that is determined Außersein even 
though it “carries in itself  the guarantee of  its own non-being in every 
sense” (Meinong 1960: 86).  
 This last sentence permits us to make the following important 
remark on the principle of  indifference and its relation to ontology. 
Meinong, of  course, does not deny that some objects do possess a 
positive ontological status. Moreover, his doctrine of  indifference is even 
compatible with the claim that some objects must exist or cannot exist. 
Indeed, as Findlay (Findlay 1963) points out, it is essential to understand 
the doctrine that objects have their nature determined Außersein to see 
that in all instances Meinong distinguishes between two things: the 
nature of  an object and what follows from this nature. Accordingly, what 
the principle of  indifference claims is that existence or non-existence 
never figures into a thing’s nature. However, nothing prevents a thing’s 
nature from determining whether it can, cannot, or must exist. As such, 
some objects can have their nature determined Außersein and nonetheless 
be necessary, contingent, or impossible objects. However, from the 
perspective of  the theory of  objects, which considers all objects 
Außersein, all such objects which fall into different metaphysical 
categories all stand on par as pure objects. Any statement that pertains to 
the ontological status of  an object is a metaphysical or ontological 
venture beyond the boundaries of  the theory of  objects.  
 This points to a second important difference between Kant and 
Meinong. Indeed, Kant claims that a thing’s nature can be fully 
determined independently of  its existence. Nonetheless, he does not 
thereby endorse a Meinongian doctrine according to which the nature of  
a pure object is determined Außersein. Indeed, according to Kant, 
concepts do possess a positive ontological status, being, which falls short 
of  existence (cf., Perszyk 1993, Chap. 2). Hence, according to Kant, if  it 
is true that natures are indifferent to  the existence of  what they are 
natures of, this does not yet mean that they are completely indifferent to 
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any kind of  positive ontological determination. Meinong’s doctrine, on 
the other hand, is that all objects can have their nature determined 
Außersein, independently of  any kind of  ontological determination at all. 
This is most clear in Meinong’s recognition that not only possible objects 
but also impossible ones, such as the round square, have their nature 
determined Außersein. Indeed, in Meinong’s eyes, the round square is 
genuinely round and square, even though, as we saw above, its 
contradictory nature makes it necessarily non-existent. 
 Finally, a third possible source of  difference concerns the status 
of  existence. Indeed, if  there is some plausibility in the claim that Kant 
interprets existence as a second-order predication, Meinong himself  
definitely interprets it as a first-order one. Consequently, from a 
Meinongian perspective, even if  we cannot conceive of  existence as a 
property that determines a thing’s nature, we can nonetheless conceive 
of  existence as a “discriminative property.” (Rosefeldt 2011: 333). 
Indeed, it allows us to distinguish, among those things over which we 
can quantify, between those that exist and those that do not.  
 To summarize the present discussion, Meinong’s principle of  
indifference amounts to the claim that all objects have their nature 
determined Außersein, that is, independently of  their having any kind of  
positive ontological status. Accordingly, an object can have a nature even 
if  does not possess any kind of  positive ontological status at all. Its 
nature, in other words, is indifferent to being. We saw, moreover, that this 
principle might be said to have historical roots in authors like Kant, even 
though Meinong’s interpretation of  the doctrine of  indifference turns 
out to be much stronger. In the next section, we focus on a second 
principle, the principle of  independence. In Meinong’s words, this 
principle “presents a welcome supplement to the principle that the 
subject is by nature indifferent to being” (Meinong 1960: 86). To what 
extent? Let us now turn to that question.  
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4. The Principle of  Independence 
4.1 The Question of  Predication 
  
A first confrontation with the principle of  indifference might be 
unsettling. One might wonder, for instance, in virtue of  what can an 
object have its nature determined Außersein. Indeed, a plausible intuitive 
principle ruling the relations between properties and particulars—what 
we earlier called the Malebranche principle—is that an object cannot 
instantiate a property without possessing some kind of  positive 
ontological status. It is at this point that Meinong’s principle of  
independence kicks in. Its job, in a nutshell, is precisely to give support 
to the notion that predication does not entail existence, and hence, that 
non-existent objects can have their nature determined Außersein.  
 Meinong’s own formulation of  the principle of  independence is as 
follows:  
The Sosein of  an object is not affected by its Nichtsein. The fact is 
sufficiently important to be formulated as the principle of  independence 
of  Sosein from Sein. The area of  applicability of  this principle is best 
illustrated by consideration of  the following circumstance: the principle 
applies, not only to objects which do not exist but also to objects which 
could not exist because they are impossible. Not only is the much 
heralded gold mountain made of  gold, but the round square is as surely 
round as it is square. (Meinong 1960: 82)  
As a first pass, this second principle can be formulated as follows: An 
object’s instantiation of  properties is independent of  its having any kind 
of  positive ontological status. The golden mountain, for instance, does 
not exist. Still, according to Meinong, this fact does not prevent the 
golden mountain from instantiating both the property of  being golden 
and the property of  being a mountain. In Meinong’s words, the Sosein of  
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a pure object, i.e., its being some way or another—is independent of  its 
Sein, i.e., its having a positive ontological status.  
 Bearing in mind the above intuitive principle that predication 
entails existence, one might immediately wonder how can Meinong claim 
that properties can be instantiated by things that do not exist. This, 
however, is probably the wrong dialectical point for gaining a proper 
understanding of  Meinong’s doctrine of  independence. Indeed, from a 
Meinongian point of  view, it would be mistaken to begin from a certain 
conception of  properties and then to move on to the claim that 
properties cannot be truly predicated of  non-existent objects. Indeed, 
according to Meinongianism, we must take our cue from a more neutral 
standpoint and mould our notion of  what properties are in such a way 
that the principle of  independence holds. This more neutral standpoint, 
according to Meinong, is the semantic operation of  predication itself.  
 Indeed, one could distinguish between two levels at which a 
theory of  properties can be discussed: a metaphysical one and a semantic 
one. At the metaphysical level, a theory of  properties is concerned with 
the conditions under which a particular can instantiate a property. At that 
level, it primarily focuses on answering three questions: (a) What is a 
property?; (b) What is a particular?; and (c) What is instantiation, the 
relation that obtains between a property and a particular? 
 At the semantic level, on the other hand, a theory of  properties is 
concerned with a related but slightly different question: Under what 
conditions can a predicative sentence or proposition be true? At this 
semantic level, a theory of  properties turns into a theory of  predication, 
and the above questions (a)-(c) fade into the background to be replaced 
by queries such as: (d) Which sentences can be regarded as predicative?; 
and (e) Under what conditions can such sentences be evaluated as true?  
 Now, having distinguished between (a)-(c) on the one hand, and 
(d)-(e) on the other, one could either start with answering the former and 
use one’s results to answer the latter. Or, alternatively, one could start 
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with the latter and use one’s results to answer the former. Meinong, 
under our interpretation, fully embraces the latter option.  
 In other words, Meinong's motivation for endorsing the principle 
of  indifference is not located at the metaphysical level. Rather, he is 
inspired by semantic concerns. The semantic side of  the principle of  
independence amounts to the claim that almost all sentences that look 
like predicative sentences can and should be treated as such, 
independently of  the ontological status of  whatever subject matter of  
which they appear to be predicating something. Much to the dismay of  
anti-Meinongians, the Meinongian school of  thought can thus be 
interpreted as taking this fact as a requirement on the metaphysical level of  
a theory of  properties. 
 At the metaphysical level, Meinong then takes himself  to be 
forced to extend a traditional realist picture of  properties to account for 
the fact that non-existent objects can instantiate properties as much as 
existent ones. Accordingly, the principle of  independence claims that 
instantiation is a cross-ontological relation—it can obtain between entities 
of  different ontological categories, such as between properties that 
presumably exist and particulars that do, or do not, exist. Moreover, 
these properties that can be instantiated by non-existent objects are 
perfectly normal properties, i.e., the very same properties that can be 
instantiated by both existent and non-existent objects. For instance, the 
non-existent golden mountain and the existent golden papal ring share 
an identical property, being made of  gold, as the most recent quotation 
testified. The next section will then be devoted to discussing why and 
how Meinong imposes this order of  things.  
4.2 The Traditional Theory of  Predication  
Let us begin with the following question: What is a predicative sentence? 
Thus far, we have spoken about such topics without clarifying whether 
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we meant sentences in a natural language or a formal language. 
Presumably, however, we could ask the question of  what is a predicative 
sentence in both cases. That is, we could ask which natural language 
sentences are predicative, or alternately, which natural language sentences 
can be interpreted as predicative in a formal language of  choice.  
 The first option, however, could be interpreted as meaning one of  
two things. First of  all, we could interpret it as an inquiry about the 
grammatical form of  predication in natural language sentences. Secondly, 
we could understand it as an inquiry into the meaning of  natural language 
sentences that feature a predicative grammatical form. The first kind of  
analysis is not philosophically crucial. Indeed, in purely grammatical 
terms, we know what predication is in natural languages. It is the joining 
of  a name with an adjective by means of  a copula, such as in “John is 
happy.” What we would like to know, however, is what such natural 
language sentences actually mean, i.e., what are the propositions that such 
sentences express.  
 An examination of  the propositions expressed by natural language 
sentences requires us to interpret natural language sentences into some 
formal language. Thus, understood in a philosophically substantial way, 
the first of  the above two options collapses into the second one. 
Knowing which natural language sentences are predicative is knowing 
which of  them express propositions that are predicative. The issue, then, 
is not the grammatical form of  predication per se. Instead, it is the logical 
form of  a predicative sentence and the relation between the former and 
the latter. We shall then focus on this latter issue.  
 There is, however, no general answer to the question, “What is the 
logical form of  a predicative sentence?” Indeed, the answer will always 
be restricted to a target formal system L or a family of  such systems. 
Thus, the appropriate way of  phrasing this question is, “What is the 
logical form of  a predicative sentence in a formal language L?” Different 
formal languages are likely to give divergent answers.  
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 We shall begin by discussing a first theory of  predication, what we 
call the traditional theory of  predication (TTP). We shall mention how 
the TTP intends to carve out the boundaries of  the notion of  a 
predicative sentence and discuss how this notion of  predicative sentence 
puts pressure on the interpretation of  natural language sentences.  
 Following Karl Lambert (Lambert 1983: 40), we distinguish 
between the core of  a theory of  predication and the specific inflection 
of  this theory by the TTP. A we shall see, Meinongianism rejects the 
specific inflection but agrees with the core of  the TTP. The core of  the 
theory can be expressed via two claims:  
(T9) The logical form of  a predicative proposition is that of  the 
concatenation of  a predicative  expression F(x) and an individual 
constant a, such as in: F(a).  
(T10) A proposition of  the form F(a) is true just in case a is F.  
The traditional theory, however, adds a further thesis to (T9) and (T10), 
namely: 
(T11) For a sentence of  the form F(a) to be meaningful, “a” must 
be assigned a unique existent  element of  the domain.  
Lambert, with the additional ascription of  the origins of  the standard 
theory to Russell and Frege, states (T11) as follows:  
There is a respect in which Meinong’s theory of  predication differs not 
one iota from either Russell’s theory or Frege’s (as manifested in Frege’s 
conception of  scientific language). This respect is what will be called the 
core of  the traditional theory of  predication. Roughly it says that the 
truth-value of  a predication depends on whether what is said of  the 
object specified by its singular term (or terms) is true (or false) of  that 
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object (or objects). However, there is also an important constraint on the 
traditional theory adopted by Russell and Frege, but rejected by Meinong. 
It says, roughly, that the objects specified in a predication must have 
being. (1983: 40) 
Theses (T9)-(T11) deliver a systematic notion of  a predicative 
proposition, i.e., any proposition that respects these three theses is 
predicative, while any proposition that fails to meet them drops out of  
that class. By extension, any natural language sentence that expresses a 
thus defined predicative proposition counts as predicative, and any 
natural language sentence that fails to express such a predicative 
proposition is not predicative.  
 Now that we possess a theoretical criterion for identifying 
predicative sentences, we can start to examine which natural language 
sentences are predicative. Here, however, the issue becomes quite 
complex. Even if  we know the formal requirements established by (T9)-
(T11) that a proposition must meet, the question of  which natural 
language expressions—if  any—are the equivalents of  logical individual 
constants is not a trivial one. Furthermore, without an answer to that 
question, we cannot properly carve out the class of  natural language 
sentences that express predicative propositions.  
 Following the cue of  Meinongianism, we shall assume for the sake 
of  the argument that at least some natural language proper names can be 
treated as the equivalent of  logical individual constants. On the basis of  
that conjecture, we shall try to move forward step by step . This 15
assumption in place, we can then state that a sentence such as:  
 Russell himself  denied, at least for a while, that proper names could be 15
interpreted as semantically equivalent to logical individual constants, restricting 
the this function to indexicals like “I” (Russell 1905). However, as our aim 
merely is to draw a contrast between two theories of  predication, we shall ignore 
such complications. 
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 (5) John is happy 
is predicative, interpreting it as “Happy (John).” Let us now compare (5) 
with the following:  
 (6) All men are happy. 
Is (6) also a predicative sentence? One reason that we might think so is 
that we can flawlessly substitute “John” for “All men” in (6) and again 
obtain (5). As such, one might take this syntactic observation as evidence 
that these two expressions play the same role, i.e., they provide an object 
of  which happiness is then predicated to the propositions expressed by 
(5) and (6) . One might claim that this simply amounts to taking the 16
grammatical form of  (5) and (6) at face value, and this form seems to be 
the same in both cases: subject-copula–predicate.  
 Logicians, however, have long contested this assertion and denied 
that sentences like (6) are truly predicative. Why? In a nutshell, logicians 
are essentially interested in the inferential powers of  propositions, and, 
as it turns out, (5) and (6) have very different inferential powers. We can 
make this more concrete as follows:  
 (7) Sam is a man.  
Assuming that both (5) and (7) are true, we can only—by applying the 
valid inferential rule of  conjunction introduction, i.e., “p, q ⊢ p & q”, to 
be read as, if  p is true and q is true—infer the truth of  the following:  
 This, of  course, is simplified for the sake of  the argument. There are also 16
syntactic observation of  the same kind that speaks against this claim. See, inter 
alia, Sainsbury 2001. 
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  (8) John is happy, and Sam is a man. 
Admittedly, inferring (8) from (5) and (7) is not tremendously interesting. 
However, from the fact that (6) and (7) are true, we can infer something 
much more substantial. Indeed, if  (6) and (7) are true, we can infer the 
following:  
 (9) Sam is happy.  
Hence, (5) and (6) have very different inferential powers. Moreover, these 
powers must be reflected in the logical form of  the proposition 
expressed by (6). 
 The standard logical form of  a sentence like (6) is the following 
quantified form:  
 (10) ∀(x) Man (x) —> Happy (x). 
The assignment of  this logical form to (6) makes it quite obvious why (9) 
follows from (6) and (7). Indeed, if  anything that is a man is happy, and 
if  Sam is a man, then it follows—by modus ponens—that Sam is happy.  
 The general idea at play here is that something important is 
revealed when we transition from, say, (6) to (10). That is, we clearly and 
transparently demonstrate the conditions under which (6) is true. As 
Mark Sainsbury puts this point: 
Formalizing a sentence or argument of  a natural language in one 
[artificial language]… reveals something about the nature of  the natural 
language, something that would otherwise be apt to remain hidden. 
(Sainsbury 2001: 339) 
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Coming back to (5) and (6), the process of  formalization allows us to 
clarify their truth conditions and, consequently, their inferential powers. 
On the basis of  these remarks, we can formulate the following thesis:  
(T12) For any natural language sentence S with a form of  type F, 
there is no guarantee that the proposition expressed by S also 
instantiates a form of  type F.  
Hence, generally speaking, for each natural language sentence S, we can 
distinguish between what is standardly called its grammatical form and its 
logical form. This distinction in place, we can then fully capture the 
meaning of  the notion of  interpreting a natural language sentence into a 
formal language: An interpretation of  a natural language sentence must 
aim to bring the logical form of  the proposition it expresses to the 
surface, and this form can be hidden behind its grammatical form. The 
process of  interpretation, however, brings it to light.  
 Therefore, what we learn from (5)-(10) is that, as a general rule, we 
must distinguish between the grammatical form and logical form of  a 
natural language sentence. More locally, natural language sentences 
formed by means of  an expression like, ‘All x…,’ do not express 
predicative propositions. Rather, they convey quantified propositions.  
 Thus far, Meinongians have little upon which to frown. Indeed, 
the above naive syntactic test that we proposed to identify predicative 
sentences, i.e., replacing “all men” with “John,” turned out to be too 
simplistic. As a matter of  fact, (5)-(10) reveal that the semantic 
contributions of  expressions like”‘all men” and “John” are very 
different. The first are quantified expressions that, in a standard analysis 
of  quantifiers, are second-order concepts that quantify the number of  
instances of  some F. On the other hand, as we assumed above, the 
second are the equivalent of  logical individual constants and refer to 
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particular individuals. Meinongians, however, become concerned when 
we consider how to treat sentences like the following:  
 (11) Pegasus does not exist. 
 (12) Pegasus has wings. 
 (13) Vulcan was postulated by Leverrier. 
Indeed, at least prima facie, all of  these sentences seem to share a 
grammatical structure that is identical to (5) and (6). Additionally, 
contrary to the case of  (6), it seems that we should be able to readily 
interpret them as predicative sentences. Moreover, (11) and (13) are 
simply true, while (12), at least for some, is intuitively true. Using “E!(x)” 
to denote a first-order existence predicate permits us to interpret each of  
these as follows:  
 (14) ¬E!(Pegasus) 
 (15) Winged (Pegasus) 
 (16) Postulated-by-Leverrier (Vulcan) 
The problem, however, is that according to the TTP and assuming that 
neither Pegasus nor Vulcan exists, (14)-(16) cannot be taken as faithfully 
expressing the logical form of  (11)-(13). Indeed, the TTP uses (T11) as a 
constraint on predication. Since neither Pegasus nor Vulcan exist, despite 
the initial plausibility of  treating (11)-(13) as predicative, following the 
TTP means that we must simply relinquish this intuition. Alternately, we 
must treat these sentences in one of  the following three ways:  
(a) They express a proposition, but their subject matter has nothing 
to do with Pegasus or Vulcan. Rather, they are concerned with 
arbitrarily assigned referents, such as the empty set, as proposed 
by Frege in the Grundgesetze. 
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(b) They fail to express any proposition, and so do not have any 
meaning. 
(c) They express a proposition that is somewhat about Pegasus and 
Vulcan, although it does not have a predicative logical form.    17
Options (a) and (b) are dead ends. Indeed, (a) is committed to the claim 
that all sentences formed by means of  a singular term that fail to refer to 
something that exists are de facto about the same thing. However, this is 
implausible. First of  all, (11) denies existence of  Pegasus, not of  the 
empty set—we assume here that existence is a first-order predicate, not 
what is expressed by “∃”. Moreover, (11) and (12) are about the same 
thing, while (13) is about something distinct from them. Nevertheless, if  
they all refer to the empty set, then we simply cannot account for this 
fact. Hence, we should reject option (a).  
 Option (b) is even worse. It is a fundamental fact that such 
sentences do have meaning. Indeed, we must be able to deny the 
existence of  things, and so (11) must have a meaning. Similarly, it seems 
impossible to deny that (12) and (13) also do have a meaning. Therefore, 
the standard theory cannot treat them as meaningless on pain of  
performing a reductio ad absurdum of  itself. The only viable choice is thus 
option (c).  
 Option (c) amounts to treating predicative sentences formed by 
means of  a singulars term that are about things that do not exist as 
expressing propositions with a logical form that substantially deviates 
from their grammatical form. Granted that logical sentences can take 
only take one of  two forms, a predicative and a quantified one, 
meaningful sentences that cannot be treated as predicative must 
therefore be treated as quantified.  
 For discussions of  each of  these views see, inter alia, Frege 1959 for the first; 17
Evans 1982 for the second; and Russell 1905 for the third. 
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 At this point, proponents of  the traditional theory routinely 
appeal to Russell’s theory of  descriptions. We shall discuss that theory in 
more detail in Chapter 4, and so shall merely say the following for the 
time being: According to Russell, we can interpret all definite 
descriptions as quantified sentences and all proper names as truncated 
definite descriptions. We can endorse this result in this strong form, or 
we can restrict it to the case of  singular terms that are about things that 
do not exist. As we shall only focus on the latter kind of  singular term, 
this distinction does not matter much for the time being. We shall ignore 
the case of  singular terms that are about things that exist and focus on 
those that are about things that do not. What shall matter for us is that as 
a result of  endorsing a Russellian treatment of  such terms, natural 
language sentences such (6)-(8) must be interpreted as having the 
following logical form:  
 (17) ¬∃(x) Pegasizes (x) 
 (18) ∃(x) Pegasizes (x) & Winged (x) & ∀(y) Pegasiszes (y) & 
Winged (y) —> x=y 
 (19) ∃(x) Planet (x) & Postulated-by-Leverrier (x) & ∀(y) Planet (y) 
& Postulated-by-Leverrier (y)    —> x=y.  
In terms of  the material introduced in this section, we can then drive 
home the following point: The TTP has important consequences for the 
doctrine of  predicative sentences. Indeed, it carves out the class of  
natural language sentences that express predicative propositions in such a 
way that many natural language sentences that have a predicative surface 
grammar turn out to have a non-predicative logical form. Some might 
find these results to be piercing and understand them as freeing us from 
many philosophical difficulties. Russell put forward the treatment of  
negative singular existential statements like (11), for instance, as a 
solution to the ancient Parmenidean riddle of  non-being, and some 
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celebrated it as such (see, inter alia, Quine 1953). That said, the standard 
theory of  predication is a disaster for the IOM. Indeed, it not only 
affects sentences such as, “Pegasus has wings,” but also sentences such 
as, “John is thinking about Pegasus.” If  the traditional theory is true, we 
cannot, contrary to the IOM, treat these as predicative sentences. A 
Meinongian theory of  predication is hence committed to rejecting the 
standard theory. It is here that the principle of  independence kicks in, 
and Meinongianism uses that principle to carve out of  the class of  
natural language sentences expressing predicative propositions, thus 
offering an alternative to the the account of  predication provided by 
TTP.  
  
4.4 The Meinongian Theory of  Predication 
               
Meinong’s principle of  independence constitutes the core of  a 
Meinongian theory of  predication, and its endorsement comprises a key 
step in remolding the TTP. On the one hand, Meinongianism endorses 
both (T9) and (T10) and is thus highly structurally similar to the TTP. 
That said, it flatly rejects what it considers an undue restriction, namely, 
(T11). As a result, it delineates the boundaries of  the class of  natural 
language sentences that express predicative propositions in a very 
different manner than the TTP. 
 The rejection of  (T11) possesses two aspects. The first one 
concerns the possible referents of  singular terms. According to 
Meinongianism, there are more things that those that exist, and so there 
is no reason to claim that the only possible referents are existent ones. 
The principle of  indifference accounts for this possibility, and the 
principle of  independence accounts for the claim that these objects can 
have properties. The second aspect concerns the rejection of  classical 
logic as the preferred formal language for interpreting natural language 
sentences. Indeed, it is an axiom of  classical logic that each individual 
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constant is assigned exactly one existent referent. Neil Tennant, in a 
typical account of  how classical logic deals with singular terms that fail 
to be about something that exists, explained this matter:  
                                                                                                                                                                   
Our language allows the formation of  terms such as ‘the square root of  
Jupiter’ or ‘the empty set’s wife.’ Are we to regard these as denoting any 
objects? Our present answer is simple and evasive. We design our 
language so that this problem never arises. We secure every name a 
denotation, and we assume that every function is ‘everywhere 
defined.’ (Tennant 1990: 22)  
From a Meinongian perspective, this endorsement of  classical logic is 
unnecessary. Indeed, the principle of  indifference provides us with 
positive reasons to reject the assumption that all individual constants 
must be assigned an existent referent, since all objects have their natures 
determined Außersein. As such, there is no reason to deny that an 
individual constant can, first of  all, be assigned a non-existent referent 
and, secondly, that this non-existent referent can be the object of  a 
semantic evaluation to determine whether a certain predicative 
expression is true of  it.  
 According to Meinongianism, we can simply claim that a sentence 
such as, “Pegasus has wings,” is a predicative sentence, one that results 
from the concatenation of  a proper name that refers to a non-existent 
object and a predicative expression and that is true just in case the 
predicate “has wing” is true of  that non-existent object. Of  course, this 
does not yet tell us how we can evaluate such sentences and, hence, 
whether they are true or false. It does, however, allow us to treat them as 
predicative sentences and to then carve out the class of  natural language 
sentences that express predicative sentences in a much less restrictive 
way than the TTP would imply. 
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 The difference between the TTP and Meinong’s principle of  
independence can be made more explicit by reflecting on the validity of  
some inferences. According to the standard theory, the following 
inference is deductively valid: 
 (20) a is F; 
 (21) a possesses a positive ontological status.  
Indeed, according to the standard theory, it is a matter of  logical truth 
that if  (20) is true, then (21) is also true, because the axiomatic of  
classical logic forbids an individual constants from being assigned non-
existent referents. Meinongianism, however, rejects the validity of  this 
inference. Indeed, according to Meinongianism, since the Sosein of  an 
object is independent of  its Sein, no inference can be drawn from a true 
premise like (20) to (21). 
 As Kenneth Perszyk (Perszyk 1998) makes clear, however, we 
would do well to not read too much into this claim of  the Sosein’s 
independence from its Sein. In particular, the logical force of  the 
independence in question does not extend beyond the fact that there is 
no logical implication between a predicative expression being true of  an 
individual constant and the referent of  that individual constant 
possessing a positive ontological status. It would be mistaken, however, 
to read this statement of  independence as the claim that a predicative 
expression being true of  something and its referent having a certain kind 
of  ontological status are logically independent in the stronger sense that 
A is logically independent from B if, and only if, A neither entails B nor 
its negation. Indeed, as mentioned above, Meinong distinguishes 
between the nature of  an object and what follows from this nature. 
Accordingly, it might well be the case that, when considered as a pure 
object, an object’s instantiation of  a certain property is independent from 
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its Sein. That said, as mentioned above, this does not mean that it cannot 
follow from the object’s nature that it either cannot exist or must exist.  
 This point needs emphasis, as it will play an important role in the 
later discussion of  a classical objection to Meinongianism. Indeed, the 
gist of  this argument is that if  Meinong believes that Sosein is 
independent from Sein, he does not believes that the opposite is true, i.e., 
that Sein is independent from Sosein. On the contrary, his claim that a 
contradictory object, such as the round square, cannot exist is equivalent 
to the claim that we can logically infer, on the basis of  an object’s Sein, 
that there are some properties, e.g., contradictory ones, that it cannot 
instantiate. In other words, if  an object has Sein, then there is a range of  
properties that it cannot instantiate, namely, those that would make it 
impossible for it to have Sein. Hence, Meinong’s principle of  
independence does not entail a theory in which anything goes. It merely 
demands that pure objects, i.e., objects considered from the point of  
view of  the determination of  their nature Außersein, are such that their 
Sein is independent from their Sosein. However, it also entails that Sein is 
not independent from Sosein, as Sein is incompatible with certain kinds of  
Sosein. 
4.5 Consequences of  the Principle of  Independence 
Meinong’s rejection of  the standard theory and its replacement by the 
principle of  independence involves a rejection of  classical logic. Thus, a 
particular kind of  non-classical logic must replace it: a free logic, which is 
a logic that is “free of  existence assumptions with respect to its terms, 
singular and general” (Lambert 2002: 258). 
 In fact, Meinongianism requires a specific version of  free logic. 
First of  all, it must be a so-called positive free logic, namely, a free logic in 
which the concatenation of  an individual constant that refers to a non-
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existent object can not only be meaningful, but also true. Moreover, it 
needs a free logic with a neutral interpretation of  quantification, i.e., one 
that does not interpret quantification as ontologically committing. We 
shall call such a logic a Meinongian free logic.  
 Such a logic is traditionally modeled in terms of  dual domain 
semantics. On the one hand, neutral quantifiers range over a non-empty 
outer domain that can be conceived as filled with Meinong’s objects 
determined Außersein and a (possibly empty) inner domain—according to 
free logic, that something exists is not a matter of  logical truth—that can 
be conceived as the domain of  what exists. Absolutely unrestricted 
quantification is then conceived as quantification over the larger domain, 
and unrestricted quantifiers are unloaded, i.e., non-ontologically 
committing, quantifiers. The traditional quantifiers of  classical logic are 
then interpreted as restrictions of  these unloaded quantifiers, i.e., as these 
quantifiers only ranging over existent things. As Graham Priest explains 
it: 
Free logics of  the kind at which we have been looking contain names for 
non-existent objects, but they do not allow us to quantify over them. 
This may be thought somewhat arbitrary, especially given the semantics. 
Why not allow quantifiers to range over all objects? Thus, we might add 
another kind of  quantifier whose truth conditions are exactly the same as 
those in classical logic, with domain of  quantification D…Let us call 
such quantifiers outer quantifiers, as opposed to the quantifiers with 
domain E, which are inner quantifiers. (Priest 2008: 295) 
Such a Meinongian logic, however, needs to introduce new symbols to be 
able to distinguish between outer and inner quantifiers. Different authors 
choose different typographical conventions to do this. We shall, however, 
choose the following ones: We will write the unloaded particular 
quantifier as “∑” and read it as “some.” There is no connection between 
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the meaning of  this sign as the summation sign in mathematics and the 
way we use it here. The unloaded universal quantifier, on the other hand, 
will be written as “√” and read as “for all.” One again, there is no 
connection between the meaning of  this sign as the square-root sign in 
mathematics and our usage.  
 That these quantifiers are “unloaded” means that there can be true 
positive quantified statements about things that do not exist, such as, 
“Some objects do not exist.” We can interpret these as follows: (where 
“E!(x)” stands for a first-order existence predicate): 
 (22) ∑(x) ¬E!(x) 
We can then treat the two quantifiers of  classical logic, “∃” and “∀”, as 
restricted quantifiers, that is, as quantifiers only ranging over the inner 
domain. Importantly, such a Meinongian free logic is not committed to 
endorsing two equally fundamental pairs of  quantifiers. Indeed, just like 
classical logic, it is committed to only one fundamental quantifier, either 
“∑” or “√.” Assuming that one chooses “√” as the fundamental 
quantifier, “∑” can be standardly introduced as follows:  
 (23) √(x) F(x) iff ¬∑(x) ¬F(x)  
The classical logic quantifiers can then be defined as following (see Priest 
2005: 14):  
 (24) ∃(x) F(x) iff ∑(x) F(x) & E!(x) 
 (25) ∀(x) F(x) iff  √(x) E!(x)  F(x) 
As we shall see below, some critics have objected to the development of  
such a Meinongian free logic. In particular, they have claimed that its 
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interpretation of  quantification is contradictory. The critical part of  this 
chapter evaluates such arguments.  
4.6 Descriptive Support for the Principle of  Indifference 
One might well wonder, however, where Meinong thinks he can find 
support for his endorsement of  such a principle as substantial as the 
principle of  independence which, as we just saw, impinges not only on 
the theory of  predication but also on the kind of  logic and notion of  
property that one should endorse. As noted by Richard Routley, the 
support for this second principle is essentially descriptive. Our warrant 
for accepting this claim is due to the fact that there are, according to 
Meinongianism, many examples of  the correct attribution of  properties 
to non-existent objects. As Routley puts it: 
The Independence Thesis, that items can and do have definite properties 
even though nonentities, is supported by a wide range of  examples of  
nonentities to which definite properties are attributed. These attributions 
occur when people make true statements about items, and therefore 
ascribe properties to them, without assuming  them to exist or knowing 
full well that they do not exist. These examples represent 
counterexamples to the Ontological Assumption, unless a successful 
reduction of  the example statements to statements about entities is 
produced. They therefore provide a prima facie case against the 
Ontological Assumption. (Routley 1980: 28–emphasis added) 
What Routley calls the ontological assumption is classical logic’s specific 
claim that individual constants must be assigned existent referents in 
order to be meaningful. According to Routley, we have descriptive 
grounds for rejecting this thesis. However, Routley only claims that this 
establishes a prima facie case against the ontological assumption. In other 
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words, according to Meinongians, we must first of  all carve out the 
axiomatic of  the theory of  objects and then assess it on the basis of  
what follows from it. As such, the claim that there are non-existent 
objects could still be defeated if  it ran into insoluble troubles. Moreover, 
as we shall see when we reach the critical part of  this chapter, many 
authors have claimed that endorsing the principle of  independence 
indeed creates more problems than solutions. First, however, the next 
section present a final Meinongian principle, the CP.  
5. The Characterization Principle 
The last principle that we shall discuss, the CP, both plays a role in 
determining the nature of  the pure objects and a role in how we can 
know truths about them. Regarding the first point, it tells us how the 
nature of  an object can be determined Außersein. Regarding the second 
point, it tells us how we can know which properties a non-existent 
possesses.  
 As a first pass, the principle can be formulated as follows: For any 
non-empty set of  properties, some object possesses all of  these 
properties. For instance, some object possesses all of  the properties in 
the following set:{being a detective, being quick-witted, being addicted to 
cocaine, living in 19th century London}, namely, Sherlock Holmes. In 
other words, Meinongianism’s most general domain of  quantification can 
be roughly conceived as the function that maps the set of  all the 
properties there are to all its possible non-empty sub-sets, as each such 
sub-set corresponds to an object. As Graham Priest clarifies: 
If  A(x) is any property, or conjunction of  properties, we can characterize 
an object, cA, and be guaranteed that A(cA). This is the Characterization 
Principle (CP) in its most naive form. (Priest 2005: 83) 
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Thus understood, the CP both plays a role in determining the nature of  
pure objects and has an epistemic function. First of  all, it tells us how 
the nature of  a pure object is determined Außersein, i.e., in terms of  the 
function just mentioned. Epistemically speaking, it tells us how we can 
know what nature a pure object possesses—namely, the one just 
determined by this function. This knowledge, moreover, is a priori. It 
simply follows from a knower’s rightful interaction with the CP.  
 As we shall see, our above first pass at the CP reveals itself  as too 
strong. It simply cannot be the case that for any non-empty set of  
properties S, there is something, existent or not, that corresponds to S. 
Indeed, if  this were the case, then it would simply follow from the CP 
that anything exists. Indeed, for any set of  properties that does not 
contain the existence property, we could simply add it and consequently 
define anything into existence. The CP, in other words, needs to be 
restricted, and some properties must be expelled from its range.  
 The problem for Meinongianism, however, is expelling the 
problematic properties from the CP in a way that is not purely ad hoc. In 
other words, it must restrict the CP in manner that does not progress 
case by case, as trouble-makers are encountered along the way. Rather, 
we need a systematic methodology for restricting CP. In Über Möglichkeit 
und Wahrscheinlichkeit, Meinong proposes sharply distinguishing between 
two kinds of  properties that he calls, respectively, “konstitutorische” and 
“außerkonstitutorische,” standardly translated as “nuclear” and 
“extranuclear” properties (Meinong 1915: §25 ). Nuclear properties, 
according to Meinong, are all properties that play a role in determining 
an object’s nature. Extranuclar properties, on the other hand, are those 
that do not. His claim is that the CP should be restricted to nuclear 
properties.  
 As we already know from the principle of  indifference, existence 
does not determine an object’s nature. Meinong, however, adds more 
properties to the list of  the extranuclear properties. In Über Möglichkeit 
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und Wahrscheinlichkeit, for instance, he discusses the case of  simple 
particulars, namely, particulars with only one property, such as colors. 
The shade phenomenal ‘blue,’ for instance, possesses just one property: 
being an unmixed instance of  an apperance of  blue. Nevertheless, 
Meinong remarks, this means that this shade in fact possesses two 
properties: being blue and being simple. The latter property, he contends, 
does not play a role in determining its nature. It is, contrary to the first 
property, extranuclear.  
 Another important kind of  extranuclear property are intentional 
properties, namely, the fact that some object is being thought about. 
Sherlock Holmes, for instance, possesses the property of  being thought 
about right now, as you read this sentence. That is, according to 
Meinong’s endorsement of  the IOM, thinking about Pegasus means that 
one stands in a relation to Pegasus, and so Pegasus possesses the 
relational property of  being thought about. Such a property, however, 
does not determine an object’s nature. In other words, Sherlock Holmes’ 
nature is determined separately from whether anyone is thinking about 
him, and being thought about is merely one of  his extra-nuclear 
properties. 
 As we shall see later on, some authors have objected to the CP, 
even in its restricted form. However, we shall postpone our discussion 
of  that topic until the critical part of  this chapter, which begins in the 
next section.  
6. Objections to Meinongianism 
Meinongianism has not been, to put it mildly, a popular view. Since its 
origin, philosophers have treated it with suspicion, and it has been the 
object of  many objections. In this section, our goal is not to be 
exhaustive. Rather, we present a series of  objections of  different force. 
Some of  them merely point to some of  Meinongianism’s commitments 
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without necessarily constituting an ultimate challenge to the coherence 
of  that view. Some, however, do greater damage and seriously challenge 
Meinongianism’s credentials as a plausible theory. Thus, on the basis of  
these objections, we ultimately reject that view and, consequently, the 
IOM.  
6.1 The Nonsense Objection 
The first objection we shall discuss the principle of  independence in a 
straightforward manner. We call  it the nonsense objection. It is a 
common complaint, but one of  its most recent iterations can be found 
in the work of  Uriah Kriegel. Its gist is quite simple: The mere idea that 
non-existent objects can instantiate properties is nonsensical. Hence, the 
principle of  independence cannot be correct. Here is how Kriegel puts 
it:  
It is sometimes claimed that there is a special class of  relations, 
“intentional relations,” that do not require the existence of  the relata. 
Strictly speaking, however, this is nonsense. The only way it could make 
sense is if  a two-place relation could be instantiated even where there are 
not two relata. Yet nobody thinks it remotely plausible that a monadic 
property could be instantiated even when there is no entity that 
instantiates it, e.g., that squareness could be instantiated even if  there are 
no squares. That is clearly absurd. The same absurdity attaches, I 
contend, to the parallel claim about relations: just as a monadic property 
cannot be instantiated in the absence of  an instantiator, so a relation…
cannot be instantiated in the absence of  a relata. (Kriegel 2011: 140) 
Upon reading Kriegel’s quote, however, one might feel slightly uneasy. 
Indeed, he begins by describing the view he targets as one in which some 
relations do not require the existence of  their relata. This perspective, he 
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claims, is “nonsense.” He then goes on to assert that this view is 
identical with one in which a relation would obtain “even where there are 
not two relata.” He then goes on to state that nobody believes that a 
property can be instantiated where there is no entity to do so. One might 
wonder, however, how the claim that some relations do not require the 
existence of  their relata entails that a relation can obtain with no relata 
and, moreover, that a property can be instantiated where there is nothing 
to instantiate it. A Meinongian, in any case, would deny that the latter 
two claims follow from the first one.  
 According to Meinongianism, it is indeed true that some relations 
can obtain even if  one of  their relata does not exist. However, this does 
not mean that such a relation is lacking a relata. It means, rather, that one 
of  its relata is a non-existent one and, according to Meinongianism, non-
existent relata are just like any other relata. Secondly, that a property can 
be instantiated even if  nothing instantiates it clearly is an absurd view. 
The problem, however, is that Meinongianism never claims such a thing. 
The claim that Sosein is independent from Sein does not amount to the 
claim that Sosein can be instantiated on its own, without something also 
being some way. It means, rather, that a non-existent particular can 
instantiate a property in just the same way as an existing one. In sum, the 
problem with Kriegel’s above quote is that it clearly attacks a straw man. 
The view it describes indeed is absurd, but no one, or at least no 
Meinongian, endorses it.  
 We might, however, recast Kriegel’s objection so that it bears on 
Meinongianism. Properly expressed, the criticism is not that it is absurd 
that a property can be instantiated by nothing but that it is nonsensical to 
claim that something that does not exist can instantiate properties. Is this 
second version of  the objection any better? 
 As a matter of  fact, it is not. First of  all, some distinguished 
philosophers have believed, and still believe, that non-existent objects 
can instantiate properties (inter alia: Meinong 1960; Parsons 1980; Routley 
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1980; Priest 2005; Berto 2013). It seems a slightly uncharitable 
assessment of  their beliefs to dub them as nonsensical. Secondly, we do 
continuously talk as if  non-existent objects could have properties. We say 
things like, “Sherlock Holmes is bright” or”‘Pegasus has wings.” Hence, 
the claim that such things cannot actually have properties certainly 
requires more of  response than simply claiming that it absurd. Thirdly 
and finally, instantiation, property, and particular are all technical notions. As 
such, the claim that the application of  these notions to the realm of  non-
existence is absurd certainly needs a bit more discussion than a mere 
statement. Indeed, we might ask, why exactly is it absurd? On its own, the 
nonsense objection does not seem to deliver any answers to this 
question. Let us then move on to the next objection.  
6.2 The Meta-Ontological Objection 
The central question of  ontology amounts to the following: “What are 
our ontological commitments?” To answer this question, however, one 
must be able to answer a preliminary one, namely, “What criterion should 
we use to determine our ontological commitments?” Indeed, as Philipp 
Bricker puts it, “A criterion of  ontological commitment is a pre-requisite 
for ontological inquiry” (Bricker 2014). Hence, one of  the central tasks 
of  meta-ontology is answering this preliminary question.  
 Contemporary meta-ontology is characterized by an “orthodox 
view” (Bricker 2014; see also Berto & Plebani 2015 and Takho 2015) 
according to which we are ontologically committed to whatever falls in 
the scope of  the quantifiers of  what we take to be our ultimately 
regimented, existentially quantified sentences. In other words, according 
to this orthodoxy, existential quantification is the meta-ontological 
criterion that we must use in our debates on ontological commitments. 
The locus classicus of  this orthodox view is Quine’s influential essay, “On 
What There Is,” in which he writes: 
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We can very easily involve ourselves in ontological commitments by 
saying, for example, that there is something (bound variable) which red 
houses and sunsets have in common; or that there is something which is a 
prime number larger than a million. But this is, essentially, the only way 
we can involve ourselves in ontological commitments: by our use of  
bound variables. (Quine 1953: 12) 
This orthodox view shall interest us insofar as it constitutes the basis of  
an important objection against Meinongianism and, hence, against the 
IOM. Indeed, since the IOM is committed to the truth of  thesis (i)—
some intentional objects do not exist—mentioned in the introduction of  
this chapter, it shamelessly quantifies over non-existent things. If, 
however, quantification is indeed ontologically committing, then thesis (i) 
is simply contradictory, as it would tell us that some things both exist 
(implicitly, in its quantified part) and do not exist (explicitly, in its 
predicative part). The meta-ontological objection is thus that the IOM is, 
via its endorsement of  Meinongianism, committed to a kind of  
existentially non-loaded quantification, i.e., Meinongian quantification, 
and that there simply cannot be such a thing.  
 The full, explicit objection (inspired by Berto and Plebani 2015: 
Chap. 7) goes as follows: 
1) In the logical framework of  the orthodoxy, i.e., first-order 
classical logic, that something exists is treated as the claim that 
something is self-identical with an element of  the domain, i.e., “a 
exists” is interpreted as “∃(x) x = a;” 
2) Negative existential claims, on the other hand, are interpreted as 
the denial of  the claim that something is self-identical with an 
element of  the domain, i.e., “a does not exist” is interpreted as 
“¬∃(x) x=a;”  
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3) Accordingly, “there are things that do not exist,” must be interpreted 
as: “∃(x)¬∃(y) x=y;” 
4) This, however, is the equivalent of  “∃(x) x≠x,” and, granted that 
everything is self-identical, this amounts to a contradiction;” 
5) Hence, Meinongianism is false.  
In this section, our goal is to evaluate the force of  this objection. Before 
turning to that task, however, we shall begin by distinguishing between 
two different contexts, or ontological projects, within which such an 
objection can occur. After explicating this distinction, we shall find 
ourselves in a better position to evaluate it.  
6.2.1 Descriptive vs. Revisionary Ontological Approaches 
The most general context within which the meta-ontological objection 
can be formulated is that of  using a formal language to clarify the 
content of  natural language sentences. As it turns out, however, this 
general idea can be implemented in two very different ways, a 
“descriptive” and a “revisionary” one (see, inter alia, Kriegel 2008; Crane 
2013: 29), thus giving rise to two versions of  the above objection.  
 To begin, the descriptive approach takes the transition from a 
natural language sentence to its interpretation in a formal language as a 
move whose aim is to uncover the real structure, as opposed to the 
surface structure, of  the propositions expressed by natural language 
sentences and, hence, to acquire insights into the proper meaning of  
natural language sentences. To use an example mentioned above, if  one 
utters, “John did it for Sam’s sake,” and takes this sentence to be true, we 
might wonder what exactly is the content of  this assertion and to what 
exactly one is committed by endorsing its truth. The transition from the 
natural language sentence to a formal interpretation is supposed to help 
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us to answer that question by getting a handle on the underlying logical 
structure of  the proposition expressed by that sentence.  
 We shall characterize the descriptive approach in terms of  the 
interaction between three things: (a) natural language sentences, (b) their 
interpretations in a formal language, and (c) their ontological 
commitments. The first are the initial data, the second are the output of  
the interpretation process, and the discovery of  the third is what the 
transition from (a) to (b) should ease. By the interaction between these 
three things, we mean that each of  (a)-(c) is liable to place some 
theoretical pressure on the whole process. That is, according to the 
descriptive approach, sorting out our ontological commitments is a 
process that results from the interaction of  three different forces: native 
speakers’ linguistic intuitions at level (a), the logical form as determined 
at level (b), and, finally, ontological commitments determined at the level 
(c). In other words, it is not ruled out a priori that some reasoning 
operating at level (a) can pressure level (b) or (c), and, to some extent, the 
other way around.  
 We can nevertheless say that these interactions are governed by a 
specific norm that we shall call the norm of  adequacy. Though the label is 
ours, the idea of  such a norm is inspired by Crane, who writes: 
The descriptive approach is concerned to get as much of  our natural 
language right as possible, and it is evaluated against the linguistic 
judgments (‘intuitions’) of  native speakers. (Crane 2013: 30) 
This quote has two parts. In the first part, Crane clearly outlines the aim 
of  the descriptive approach, namely, providing an adequate picture of  
the content of  natural language sentences. In the second part, he hints at 
a standard or norm for evaluating the descriptive approach: We must 
evaluate these descriptions in the light of  the linguistic judgments, or 
intuitions, of  the language’s native speakers.  
Chapter 3  187
 We contend that the second part of  the quote is implying that the 
transition from a natural language sentence to its formal interpretation 
should be evaluated on the basis of  the judgments of  native speakers of  
that language. In that sense, we might still disregard an interpretation of  
a sentence that presents an advantage regarding the evaluation of  its 
ontological commitments if  it leads us too far from the linguistic 
intuitions of  native speakers. In other words, linguistic intuitions can put 
legitimate pressure on the cogency of  one’s chosen interpretation and, 
hence, on one’s resulting ontological commitments. In that sense, the 
above-mentioned elements (a)-(c) indeed interact, but this interaction is 
governed by a overarching norm that reflects the aim of  the descriptive 
approach: providing descriptions of  natural language sentences and, 
then, a clearer picture of  their ontological commitments.  
 The revisionary approach, on the other hand, conceives of  the 
relation between a natural language sentence and its formal 
interpretation in a very different manner. Of  course, it still distinguishes 
between the above (a)-(c). However, from the revisionist point of  view, 
the aim is not to use the second to describe the content of  the first in 
order to get clear on the third in such a way that the overall process is 
accountable to the intuitions of  native speakers. Instead, the objective is 
to use the second in order to revise the first in a manner that guarantees 
its agreement with ontological commitments that have been determined 
on independent grounds.  
 Within such an approach, the norms at play in evaluating the 
transition from natural to formal language are very different from the 
those at play in the descriptive approach. In such a context, there is 
nothing like the above-mentioned norm of  adequacy. On the contrary, 
the dialectic runs in the other direction; it is independently determined 
ontological commitments that place pressure on the rest. If  a certain 
formal interpretation is better aligned with some independently 
determined ontological commitment, we should select it even if  it greatly 
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deviates from the meaning of  the original natural language sentence, as 
assessed on the basis of  native speakers’ linguistic intuitions—hence, the 
label of  revision. As Berto and Plebani put it: 
…if  the aim of  the ontologist is not to clarify the real ontological import 
of  speakers’ ordinary talk, but to reform it so that it better sticks to what 
is out there, she may not need her paraphrases to do what we ordinarily 
expect from good translations. (Berto & Plebani 2015: 40) 
What are the sources of  the norms at play in the revisionary approach? 
This is a question with many ramification, but we might simply point to 
two main sources of  that view and of  the norms that govern them. The 
first source is the formal language, or family of  formal languages, 
standardly endorsed by revisionism as the canonical idiom in which to 
conduct ontological enquiries. The second source is a certain general 
view as to what shape the best theory of  reality should take and which 
data should allow us to determine our ontological commitments, 
independently of  a concern for natural language and native speakers’ 
intuitions.  
 As an example of  the first kind of  reason, we can point to Quine’s 
tireless defense of  first-order classical logic as the canonical idiom in 
which to pursue ontological debates. Non-exhaustively, his main grounds 
are that this formal language is purely extensional, i.e., all its connectors 
are truth functional, its co-referential terms can be substituted salva 
veritate, all of  its referential positions can be subjected to the application 
of  existential generalization, and, last but not least, the limitation of  that 
language to first-order quantification guarantees that, coupled with a 
nominalist account of  the values of  predicates, one is not committed to 
quantification over anything else than concrete particulars. 
 As an example of  the second kind of  reason, we can again look to 
Quine, who is well-known for his tireless defense of  full-blown 
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naturalism, defined as the view that the language of  fundamental physics 
has complete primacy over any other modes of  expressions and that a 
central philosophical task is either to provide translations of  
philosophical theories into that language or explain them away. From 
such a perspective, our ontological commitments should not be 
determined by philosophy but by science itself, and by physics, in 
particular. In that spirit, the task of  ontology is not to determine our 
ontological commitments from its own authority but to provide a 
methodology that can help us to clarify as much as possible the 
ontological commitments of  a given theory. Whether we are actually 
committed to whatever the translation in the canonical idiom reveals we 
would be committed to if  the theory were true ultimately depends on the 
scientific community’s decision regarding the status of  the theory in 
question.  
 This distinction between these two ways of  conceiving of  the 
ontological battlefield, a descriptive approach and a revisionary one, 
should now allow us to differentiate between two versions of  the meta-
ontological objection: a descriptive one and a revisionary one. Let us 
begin with the revisionary version. Revisionism is, first and foremost, a 
methodological doctrine. Indeed, it claims that we have independent, 
methodological reasons for endorsing the claim that quantification is 
ontologically committing—that is, that a statement that existentially 
quantifies over some x entails an ontological commitment towards that 
x. Indeed, as Quine indicated, the goal of  revisionism is to provide a 
neutral ground—a so-called canonical idiom—from which we can 
assesses the ontological commitment of  any kind of  theory.  
 From that point of  view, the notion that quantification is not 
ontologically committing does not make much sense. The premise of  
revisionism is that we should use a language with loaded quantifiers, 
because such a language provides us with a sound meta-ontological 
methodology. As such, if  revisionists felt pressured by Meinongianism, 
Chapter 3  190
they could always answer that they use a stipulated form of  
quantification for specific means—and, moreover, that we should all 
follow them down that path, because such a condition bears important 
philosophical fruits. As such, the problem with the revisionist objection 
is not that it is uninteresting. Rather, the issue is that it is formulated 
from within a debate that occupies a rather insular position with respect 
to the discussion of  Meinongianism. As such, we shall simply leave the 
revisionist objection aside and exclusively focus on the descriptive 
version.  
6.2.2 The Descriptive Approach and the Meta-Ontological 
Objection 
In this section, we focus on how we should understand the meta-
ontological objection from a descriptivist perspective. From the 
revisionist point of  view, the objection against Meinongianism amounted 
to the claim that Meinongian quantification contravenes the stipulated 
meaning of  the existential quantifier. The descriptive approach, however, 
does not involve itself  in the business of  stipulation. Instead, as Crane 
describes, it is, “concerned to get as much of  our natural language right 
as possible” (Crane 2013: 30). From that perspective, the meta-
ontological objection cannot be that Meinongian quantification 
contravenes the stipulated meaning of  the existential quantifier. Rather, 
the critique is that the existential quantifier turns out to be ontologically 
committing as a matter of  its natural meaning in the vernacular. The gist 
of  the objection is therefore that Meinongianism cannot be true, because 
sentences that quantify over things that do not exist are contradictory as 
a matter of  their natural meaning.  
 Let us make this claim more precise by means of  the following 
example:  
Chapter 3  191
 (26) Some things do not exist.  
As such, (26) is a sentence of  the vernacular and, moreover, one that can 
be both meaningful and true. Indeed, imagine a tense discussion between 
a young child and her parents over the non-existence of  Santa Claus. 
Furious, the child refuses to believe that Santa Claus does not exist. The 
parents, on the verge of  a nervous breakdown, utter, “Get over it; some 
things don’t exist.” On the basis of  this observation, one might well 
wonder what exactly is the orthodoxy’s charge against Meinongianism. 
Indeed, one might conclude from such an example that whatever theory 
of  quantification one endorses, one ought to be able to account for the 
truth of  (26).  
 As a matter of  fact, however, Meinongianism and the orthodoxy 
mean very different things by their putative recognition of  the truth of  
(26). Indeed, according to Meinongianism, (26) is not only true but also 
literally true. That is, according to Meinongianism, (26) must be taken as 
meaning that among those things that “some” ranges over, we can 
discriminate between those that possess the property of  existence and 
those that do not. The orthodoxy, on the other hand, claims that (26) can 
only be non-literally true. In other words, it is true not by virtue of  the fact 
that its Meinongian interpretation is true but because a paraphrase of  
(26) that does not quantify over anything non-existent is true. According 
to the orthodoxy, (26) merely constitutes a sloppy way of  saying 
something like, “There is no such thing that fits the description 
commonly attributed to ‘Santa Claus’.”  
 The orthodoxy’s case against the literal truth of  (26) rests on the 
idea that, read as such, (26) is contradictory. In other words, it is 
equivalent to the claim that some things that exist do not exist, since 
“some things” already means “some existent things.” This, however, 
constitutes a flat contradiction, on par with a sentence such as: 
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 (27) John is human and not-human. 
The whole objection can be summarized under the form of  a modus 
tollens as follows: 
  
1) Meinongianism is committed to the claim that at least some 
sentences that quantify over non-existent things are literally true. 
2) If  at least some sentences that quantify over non-existent things 
are literally true, then the existential quantifier is not 
ontologically committing. 
3) The existential quantifier is, as a matter of  its meaning, 
ontologically committing. 
4) Hence, Meinongianism is false.  
The key premise of  the argument is, of  course, premise 3). We shall now 
discuss it in detail. 
6.2.3 Quantification and Existence 
As the name suggests, quantification is the ability to speak about 
quantities rather than particulars elements of  a domain of  discourse. 
When used unrestrictedly, universal quantifiers like the natural language 
“all” or “everything,” and their formal equivalent “∀” permit us to speak 
about everything that is in the domain of  quantification. When overtly or 
covertly restricted, on the other hand, they allow us to speak about a sub-
set of  the domain. Existential quantifiers, on the other hand, such as the 
natural language “some” or “a handful of ” and their formal equivalent 
“∃,” permit us to speak about some elements of  a certain sub-set of  the 
domain. If  true, “Some x are F,” for instance, tells us that there is a non-
empty sub-set of  the domain, namely, F.  
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 This first function of  quantifiers we might call their basic function, 
as all conceptions of  quantification should embrace it. Allowing us to 
speak about quantities is simply the purpose for which quantifiers are 
designed. According to the orthodoxy, however, quantifiers do 
something more. That is, according to the orthodoxy, quantifiers not 
only allow us to speak about quantities, but also ontologically commit us 
to whatever makes quantified statements true. As Tim Crane puts it:  
If  the standard approach is right, then we cannot think of  ‘some Fs’ as 
picking out a collection of  things independently of  whether they exist. 
And so we cannot go on to predicate existence of  some of  them but not 
of  others. This is because ‘some’ already introduces, implies, or otherwise 
contains the idea of  existence. A defender of  the standard view might 
say that this is the reason that the symbol used to represent ‘some’ in the 
predicate calculus (‘∃’) is called the existential quantifier. (Crane 2013: 31) 
One might wonder, however, why exactly the orthodoxy thinks that the 
two functions we just mentioned always come together. In the 
vernacular, it is pretty clear that not all uses of  a quantifier are 
existentially committing. The grammatically well-formed sentence, 
“Some characters in the Bible exist and some do not,” is a perfectly 
suitable example of  a natural language sentence in which quantification 
and existence diverge. According to the orthodoxy, however, such 
sentences only seem to quantify over non-existents. Why should we think 
that these two functions, speaking about quantities and expressing 
ontological commitments, always go hand in hand? In answer, we shall 
point to three main reasons that may be advanced in favor of  that claim.  
 The first reason is that an account of  quantification that allows for 
literal quantification over non-existents must countenance the claim that 
non-existent things can fall within the scope of  quantifiers. Hence, such 
an account of  quantification must presuppose that there are things that 
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do not exist. This first claim, however, can hardly serve as an objection 
against a Meinongian theory of  quantification. Indeed, saying that such a 
theory of  quantification commits to non-existent objects is a mere 
statement of  facts. What would be needed is an argument against the 
existence of  such non-existent objects. This claim, however, does not 
provide any such argument.  
 On that score, as Priest (Priest 2008) and Berto (Berto 2013) point 
out, it is quite ironic that in what is universally considered as the locus 
classicus of  the view that quantification is ontologically committing, 
namely, Quine’s “On What There Is” (Quine 1953), one cannot find a 
single positive argument in favor of  the view. Rather, Quine proceeds by 
elimination, deflating proper names and variables of  any form of  
ontological commitment before asserting that quantification commits us 
ontologically. He merely assumes that the existential quantifier is 
ontologically committing and does not provide any additional support in 
favor of  his conjecture. At best, Quine makes clear that he does not 
believe that there are things that do not exist and, hence, that 
quantification is always quantification of  what exists. This claim, 
however, is not about quantification itself  but, rather, about domains of  
quantification. As Berto writes: 
[In ‘On What There Is’] there is no argument positively supporting the 
thesis that existential commitment is expressed by quantification: Quine 
assumes that a domain of  quantification can encompass only existing 
things. (Berto 2013: 31)  
In other words, if  Berto is right, then of  the two Quinian claims—(a) 
quantification is ontologically committing, and (b) domains contain only 
things that exist—it is the latter that wears the trousers. That is, Quinian 
quantification is ontologically committing solely because domains only 
contain existing things. However, from a Meinongian point of  view, it is 
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precisely this conception of  domains that is challenged. Thus, we can 
simply leave this first reason behind us.  
 Peter Van Inwagen has advanced a second, more substantial, kind 
of  reason. The gist of  Van Inwagen’s claim is that the mere notion of  
Meinongian quantification is problematic, because it amounts to, in 
Berto’s words, “something like an analytic falsehood” (Berto 2013: 73). 
That is, the assertion that, “There are things that do not have any kind 
of  being,” amounts to a falsehood by virtue of  the meaning of  the 
terms employed. One cannot meaningfully say that “there are” things 
before denying that these things “have any kind of  being.” Here is how 
Van Inwagen puts it:  
Meinongianism entails that there are things that participate in neither 
mode of  being, things that have no being of  any sort; but if  there are 
such things, they obviously have being. For a thing to have being is for 
there to be such a thing as it; what else could being be? (Van Inwagen 
2008: 39) 
Let us, first of  all, clarify a background assumption in Van Inwagen’s 
objection, namely, the claim that one cannot appeal to a distinction 
between kinds of  being to deflate the charge that Meinongianism is 
contradictory. Indeed, reflecting on sentences such as, “There are things 
that do not exist,” one might simply claim that this contains no 
contradiction on the grounds that we have to contrast what it is for 
something to have being from what it is for it to exist. A thing that exists 
certainly has being, but the converse need not be true: One thing may 
have being but fail to exist.  
 Such a rejoinder assumes a substantial thesis—that there are kinds 
of  being and that existence only constitutes one kind of  being among 
others. One main intuitive ground for the doctrine of  the plurivocity of  
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being is that different things exist in different ways: Substance are wholly 
present at each time of  their existence, events unfold over time, 
properties are abstract, and so on. This, however constitutes an 
unwarranted reason for supporting the claim that we can distinguish 
between different kinds of  being. Indeed, as Van Inwagen puts it, “many 
philosophers distinguish between a thing’s being and its nature” (Van 
Inwagen 2009: 476), and this distinction should suffice to account for 
any metaphysical difference between, say, substances and events. 
Everything that exists does so in the very same sense, even though 
things that exist may possess different natures. To be wholly present at 
each time and to unfold over time, for instance, does not amount to have 
different kinds of  being but to having different kinds of  natures.  
 We shall simply grant this background assumption to Van 
Inwagen. As a matter of  fact, the debate over the plurivocity of  being 
and the debate over Meinongian quantification turn out to be orthogonal. 
Indeed, some Meinongians accept the thesis of  the univocity of  being 
and nonetheless defend a Meinongian conception of  quantification (see, 
inter alia, Berto and Plebani 2015: 107). Thus, from a Meinongian 
perspective, if  there is a problem with Van Inwagen’s objection, it is not 
that he denies that we can distinguish between kinds of  being.  
 This first rejoinder set aside, let us now come back to Van 
Inwagen’s argument against Meinongian quantification proper. We shall 
propose reconstructing it as follows:  
1) Meinongianism is committed to the literal truth of, “There is a 
thing that does not possess any kind of  being.” 
2) The meaning of  the expression “a thing has being” is given by, 
or is equivalent to, the meaning of  the expression “there is a 
thing that…” 
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3) If  2) is true, then any true sentence formed by means of  an 
expression of  the form “there is…” entails that some thing has 
being. 
4) Hence, Meinongianism is committed to a contradiction.  
The key premise of  this argument is premise 2), as 1) merely provides 
information about Meinongianism, and 3) is supposed to follow from 2). 
Is it, however, plausible? Van Inwagen makes it sound as if  it is a rather 
straightforward point. However, 2) contains a very substantial notion—
and one that, moreover, is poorly supported by evidence. Let us see how 
a proponent of  Meinongianism might answer Van Inwagen’s objection.  
 We shall discuss two complementary lines of  answer to Van 
Inwagen’s objection discussed in the literature on quantification and non-
existence. The first one is that the use of  the verb “to be” is accidental to 
quantification (Berto 2013; Crane 2013). That is, there are many different 
forms of  quantification in the vernacular, and not all of  them use the 
verb “to be.” The second one is that the verb “to be” is ambiguous and 
so not all expressions of  the form “there is…” or “there are…” mean 
the same thing as “to exist” (Berto 2013).  
 Natural language quantifiers are much more rich than the generic 
“∃” of  first-order classical logic. Indeed, “there is…” and “there are…” 
are not the only means of  speaking about quantities. In addition, 
expressions like “some” or “a handful of ” are fully-fledged quantified 
expressions, even though they do not make use of  the verb “to be.” 
Also, one would need a supplementary argument to support the claim 
that all of  these quantified expressions are nonetheless synonymous with 
“there is…” and “there are…,” despite the fact that they do not overtly 
contain the verb “to be.” Van Inwagen’s argument, however, is 
insufficient for establishing that claim.  
 Note, moreover, that even if  such an argument existed, it would 
not be sufficient to substantiate Van Inwagen’s claim. Indeed, one would 
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also need to establish two further claims: first of  all, that “to be” is 
synonymous with “to exist” and, secondly, that all such quantified 
expressions are generically translatable by “∃.” As we shall now see, the 
existence of  an argument seems very unlikely.  
 Indeed, the verb “to be” is ambiguous between “absolute” and 
“non-absolute” uses (Berto 2013: 75). In an absolute use, “to be” is 
equivalent with “to exist.” This usage is very well attested in technical 
contexts, like philosophy, but not that common in the vernacular. Indeed, 
philosophers often say things such as, “There are numbers” or “There is 
a God,” or even, “God is,” but these constructions are not very 
common in the daily routines of  competent English speakers. On the 
contrary, in the vernacular, non-absolute constructions are the most 
common, that is, constructions in which the verb “to be” is—just like 
the verb “to have”—conjoined with adjectives to form predicates. One 
says, for instance, “John is late” or “John is Swiss,” just has one says, 
“John has measles” or “John has big dreams.” 
 Now, clearly enough, in an absolute use, “to be” is synonymous 
with existence. What, however, about the non-absolute uses? Is “to be” 
also synonymous with “to exist” in such cases? As Berto points out, this 
is rather unlikely. If  we take, for instance, a sentence such as, “There are 
two trucks in the garage,” which is felicitous, and replace it with “There 
exist two trucks in the garage,” we seemingly end up with something 
much less felicitous (Berto 2013: 75). As such, then, there does not seem 
to be a straightforward route from the claim that absolute uses of  “to be” 
are synonymous with “to exist” to the stronger one that all uses of  “to 
be” are synonymous with “to exist.”  
 In answer, one could ask whether it is at least the case that even if  
absolute and non-absolute uses cannot be synonymous, we can say that 
non-absolute uses entail existence, i.e., that when one asserts that “John is 
late,” one does not mean that John exists but says something that at least 
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entails that John exists. As a matter of  fact, this question is precisely the 
one at stake within the debate over Meinongianism. Hence, one cannot 
simply claim that there is such an entailment in the absence of  an 
argument, as this would simply beg the question against Meinongianism. 
Thus, the orthodoxy must offer us a substantial argument, but, as we 
shall now see, the prospects for such an argument do not look very 
promising.  
 Indeed, linguists distinguish between two uses of  expressions like 
“there is…” and “there are….” On the one hand, they can have an 
existential function, in which they assert the existence of  something and, 
on the other hand, they can have a locative function, in which they merely 
introduce elements of  discourse. Now, for Van Inwagen’s argument to 
work, the relations between these two uses would need to be such that: 
either existential and locative uses of  such constructions would be co-
extensional or, at least, locative constructions would constitute a sub-set 
of  existential ones, i.e., all locative constructions would be existential 
ones, even though some existential constructions might not be locative 
ones.  
 As a matter of  linguistic analysis, however, the contrary is the case: 
Existential constructions constitute a sub-set of  locative constructions. 
In other words, existential constructions are a sub-type of  the 
introduction of  elements of  discourse—the introduction of  existing 
elements of  discourse. The descriptive version of  the meta-ontological 
objection is hence doomed to remain unsupported by the linguistic 
intuitions of  native speakers.  
 Frederike Moltmann argues for this point in her paper, “The 
Semantics of  Existence” (Moltmann 2013). She notices that the locative 
uses of  quantificational expressions are much broader than their 
existential uses. That is, in the vernacular, there are uses of  “there is…” 
and “there are…” that explicitly do not convey any ontological 
commitment. As Moltmann remarks:  
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…there-sentences can quantify over past, merely possible, and merely 
intentional objects, objects that the predicate exist (or other existence predicates) 
could not be true of. This is particularly clear with [noun phrases] containing 
intensional or intentional adjectival or relative clause modifiers, as in the 
following, possibly true sentences: 
(13)   a. There are possible buildings that do not actually exist. 
  b. There are imaginary buildings that do not exist. 
  c. There are historical buildings that no longer exist. 
(14)   a. There are buildings built in the past that no longer exist. 
  b. There are buildings I might have built that do not exist. 
  c. There are buildings John thought of  that do not exist. 
        ( M o l t m a n n 
2013:7–emphasis added) 
This allows us to deliver the final blow to Van Inwagen’s argument: He 
cannot simply ground his claim in the meaning of  the expressions “there 
is…” and “there are….” That there is an is in “there is” is hence not 
sufficient for arguing that any such expression is ontologically 
committing. That said, as Berto points out, all of  this does not mean that 
there are no uses of  “there is…” and “there are…” that may partially 
support Van Inwagen’s claim (Berto 2013: 77). That is, there may well be 
cases where “there is…” and “there are…” entail existence. In light of  
the above consideration, however, such uses must be considered as 
restricted, rather than absolute, uses of  quantifiers.  
 These restrictions, moreover, need not be explicit. That is, in order 
to quantify over things that exist, one may not need to say something 
like, “Of  the things that exist, some of  them are merely contingent.” On 
the contrary, it is often sufficient to assert, “There are things that are 
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merely contingent,” where it is routinely taken up by the context that the 
quantifier “There are” is restricted to things that exist. As such, the 
Meinongian diagnosis of  Van Inwagen’s mistake is that he treats what 
are, in fact, restricted uses as absolute ones and hence misinterprets the 
relation between existential and locative constructions. As Berto 
concludes, “That there is an ‘is’ in ‘there is’ should not lead us to 
conclude that, in all cases, we ascribe… being in the absolute sense or 
existence, to the things we quantify over” (Berto 2013: 75). To conclude, 
Van Inwagen’s argument has no grip on Meinongian quantification.  
 Finally, a third reason that could be put forward as an objection 
against the idea of  Meinongian quantification is that we need the notion 
that quantification is ontologically committing, because we possess no 
other means of  expressing ontological commitments. In particular, there 
is no hope of  carving out a bona fide first-order existence predicate that 
does not appeal in part to quantification, like the standard first-order 
predicate of  first-order classical logic, “E!(x) = df. ∃y(y=x).” Here, 
however, we shall simply rely on examples from the literature of  such 
bona fide existence predicates (see, e.g., McGinn 2001; Berto 2013; Crane 
2013).  
 To summarize our discussion, the meta-ontological objection, 
when understood as a descriptive one, does not seem to have strong 
support. As such, we can conclude that if  Meinongianism poses a 
problem for the IOM, it is not by virtue of  its theory of  quantification. 
In the remainder of  this chapter, we shall point to three unwelcome 
consequences of  Meinongianism: (i) its endorsement of  a restriction of  
the law of  non-contradiction, (ii) the primitive character of  the 
distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear properties, and (iii) the 
strongly unintuitive character of  its doctrine of  nature.  
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6.4 Meinongianism and the Law of  Non-Contradiction 
The next objection we shall consider is that Meinongianism entails a 
rejection of  the law of  non-contradiction, i.e., that it cannot be the case 
that both p and ¬p are true or, in the material mode, that a particular 
instantiates both a property and its negation. This law is standardly 
qualified as one of  the basic laws of  thought, and Aristotle himself, in 
the Metaphysics Γ, famously called it “the most certain of  all principles.” 
The charge is that Meinongianism is bound to reject it.  
 The objection centers on the CP. As we saw above, this principle 
needs to be restricted in order to avoid absurd results, such as the 
consequence that everything can be defined into existence. Meinong’s 
answer was to distinguish between two kinds of  properties, nuclear and 
non-nuclear ones, and to claim that the CP is restricted to nuclear 
properties. The gist of  the present objection is that this restriction is by 
no means sufficient for Meinongianism to avoid other absurdities, such 
as the rejection of  the law of  non-contradiction.  
 Indeed, for any nuclear property, such as being round, one can 
imagine a set of  properties S such that S contains this property and its 
negation, e.g., S={being round, ¬being round}. Moreover, it follows 
from the CP that there is an object that instantiates these two 
contradictory properties. That there is such an object, however, 
contradicts the law of  non-contradiction. Assuming that the law of  non-
contradiction indeed constitutes a basic law of  thought, Meinongianism 
contravenes it, greatly threatening its plausibility.  
 Meinong’s own answer to this objection is pretty simple: He bites 
the bullet. That is, he recognizes that there are objects whose nature 
contravenes the law of  non-contradiction. This, one might argue, just 
makes it even worse for Meinongianism. Indeed, not only is the view 
contradictory but, on top of  that, its proponents explicitly recognize that 
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charge. They cannot even plead ignorance, as they explicitly reject the law 
of  non-contradiction. 
 At this point, however, one needs to be cautious when assessing 
Meinong’s reaction to the charge of  infringing on the law of  non-
contradiction. Indeed, he is well-aware that the rejection of  the principle 
of  non-contradiction is problematic but claims that his own 
infringement on the law of  non-contradiction is innocuous. He does not 
reject it but simply proposes restricting it. Indeed, he claims that his 
rejection of  the law of  non-contradiction holds only for impossible 
objects. As such, then, Meinongianism’s infringement on the law of  non-
contradiction should not come as a surprise. It merely follows from the 
claim that some non-existent objects are such that they possess a nature 
that precludes their existence.  
 Recall our above discussion of  the principle of  independence. We 
claimed that the meaning of  Meinong’s slogan “Sosein is independent 
from Sein” means that it does not follow from the truth of  sentence of  
the form “a is F” that a exists. We also made clear that Meinong did not 
believe the converse of  this principle, i.e., that Sein is independent from 
Sosein. Indeed, as he explicated, some objects possess a nature that 
prevent them from existing. It is to these objects, Meinong claims, that 
the law of  non-contradiction does not apply. As such, when we are 
talking and reasoning about ordinary objects, the law of  non-
contradiction holds for Meinong, just as it holds for anyone else.  
 Logically speaking, the worse consequence of  this rejection of  the 
law of  non-contradiction is that some principles of  inference that were 
considered valid turn out to be invalid. Graham Priest mentions, for 
instance, that the disjunctive syllogism would turn out to be invalid if  the 
law of  non-contradiction were rejected (Priest 2006: 110). According to 
disjunctive syllogism, p v q, ¬p ⊢ q. But if  we reject the law of  non-
contradiction, then p and ¬p can both be true and so one could not rely 
on it to eliminate the disjunction in the first premise. Importantly, 
Chapter 3  204
however, Meinong’s infringement of  the principle of  non-contradiction 
does not entail that he has to refrain from using such logical principles. 
Indeed, since he merely wishes to restrict, and not reject, the law of  non-
contradiction, a principle like disjunctive syllogism can still be validly 
applied when reasoning over everything but impossible objects. As such, 
then, Meinong’s restriction of  the law of  non-contradiction merely 
amounts to the claim that it does not constitute a valid principle to think 
about impossible objects, something that, given the nature of  these 
objects, one might have guessed right from the start. About this issue, 
John Findlay writes the following:  
We speak of  the world of  Außersein, but in reality the objects which have 
no being do not constitute a world. They are a chaos of  incoherent 
fragments… From another point of  view Außersein is incapable of  
scientific treatment because of  its excessive richness. In the case of  the 
actual world we can always ask whether a certain object is comprised in it 
or not; the question is interesting, because some things are excluded 
from it. The realm of  Außersein, however, has no such exclusiveness; 
every possibility or impossibility is comprised in it, and this fact silences 
a multitude of  questions. (Findlay 1963: 56-57, quoted in Lambert 1983: 
58-59)  
How should we evaluate this objection? If  formulated as the claim that 
Meinong is bound to a rejection of  the law of  non-contradiction 
simpliciter, then it seems too strong. Meinong is not bound to a rejection of  
the law of  non-contradiction but, rather, to a restriction of  it, something 
that one may have anticipated, granted that impossible objects do, by 
definition, break that law. Hence, the objection must be reformulated as 
the one that Meinong is bound to a restriction of  the law of  non-
contradiction. This restriction, however, would be truly problematic if  
one of  its consequences were something like the complete rejection of  
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the disjunctive syllogism as a valid principle of  reasoning over possible 
objects. Meinong, however, is not bound to such a rejection.  
 As such, then, one might simply reformulate this objection as 
follows: If one wants to endorse Meinongianism, one must be ready to 
live with such a restriction of  the law of  non-contradiction, a feature that 
some might find distressing. Meinongians, on the other hand, might be 
ready to live with it. 
6.5 Nuclear and Non-Nuclear Properties  
A restriction of  the law of  non-contradiction is not the only problem 
looming around the CP. Indeed, in this section, we discuss a further 
potentially problematic consequence of  the CP, namely, the primitive 
character of  the distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear properties.  
 The distinction, recall, amounts to the following. A naive 
formulation of  the CP runs into the problem that everything can be 
defined into existence. Meinong’s answer to this problem is to define two 
kinds of  properties, those to which the CP applies and those to 
which it does not. The first ones are called nuclear properties 
(konstitutorische) and the second ones extranuclear properties 
(Außerkonstitutorische). Existence, Meinong claims, is an extranuclear 
property, which purportedly neutralizes the problem that everything can 
be defined into existence.  
 What, however, is an extranuclear property? Meinong’s 
characterization of  this notion is rather thin: Every property such that it 
creates difficulties for the CP must be deemed extranuclear. However, is 
there something more informative one can say about this distinction? As 
Tobias Rosefeldt remarks, this does not seem to the case:  
Chapter 3  206
A further disadvantage of  Meinongianism is, according to me, the fact 
that the distinction between nuclear and extra-nuclear properties cannot 
be further explained philosophically. The distinction is introduced, 
because the conjunction of  the assumption…that existence is a 
discriminating property…and the naive characterization principle leads 
to absurd consequences. The problem is that we do not possess another 
understanding of  the notion of  extra-nuclear property than the one of  a 
property that creates difficulties for the conjunction of  the 
characterization principle and [the assumption that existence is a 
discriminating property]. (Rosefeldt unpublished: 37 – own translation ) 18
The objection here is not that the distinction between nuclear and 
extranuclear properties leads to problematic consequences. The problem, 
rather, is that the distinction admittedly plays an important role for 
Meinongianism and, as such, should be liable to thorough philosophical 
explanation. Meinong, however, does not provide much clarification 
beyond describing the role that the distinction should play, i.e., preventing 
the CP from becoming an absurdity. That said, one might regard such an 
elaboration of  the distinction as slightly too thin to play a foundational 
role in the elaboration of  the axiomatic of  a Meinongian theory of  
objects. Again, the objection might not be lethal for Meinongianism, as 
 “Ein weiterer Nachteil der Meinongianischen Konzeption ist in meinen 18
Augen die Tat- sache, daß die Unterscheidung zwischen konstitutorischen und 
außerkonstitutorischen Eigenschaften keiner tiefergehenden philosophischen 
Erklärung zugänglich ist. Die Unterscheidung wird eingeführt, weil die 
Annahme (M6) – Existenz ist eine diskriminierende Eigenschaft – und das naive 
Komprehensionsprinzip zusammengenom- men zu absurden Konsequenzen 
führen würden . Das Problem dabe i i s t , daß man von e iner 
außerkonstitutorischen Eigenschaft eigentlich keinen anderen Begriff  hat als 
den Begriff  von einer Eigenschaft, für die das naive Komprehensionsprinzip 
zusam- men mit (M6) zu Schwierigkeiten führen würde.” (Rosefeldt 2006: 37)
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Meinongians might be perfectly content to bite this second bullet. It is, 
however, another question as to whether we should really follow them in 
that direction.  
6.6 Meinongianism and the Objection from Natures 
In the last two sections, we presented two important consequences of  
Meinongianism: its restriction of  the law of  non-contradiction and the 
primitive character of  the distinction between nuclear and extranuclear 
properties. In this section, we discuss a third such consequence, this time 
pertaining to the notion of  nature, which Tim Crane proposes in his 
recent The Objects of  Thought (Crane 2013).  
 According to Meinongianism, there are many things that do not 
exist, or that even cannot exist, but that are, apart from their lack of  a 
positive ontological status, pretty much like anything that exists. That is, 
the golden mountain might not exist, but it is still a mountain made of  
gold, and Pegasus might not exist, but he is still a horse. That is, in 
conformity with the principle of  indifference, anything can have its 
nature determined Außersein, and in conformity with the CP, this nature 
can be constituted of  any set of  nuclear properties. Hence, Pegasus and 
any existing horse can share the very same nature, namely, being a horse.  
 This might sound alright until the moment one pauses to reflect 
on what exactly is constitutive of  a horse’s nature. One might conceive 
that, through an unlikely cosmic event, a bunch of  molecules materialize 
as a horse. As such, then, one might be willing to accept that being born 
from other horses is not a constitutive condition on being a horse. That 
said, what about other properties, such as occupying space and time, 
having inner organs, normally having four legs, and so on? Would 
anything lacking any of  these properties still count as horse?  
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 It is highly intuitive to believe that anything that is lacking these 
properties could not be a horse on the same count as any existing horse. 
However, Pegasus or any non-existent horse lacks any of  these 
properties. Hence, the thought goes, it cannot be true that non-existent 
objects really share a nature with existent ones.  
 Meinongianism, however, is likely to answer that this objection is 
misguided. Indeed, Pegasus and other existent horses do possess 
properties such as occupying space-time, having inner organs, and having 
four legs. It is just that they occupy a non-existent space-time, have non-
existent inner organs, and normally have four non-existent legs.  
 The problem with this Meinongian rejoinder is that it somewhat 
misses the original intuition behind the objection. The original idea is 
that non-existent horses cannot be horses on the same count as existent 
ones insofar as being a horse is an existence-entailing property, that is, it 
entails having a series of  properties that nothing that fails to exist could 
instantiate. Meinong, we saw earlier, distinguishes between a thing’s 
nature and what follows from this nature. Any object, including a 
necessary one, does not have existence as a constituent of  its nature. A 
necessary object, according to Meinong, is not an object that possesses 
the property of  existing as constitutive of  its nature. It is, rather, an 
object whose existence necessarily follows from its nature as determined 
Außersein. The problem pointed to here, however, is that we greatly 
struggle in making sense of  this distinction between a thing’s nature and 
what follows from this nature. Indeed, quite often, a thing’s nature is 
directly constituted by properties that are existence-entailing in the sense 
that one cannot instantiates this property and not exist. As Tim Crane 
puts it: 
The general point here should be obvious: there are general empirical or 
metaphysical conditions that objects normally have to meet if  certain 
predications are going to be true of  them. What these conditions are is a 
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matter of  the nature of  the individual things in question. But in many 
cases, it is required by something’s having the property in question that if  
they have that property, there are other properties they must have, and 
many of  these properties are existence-entailing. This is not because of  
anything about the logic of  the sentences we use to ascribe these 
properties; but because of  the natures of  the things to which the 
properties are correctly ascribed. (Crane 2013: 62-63) 
At this point, the distinction between Kant’s conception of  the principle 
of  independence and Meinong’s understanding of  that principle 
becomes particularly crucial. According to Kant, the concept of  
something is independent from its existence. However, the concept of  a 
horse is not itself  a horse. Rather, it is something that can be satisfied by 
a horse. Meinong’s trouble is that he believes that something can be a 
horse and yet not fulfill the most basic conditions of  being a horse. 
 In his famous critique of  Meinong, Russell points to what he calls 
“that feeling of  reality that ought to be preserved even in the most 
abstract studies” (Russell 1919: 169). He claims that by believing that 
some things do not exist, Meinong loses touch with this sense of  reality. 
Crane, however, proposes reformulating Russell’s critique in terms of  the 
idea that some natures are existence-entailing. The problem with 
Meinongianism, hence, is that it entails that all natures are not existence-
entailing. As Crane puts it: 
I would like to interpret Russell’s phrase in terms of  the understanding 
of  having properties just offered. Objects have natures. What their 
natures are is a matter of  empirical or metaphysical study. But having 
some of  these natures requires that those objects exist. It is in the nature 
of  horses, planets, golden things, living things (and so on) to exist. Non-
existent things do not have what it takes to have the properties of  these 
things. Non-existent objects cannot have properties like being a horse, 
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being golden, being a detective, and nor can they stand in relations like 
killing…The feeling for reality, then, is a feeling about what is required 
by the natures of  things. Someone who lacked the feeling for reality 
might mistakenly think that something could be a planet even if  it never 
actually orbited anything. But this is a mistake: it belongs to the natures 
of  certain things that they exist. Meinong’s theory of  objects, I think, is 
based on this mistake. (Crane 2013: 63-64) 
Two remarks are in order about this last objection. First of  all, once 
again, a Meinongian might just reject it on the grounds that it uses a 
mistaken conception of  natures. As such, then, the objection might not 
turn out to be lethal. It is, however, quite strong. Indeed, Crane’s account 
of  the conditions that pertain to certain natures sounds plausible. 
Moreover, a Meinongian willing to defend herself  against Crane’s 
criticism would have to defend some particularly strange theses, such as 
that there is a non-existent space-time. In fact, one might start to wonder 
what such theses even mean. 
 Secondly, Crane’s account is a charge against the principle of  
indifference and the CP. That is, it attacks the idea that all natures that 
conform to the CP are determined Außersein. Importantly, however, 
Crane’s critique is compatible with a restricted endorsement of  the 
principle of  independence. That is, if some properties turn out to be 
non-existence entailing, there is no reason to deny that, for these 
properties at least, putative non-existent objects could have them. This 
opens up the possibility of  a very deflated version of  Meinongianism, 
which we shall discuss in Chapter 6.  
 Why not turn to such a discussion right now? In addition to the 
objections already discussed, a further extremely influential objection 
against Meinongianism is not merely that it has troubling consequences 
but also that such a strange philosophical theory is simply unnecessary. 
Whatever task the theory of  objects was supposed to help accomplish—
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in particular, providing an adequate theory of  intentionality—can be 
achieved independently of  any Meinongian inkling. We shall now turn to 
this objection by discussing two alternative models of  intentionality in 
Chapters 4 and 5.   
7. Conclusion 
As we saw in the previous chapter, the IOM is committed to the truth of  
the following two theses:  
(i) Some intentional objects do not exist.  
(ii) Non-existent intentional objects can be the relata of  the relation 
of  “being about.” 
In this chapter, we discussed a particular theory that aims to account for 
their truth, namely, Meinongianism. As we saw, it intends to account for 
these two theses in a substantial way, i.e., in terms of  their being mind-
independent non-existent objects that have their nature determined 
Außersein and to which intentional experiences can stand in the relation 
of  “being about.” 
 We then discussed five main objections against Meinongianism: 
the nonsense objection, the meta-ontological objection, the objection 
from the law of  non-contradiction, the primitive character of  the 
distinction between nuclear and non-nuclear properties, and, last but not 
the least, the objection from natures. As we saw, none of  them 
constitutes a lethal threat for Meinongianism. Taken together, however, 
they start to pile up and to constitute a rather heavy bullet for 
Meinongians to bite. The cost of  being able to account for (i) and (ii) 
might start to look prohibitive. If  we add that many have found 
Meinongianism to be, in fact, unnecessary, then one might consider that 
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it is simply time to move on to non-Meinongian alternative theories of  
intentionality.  
 That said, this does not necessarily mean that all of  the 
fundamental ideas of  Meinongianism are hopeless. Rather, it means that 
if  they are to have any plausibility, they must take a very restricted form, 
one that is unlikely, however, to be capable of  accounting for (i) and (ii) 
as they stand. We shall return to this issue in Chapter 6. In the meantime, 
the next chapter turns to the IOM’s most important relational contender, 
the content model. 
Chapter 4: The Content Model 
It might seem odd to suggest that experiences 
might not have content, since it is difficult to find 
any major figure in contemporary discussion who 
does not characterize the intentionality of  
experiences in terms of  their possession of  
content. Pick up any work on perception, 
intentionality, or the philosophy of  mind, that has 
been written in the last several decades, and the 
chances are that it is bristling with ‘contents’.  
     (Hopp 2011: 8) 
1. Introduction 
We started our inquiry with the ideas of  both the fundamental 
intentional schema (FIS) and a literal interpretation of  that schema, as 
offered by the intentional object model (IOM). We then stumbled onto 
the main problem faced by the IOM, namely non-existence, and claimed 
that the IOM should be conjoined with Meinongianism. As we saw, 
however, Meinongianism faces some concerns that undermine its 
plausibility. In this chapter, we hence move on to an alternative relational 
model of  intentionality, the content model (CM). We discuss a simple 
version of  the CM, as we contend that the problems it faces are rather 
basic.  
 One may try to formulate the key idea behind the CM in this 
manner. The IOM considers the following two ideas to be two faces of  
the same coin: (i) the underlying metaphysical nature of  intentionality is 
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relational and (ii) intentionality is aboutness. Indeed, the IOM asserts 
that intentionality is a relation and that this relation is nothing but the 
“being about” relation. In contrast, the core characteristic of  the CM is 
that it proposes treating these two ideas separately. 
 On the one hand, the underlying metaphysical nature of  
intentionality is indeed relational; however, first, this relation is not the 
one of  “being about” and, second, its relata are not intentional objects 
but rather intentional contents. Nonetheless, intentional contents are not 
what intentional experiences are about. As such, the underlying 
metaphysical nature of  intentionality is then indeed relational, although 
this relation is not one of  “being about”; it is instead one of  standing in 
a non-intentional relation to a content.  
 On the other hand, according to the CM, intentionality’s central 
feature is indeed aboutness—but not aboutness as a relation. The 
alternative idea is that the entities one stands in relation to, namely 
intentional contents, have certain non-relational properties from which 
we can cash out the general intuition that lies behind aboutness. 
According to the CM, being the bearer of  an intentional state is thus a 
kind of  two-steps process. First, one must stand in a relation to a 
content; second, this content must have some properties that account for 
the fact that this state is about something. The strategy of  the CM is 
hence to divide and conquer whereas the IOM treats matters as a single 
conceptual package. 
 This chapter proceeds as follows. We start by introducing the 
notions of  content and representation before applying them to intentional 
experiences. We then discuss how the CM is supposed to account for the 
six features of  intentionality introduced in Chapter 1, focusing especially 
on aboutness and non-existence. Finally, we close by proposing two 
fundamental objections to the CM.   
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2. The Idea of  Content 
2.1 Intentional vs Representational Content 
Upon realizing that the hypothesis that intentional experiences can be 
relations to non-existent intentional objects is problematic, a somewhat 
natural fallback is to keep the IOM’s relation of  “being about” steady 
while trying to change its target whenever non-existence kicks in. This 
can be done in three main ways: first, by claiming that intentional 
experiences that are about things that do not exist, e.g., Pegasus, are not 
about particulars but rather about properties, such as the property of  being 
Pegasus; second, by claiming that such intentional experiences are not 
about non-existent concrete particulars but rather about existent abstract 
objects; and third, by claiming that such intentional experiences are not 
about non-existent concrete particulars but instead about representations 
of  such particulars.  
 All of  these ideas are non-starters, and for the very same reason. 
Indeed, we know that if  John thinks about Pegasus or desires to ride 
Pegasus, he neither thinks about nor wishes to ride a property, an 
abstract object, or a representation. Indeed, whatever these things could 
mean, they are just plainly absurd as an analysis of  such experiences’ 
intentional character. There is simply no plausible way to go down any 
of  these roads. One cannot get around the problem that theories of  
intentionality face when non-existence kicks in by simply redirecting the 
mind to something other than, e.g., a non-existent concrete particular. 
Focusing on the second and third of  the above possibilities, Hopp nicely 
summarizes this point as follows: 
If  Timmy hopes that Rudolph the Red-Nosed Reindeer lands on his 
roof  tonight, what existing object could plausibly be taken to be the 
object of  his hope? One is tempted to start with the obvious culprit, 
Rudolph, and claim that he is really an idea in the child’s mind or an 
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abstract object of  some sort. Both claims are quite unbelievable. First, 
nothing “in” Timmy’s mind, nor anything abstract, could possibly qualify 
as what he is thinking about when he thinks about Rudolph; as confused 
as he might be, he does not hope that one of  his ideas or an abstract 
object will land on his roof  tonight. What he hopes will land on his roof  
is a reindeer that is identical with Rudolph, and this thing does not exist, 
either in his head, in the actual world, or in an abstract realm. (Hopp 
2011: 14) 
These ideas set aside, one might nonetheless wonder whether there is not 
something intrinsically correct about bringing the notion of  
representation into the game. Indeed, Pegasus himself  does not exist, 
but there are many representations of  Pegasus that do exist and these 
representations manage, in one some way or another, to direct us on to 
Pegasus. This fact, after all, is rather startling—and, one might add, 
inspiring. Indeed, since representations of  Pegasus manage to direct us 
on to Pegasus, is there not another way to use the notion of  
representation—i.e., not as what the mind is directed upon—that would 
somewhat allow us to explain the intentional character of  an experience? 
However, what other roles could representations play? What about the 
idea that intentional experiences themselves are representations of  some 
kind?  
 This idea has been enormously influential in recent philosophy of  
mind. In an encyclopedia entry on intentionality, Alex Byrne 
symptomatically writes the following:    
The moral of  the paradoxes of  intentionality is that thinking of  
intentionality in terms of  "the intentional relation" is a bad idea. A better 
way involves drawing a distinction between the representational content of  a 
mental state (or some other thing that has intentionality) and the objects 
(if  any) the mental state is about. (Byrne 2006: 407) 
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However, what do we mean by representation and representational content, and 
how can intentional experiences themselves be conceived as 
representations? These are the key questions we target. That said, we 
actually begin with the obvious. When reading the above quotation from 
Byrne, one could well claim to not see much of  a difference between the 
IOM and the CM. Indeed, after all, the IOM also distinguishes between 
the content and object of  an intentional experience. How can Byrne’s 
sketch then stand as an alternative to the IOM? All of  the differences are 
obviously revealed in Byrne’s italicized text. Indeed, there is an important 
difference between (i) distinguishing between the content and object of  
an intentional state in the manner of  the IOM and (ii) claiming that the 
contents of  intentional experiences are representational contents that 
themselves can account for the intentional nature of  intentional 
experiences. However, where does the difference lie?  
 First, the IOM distinguishes between intentional objects and 
intentional contents but does not view this distinction as having anything 
to do with the task of  explaining the intentional character of  intentional 
experiences, i.e., their having aboutness. Indeed, as we saw, the IOM 
claims that for an intentional experience to have aboutness just means 
that it has an intentional object. The notion of  content is introduced at a 
later stage to account not for aboutness in itself  but, rather, for the 
feature we called aspectuality. However, the matter is viewed differently 
within the CM, which asserts that the intentional nature of  an experience 
must be accounted for in terms of  its having a content alone, 
independently of  its having an intentional object.   
 Second, as Byrne clarifies, the CM uses a notion of  content that is 
representational. We detail exactly what is meant by this qualification below, 
but a key issue is that if  a content C is representational, it can, unlike 
intentional content of  the IOM, represent something in a way that is 
completely independent of  there being something that it represents. For 
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instance, a map of  Tolkien’s Shire can represent the Shire in a way that is 
completely independent from anything like the Shire itself  either existing 
or non-existing in a Meinongian way. Crucially, this is not the case with 
the notion of  content introduced by the IOM, which is precisely defined 
in terms of  the notion of  intentional object, i.e., a content as conceived 
by the IOM amounts to a way an intentional object is given. According 
to the IOM, the notion of  intentional object hence cannot be dropped 
without thereby also losing grip on the notions of  intentional content 
and, also, intentionality itself.  
2.2 Introducing Representation 
Now that these preliminary remarks have been provided, we can turn to 
the next question: What is a representation? Let us tackle this by 
discussing the example of  a map of  London that one is handed as 
leaving a hotel. We claim that the map constitutes an indisputable 
instance of  a representation of  London. In the most general terms, a 
map can be characterized as a pattern of  ink marks that stand in some 
relation with each other in such a way that they can be said to represent 
the geography of  some real place, that is, to represent the respective 
positions and distances that separate a series of  real geographical 
locations. For instance, one point on the map represents Big Ben 
whereas another represents Westminster Abbey. Knowing that the top 
of  the map represents north (and where it is), the map-reader is in a 
position to know the respective positions of  these two landmarks and 
the distance that separates them. Knowing where one is on the map also 
enables one to reach them.  
 That said, in virtue of  what is a map a representation? Most 
basically, for something to be a representation it is essential that it stands 
in a semantic relation with what it represents. Indeed, as David Pitt puts it: 
“a representation is an object with semantic properties” (Pitt 2012). It is 
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this possession of  semantic properties that turns a piece of  paper with 
scattered ink marks into a map. That is, a map contains information 
about the way things are in the real world and, as such, can be evaluated 
semantically as being either accurate or inaccurate. It is accurate if  the 
points on the map can be said to accurately model the relations between 
a series of  real geographical locations and inaccurate if  not. We refer to 
the feature of  the map that can be semantically evaluated as its 
representational content.  
 Moving beyond maps, all representations share a general 
commonality: they possess a representational content that is semantically 
evaluable. As shown below, different kinds of  representations can have 
different kinds of  representational contents and different kinds of  
representational contents can possess different kinds of  semantic 
properties. Nonetheless, deep down all representations possess a 
representational content, to be characterized as follows:   
Representational content: For any representation R, its 
representational content constitutes an element or feature of  that 
representation that can be semantically evaluated, i.e., can be 
deemed correct or incorrect, accurate or inaccurate, true or false, 
and so forth.   
Representations, however, are complex objects and their having a 
representational content only constitutes one of  their features. 
Distinguishing among some of  these features will help us make stand 
out what representational content is. With respect to any representation 
R, the following features can be distinguished:  
a) Its possessing a semantically evaluable content; 
b) The way it encodes this content; 
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c) The way this encoding is realized in a certain medium of  
representation; and 
d) The manner it possesses this content.  
A map of  London again serves as a useful example. Such a map 
possesses some semantically evaluable content about London, but this 
content is encoded in a particular way: As a map is essentially a drawing, 
its content can be said to essentially encoded in a pictorial way. It is 
difficult to determine exactly how a content can be encoded pictorially, 
but we do not pursue this matter here. It is likely that different kinds of  
pictorial content encode information in different manners, and our task 
is not to provide a detailed account of  each option. However, in the case 
of  a map it is plausible that the notion of  mapping plays an important 
role in the way the representational content of  a map is encoded. That is, 
an accurate map is a map that stands in a one-to-one relation of  
mapping with the portion of  the world (including not only particulars 
but also some relations between them) it aims to represent. As such, at 
least one way for a pictorial representation to encode its content is to be 
an image that maps one-to-one what it aims to represent.  
 Imagine now a very long text that presents a detailed description 
of  the geography of  London as it is represented on a map of  that city. 
Such a text might plausibly be said to represent the geography of  
London. However, sentences are not drawings; that is, we do not claim 
that the sentence “Big Ben is located near the Thames” represents the 
geographical location of  Big Ben by virtue of  physical properties that 
somewhat map one-to-one the real relation between Big Ben and the 
Thames, as would be true for the kind of  pictorial representational 
contents that characterize maps. On the contrary, such a sentence can be 
said to represent the real relation between Big Ben and the Thames only 
symbolically, that is, by means of  symbols that are endowed with meanings 
which when combined in a sentence indicate that Big Ben is located near 
Chapter 4  221
the Thames. As such, we must then distinguish between two things: the 
representational content of  a representation and the particular way in 
which it encodes this representation, e.g., in a pictorial, symbolic, or other 
manner.  
 Next, distinguishing between different ways in which a content 
can be encoded, e.g., pictorially or symbolically, might be finessed further 
by distinguishing not only the kind of  a representation but also the 
particular medium in which a representation of  a certain kind is realized. 
For instance, compare a painting and a photograph of  London. While 
both might be said to be pictorial representations of  London, paintings 
and photographs are very different kinds of  things. As such we might 
distinguish between the way in which a representational content is 
encoded, e.g., pictorially, and the medium into which it is encoded, i.e., its 
representational vehicle. A painting and a photograph of  London can hence 
be said to be two pictorial representations of  London with different 
kinds of  representational vehicles.  
 Finally, we indicated above that a map of  London has been 
assigned a certain function, namely representing a portion of  the world. 
This results from the imposition of  a certain content to the map. 
However, not all representations are such that their having a content 
derives from their having been assigned a content by something distinct 
from them. Indeed, if  this were the case, we would be confronted by a 
regress that threatens the possibility of  their being representations in the 
first place. As such, we must thus distinguish between representations 
that represent originally or intrinsically and those that represent only 
derivatively (Searle 1992; Haugeland 1998a). Original representation occurs 
only if  the fact that a representation is representing something is not 
explained in terms of  the representational properties of  something else. 
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2.3 Experiences as Representations 
With these basic elements in place, let us return to the topic of  
intentional experiences. We have introduced the notion of  representation 
as well as some key ideas that revolve around it. The idea embodied in 
Byrne’s above quotation is then that intentional experiences form just 
another kind of  representation, alongside inter alia maps, words, 
sentences, paintings, and pictures. Accordingly, intentional experiences 
are complex things in at least just the same way any kinds of  
representations are.  
 At the most basic level, the idea is that experiences are a kind of  
representational vehicle, alongside maps, paintings, and pictures. 
However, experiences stand out among the possible different kinds of  
representational vehicles. Indeed, their having representational content in 
the first place is quite unique in the fact that they have representational 
content intrinsically or originally. That is, unlike artefacts endowed with 
representational content by means of  this content having been imposed 
on them, experiences do have such contents in a way that is not 
explained in terms of  the representational properties of  something else. 
But in what way is the content of  an intentional experience encoded? We 
voluntarily do not address this question here. Indeed, it is very likely that 
different kinds of  mental representations encode their contents in 
different ways. Abstract thought might be purely symbolic while some 
kinds of  mental imagery might be more pictorial. Accounting for this 
diversity would bring us too far. 
 However, intentional experiences are not exhausted by having a 
certain representational content. Indeed, for one to undergo an 
intentional experience is for one to undergo an experience of  a particular 
kind, i.e., for one to judge, desire, hope, or fear something. The 
“something” part is supposed to be covered by the notion of  
representational content, but the CM still needs to account for the fact 
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that one is always intentionally directed upon something in a certain 
manner. Accordingly, for the CM, for an experience to be intentional is 
for an intentional subject to take a certain intentional attitude with respect 
to what a certain representational content represents. For instance, to 
desire that p is to desire that what is represented by p obtains. Similarly, 
to judge that p is to judge that what is represented by p is the case. And 
so forth for each possible kind of  intentional attitude. In sum, the CM 
thus contends that for something to be about something essentially is to 
entertain a certain intentional attitude with respect to something that is 
represented by a certain representational content. As Jaegwon Kim 
summarizes the issue: 
You hope that it will be warmer tomorrow, and I believe that it will. But 
Mary doubts it and hopes that she is right. Here we have various 
“intentional” (or “content-bearing” or “content-carrying”) states: your 
hoping that it will be warmer tomorrow, my believing, and Mary’s doubting, 
that it will be so. All of  these states, though they are states of  different 
persons and involve different attitudes (believing, hoping, and doubting), 
have the same content: the proposition that it will be warmer tomorrow, 
expressed by the embedded sentence “it will be warmer tomorrow.” This 
content represents a certain state of  affairs, its being warmer tomorrow. 
(Kim 2006: 269) 
Now that these fundamentals elements of  the CM have been introduced, 
let us compare how the CM and IOM respectively describe intentional 
experiences. According to the IOM, intentional experiences are 
essentially characterized by the presence of  intentional objects to the 
mind. That is, for something to be an intentional experience is for that 
experience to be an instance of  a determinable relation of  “being about” 
directed towards an intentional object. Accordingly, to be the bearer of  
an intentional experience is for one to direct one’s mind upon an 
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intentional object in terms of  a determinable relation, i.e., one can judge 
that a certain intentional object obtains, or desire a certain intentional 
object, or merely think about it.  For the IOM, all such are instances of  
the mind standing in the “being about” relation to some intentional 
object.  
 According to the CM, this picture of  intentionality is deeply 
misleading. Indeed, the CM asserts that for an experience to be 
intentional is not for it to stand in a determinable relation of  “being 
about” to an intentional object; rather, it is a matter of  entertaining 
intentional attitudes toward ways the world is or can be, as represented 
by so-called representational contents. Let us take the following 
intentional experience as an example:  
 (1) John hopes that Federer retires.  
According to the IOM, for John to hope that Federer retires is a matter 
for John, or John’s experience, to be standing in the relation of  “being 
about” with an intentional object—presumably, the non-obtaining fact 
that Federer retires—in a certain way, that is, in a way that John hopes 
that this fact obtains.  
 The IOM therefore analyzes the intentional nature of  (1) as 
follows. “John” designates the intentional subject, that is, the person 
undergoing the intentional experience; “to hope” indicates the particular 
way in which John is mentally directed on an intentional object; and 
finally the that-clause “that Federer retires” plays a double role: it states 
both the intentional object of  John’s hope, i.e., what it is about, and the 
content of  John’s hope, i.e., the way John in which is intentionally 
directed upon his intentional object.  
 The CM provides a very different description of  this example. In 
particular, the CM does not claim that for John to hope that Federer 
retires is for John to stand in some relation toward an intentional object. 
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On the contrary, the CM contends that for John to hope that Federer 
retires is for John’s experience to have a certain representational content, 
namely that Federer retires. Moreover, this representational content is not 
what John’s intentional experience is about: John’s experience is about 
some fact, not some representational content. According to the CM, 
John’s intentional experience is about what this content represents, that is, 
that Federer retires.  
 The CM therefore analyzes the intentional nature of  (1) as 
follows. “John” designates an intentional subject, that is, the person 
undergoing an intentional experience; “to hope” represents the particular 
attitude that the experience is an instance of, and finally, the that-clause 
“that Federer retires” denotes the experience’s representational content. 
To hope that Federer retires is thus to hope that what the 
representational content represents obtains at some point.  
 In the next section, we see how the CM is supposed to be able to 
account for the six main features of  intentionality introduced in Chapter 
1.  
3. The CM and the Six Main Features of  Aboutness 
3.1 Aboutness  
The first task of  a theory of  intentionality should be to provide us with 
an account of  the property of  intentional experiences we have called 
“aboutness.” In this section, we focus in more details on the way in 
which the CM tries to account for this property. We argue that the CM 
defends two claims with respect to aboutness: first, that the notion of  
aboutness should be accounted for in terms of  the notion of  
representational content; and second, that aboutness thus understood is 
conceptually derivative of  another feature of  intentionality, namely 
semantic normativity. We discuss the first point in this sub-section and 
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the second one in the subsequent discussion of  semantic normativity 
itself.  
 The CM’s key tenet is that the feature we called “aboutness” can 
be elucidated in terms of  the idea that intentional experiences have 
representational content. As should be obvious, however, the idea cannot 
be that the very notion of  aboutness employed by the IOM can be 
defined alternatively in terms of  the notion of  representational content. 
Indeed, the notion of  aboutness used within the IOM was tailor-made 
insofar as, within that framework, for an experience to be about 
something merely means for it to stand in a relation of  “being about” 
with some intentional object. As such whatever notion of  aboutness the 
CM delivers, it must be one that is different from the notion advocated 
by the IOM.   
 One way to understand the CM’s strategy with respect to the way 
it chooses to cash out aboutness is as follows: a general intuition lies 
behind the fundamental intentional schema and this general intuition can 
be philosophically accounted for in more than one way. The IOM cashes 
it out in terms of  the notion of  intentional object, but this interpretation 
is at best contingent and at worse mistaken as it saddles the theory of  
intentionality with the intractable problem of  accounting for relations to 
non-existent objects. There is hence room for an alternative 
interpretation of  this general intuition.  
 What is this general intuition? It is, roughly, that intentional 
experiences are essentially concerned with the world in a way that 
nothing non-intentional is. This familiar idea can be recalled by means of  
a comparison. John weighs 80 kg. This non-intentional state is a 
constituent of the world but is in no sense concerned with the world. As far as 
we can see, it is not concerned with anything. It just is what it is, namely 
a state of  weighing 80 kg. Now take John’s judgment that Obama is 
American. This intentional experience is also a constituent of  the world, 
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but it displays something more. Indeed, unlike John’s state of  weighing 
80 kg, it is in addition concerned with the world.  
 The IOM cashes this general intuition out in terms of  the IOM 
schema. For an intentional experience to be concerned with the world is 
for that experience to take the world, or rather a portion of  it, as an 
intentional object. However, according to the CM the problem of  non-
existence as faced by the IOM must be taken as a good sign that this 
conception of  aboutness is mistaken and that the general intuition must 
be cashed out in an alternative manner, i.e., by means of  the notion of  
representational content. 
 The CM hence asserts that for an intentional experience to be 
concerned with the world is for it to have a representational content 
endowed with semantic properties. That is, like any other kind of  
representation, each intentional experience possesses a certain 
representational content C such that there are conditions under which C 
can be said to be semantically evaluable, i.e., true, veridical, or whatever 
other semantic property is required. The conditions under which C can 
be true or alternatively what C can be true of  constitute what C is about. 
In other words, C determines a state of  the world S such that C is true 
just in case S obtains. By being the bearer of  an intentional experience 
that tokens a certain intentional content, an intentional subject is hence 
concerned with the world in the sense of  tokening a certain content that 
is true just in case some conditions obtain. According to the CM, this is a 
sufficient gloss on the notion of  general intuition that lies behind 
aboutness.  
 As demonstrated later when we discuss the CM’s take on non-
existence, it is important to distinguish between the claim that a 
representational content determines the conditions under which it can be 
positively semantically evaluated and the status of  these conditions. 
Indeed, at least for some way to conceive of  these conditions, they can 
be determined independently of  being fulfilled. As such, an intentional 
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experience with a certain content C can still be said to be about what 
would fulfill the conditions determined by C even if  these conditions are 
not fulfilled.  
 We can accordingly saddle the CM with an interpretation of  the 
FIS that involves two steps. First, the word “about” is eliminated in favor 
of  the notion of  representation; second, the notion of  representation is 
cashed out in terms of  the notions of  representational content. The 
following schema is the result: 
The CM schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x represents y”; and 
x can be said to represent y just in case there is a representational 
content C that either is, or could be, true of  y.  
As Bradon-Mitchell and Jackson summarize the issue: 
If  you desire that it rain soon, your desire is about what the proposition 
expressed by the sentence ‘It will rain soon’ is about: namely, rain in the 
near future. Moreover, its ‘aboutness’ does not depend on the existence 
of  what it is about. There may be no rain in the near future; nevertheless, 
that is what you desire. Your desire counts as being about future rain in 
that only future rain would make the proposition that you desire true, 
and so satisfy your desire. Again, some believe in the Devil but that is not 
a matter of  standing in the belief  relation to the Devil; there is no such 
thing to be related to. Rather, they believe that the Devil exists, and their 
belief  counts as being ‘about’ the Devil only in the sense of  that the 
proposition that they believe could not be true unless the Devil exists. 
(Bradon-Mitchell and Jackson 1996: 162) 
From the IOM’s perspective, what is certainly the most remarkable 
feature of  the CM schema is the complete disappearance of  the notion 
of  intentional object. Indeed, according to the CM, the notion of  
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intentional object plays absolutely no role in an experience being 
intentional. The notion of  content is instead the sole determining factor. 
This is the now familiar sense in which most contemporary theorists of  
intentionality claim that something is intentional only if  it is “content-
bearing” or “content-carrying”, as illustrated by Kim in the passage 
quoted above.  
 That being said, there is no implication that the CM has no use at 
all for a notion such as the one of  intentional object. On the one hand, 
the CM claims to be able to discharge the intuitive sense of  aboutness 
encapsulated in the FIS in terms of  the above CM schema. However, 
intentional experiences conceived in that manner can also be said to be 
about something in another, more demanding, sense. Take John’s 
judgment that Obama is American. According to the CM, this judgment 
is about Obama in the sense that it has the following propositional 
content: Obama is American. As this proposition contains a succesfully 
referential compotent, “Obama”, this judgment can be said to be a 
member of  an important sub-set of  intentional experiences that not only 
has aboutness in the above sense of  having a content but also in the 
sense of  being referentially successful. That is, this proposition and the 
intentional experience that has it as content both manage to refer to 
Obama and, since this proposition is true, the fact that he is American. A 
second sense of  aboutness can then be defined as the feature that 
propositions and subjects entertaining them possess when they are 
referentially successful.  
 The implications for the CM’s analysis of  aboutness are as follows. 
The members of  a sub-class of  intentional experiences, namely those 
whose content contains a successful referential propositional 
component, have aboutness in two senses: first in the sense of  having a 
content and, second, in the sense of  being referentially successful. On 
the other hand, the members of  another sub-class of  intentional 
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experiences, namely experiences that do not contain a successful 
referential component, have aboutness only in the first sense.  
 John Searle aptly captures the essential difference between these 
two notions of  aboutness in the following passage:  
Part of  the difficulty here derives from “about,” which has both an 
extensional and an intensional-with-an-s-reading. In one sense (the 
intensional-with-an-s), the statement or belief  that the King of  France is 
bald is about the kind of  France, but in that sense it does not follow that 
there is some object which they are about. In another sense (the 
extensional) there is no object which they are about because there is no 
King of  France. (Searle 1983: 17) 
The treatment of  aboutness in terms of  both the notion of  
representational content and the distinction between the two notions of  
aboutness has important consequences for the application of  existential 
generalization (EG) to intentional experiences as analyzed by the CM. 
Indeed, the CM asserts that EG applies only to the members of  the first 
sub-set of  experiences, namely those that have a successful referential 
component as part of  their content. Take the following example: 
 (2) John judges that Obama is American. 
This sentence is a successful instance of  a judgment. That is, its 
propositional content is true and, crucially, “Obama” is referentially 
successful. From (2) we can legitimately infer the following:  
 (3) There is someone about whom John judges that he is 
American, namely Obama. 
Compare this with the following: 
Chapter 4  231
 (4) John judges that Pegasus is a horse. 
In the case of  (4), since Pegasus does not exist and hence “Pegasus” is 
not referential, we are not allowed to infer the following:  
 (5) There is something about which John judges that it is a horse, 
namely Pegasus. 
In plain words, this means that the CM deems that contrary to the case 
of  (5), in (4) there is nothing John is thinking about in the sense of  
aboutness captured by the application of  EG that was at the center of  
the IOM. If  proof  is still needed, this shows that the notion of  
aboutness that pertains to the FIS captured by the IOM and the CM are 
indeed different.  
 However, the CM contends that what matters is that both (2) and 
(4) meet the conditions for another application of  EG that is taken to be 
sufficient to capture the intuitive sense of  aboutness that lies behind the 
fundamental intentional schema. That is, according to the CM, we can 
uniformly infer the following from (2) and (4): 
 (6) There is something that John is judging, namely that Obama is 
American.  
 (7) There is something that John is judging, namely that Pegasus is 
a horse.  
In light of  this, the CM thus describes the situation of  John judging that 
Pegasus is a horse as follows. By virtue of  having a representational 
content to the effect that Pegasus is a horse, in (6) John’s experience is 
engaging with the world in a way that is sufficient to describe it as being 
about something. However, in another sense of  “about,” since in (2) 
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John’s experience is not referentially successful, then it fails to be about 
anything. 
 As the below discussion of  non-existence reveals, proponents of  
the CM take this distinction between the two senses in which we can 
read “about” as an advantage of  their account. Indeed, by isolating a 
notion of  aboutness from any way the world must be like, it manages to 
evince the IOM’s fate to postulate a realm of  non-existent intentional 
objects that intentional experiences can be about. However, as shown 
below, it remains unclear whether this feature really speaks in favor of  
the CM.  
3.2 Aspectuality 
It should be recalled that aspectuality is the feature of  intentionality that 
explains why, e.g., we cannot infer (9) from (8) despite the fact that 
Phosphorus = Hesperus:  
 (8) John believes that Phosphorus is a star. 
 (9) John believes that Hesperus is a star. 
How can the CM account for aspectuality? From the CM’s perspective, 
the issue concerns the conditions of  individuation of  representational 
contents. That is, from this viewpoint the likeliest explanation of  the 
invalidity of  the inference from (8) to (9) is that the representational 
contents of  (8) and (9) turn out to be different, such that John can 
entertain an attitude with respect to one content without thereby also 
entertaining the same attitude toward the other.  
 However, the problem is that these two contents, namely 
Phosphorus is a star and Hesperus is a star, possess the same truth-
conditions, i.e., they are both true if, and only if, what both 
“Phosphorus” and “Hespherus” refer to—Venus—is a star. 
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Consequently, if  we individuate representational contents in terms of  
their truth-conditions alone, Phosphorus is a star and Hesperus is a star turn 
out to constitute the same representational content despite superficial 
differences. The conclusion to draw from this is that the easiest route for 
the CM to account for aspectuality is to endorse the claim that 
representational contents are not individuated in terms of  their truth-
conditions. 
 The question of  how exactly the CM should then individuate 
representational contents is a very complex one that we cannot tackle 
here. We later expand somewhat on the determination of  truth-
conditions for representational contents when we discuss non-existence, 
but a full review and discussion of  the many options would require a 
dissertation of  its own.   19
3.3 Semantic Normativity 
Semantic normativity is the feature in virtue of  which at least some 
intentional experiences can be said to be semantically evaluable. For 
instance, John’s judgment that Obama is American can be said to be true 
or false. However, the question is in virtue of  what can intentional 
experiences be said to be thus semantically evaluable? According to the 
CM, for an experience to be intentional is for it to have a 
representational content; moreover, for something to be a 
representational content is for it to possess semantic properties. From 
the perspective of  the CM, a constitutive account of  intentional 
experiences is hence one that must be couched right from the start in 
such semantic terms. 
 The literature about this issue has now taken gigantic proportions. A helpful 19
collection is Matthew Davidson’s On Sense and Direct Reference (Davidson 2007). 
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 In other words, the CM asserts that intentional experiences can 
instantiate the feature we call semantic normativity because they are 
representations, as defined above in semantic terms. As such it is then in 
the very nature of  intentional experiences to have such semantic 
properties. At least at the conceptual level, we thus reach a rock-bottom 
level: intentional experiences can be semantically evaluable because, 
according to the CM, we understand what it means for an experience to 
be intentional in terms of  its possession of  a representational content 
that is endowed with semantic properties.  
 That being said, there is an important question for the CM, 
namely whether the definition of  representational contents in terms of  
semantic properties constitutes a rock-bottom description tout court or, 
alternatively, whether we can provide an account of  representational 
contents in non-semantic, e.g., causal or causal-teleological, terms. For 
instance, Fodor writes the following:  
I suppose that sooner or later the physicists will complete the catalogue 
they've been compiling of  the ultimate and irreducible properties of  
things. When they do, the likes of  spin, charm, and charge will perhaps 
appear upon their list. But aboutness surely won't; intentionality simply 
doesn't go that deep. It's hard to see, in face of  this consideration, how 
one can be a Realist about intentionality without also being, to some 
extent or other, a Reductionist. If  the semantic and the intentional are 
real properties of  things, it must be in virtue of  their identity with (or 
maybe of  their supervenience on?) properties that are themselves neither 
intentional nor semantic. If  aboutness is real, it must be really something 
else. (Fodor 1987: 97)
However, it is important to note that this debate is to be located at the 
engineering, and not constitutive, level of  a theory of  intentionality. As 
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such, with respect to the policy introduced in Chapter 1, we simply 
ignore it.  
3.4 Intentional Identity 
Intentional identity is that feature of  intentionality by virtue of  which 
numerically distinct intentional subjects can be said to undergo 
intentional experiences that are the same thing. As we saw, however, the 
CM distinguishes between two notions of  aboutness; as such, intentional 
identity can be taken to mean two different things. On the one hand, it 
can simply mean that the two intentional subjects undergo numerically 
distinct experiences with the same content. According to the CM, this 
feature can be analyzed by saying that the two subjects stand in the 
“having content” relation to the same proposition. That is, if  both John 
and Sam judge that Obama is American, they can be said to be 
intentionally directed toward the same thing in the sense of  having 
numerically distinct experiences that are relations to the same 
proposition.  
 That being said, in a case such as this one, John and Sam can also 
be said to be intentionally directed toward the same thing in the sense of  
both judging something about the fact that Obama is American (which 
reflects the second sense of  aboutness distinguished above). However, 
this second sense of  intentional identity only characterizes this sub-class 
of  intentional experiences that can be said to possess a referentially 
successful representational content.  
 In a case in which, say, John and Sam both think about Pegasus, 
since they are not really thinking about anything, the question of  
whether their two intentional experiences are about the same thing in the 
second sense of  aboutness distinguished above does not arise. However, 
we can still characterize John and Sam as sharing a same kind of  
intentional experience, namely a Pegasus experience, which can be 
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identified with having a certain content, that is a Pegasus content. Such 
kinds of  content are addressed further in our later discussion of  non-
existence.  
3.5 Generality 
The CM can deal with generality very elegantly. It should be recalled that 
generality is the feature by which an intentional experience can be said to 
be about something, although nothing in particular. For the CM, this 
simply means that an intentional experience has a content with semantic 
properties that correspond to those of  a non-uniquely restricted 
existentially quantified sentence. For instance, if  John desires to have a 
beer, the CM views this as equivalent to John entertaining the attitude 
“desire” toward a certain proposition, namely that he has a beer. 
Moreover, this proposition would be true just in case John is handed a 
beer—any beer. This experience can thus be said to about something, 
although nothing in particular.  
3.6 Non-Existence 
As faced by the IOM, the problem of  non-existence originates from the 
IOM’s interpretation of  the FIS in terms of  a relation to an intentional 
object. Coupled with the claim that some intentional experiences can be 
about things that do not exist, this yields the result that intentional 
experiences that are about things that do not exist must be analyzed as 
relations to non-existent intentional objects. However, this not only 
commits the IOM to a realm of  non-existing entities, but also to the 
claim that relations can obtain between denizens of  distinct ontological 
realms: existence and non-existence. We saw in Chapter 3 that there are 
good reasons to stay away from these claims.  
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 The CM does not offer a solution to this particular problem; that 
is, it does not offer an answer to the question: “How can there be 
relations to things that do not exist?” The development of  the CM 
instead allows its proponents to find a route to non-existence that does 
not automatically get us trapped in the problem of  non-existence as 
faced by the IOM. As we have seen, the CM proposes to cash out the 
intuitive notion of  aboutness captured by the FIS in terms that are 
independent of  the notion of  intentional object. That is, the CM first 
constructs intentionality as a non-intentional relation to intentional 
contents and, second, cashes out the intuitive notion of  aboutness non-
relationally in terms of  the semantic properties of  contents. 
 We have seen that the CM also defines a second, more 
demanding, notion of  aboutness that is defined similarly to the notion 
of  intentional object used by the CM and that can be captured by 
successfully applying EG. That is, an intentional experience can be about 
something in the stronger sense of  having an intentional object if  its 
propositional content is successfully referential. However, once again, the 
first notion of  aboutness, which is defined entirely in terms of  the 
notion of  content and of  its properties, is taken to be independent of  
referential success. That is, a content that is not referential still possesses 
semantic properties and can determine what is is about, even though it is 
not about anything in the second (stronger) sense. To sum up, according 
to the CM, an intentional experience can be about something that does 
not exist in the sense that is has a representational content but no 
intentional object.  
 As such, the CM can then be taken to offer a dissolution of  the 
problem of  existence as faced by the IOM. For the CM, there is no 
question as to how intentional experiences can stand in relation to things 
that do not exist. The CM views this as a pseudo-question that does not 
need to be asked. Its fundamental notion of  aboutness, the one taken to 
cash out the intuitive sense of  aboutness captured by the FIS, has been 
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divorced from the notion of  intentional object. Whereas the IOM looks 
for a philosophical theory, the CM offers a therapy. 
 One might then wish to ask how well the CM fairs as a therapy for 
the problem of  non-existence. With a slight nod in the direction of  
Carnap’s famous distinction (Carnap 1956), we propose distinguishing 
two ways of  understanding this question, namely an internal and an 
external.   
 The internal question can be put as follows: 
Internal question: Is the therapy offered by the CM internally 
consistent? 
In contrast, the external question can be put as follows:  
External question: Is a therapy of  the kind offered by the CM 
the right solution to the problem posed by the feature of  non-
existence? 
Two remarks are in order about this distinction. First, as laid out by 
Carnap, the distinction between internal and external questions is 
supposed to emphasize internal questions to the detriment of  external 
ones. However, this does not correspond with our version of  the 
distinction.  
 According to Carnap, we must distinguish internal questions such 
as: 
 (10) What is the number of  planets in the solar system? 
From external questions such as: 
 (11) Do numbers exist? 
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Carnap takes an internal question such as (10) as occurring from within 
an antecedently endorsed theoretical or linguistic framework, for 
instance the one of  arithmetic. From within that framework, we can then 
ask questions as to the number of  planets, i.e., questions that make use 
of  the framework in some way and that we answer by conducting 
empirical research. An external question such as (11), however, does not 
pertain to something we can ask from within the framework. Instead, it 
concerns the framework itself. That is, it asks whether the elements of  
the framework themselves, e.g., numbers, exist. For Carnap, there is no 
“cognitive” answer to that kind of  question (Carnap 1956: 207). On the 
contrary, the endorsement of  a framework does not amount to an 
endorsement of  a genuine ontology of  numbers, but, say, to the 
endorsement of  a set of  “rules for forming statements and for testing, 
accepting, or rejecting them” (Carnap 1956: 208). One can either accept 
or reject the framework, but from Carnap’s perspective it does not make 
sense to inquire about the reality of  the framework’s elements. Only 
internal questions are substantial.  
 We use the distinction between internal and external questions in a 
way that strongly opposes the idea that, with respect to the theory of  
intentionality, external questions are non-substantial. Indeed, one way to 
strictly apply Carnap’s distinction to the problem of  intentionality would 
be to claim something along the following lines: We do not have a grasp 
on the notion of  aboutness from the outside of  a specific theory of  
intentionality, e.g., the CM. As such, we can only assess a certain theory 
of  intentionality from an internal point of  view. However, this is simply 
not true. Intentional experiences are not like numbers. Whereas we do 
not have a first-person access to numbers, we do have a first-person 
access to intentional experiences as we undergo them and as such have a 
first-person, pre-theoretical access to intentional experiences and to at 
least some of  their features, e.g., aboutness. 
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 Of  course, we do not necessarily have access to the nature of  
aboutness itself, which is something that might actually require a 
theoretical enterprise such as the one we are currently undertaking. 
Nonetheless, we do have access to aboutness as it is manifested in 
intentional experiences. As such, we do possess an external footing from 
which to assess theories of  intentionality. An external question is then 
not a purely pragmatic one that concerns the way we decide to talk but, 
rather, a substantial one that concerns which theory of  intentionality fits 
best the way intentional experiences are given to us through our first-
person perspective.  
 A second remark about the above two kinds of  questions 
concerns the relative degree of  independence they enjoy. Indeed, the CM 
could be internally consistent while still failing to provide an adequate 
account of  non-existence as evaluated from an external footing. As such, 
these two questions can be treated separately. We accordingly treat the 
internal question in the next section and the external one in section 5.   
4. The Internal Challenge to the CM 
The internal challenge to the CM can be summarized as follows. 
According to the CM, intentional experiences that are about things that 
do not exist have a content but no intentional object; they are about 
something that does not exist in the sense of  having a content with some 
semantic properties that are independent from intentional experiences 
being successfully referential. In claiming this, however, the CM utilizes a 
substantial implicit premise, namely that it is possible to specify the 
semantic properties of  a representational content that is about 
something that does not exist without making use of  non-existent 
intentional objects. In other words, that it is possible for an intentional 
experience to be about something in the first sense of  “about” as 
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distinguished above without thereby also being about something in the 
second sense of  the term. How is that supposed to work? 
 Let us look at the following example: 
(12) Sam judges that Pegasus is a horse.  
As Pegasus does not exist, Sam’s judgment is false. Nevertheless, Sam’s 
judgment is about something—Pegasus, at least. According to the CM, 
this fact is supposed to be captured by the claim that the content of  
Sam’s judgment, Pegasus is a horse, can be semantically evaluated despite 
not being referentially successful. However, what are the truth-
conditions of  the content Pegasus is a horse? Naively, one might think that 
they are the conditions in which there is a particular individual, Pegasus, 
who happens to be a horse. But how can we even start to specify such 
conditions if  there is no horse, either existent or non-existent, which is 
identical to Pegasus? The CM must be able to provide an answer to that 
question.  
 The dialectic is then as follows. The CM might have a legitimate 
claim to the dissolution of  the problem of  non-existence as faced by the 
IOM, but it is confronted with a problem of  non-existence of  its own. 
Namely, how can we determine the truth-conditions of  a 
representational content that is about something that does not exist in a 
way that does not appeal to non-existent intentional objects?  
 The consensus is that the CM can answer that challenge, although 
there is no established consensus about the particular semantic theory 
that it should endorse to do so. In the rest of  this section, we identify 
some pros and cons for few options. However, we start with some 
general remarks on the notion of  truth-conditions.  
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4.1 General Remarks on Truth-Conditions  
We appeal to the traditional idea that an account of  a formal language’s 
semantic properties is the correct way to capture the notion of  truth-
conditions. For the time being, we also assume that the required formal 
language is either first-order classical logic or any of  its extensions. 
Moreover, we assume familiarity with such a family of  languages and 
merely recall one main explicit assumption that was already discussed in 
the previous chapter, namely that for any such language L there cannot 
be such a thing as an undefined individual constant. That is, for any such 
language L, there cannot be an element of  the set of  its individual 
constants {a, b, c, …} that is not assigned exactly one element of  the 
domain of  L.  
 Within first-order classical logic, we can distinguish between two 
distinct syntactic operations that give rise to a truth-evaluable sentence. 
The first is the concatenation of  a predicative expression with an individual 
constant. This gives rise to so-called simple sentences of  the kind: F(a). 
Such sentences possess so-called singular truth-conditions; in other 
words, they are true if, and only if, a satisfies the predicate “being F.” If  a 
is not F, then the sentence is false. If  a happens to be undefined, it is 
simply meaningless.  
 The second operation is the prefixation of  a predicative expression 
by means of  a quantifier, either universal or existential. Let us begin with 
the first case and assume that we are concerned with an unrestricted use 
of  the universal quantifier. The prefixation of  a predicative expression 
such as “F(x)” by means of  the universal quantifier “∀” gives rise to a 
sentence of  the form “∀(x)F(x),” to be read “Everything is F.” This 
sentence is true if, and only if, any element of  D satisfies the predicate 
“being F.” If, on the other hand, such a predicative expression is prefixed 
by the existential quantifier “∃,” this gives rise to a sentence of  the form 
“∃(x)F(x),” to be read “Some x are F.” This sentence is true if, and only 
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if, at least some elements of  the domain are F or, alternatively, if  the 
sub-set of  D {x|Fx} is non-empty.  
 Importantly, the use of  quantifiers can be combined to obtain 
more finely grained quantified sentences, that is, sentences that do not 
only tell us whether all or some x are F but actually how many, if  any, x 
are F. One type of  such a combination that plays a substantial role in the 
present discussion is the combination of  the two quantifiers and the 
identity predicate “…=…” to express uniqueness, that is, the claim that at 
most one element of  D satisfies a certain predicate, either simple or 
complex.  
 Such a claim of  uniqueness can be expressed as follows:  
(13) ∃(x) F(x) & ∀(y)F(y)—>x=y.  
The first conjunct is true just in case {x|Fx} is non-empty while the 
second conjunct reveals that anything that is F is going to be numerically 
self-identical. The full conjunction hence indicates that the set {x|Fx} 
contains exactly one element and is true if, and only if, this is the case. 
Let us call such a sentence a particularized existential sentence.  
 Particularized existential sentences are to be distinguished from 
existentially quantified and universally quantified sentence even though 
all quantified sentences—universal, existential, and particularized—have 
the same kind of  truth-conditions, namely so-called general truth-
conditions. The idea behind this label is that these three kinds of  
sentences are true just in case some elements of  D—either all, some, or 
a unique element—are F. However, for any instance of  such a sentence 
type to be true, it is not required that one element of  D in particular be 
F. That is, the very identity of  the witness, or witnesses, does not matter; 
what matters is merely that some element of  D—either all, some, or 
exactly one—satisfies some specific condition, namely F.  
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 The difference between singular and general truth-conditions can 
be illustrated as follows. Assume that qualitative and numerical identity 
are distinct notions, that is, some things can be qualitatively identical 
without thereby being numerically identical. Now take the proposition 
that a is F. This proposition is true just in case a specific particular, a, is F. 
At some point, however, an omnipotent being destroys a and replaces it 
instantly by the qualitatively identical b. Can b make the proposition a is F 
true? No, granted that a is F has singular truth-conditions, nothing but a 
can make “a is F” true. Numerical identity, and not merely qualitative 
identity, matters. However, what about the particularized sentence (13)? 
This sentence would actually be just as true before and after switching 
from a to b. What matters here is mere qualitative identity.  
 Now that these preliminary distinctions have been made, we can 
reformulate the challenge the CM must face as follows. A proposition of  
the kind “Pegasus is a horse” intuitively seems to have singular truth-
conditions as it seems to be saying something about Pegasus himself. 
However, as Pegasus does not exist, the sentence “Pegasus is a horse” 
cannot express the singular proposition “Being a horse (Pegasus).” How 
can the CM then assign some adequate truth-conditions to such a 
proposition?  
 Before seeing this, let us make a further clarification. We have now 
entered rather muddled territory. Our target is a theory concerning the 
content of  intentional experiences. The contents of  these experiences 
have a certain psychological reality. We are speaking about these 
intentional experiences by means of  natural language, e.g., English. 
Moreover, we have now introduced elements of  a formal language, 
namely first-order classical logic, with the aim of  more precisely 
capturing the logical form of  the propositions expressed by the natural 
language sentences used to describe intentional experiences. One might 
legitimately wonder how all of  these things mesh together.  
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 The relation between these three things is complex and we cannot 
pretend to address the issue here. The best we can do is to clarify how 
we intend to have these three things working together, namely (i) the 
reality of  intentionality as a psychological phenomenon, (ii) the 
assignment of  propositional contents to intentional experiences, and (iii) 
the interpretation of  these propositional contents in a formal language.   
 We conceive of  these relations as follows. Intentional experiences 
are analyzed by the CM as non-intentional relations to representational 
contents. These contents might not necessarily be identified with 
propositions but it is at least helpful to treat them as such, in particular if  
truth-evaluability is the property of  intentional contents we are tracking, 
as the framework of  propositions is tailor-made to track truth. This is 
how we conceive of  the relation between (i) and (ii).   
 Moreover, the right tool for accessing the nature of  propositional 
contents is formalization. That is, we assume a standard distinction 
between grammatical and logical form. Grammatical form is the form of  
a sentence as parsed by the grammar of  a natural language, whereas 
logical form is the form of  a sentence as interpreted within a formal 
language. As already discussed in Chapter 3, these two things can 
sometimes come apart. The proposition expressed by the natural 
language sentence and, hence, its truth-conditions are revealed by the 
analysis of  its logical form. This is how we conceive of  the relation 
between (ii) and (iii).   
 We thus suppose a kind of  two-step translation from the 
psychological reality of  intentionality to natural language descriptions, 
and from natural language descriptions to formalizations. What is the 
nature of  these translations? We remain agnostic: these translations 
either faithfully reflect the nature of  intentionality or constitute a useful 
idealization. In either case, they provide us with a better understanding 
of  some facets of  intentionality. This is how we understand the relation 
between (i) and (iii).  
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 To summarize, at this point we can understand the question that 
the CM faces as follows. The CM must be able to provide a specification 
of  the truth-conditions of  the representational content of  the 
intentional experiences that it describes by means of  natural language. 
Such a specification requires interpreting the sentences of  natural 
language used to describe intentional experiences into a formal language. 
This interpretation yields sentences in a formal language that are taken to 
represent the form of  the propositions expressed by the natural language 
sentences. The challenge then faced by CM proponents is to elaborate 
how they aim to account for the determination of  the truth-conditions 
of  representational contents that are about things that do not exist. 
4.2 The Semantics of  the CM 
The CM must be able to determine the truth-conditions of  
representational contents that are about things that do not exist without 
appealing to the non-existent intentional objects. It has three main 
options for doing this:  
(i) Endorse classical logic and attribute general truth-conditions to 
such contents; 
(ii) Endorse classical logic and attribute singular truth-conditions to 
such contents; or 
(iii) Endorse a non-classical logic and attribute non-classical logic 
truth-conditions to such contents.  
We discuss the main tenets of  these three options, thereby mentioning 
some of  their main pros and cons.  
 4.2.1 Descriptivism 
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Option (i) amounts to endorsing some kind of  descriptivist semantics, at 
least for singular terms that aim to refer to things that do not exist. In 
other words, it entails endorsing a semantics for such singular terms that 
treat their semantic contribution as equivalent to that of  a particularized 
quantified sentence. Accordingly, propositions expressed by means of  
such singular terms turn out to be quantified ones.  
 The origins of  descriptivism can be traced back to the doctrine’s 
father, Bertrand Russell, who is well-known for having conceived his 
theory of  definite descriptions as a barrier against the postulation of  
non-existent entities. Russell’s theory can be schematically presented as 
follows. First, it carves a distinction between grammatical and logical 
form. Second, it argues that the need to postulate non-existent entities 
results from blindly following the grammatical form of  sentences that 
are about things that do not exist when interpreting them in a formal 
framework. Third, it argues that once the correct logical form of  the 
propositions expressed by these sentences is uncovered, the need to 
postulate non-existent entities vanishes. We now examine in further 
detail how this program is carried out.  
 We are already familiar with the distinction between grammatical 
and logical form from earlier parts of  this work, but let us recapitulate. 
First, grammatical form is a sentence’s form or structure as uncovered by 
natural language grammar. In the sentence “Jones met a man,” the 
natural grammatical structure comprises a verb (“to meet”) and two 
noun-phrases (“Jones” and “a man”). In contrast, logical form concerns 
the nature of  the propositions expressed by such a sentence. In 
accordance with the account of  truth-conditions introduced earlier, this 
logical form can be either one of  a simple sentence that results from the 
concatenation of  an individual constant or one of  a quantified sentence.  
 Grammatical form can sometimes be misleading. Russell belabors 
this point first with an analysis of  indefinite descriptions, that is, 
expressions such as “a man.” The sentence “Jones met a man” can be 
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used as an example. This sentence’s surface grammar tells us that the 
sentence is formed by means of  a verb and two noun-phrases. 
According to Russell, however, some people have been misled into 
believing that the logical form of  the proposition expressed by this 
sentence mirrors its grammatical structure and thus amounts to 
something like: Meet (Jones, a man).  
 If  this were correct, however, we would be faced with a puzzle. In 
this analysis, “a man” is taken to be an individual constant and individual 
constants have first-order elements of  the domain as semantic values. If  
this analysis were correct, we would thus have to find an element of  the 
domain that serves as the semantic value of  “a man.” It hence seems that 
if  we are willing to treat this sentence as having such a logical form, we 
must postulate a specific semantic value for “a man,” namely an 
indeterminate man who adds to the numbers of  all of  the men there are. 
However, according to Russell there is no need to postulate such a weird 
kind of  entities as the content of  an assertion of  the sentence “Jones 
met a man” is not equivalent to the content of  an assertion that Jones 
met a particular man. As he argues, 
The question of  ‘unreality’, which confronts us at this point, is a very 
important one. Misled by grammar, the great majority of  those logicians who have 
dealt with this question have dealt with it on mistaken lines. They have regarded 
grammatical form as a surer guide in analysis than, in fact, it is. And they have 
not known what differences in grammatical form are important. ‘I met 
Jones’ and ‘I met a man’ would count traditionally as propositions of  the 
same form, but in actual fact they are of  quite different forms: the first 
names an actual person, Jones; while the second involves a propositional 
function, and becomes, when made explicit: “The function ‘I met x and 
x is human’ is sometimes true”… This proposition is obviously not of  
the form ‘I met x’. (Russell 1919: 68–emphasis added) 
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Russell’s diagnosis is the following: We have become trapped into having 
to answer odd questions such as “Which first-order element of  the 
domain is the semantic value of  ‘a man’?,” due to being misled by the 
surface grammar of  natural language sentences. That is, we treated as 
individual constants expressions that actually belong to another logical 
category. Once we realize this, assures Russell, we can simply dissolve the 
original problem into the correct logical analysis. Accordingly, the real 
logical form of  the proposition expressed by a sentence such as “Jones 
met a man” is something like the following:  
(14) ∃(x) Man(x) & Meet (Jones, x).  
This analysis does not commit us to any element of  the domain being an 
indeterminate man. It instead commits to the predicate “Being a man” 
and can be taken as the content of  an assertion of  the sentence that 
Jones met a man. This proposition is then true if  Jones indeed met a 
man, whoever that man is. But at no point in the process do we need to 
appeal to an indeterminate man as the semantic value of  the expression 
“a man.” 
 However, Russell did not limit his approach to indefinite 
descriptions. He successively applied it to all natural language singular 
terms, with different exceptions at different times (which we ignore here 
on grounds of  convenience). His subsequent target was the analysis of  
definite descriptions, such as “the golden mountain.” According to 
Russell, the formal interpretation of  natural sentences formed out of  
such definite descriptions also creates some difficulties. If  treated as an 
individual constant, a definite description such as “the golden mountain” 
requires that we attribute it a first-order semantic value. However, as no 
such thing as a golden mountain exists, we would be forced to accept 
non-existent things as the semantic value of  definite descriptions that are 
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about things that do not exist. Russell is again not satisfied with such an 
answer, as he makes it clear in the following memorable passage: 
For want of  the apparatus of  propositional functions, many logicians 
have been driven to the conclusion that there are unreal objects. It is 
argued, e.g., by Meinong, that we can speak about ‘the golden mountain’, 
‘the round square’, and so on; we can make true propositions of  which 
these are the subjects; hence they must have some kind of  logical being, 
since otherwise the propositions in which they occur would be 
meaningless. In such theories, it seems to me, there is a failure of  that 
feeling for reality which ought to be preserved even in the most abstract 
studies. Logic, I should maintain, must no more admit a unicorn than 
zoology can; for logic is concerned with the real world just as truly as 
zoology is, though with its more abstract and general features… The 
sense of  reality is vital in logic, and whoever juggles with pretending that 
Hamlet has another kind of  reality is doing a disservice to thought. A 
robust sense of  reality is very necessary in framing a correct analysis of  
propositions about unicorns, golden mountains, round squares, and 
other such pseudo-objects. (Russell 1919: 169) 
According to Russell, such a robust sense of  reality can be preserved by 
extending his analysis of  descriptions from indefinite to definite ones. 
That is, by considering that the semantic contribution of  a definite 
description is not equivalent to the semantic contribution of  an 
individual constant but, rather, of  a quantified expression. However, this 
quantified expression cannot be of  exactly the same kind as in the case 
of  indefinites, on pain of  blurring the semantic distinction of  
uniqueness implied by the passage from the indefinite article “a” to the 
definite “the.” In other words, Russell asserts that the quantified 
expression must be a considerably more complex one that results, as we 
have seen above, from the combination of  two quantifiers and the 
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identity sign in order to be able express the uniqueness feature of  
definite descriptions. This can be achieved by interpreting a natural 
language sentence such as “The golden mountain is high” as follows: 
 (15) ∃(x) Mountain (x) & Golden (x) & High (x) & ∀(y)    
  Mountain (y) & Golden (y) & High (y) —> x=y. 
The left-hand side of  the principal disjunct is formed of  the existentially 
quantified sentence “∃(x) Mountain (x) & Golden (x) & High (x).” It can 
be taken to mean that at least one thing is a golden high mountain and is 
true just in case there is indeed in the domain something that does 
possess these properties. The right-hand side, “∀(y) Mountain (y) & 
Golden (y) & High (y) —> x=y,” is the conditional statement that if  
anything is a high golden mountain, then that thing is identical with 
itself. The conjunction of  these two things says that there is at most one 
thing that is a high golden mountain. As no such thing exists, however, 
the proposition is false.  
 The general idea here is exactly the same as the one at play in the 
analysis of  indefinite descriptions. Treating definite descriptions as 
quantified sentences scratches off  any problematic reference to first-
order elements of  the domain. As such, a sentence such “The golden 
mountain is high” does not express a proposition in which “The golden 
mountain” serves as a singular term that picks out a particular element 
of  the domain. Rather, it expresses a quantified proposition constituted 
only of  predicates, such as “being golden,” “being a mountain,”, “being 
high”, and “…=…”, as well as quantifiers. As such, it is not true just in a 
case a particular element of  the domain is a high golden mountain but, 
rather, just in case at most one thing in the domain, whichever it is, 
satisfies these predicates. As Russell puts it in the Philosophy of  Logical 
Atomism: 
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It is of  utmost importance to realize that ‘the so-and-so’ does not occur 
in the analysis of  propositions in whose verbal expression it occurs, that 
when I say ‘The author of  Waverley is human,’ ‘the author of  Waverley’ 
is not the subject of  that proposition, in the sort of  way Scott would if  I 
said ‘Scott is human,’ using ‘Scott’ as a name. I cannot emphasize 
sufficiently how important this point is, and how much error you get in 
metaphysics if  you do not realize that when I say ‘The author of  Waverley 
is human’ that is not a proposition of  the same form as ‘Scott is human’. 
It does not contain a constituent ‘the author of  Waverley’. (2010: 89) 
It is noticeable in this quotation that Russell makes a distinction between 
definite descriptions (such as “the author of  Waverley”) and names (such 
as “Scott”), to be understood here as the natural language equivalents of  
individual constants. As he later reflected on the matter, however, Russell 
came to realize that it is debatable whether natural language proper 
names really correspond to logical individual constants.  
 Russell thought two main issues seem to argue against such an 
assimilation of  natural language proper. First, the problem of  empty 
proper names makes the semantic contribution of  natural language 
proper names as problematic as that of  empty definite descriptions. 
Second, the problem of  the cognitive value of  proper names, famously 
rediscovered by Frege (Frege 1997a), makes it dubious that names can be 
semantically treated as merely contributing their reference to truth-
conditions. Russell’s strategy here was to kill two birds with one stone by 
arguing that both problems could be economically solved by means of  
treating all natural language proper names as abbreviated definite 
descriptions. We need neither to introduce non-existent objects nor 
accept the existence of  Fregean senses; we instead merely have to treat 
proper names as abbreviated definite descriptions.  
 The general idea is as follows. For each name, we can come up 
with a conjunction of  predicates that uniquely characterizes whatever the 
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proper name aims to refer to. We then form a uniquely restricted 
quantified sentence with that conjunction of  predicates and obtain what 
we want: a definite description that the proper name can be taken to 
abbreviate. Take the example of  the proper name “Scott.” We can track 
down properties that uniquely characterize the referent of  that name, 
such as “being the author of  Waverley.” The same is true for “Pegasus”, 
i.e., “being a horse,” “having wings,” and “being famous.” The 
corresponding definite descriptions are then constructed out of  these 
predicates and quantifiers. Consequently, natural language sentences such 
as: 
 (16) Scott is human;  
 (17) Pegasus eats;  
 (18) Pegasus does not exist.  
Are taken to respectively express the following propositions:  
 (19) ∃(x) Author of  Waverley (x) and Human (x) &∀(y) Authors   
  of  Waverley (y) & Human (y) —> x=y. 
 (20) ∃(x) Horse (x) & Flying (x) & Eating (x) & ∀(y) Horse (y) &   
  Flying (y) & Eating (y) —> x=y;  
 (21) ¬ ∃(x) Horse (x) & Flying (x) & ∀(y) Horse (y) & Flying (y)   
  —> x =y. 
According to Russell, such a treatment of  proper names offers a solution 
to the two problems alluded to above. First, we do not need to postulate 
exotic referents for empty names as propositions such as (19)–(20) are 
constituted only of  concepts. Second, the cognitive difference between 
co-referential sentences such as “Hespherus = Hespherus” and 
“Hespherus=Phosphorus” can be accounted for in terms of  the fact 
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that the two proper names are given different definite descriptions that 
then turn out to be co-extensional. 
 With these standard elements of  descriptivism in place, we can 
formulate a first way in which the CM may be able to account for the 
truth-conditions of  the representational contents of  intentional 
experiences that are about things that do not exist: namely, for any 
representational content of  an experience that is about something that 
does not exist, this content is accounted for along descriptivist lines. For 
instance, if  John judges that Pegasus eats, the content of  this experience, 
namely Pegasus eats, can be analyzed along the lines proposed above. As 
such, descriptivism would allow the CM to saddle such experiences with 
contents without thereby having to appeal to anything such as 
Meinongianism. As John McDowell summarizes the issue: 
The point of  the theory of  descriptions is exactly to avoid an apparent 
need for nonexistent real objects as relata for intellectual acts. Where a 
relational conception of  intellectual acts would require them to stand in 
relations to possibly non-existent objects, Russell instead takes their 
content to include specifications of  objects. If  no objects answer to the 
specifications, that does not threaten the contentfulness of  the acts. 
(McDowell 2009: 23) 
How successful is this first option? In such a simple version, 
descriptivism is threatened by a battery of  arguments that are much 
discussed in contemporary semantics. These arguments generally target a 
descriptivist treatment of  referential proper names, although at least 
some of  them can also be extended to empty names. For instance, in his 
influential Naming and Necessity, Saul Kripke is well-known for having 
proposed three powerful arguments against descriptivism: the so-called 
modal, semantic, and epistemic arguments (Kripke 1980). We focus here 
on the the semantic argument. 
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 The semantic argument focuses on the descriptivist claim that for 
each proper name N, N refers, as a matter of  its semantics, to whatever 
is singled out by its descriptive content. However, Kripke contests that 
this is the case by means of  the following example: 
Suppose that Gödel was not in fact the author of  [Gödel’s theorem]. A 
man named “Schmidt,” whose body was found in Vienna under 
mysterious circumstances many years ago, actually did the work in 
question. His friend Gödel somehow got hold of  the manuscript and it 
was thereafter attributed to Gödel. On the view in question, then, when 
our ordinary man uses the name “Gödel,” he really means to refer to 
Schmidt, because Schmidt is the unique person satisfying the description, 
“the man who discovered the incompleteness of  arithmetic”... So, since 
the man who discovered the incompleteness of  arithmetic is in fact 
Schmidt, we, when we talk about “Gödel,” are in fact always referring to 
Schmidt. But it seems to me that we are not. (Kripke 1980: 83-84) 
The gist of  this example can be summarized as follows. If  descriptivism 
is true, then a proper name N refers to what is singled out by its 
corresponding definite description. Moreover, if  it is true that the 
referent is thus singled out, then it follows that what a competent 
speaker refers to by means of  a use of  a proper name N must be a 
function of  the beliefs that she holds about the referent of  N, i.e., these 
predicates the speaker believes to be true of  whoever, or whatever, 
uniquely satisfies them. However, the above Gödel example 
demonstrates that this cannot be true. Indeed, “Gödel” does not refer to 
whoever satisfies some description we standardly attach to “Gödel,” such 
as “being the man who discovered the incompleteness of  arithmetic.” If  
this were the case, then in a counterfactual situation in which it would be 
false that Gödel discovered the incompleteness of  arithmetic, “Gödel” 
would refer to the person who really discovered the incompleteness of  
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arithmetic, e.g., Schmidt. However—and here is Kripke’s central claim—
we keep referring to Gödel by means of  “Gödel” even if  the 
descriptions we attach to “Gödel” are false. As such, the reference of  
“Gödel” cannot be determined by some definite description. 
 This argument is interesting in that it also seems to be 
straightforwardly applicable to non-referential proper names. Imagine 
that we coin a non-referential proper name N to talk about a non-
existent individual who we describe by means of  a definite description 
“The F.” If  descriptivism is true, then “The F” determines the reference 
of  N. Unbeknownst to us, however, there might be someone who exists 
and satisfies the description “The F”; let us call this person a. However, 
N clearly does not refer to a; it instead aims at referring to that thing we 
know does not exist.  
 The goal of  this argument is not to prove descriptivism wrong; it 
is rather to show that if  the CM is being willing to endorse a descriptivist 
semantics, this comes at a certain theoretical cost, namely the need to 
find rejoinders to this and related arguments. That being said, 
proponents of  descriptivism must beware of  the following difficulty: the 
more complex descriptivism becomes, the less plausible it is that the 
common usage of  singular terms can be explained in descriptivist terms. 
This is because it seems unlikely that common speakers will routinely 
treat singular terms as equivalents to philosophically complex definite 
descriptions.  
 Moreover, one might have the intuition that whenever one is 
thinking when, say, one is thinking about Pegasus, the content of  one’s 
intentional experiences goes beyond “specifications” of  Pegasus, to use 
McDowell’s phrase. That is, whenever one is thinking about Pegasus, one 
tokens a kind of  thought that seems similar to a thought about an 
existent object such as, say, Obama. The CM, however, must either treat 
both kinds of  thought as equally having a content that primarily amounts 
to specifications of  particulars or bite the bullet that thoughts about, e.g., 
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Pegasus are of  a different kind than thoughts about, e.g., Obama. One 
might argue that both options have unpleasant consequences.  
 4.2.2 Non-Descriptivism 
On the basis of  the above remarks on descriptivism, one might be 
willing to explore the traditional alternative to descriptivism: non-
descriptivism. However, non-descriptivism comes in two different 
flavors. The first one, which we refer to as “Millianism”—after John 
Stuart Mill—asserts that a proper name’s semantic content is exhausted 
by its referent. The second option, which we call “non-Millian non-
descriptivism” (NMND), contends that a proper name’s semantic 
content is non-descriptive but does regard it as being exhausted by its 
referent. Let us briefly discuss each option.  
 The Millian option probably constitutes the less natural ally to the 
CM. Indeed, if  some intentional experiences are about things that do not 
exist and to which we aim to refer by means of  proper names, then 
Millianism will not be able to account for their representational content. 
However, in most of  such cases, Millians are willing to take a hard line 
and claim that a great number of  what we take to be intentional 
experiences that are about things that do not exist are in fact about 
things that do exist. First and foremost, Millians standardly recognize the 
existence of  fictional characters in order to serve as the semantic value 
of  fictional proper names (Van Inwagen 1977; Salmon 1998; Thomasson 
1999; Voltolini 2006). We cannot evaluate these arguments here, in 
particular because most of  them are independent of  considerations that 
pertain to intentionality; nonetheless, we point to two important issues. 
First, this leaves open the exact treatment that Millianism should give of  
proper names for which even Millians themselves do not want to 
concede existent referents. Most importantly, someone ready to embrace 
a conjunction of  the CM and Millianism would have to live with an 
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important and daunting drawback, namely the simple observation—that 
non-descriptivist would certainly dismiss as philosophically naive—that 
many people would simply consider the claim that fictional characters 
and the like exist as ontologically unacceptable and phenomenologically 
inadequate. Indeed, as Jody Azzouni remarks: 
Imagine a child pointing at a cartoon figure while watching television. 
“That’s Santa Claus,” the child shouts gleefully. One day in the near 
future, she will revise her ontological commitments: She will realize (to 
her dismay) that there is no Santa Claus. We adults –most of  adults, 
anyway– already know that there is no Santa Claus. What, then, was she 
referring to when she said, “That’s Santa Claus”? It seems that the 
answer should be this: She was referring to Santa Claus. And it should be 
added that Santa Claus is nothing at all–that is, it should be added that 
Santa Claus doesn’t exist. (Azzouni 2012: 253-254) 
On the other hand, NMND is often formulated by drawing a Fregean 
distinction between the sense and reference of  a proper name. Within 
that framework, however, senses are deemed to be non-descriptive. In 
other words, senses reflect the cognitive contribution of  a proper name, 
in addition to the semantic contribution made by its referent—although 
this cognitive contribution is not to be identified with a definite 
description that determines the referent. In recent years, an increasingly 
influential idea is that such non-descriptive senses can be identified with 
so-called “mental files” (Recanati 1993, 2010, 2012).  
 The key idea behind the notion of  mental file is that our cognitive 
life is structured by the opening and updating of  mental files, either 
temporary or more permanent, that pertain to individuals about which 
we entertain intentional experiences. The files may be descriptive or non-
descriptive, with the distinction cashed in the way the different kinds of  
files treat information about their referents. In the case of  a descriptive 
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file, the referent is always determined satisfactionally, i.e., as a function of  
the information contained in that file. As such the file’s referent can 
change as the information in the file is updated. For instance, our file 
labeled “The president of  the USA” now refers to Obama but will refer 
to Trump as soon as he, alas, takes office. On the other hand, non-
descriptive files contain information about their referents but this 
information does not serve to determine these referents. The reference 
of  non-descriptive files is not determined satisfactionally but relationally, 
by what Recanati calls “epistemically rewarding” acquaintance relations 
(Recanati 2010: 156), such as perception, testimony, and the like. 
 Of  course, in the case of  intentional experiences that are about 
things that do not exist, there cannot be such relational determination of  
reference. However, the proponents of  NMND assert that this does not 
mean that such experiences must be saddled with descriptive contents; 
they instead assume that there is a middle ground between descriptive 
contents and fully-fledged non-descriptive referential contents. These 
contents can be characterized as the opening of  non-descriptive files that 
fail to have a referent. Such openings are somewhat degenerative 
openings of  genuine non-descriptive mental files, and are parasitic on 
them; nonetheless, they are fully non-descriptive.  
 This idea, however, is not too promising for the CM. First, the 
CM needs representational contents with truth-conditions in order to 
account for aboutness, and non-descriptive files that lack a referent 
would not be able to determine such truth-conditions. These files might 
play a certain cognitive role, but they cannot play a semantic role. 
Second, it is hard to make phenomenological sense of  this notion of  
mental files. The talk of  opening mental files might make sense at a sub-
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conscious level, but it seems out of  place in a description of  intentional 
experiences.  20
 In sum, then, both descriptivism and non-descriptivism do face 
some problems and there is no easy, straightforward, road for the CM to 
take. As such, then, the IOM is not the only theory that needs to pay a 
theoretical price to be able to account for non-existence. The CM must 
as well pay some theoretical price, though in a different, semantic, 
currency by embracing either some descriptivist or non-descriptivist 
semantics, each with some respective problems and challenges.   
 According to some philosophers, however, we might be able to 
avoid an oscillation between descriptivism and non-descriptivism if  we 
recognize the fact that at the core of  both positions lie an assumption 
about the kind of  formal framework in which semantic inquiries should 
be conducted. Once this assumption is bracketed, however, these 
philosophers claim that we could come up with an account of  the 
semantic of  proper names that would avoid much of  the difficulties 
encountered by the two standard positions. Moreover, such a rejection 
of  classical logic would not necessarily amount to an endorsement of  
Meinongianism. In the next section, we quickly present the main tenets 
of  an account willing to go down this alternative road: namely, the one 
proposed by Mark Sainsbury in his book Reference without Referents 
(Sainsbury 2005). 
  
 Of  course, we adapt here the framework of  mental files to intentional 20
experiences but Recanati conceives of  intentionality as being essentially a matter 
of  sub-conscious states. As such, then, the objection is not targeted at Recanati’s 
himself  but, rather, at the application of  the idea of  mental files to a conception 
of  intentionality as being essentially conscious. 
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 4.2.3 The Temptation of  Non-Standard Semantics 
  
As already mentioned earlier, classical logic treats it as axiomatic that 
there are only two ways to form a meaningful, i.e., truth-evaluable, 
sentence: either by concatenating a well-defined individual constant with 
a predicate or by prefixing a predicate by a quantifier. Everything else, 
e.g., use of  an empty individual constant or a mere open sentence, has no 
meaning—or in the latter case, no meaning on its own (cf. Sainsbury 
2005: 45).  
 Aside from the purely formal reasons that exist for supporting 
these axioms, their endorsement is also quite intuitive. As Russell puts it: 
“Logic is concerned with the real world just as truly zoology is” (Russell 
1919: 169). It hence seems natural that logical sentences are formed in 
such a manner that they are anchored in reality right from the start, by 
means of  either individual constants that stand for elements in the 
domain or quantifiers that range over things that exist.  
 Nonetheless, this claim to naturalness can be challenged. A 
classical objection is that logic should be a completely a priori discipline 
and that the claim that individual constants must all be well-defined is an 
a posteriori one. Indeed, classical logic presupposes that the domain of  
quantification is not empty, which is something that logic alone cannot 
account for. This can be argued as follows. 
 In classical logic, it is a matter of  logical truth that for any 
individual constant a, “∃(x) x = a” is true. Granted that proper names are 
the equivalent of  individual constants, “∃(x) x = Obama” is hence true 
on purely logical grounds. Since this sentence is logically true, then any 
substitution of  “Obama” by a syntactically similar term should yield a 
truth. However, “∃(x) x = Pegasus” is false, as Pegasus does not exist. As 
a result, the truth of  “∃(x) x = Obama” is a logical one only under that 
assumption that Obama exists. However, this is not a logical claim as one 
cannot know on purely logical grounds that Obama exists.   
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 As Karel Lambert puts it: 
In general, no singular term that falsifies the condition 
 s exists, 
can be allowed to replace the singular term [“Obama”] in [the above 
sentence]. So a logic containing that statement among its logical truth is 
not free of  existence assumptions with respect to its singular terms 
because, again, there are statements in it that will not be logically true 
unless it is true that s exists for any singular term s. (Lambert 2003: 125) 
However, if  logic is supposed to be a purely a priori discipline, it cannot 
be taken as axiomatic that individual constants must, as a matter of  logic, 
be assigned existent referents. As Sainsbury puts it: 
Applying classical logic to language would require a prior segregation of  
its proper names into those which have bearers and those which do not; 
only the former should be allowed to replace individual constants in the 
classical formalism. Effecting this segregation does not seem to be part 
of  the job of  a logician (traditionally conceived): logic is supposed to be 
a priori, and not to involve the kind of  astronomical or literary knowledge 
require to determine in which category a name like ‘Vulcan’, Homer’, or 
‘Patanjali’, should be placed. (Sainsbury 2005: 65)  
This objection is not tied to the problem of  either non-existence or 
empty terms; it is an objection about the foundations of  logic itself. If  
correct, the assumption that classical logic constitutes a privileged formal 
language for semantic inquiries appears to be ungrounded.  
 Another objection more closely related to the issues addressed in 
this chapter that one could address to proponents of  classical logic is 
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that the use to which we put logic is an inquiry into not only “the more 
abstract and general features” of  reality (Russell 1919: 170) but also the 
means we use to speak about and represent reality. Moreover, these means 
have many uses, including the use of  empty names. As such, our 
privileged formal language should not be one that right from the start 
ostracizes a non-negligible portion of  natural language. In light of  this 
remark, the fact that we get stuck with an oscillation between 
descriptivism and non-descriptivism might be viewed as a sign that this 
remark has not been taken seriously enough and that we are operating 
within the boundaries of  a logic axiomatized too restrictedly.  
 Let us call any logic that rejects the axiomatization of  classical 
logic non-classical. An important family of  non-classical logics are the 
so-called “free logics,” which are called thus as an abbreviation for the 
phrase “free of  existence assumptions with respect to its terms, general 
and singular” (Lambert 2003: 123). In essence, these are logics in which 
the above-mentioned condition “s exists” is lifted for the formation of  
simple sentences. Within a free logic, the criterion for the formation of  a 
meaningful simple sentence is hence a mere syntactical one, free of  any 
assumption about what the domain contains. In other words, once a set 
of  predicates {F, G, H, …} and a set of  individual constants {a, b, c, d, 
…} have been provided for a language L, one can meaningfully combine 
their elements into well-formed sentences independently of  any 
assumption with respect to these sets’ ontological commitments.    21
 A direct consequence of  endorsing a logic that countenances 
such sentences as well-formed concerns quantifiers. This consequence, 
however, takes different forms depending on the kind of  free logic one 
is willing to endorse. In Chapter 3, we saw how a Meinongian free logic 
must introduce unloaded quantifiers to quantify over its outer-domain of  
 We ignore here the argument in favor of  the claim that predicates should not 21
also be considered as ontologically committed. See, for instance, Lambert 2003. 
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quantification; however, other kinds of  free logics deal with 
quantification differently.  
 The kind of  free logics we are concerned with in this chapter do 
not aim to quantify over non-existent objects, unlike a Meinongian free 
logic; as such they do not need to introduce unloaded quantifiers. 
Nevertheless, the rejection of  the existence assumption placed on 
individual constants by classical logic forces such a kind of  free logic to 
revise the standard quantifier rules of  universal instantiation (UI) and 
EG.  
 The UI rule specifies that from any true universally quantified 
sentence of  the form “∀(x) F(x),” one can validly infer the truth of  any 
sentence that results from substituting the variable “x” with an individual 
constant. On the other hand, EG is the rule that from the truth of  a 
sentence of  the form “F(a),” one can validly infer the truth of  an 
existentially quantified sentence of  the form ∃(x)F(x). However, both of  
these rules must be modified in a free logic that maintains a classical 
reading of  the quantifiers. Indeed, since empty individual constants are 
allowed, there is no guarantee that an occurrence of  an individual 
constant will refer to something that falls within the scope of  the 
quantifiers, classically conceived. Accordingly, these rules must be 
modified as follows: 
Universal Instantiation: From ∀(x) and ∃(x) x = t infer A(t/x) (where ‘A(t/
x)’ is the formula that results from ‘Ax’ by replacing every occurrence of  
‘x’ by ’t’). 
Existential Generalization: From A(t/x) and ∃(x) x=t infer ∃(x)A(x).  
       (Sainsbury 2005: 65) 
As such, UI is modified as follows: One cannot infer that, e.g., t is A from ∀(x) A(x), but rather only from the conjunction of  ∀(x) A(x) and the 
claim that t exists, i.e., ∃(x) x = t. On the other hand, EG is modified as 
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follows: one cannot infer that ∃(x)A(x) from A(t) alone, but rather only 
from the conjunction of  A(t) and the claim that t exists, i.e., ∃(x) x = t.  
 Once the idea of  a free logic has been accepted, however, one is 
faced with an important question that concerns the possible truth-values 
of  sentences now licitly formed by means of  an empty name. Here a free 
logic can take one of  the following three forms (Sainsbury 2005: 66):  
(i) Negative free logic: all simple sentences that result from the 
concatenation of  an empty name and a predicate result in a 
falsehood; 
(ii) Non-valent, or Fregean, free logic: sentences that result from 
the concatenation of  an empty name and a predicate are well-
formed but truth-valueless; 
(iii) Positive free logic: at least some simple sentences that result 
from the concatenation of  an empty name and a predicate result 
in a truth. 
In this chapter, we are only concerned with (i) as this is the version that 
Sainsbury endorses to frame his theory. In passing, however, note that 
(iii) is not to be identified with a Meinongian free logic of  the kind 
discussed in Chapter 3. Indeed, a Meinongian free logic is certainly 
positive as it recognizes that there can be true predications about things 
that do not exist. That being said, the endorsement of  unloaded 
quantifiers is not a necessary feature of  a positive free logic; the 
recognition that there can be true predications formed out of  empty 
individual constants, however, does constitute such a condition.  
 In his book Reference Without Referents, which was inspired by 
pioneering work by Tyler Burge (Burge 1974), Mark Sainsbury has 
proposed a semantic framework based on negative free logic that he 
asserts, 
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…is not Millian, for it allows that there are intelligible empty names, 
but it is also not descriptivist in that it denies that any names have a 
meaning that is properly captured by a definite description. (Sainsbury 
2010: 39).  
We present the great lines of  his proposal below. 
 Sainsbury’s fundamental claim is that all instances of  proper 
names do not get assigned as their fundamental semantic value neither a 
referent nor a description but, rather, a non-descriptive reference 
condition of  the form: 
 (20) ∀(x) “Obama” refers to x iff  x = Obama.  
Such a condition distinctively appeals to (i) signs, such as “Obama”; and 
(ii) the property of  being identical with Obama, formally represented as 
“x=Obama.” However, this condition is not descriptive, for the 
following reason. As Sainsbury puts it, the aim of  such a condition is not 
“an attempt to analyze the meanings of  individual words” (Sainsbury 
2005: 74), which is a task that descriptivism avowedly pursues. That is, as 
a statement of  the meaning of  “Obama,” a condition such as (20) is idle 
as the word “Obama” is present on both on left- and the right-hand 
sides, once mentioned and once used. In no sense this would suffice as 
an analysis of  the meaning of  the word “Obama.”  
 According to Sainsbury, such axioms can nonetheless accomplish 
a great deal of  work. For instance, they can assign a semantic 
contribution to empty names. That is, for any empty name, e.g., 
“Pegasus,” such a condition will turn out to be false as nothing 
corresponds to it. Nonetheless, “Pegasus” can be used to form simple 
sentences that will be semantically evaluable, which is impossible in a 
classical logic set-up.   
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 As a result, for any predicate F, “Pegasus is F” will turn out false 
as a matter of  the axiomatic of  classical logic. Sentences that are formed 
out of  empty names can nonetheless be true when embedded into an 
operator, either a truth-functional one such as “¬” or an intensional one 
such as “believes that.” For instance, if  “Pegasus exists” turns out to be 
false, which is fine, its negation, “¬(Pegasus exists)” will turn out to be 
true, which is even better. Similarly, if  “Sherlock Holmes lives 221B 
Baker Street” is false, it could turn out to be true if  embedded in an 
intensional operator such as “John believes that” or “In the Sherlock 
Holmes fiction.” 
 Note also that contrary to descriptivist semantics, the semantic 
contribution of  these referential axioms for empty names is singular. 
Indeed, since for any x there is at most one thing that can be numerically 
identical with it, if  the referential axiom turns out to be true it is that 
thing, and not any other one, that makes it true.  
 Sainsbury’s underlying idea is that such referential axioms capture 
the tacit knowledge of  truth-conditions that comes with minimal 
semantic competency with a proper name, which is a general 
competency that one acquires when learning a natural language. A 
genuine understanding of  instances of  proper names comes later 
progressively as one becomes immersed within what Sainsbury calls a 
“proper name-using practice” (Sainsbury 2005: 106).   
 If  Sainsbury is on the right track, then we would have means to 
assign truth-conditions to propositions expressed by means of  empty 
names in such a way that, first, they would not require the assignment of  
a referent to be meaningful and, second, their meaning would not end up 
being equivalent to a definite description. As such, it seems that 
Sainsbury’s position constitutes an interesting middle ground for the CM.  
 Nonetheless, Sainsbury’s framework is not without problems. 
First, it is not obvious that all true sentences expressed by means of  an 
empty proper name are sentences that result from the embedding of  a 
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false sentence under an intensional operator. For instance, the meta-
fictional sentence “Sherlock Holmes is more famous than Miss 
Marple” (Crane 2013: 81) is true and formed out of  two fictional proper 
names. However, it is doubtful that there is an intensional operator under 
which it is embedded and that makes it true.  
 A second problem concerns non-propositional attitudes, such as 
“to think about” (Sainsbury 2010). Such verbs are transitive and take a 
direct grammatical object as a complement, as in: “I am thinking about 
Pegasus.” Now, imagine that this is true, i.e., that I am indeed thinking 
about Pegasus. According to Sainsbury’s account, this cannot be literally 
true as Pegasus does not exist; however, this certainly is literally true. 
Sainsbury’s account thus seems to be extensionally inadequate. Of  
course, one might protest that there is no such thing as a non-
propositional attitude; we come back to this point in more detail in the 
next section.  
  
5. Evaluating the CM 
At the beginning of  the preceding section, we made a distinction 
between two kinds of  questions one can address to the CM: internal and 
external ones. The central internal question was whether the CM is able 
to determine the truth-conditions of  the representational contents of  
intentional experiences that are about things that do not exist. As we 
have seen, this issue is complex and there is room for much 
philosophical debate. Nonetheless, proponents of  the CM are confident 
that some adequate account of  the semantics of  representational 
contents that are about things exists. We mentioned in passing some 
main bullets they might have to bite along the way.  
 In this section we turn to external issues. In this regard it should 
be recalled that our distinction between internal and external questions 
was fundamentally different from Carnap’s. Indeed, Carnap contended 
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that external question are non-substantial as he thought that there is no 
external footing from which to address substantial questions about 
frameworks. However, we assert that the case of  intentionality is 
different: intentional experiences have peculiar features: they are 
phenomenological entities that have a psychological reality and that can 
be accessed from the first-person perspective; a good theory of  
intentionality should be accountable to these features.  
 We mention two central external objections below. The first 
concerns the existence of  irreducibly non-propositional—or objectual—
attitudes while the second concerns the notion of  aboutness itself.  
5.1 Non-Propositional Attitudes 
The first objection that we consider is based on the existence of  so-
called non-propositional attitudes, that is, intentional attitudes that are 
irreducibly non-propositional. These attitudes are described by means of  
an intentional transitive verb, i.e., an intentional verb that takes a direct, 
rather than indirect, object. However, the point is not strictly speaking 
l inguistic but phenomenological . Namely, there is a real 
phenomenological distinction between non-propositional and 
propositional attitudes and this distinction is reflected at the grammatical 
level.  
 For instance, consider the following examples: 
(21) John loves Mary.  
(21) John is seeking his car. 
(23) John contemplates the moon. 
(24) John thinks about Obama. 
(25) John notices Samantha. 
(26) John admires Obama.  
(27) John fears God. 
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All of  these examples initially share the same grammatical form: they all 
feature an intentional transitive verb, i.e., a verb that takes a direct object. 
Beyond their mere grammatical form, they also seem to share a 
phenomenological feature: they all are instances of  intentional 
experiences directed upon particulars, without the presence of  an 
instance of  predication. That is, to love Mary is undergo an emotion 
directed at Mary herself  and not necessarily to love that Mary possesses 
some feature. Similarly, for John to seek his car is not for John to seek 
that his car is somehow. It is simply to seek for a particular. 
 That being said, at the outset we have to distinguish between two 
issues, namely:  
(i) The notion that intentional experiences are always directed upon 
something under a certain aspect; and:  
(ii) The notion that intentional experiences are always propositional.  
Indeed, to defend that some intentional attitudes are irreducibly 
propositional does not entail endorsing the idea that objects of  non-
propositional attitudes are not being intentionally targeted under a 
certain aspect. For instance, to defend the claim that an attitude of  the 
kind “John thinks about Obama” is irreducibly non-propositional does 
not entail that John is not thinking about Obama—the man himself, as 
could be pointed to from the point of  view of  nowhere, as Nagel would 
put it (Nagel 1986)—as Obama or, similarly, that when John notices 
Samantha, he notices her under some aspect: namely, that aspect of  
Samantha looking some way from John’s perspective. Rather, what one 
defending such a view is committed to is the claim that there is a 
difference between, on the one hand, being intentionally directed at an 
object under a certain aspect and, secondly, being intentionally directed 
at something in a propositional way.  
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 Where does the difference lie? Two complementary features are 
worth pointing to. First, as mentioned above, not all intentional 
experiences are predicative ones. That is, not all intentional experiences 
are experiences that have, as part of  their nature, the application of  a 
predicate to a particular. For instance, to undergo the intentional 
experience as of  being presented with the tea cup being on the left 
seems to entail somehow that one attributes, consciously or sub-
consciously, the property of  being on the left to the tea cup. Accordingly, 
the content of  that experience can be expressed by saying that one 
experiences that the tea cup is one the left.  
 However, it does not seem that all intentional experiences are thus 
predicative. John’s intentional experience of  loving Mary, for instance, is 
not predicative. Of  course, John could find that Mary is lovable, which 
would be a clear instance of  an intentional experience that entails a 
predicative part. However, to love Mary and to find Mary lovable are not 
the same kind of  experience, as one may find lovable many persons one 
does not, in fact, love. Accordingly, there is a basic difference between 
being non-propositionally intentionally indirected upon something under 
some aspect and, second, being propositionally directed upon something.  
 A complementary point is that not all intentional experiences we 
undergo are experiences that have a semantic nature, i.e., not all 
experiences are experiences that the world is or should be some way. Some 
experiences are simply appearances of  things. Propositional attitudes can 
be semantically evaluated: judgments can be true or false, desires can be 
satisfied or non-satisfied, perceptions can be veridical or non-veridical. 
However, non-propositional attitudes are not the same. For instance, 
John’s contemplating the moon is not semantically evaluable. It is just an 
experience as of  John turning his gaze in some way to the moon.  
 On the basis of  these observations, we may then say that there is a 
good prima facie case in favor of  the existence of  irreducibly non-
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propositional attitudes. Michelle Montague aptly summarizes the matter 
as follows: 
Simply put, objectual attitudes resist a propositionalist analysis. Mary 
loves Nancy. She seeks the fountain of  youth. She has you in mind. She 
contemplates the sky. And she wants Nancy’s car. These intentional 
attitudes appear to be relations that hold simply between thinkers and 
non-propositional objects, rather than between thinkers and 
propositions, and we need to be given some reason to think otherwise. 
The burden of  argument is plainly on the propositionalists. (Montague 
2007: 507) 
So far, the case in favor of  the existence of  non-propositional attitudes is 
only prima facie; unless one is given some reason to think otherwise, it just 
appears that there are non-propositional attitudes. However, the CM 
gives us an important reason to think otherwise. Indeed, the CM 
provides an analysis of  intentionality that relies on the idea that for an 
intentional experience to be intentional is for it to have a certain 
representational content from which we can derive its property of  being 
about something. The existence of  non-propositional attitudes threatens 
this analysis. The problem that the existence of  irreducibly non-
propositional attitudes creates for the CM can be then summarized by 
means of  the following two incompatible theses: 
(A) Some intentional attitudes are ir reducibly non-
propositional; and 
(B) The intentionality of  an attitude is derived from the 
semantic properties of  its propositional content. 
As noted, (A) and (B) are incompatible. Indeed, if  (A) is true, then there 
are some intentional attitudes that do not derive their intentionality from 
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the semantic properties of  their propositional content. On the other 
hand, if  (B) is true, then there cannot be irreducibly non-propositional 
intentional attitudes. The present objection to the CM argues that we 
should endorse (A) and reject (B).  
 However, the CM might try to resist this objection by rejecting (A) 
and the prima facie case in its favor provided above. Indeed, it might claim 
that even though it might appear that there are non propositional 
attitudes, these are in fact reducible to propositional ones. How could the 
CM argue in favor of  that claim? 
 A CM proponent could first employ a syntactic strategy to pursue 
that aim. That is, she could try to defend the claim that what we take to 
be non-propositional sentences in fact possess hidden propositional clauses 
upon analysis. One tactic employed in the literature to achieve this 
consists of  modifying a sentence that contains an intensional transitive 
by means of  an adverb and then showing that this modification creates 
ambiguities that can be resolved only by uncovering covert propositional 
material. For instance, consider the following sentence: 
 (28) John wants your bike tomorrow.  
This sentence is ambiguous: it can be read  as meaning either that John 
now wants your bike for tomorrow or, alternatively, that John will 
tomorrow want your bike, without necessarily requiring your bike for 
tomorrow. In the first case, “tomorrow” modifies the content of  John’s 
wanting, that is, it is a specific wanting that John has—a wanting for 
tomorrow. In the second case, however, “tomorrow” is not used to 
modify the content of  the wanting but, rather, the time at which it will 
occur in John’s mind.  
 A proponent of  the CM can then claim that in order to be able to 
account for this ambiguity, one needs to treat (28) as containing a hidden 
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propositional construction. In this regard, we can then disambiguate (28) 
as follows: 
 (29) John is such that he wants your bike for tomorrow.  
 (30) Tomorrow, John will be such that he will want your bike.  
The CM proponent can then try to demonstrate that this strategy can be 
applied to all intentional transitive constructions, which would 
demonstrate that all non-propositional constructions are in fact covert 
propositional constructions. For instance, Richard Larson writes the 
following: 
In fact, a ‘hidden clause’ analysis of  intensional transitive constructions is 
plausible in many cases, and has been urged by a number of  researchers. 
Quite typically, intensional transitive constructions have a close 
paraphrase involving a clausal, or clausal-like construction. (Larson 
2002 : 233)  
However, the CM proponent must confront two problems with such a 
syntactic strategy. The first is simply that this constitutes a mere syntactic 
observation and that it is not clear exactly how it impinges on the 
phenomenological data described above. Indeed, does the fact that (28) 
is ambiguous really show that a simpler instance of  intentionality, such as 
the one described by “John wants your bike,” is not an instance of  a 
non-propositional attitude? The proponent of  the CM must here give us 
some reason to believe that this is the case. She cannot simply put 
forward the fact that (28) is ambiguous and requires a hidden 
propositional structure to account for this ambiguity as an argument in 
favor of  the claim that there are no irreducible non-propositional 
properties.  
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 The second problem is that this syntactic strategy in fact does not 
generalize. Indeed, as remarked by Montague, such an ambiguity test 
works well for verbs from the “want/needs” verb group, but it does not 
generalize smoothly beyond that group (Montague 2007: 508). For 
instance, it is indeed difficult to distinguish any ambiguity in the 
following:  
(31) John loves Mary tomorrow.  
One might imagine that one is anticipating John’s first encounter with 
Mary and, aware of  John’s sensibility as well as Mary’s natural charm, 
knows that John will instantly fall in love with Mary tomorrow. However, 
there is no way to read this sentence as saying that “tomorrow” 
somehow modifies John’s loving, as was the case with (28) above. 
 Alternatively, one may point to an example such as:  
 (32) John loves Mary faithfully.  
Here it seems quite clear that “faithfully” modifies John’s loving of  Mary, 
but it is once again hard to find any ambiguity in the sentence.  
 Montague suggests an interesting reason as to why the “wants/
needs” verb group is, unlike other groups of  transitive verbs, subject to 
such ambiguities. Desire is commonly taken as being directed at a way 
the world can be, i.e., as a paradigmatic case of  a propositional attitude. 
The proximity that members of  the “wants/needs” verb group have to 
desire might then explain why such constructions in fact contain hidden 
propositional clauses.  
 This first syntactic strategy does not seem to be very promising 
for the CM. How else can one try to defend the claim that non-
propositional attitudes can be reduced to being propositional? We might 
try to saddle a proponent of  the CM with the following strategy, 
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discussed by Montague 2005. First, we might say that for each non-
propositional attitude, there is a true bi-conditional with a non-
propositional attitude on one side and a propositional attitude on the 
other; for instance: 
 (13) John fears God iff John fears that God is omnipotent.  
The problem with such a bi-conditional is that if  the right-hand side 
certainly counts as a sufficient condition for John to fear God, it does 
not constitute a necessary condition. Indeed, John could well ignore that 
God is omnipotent or even be unfamiliar with the concept of  
omnipotence and yet still fear God. Of  course, the point is not merely 
about (13), but rather about the way we can generalize over this example. 
Namely, it seems that if  the content of  the propositional attitude that 
stands on the right-hand side of  the bi-conditional is too specific, we 
could always remark that such an attitude might not count as a necessary 
condition for the non-propositional one on the left-hand side.  
 However, we might retreat from the attribution of  a determinate 
content and merely claim that for any non-propositional attitude of  the 
form “x φs y” there is some propositional attitude with the form “For 
some F, x φs that y is F” that is true; moreover, we could also assert that 
the two propositions that would be instances of  these two schemas 
could truly flank a bi-conditional. For instance, one may claim that if  
“John loves Mary” is true, then the following bi-conditional is true: 
“John loves Mary iff  for some F, John loves that Mary is F.” However, 
here it seems that we might be confronted by the converse of  the above 
problem, namely that the truth of  the propositional attitude that would 
flank the right-hand side of  the bi-conditional would not count as being 
sufficient for the truth of  the propositional attitude. That is, John might 
well love that, for some F, Mary is F, without this entailing that John 
loves Mary. If  that is not the case, then CM proponents should be able 
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to tell us which F exactly are such that they are sufficient for the fact that 
if  Mary has one of  them, then John loves her. However, the prospects 
for the existence of  such a property appear rather dim.  
 As such, we might also conclude that this second strategy is not 
more promising than the first and that, consequently, it does not seem 
that we have good reasons to reject (A). The existence of  irreducible 
non-propositional attitudes thus does constitute a genuine problem for 
the CM.  
5.2 Aboutness 
We now turn to a second external objection to the CM. In essence, it 
amounts to the claim that the CM’s analysis of  aboutness is wrong-
headed. In order to properly understand this objection, however, it is 
important to distinguish between two versions of  it.  
 First, one might say that from the perspective of  an IOM 
proponent, the analysis of  aboutness suggested by the CM is insufficient. 
Indeed, for proponents of  the IOM, aboutness is defined in terms of  
the notion of  intentional object. By rejecting an irreducible appeal to 
that notion, the CM would—from the point of  view of  the IOM—
simply be missing the nature of  aboutness.  
 Of  course, this first way to frame the objection is not very 
interesting. Indeed, as we saw earlier its antecedent, namely that the IOM 
provides us with a correct analysis of  aboutness is rather problematic. 
Nonetheless, one might be willing to distinguish between two things: the 
general intuition that lies behind the analysis of  aboutness provided by the 
IOM and the specific analysis of  this intuition of  the IOM.  
 What is this general intuition? To put it in Crane’s terms, it is that 
“our mental life seems to involve the presence to the mind—or apparent 
presence to the mind—of  things in the world” (Crane 2013: 4). A 
compelling reading of  what Crane is saying is that for each intentional 
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experience, there is something such that it appears that we are 
intentionally directed upon that thing. However, the CM is bound to 
reject this intuition. As we saw above, the CM might indeed well 
countenance that all intentional experiences, including those that are 
about things that do not exist, are about something in the sense of  
having a representational content. Nonetheless, it must reject the claim 
that all intentional experiences are about something in the sense of  there 
always being something that one is intentionally directed upon. For 
instance, if  John judges that Pegasus is a horse, then his judgment has a 
representational content but is not literally about anything since Pegasus 
does not exist. In such a case, then there is then nothing that is present 
to John’s mind.  
 Disambiguation often constitutes a helpful philosophical tool. For 
instance, imagine that someone is trying to analyze the sentence “You 
have no reason to believe this.” Telling that individual that the word 
“reason” could actually be ambiguous between, say, “epistemic reason” 
and “practical reason” might turn out to be helpful. For instance, that 
person might come to realize that this sentence could receive different 
truth-values depending on how the word “reason” is interpreted. For 
instance, I might have no epistemic reason to believe that the door is 
closed but still possess a practical reason for believing that it is; on that 
ground, I may then try to convince myself  that the door is closed (see, 
e.g., Ginet 2001).  
 However, in the case of  the word “reason,” the distinction 
between, say, epistemic and practical reasons does not follow from 
endorsing a particular account of  reasons. It is simply is a fact about 
reasons that they come in different kinds and any theory of  reasons 
should account for that fact. Hence, whatever grounds we might have to 
disambiguate between different senses of  the word “reason,” these 
grounds are independent of  any specific theory of  reasons.  
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 The case of  “about”  turning out  to be non-univocal according to 
the CM is very different. Indeed, in light of  Crane’s above quotation, that 
there are two senses of  aboutness is not a fact about intentional 
experiences themselves but instead a fact about their analysis by the CM. 
Indeed, as Richard Cartwright remarks, it is far from clear that there is 
any reason to believe that “about” as it is routinely used is ambiguous:  
…it is at least disturbing to be told that, when we finally tell our children 
that Santa Claus does not exist, we say nothing about Santa Claus. 
Presumably they expect to hear something about him—the truth about 
him, one way or the other; and it is scarcely believable that the hard facts 
of  semantics force us to disappoint them. Nor is it much consolation (to 
us or to them) to be told that we say nothing about him in the same 
sense as that in which we say something about Caesar when we say he 
crossed the Rubicon; for it is not clear that “about” has an appropriately 
different sense. (Cartwright 1960: 633) 
If  Cartwright is right—and we cannot see any reason to doubt that he is
—then the CM’s distinction between two senses of  “about” is simply ad 
hoc and should actually count against the CM providing a correct 
description of  intentional experiences. Moreover, insofar as one’s aim is 
to provide a correct description of  intentional experiences, one should 
reject the CM’s account as an ill-conceived analysis of  such experiences.  
6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discussed the main relational alternative to the IOM, 
the CM. According to the CM, intentional experiences are relations to 
representational content. This relation is not the one of  “being about” 
but, rather, the one of  having a certain content. What an intentional 
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experience is about is then cashed out in terms of  the semantic 
properties of  its representational content.   
 We then examined how the CM is supposed to account for the six 
main features of  intentionality, focusing particularly on non-existence. 
The CM is able to dissolve the problem of  non-existence faced by the 
IOM, but it is confronted by a problem of  non-existence of  its own—
namely how to determine the truth-conditions of  representational 
contents that are about things that do not exist. As we saw, the CM must 
choose between some options here. The task ahead is difficult, but it is 
commonly believed to be realizable.  
 Finally, we presented two objections to the CM, based on (i) the 
existence of  non-propositional attitudes and (ii) aboutness. According to 
the first, the CM schema cannot be generally true as some experiences 
are about things even though they do not have any representational 
content. According to the second, the CM schema is not strong enough 
to capture the intuitive notion of  aboutness that characterizes intentional 
experiences. In the next chapter, we turn to a further model of  
intentionality, namely adverbialism.  
Chap. 5: Adverbialism 
It is possible to avoid commitment to merely 
intentional objects, then, but the price, if  such it is, is 
the adoption of  adverbialism about intentionality. It 
strikes me that recent discussions of  intentionality 
have treated this web of  issues rather glibly.  
     (Kriegel 2008: 86) 
1. Introduction 
In the two preceding chapters, we discussed a first family of  theories of  
intentionality, namely the relational theories of  intentionality. We 
discussed two different models: the intentional object model (IOM) and 
the content model (CM). As we saw, the two models present two very 
different understandings of  the idea that the underlying nature of  
intentionality is that of  a relation. However, both raise some concerns. 
This provides us with justification to move on to an exploration of  
another family of  theories of  intentionality, namely non-relational ones.  
 In this chapter and the next, we shall discuss two such non-
relational theories of  intentionality: adverbialism and polyadism. As we 
shall see, both theories are united in their rejection of  the claim that the 
underlying metaphysical nature of  intentionality is that of  a relation, but 
they diverge in their positive claim. Polyadism rejects that the choice 
between intentionality being either a relation or a monadic property is 
exhaustive. Adverbialism, on the other hand, claims that intentionality is 
a monadic property.  
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 In this chapter, we focus on adverbialism, as it has recently been 
defended by Uriah Kriegel (Kriegel 2007, 2008, 2011). According to 
adverbialism, intentional properties are adverbial modifications of  
consciousness. Just as to run quickly is an adverbial modification of  a 
run—that is, a particular way of  performing the action of  running—to 
be the bearer of  an intentional experience that is about Obama is 
analyzed by adverbialism as an adverbial modification of  consciousness, 
i.e., as a particular way of  being conscious—thinking Obama-wise.  
 The chapter is organized as follows. We shall begin by clarifying 
what is meant by a non-relational theory of  intentionality. This task 
accomplished, we shall introduce the basic elements of  adverbialism 
before discussing how it is supposed to account for the six features of  
intentionality. We shall then consider a first round of  standard objections 
to adverbialism and consider the way in which Kriegel recently proposed 
to defend adverbialism against these objections. However, as we shall see, 
a second round of  objections will cast doubt on Kriegel’s rejoinders.  
2. Non-Relationality 
In light of  the different reasons put forward in favor of  the claim 
proposed in Chapter 2, the claim that intentionality is not a relation 
might seem implausible. Hence, before entering into the discussion of  
specific instances of  non-relational theories of  intentionality, we shall 
first make two clarifications regarding the claim that intentionality is not 
a relation.   
 The first point to notice is that the claim that intentionality is not 
a relation is not necessarily intended as a denial of  the claim that 
intentionality might appear to be a relation. As such, then, non-relational 
theories need not disagree with the data, in particular grammatical and 
phenomenological, that speak in favor of  treating intentionality as a 
relation. Non-intentional theories, however, build on the difficulties 
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faced by relational theories of  intentionality to argue in favor of  a 
distinction between appearance and reality: Intentionality may appear to 
be a relation, but this does not mean that we must treat it as one.  
 Brentano expresses himself  most clearly on this issue in one of  
his late essays, “Mental Reference as Distinguished from Relation in the 
Strict Sense,” in which he writes:   
The terminus of  the so-called relation does not in reality need to exist at all. 
For this reason, one could doubt whether we really are dealing with 
something relational here, and not rather with something in certain 
respects relation-like (Relativen Ähnliches), something which might therefore 
be called quasi-relational/relational-ish (Relativliches). (Brentano 2015: 
272)  
There is an important issue of  translation concerning this passage that 
was recently indicated by Kriegel (Kriegel 2016). In the German original, 
Brentano uses the expression “Relativen Ähnliches,” which can be 
translated most literally to “similar to a relation.” The standard English 
translation of  this passage, however, translates it to “quasi-relation,” 
which might be taken to imply that Brentano believes that there are two 
kinds of  relations: genuine relations on the one hand, for which all the 
relata must exist; and quasi-relations on the other, for which it is not 
required that the relata exist. As Kriegel points out, however, the 
translation of  “Relativen Ähnliches” by “quasi-relation” is unwarranted and 
leads to confusion. A more felicitous translation would be “relation-ish,” 
which implies that intentionality does indeed possess the air of  a relation 
without necessarily implying that it is, as a matter of  fact, a relation.  
 In light of  that remark, the spirit and task of  non-relational 
theories of  intentionality become clearer. They do not necessarily aim to 
deny that there are data about the phenomenon of  intentionality that 
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speak in favor of  treating it as a relation. What they deny is that these 
data entail that it is a relation. What we should strive for, ideally, is an 
analysis of  the underlying metaphysical nature of  intentionality that 
would allow us to account for these two facts: (i) intentionality seems to 
be a relation; and (ii) intentionality is not a relation. One must then try to 
save the appearances without turning them into facts.  
 The second point to notice is that the initial plausibility of  non-
relational theories of  intentionality also rests on distinguishing between 
two different readings of  the claim that intentionality is not a relation: a 
strong reading and a weak one. A first, strong way to read the claim that 
intentionality is not a relation would be to claim that intentionality is never 
a relation. This, however, would certainly threaten the claim that 
intentionality can put us in contact with the world, and would make non-
relational theories of  intentionality fall pray to the objection of  idealism 
alluded to by Grossmann that we reported in Chapter 2.  
 A second, weaker reading of  the thesis that intentionality is not a 
relation amounts to taking it as meaning that intentionality is not 
constitutively a relation. This second claim, contrary to the first one, is 
perfectly compatible with the claim that some instances of  intentionality 
genuinely are relations. It denies, however, that being relational is 
constitutive for something to be an instance of  intentionality. The claim 
that a certain instance of  intentionality is a relation can then be 
challenged without this impinging in any sense either on its intentional 
nature or on the relational character of  some instances of  intentionality.  
 That said, although denying that a certain instance of  
intentionality is relational might not impinge on its claim to be a fully 
fledged instance of  intentionality, it might nonetheless impinge on some 
of  its other features, such as its content being true or veridical, or it 
being an instance of  knowledge, or, more metaphorically, it being an 
instance of  a bridge between the mind and reality. As Kriegel puts it, 
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The deeper point… is that there is a confusion lurking in the way the 
“cognitive contact” requirement is often wielded. The requirement need 
not be satisfied by intentionality as such, only by successful intentionality. A 
true thought connects us to the world; but it does so in virtue of  being 
true, not in virtue of  being a thought. An accurate auditory experience as 
of  trumpets connects us to trumpets, not in virtue of  being an 
experience as of  trumpets, however, but in virtue of  being accurate. 
Admittedly, there must be a bridge between intentional states and reality. 
But intentionality is the bridged, not the bridging. The bridging is 
provided by such notions as truth, accuracy, veridicality, and the like. 
What is true of  non-veridical experiences is not that they connect us to 
the word, but that they would connect us to the world if  they were 
veridical. (Kriegel 2011: 166) 
This is a very substantial point that cuts right into the heart of  the 
metaphysics of  intentionality: What do we mean by words like 
“intentional experience,” “thought,” and “perceptual experience,” and 
how do we conceive of  the conditions of  individuation of  such mental 
states? The issue is of  course very complex, but we shall briefly examine 
it.   
 First of  all, one must clearly distinguish between genetic and 
constitutive issues: between the genetic question, “how did we end up 
being such intentional creatures?”; and the subsequent constitutive 
question, “what makes us such intentional creatures?” It is plausible 
enough that we might have evolved to be intentional creatures by 
standing in relation to our environment. This, however, is only a claim 
about the causal origin of  our intentional nature, and is not de facto 
equivalent to a constitutive account of  intentionality. Non-relational 
theories might then claim that although the appeal to relations represents 
a plausible genetic story, it does not represent a plausible constitutive 
one.   
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 Brains-in-a-vat scenarios are helpful tools for such discussions. We 
might, for instance, imagine a counterfactual world where, by pure 
chance and without any hint of  design, the following situation 
materializes: A brain is maintained in life in a vat of  nutrients and is 
connected to a computer that feeds it experiences. Such a brain-in-a-vat 
scenario certainly does seem to be metaphysically possible, and it also 
seems perfectly possible for the brain to undergo experiences that are 
identical to ours such as, say, the cognitive experience characteristic of  
thinking about Pegasus. Now, clearly enough, the genetic story as to how 
this brain-in-a-vat ended up being an intentional creature would be much 
different from our own. That said, that the genetic story would be 
different does not prevent the constitutive story as to what makes it the 
case that this brain-in-a-vat is the bearer of  intentional experiences to be 
in principle completely sharable between it and us. And, moreover, since 
this brain-in-a-vat does not entertain any relation with its environment—
or at least not any relation that would plausibly explain why it undergoes 
just these experiences—this constitutive story that shall account for what 
we share with it cannot be the genetic one alluded to above.  
 Externalists about mental contents have of  course denied the 
plausibility of  such scenarios. According to them, the individuation 
conditions of  intentional contents are such that they necessarily depend 
on relations to the environment. Accordingly, it cannot be the case that 
we share the same intentional life as a brain-in-a-vat that never had any 
relation with our environment. As Putnam puts it: 
[The brains in vat] images, words, etc., are qualitatively identical with 
images, words, etc., which do represent trees in our world; but we have 
already seen… that qualitative similarity to something which represents 
an object… does not make a thing a representation all by itself. In short, 
the brains in a vat are not thinking about real trees when they think 
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“there is a tree in front of  me” because there is nothing by virtue of  
which their thought “tree” represents actual trees. (Putnam 1981: 12-13)   
The gist of  Kriegel’s quote above, however, is that a claim such as 
Putnam’s is far too strong. First of  all, Putnam is under-describing the 
case at hand. He treats contents of  consciousness on par with images. 
The imagistic theory of  intentionality, however, is absurd. It claims that 
we can think about things because we can token mental images that 
stand in a similarity relation to these things. It is clear, however, that 
similarity is not enough to explain intentionality, as similarity is a 
symmetric relation. Hence, if  my mental image of  Obama is about 
Obama in virtue of  being similar to him, then, by the symmetry of  
similarity, Obama is about my mental image. But this is absurd! Putnam, 
hence, is not exactly displaying much charity in saddling his opponent 
with such a view.  
 Second, properly described, the case at hand does not concern 
images but appearances. There is no reason, however, to think that 
appearances are imagistic—and, moreover, no reason to think that 
appearances have intentionality in virtue of  a relation of  similarity. 
Moreover, we can perfectly recognize that there is a fundamental 
difference between the brain-in-a-vat and ourselves without thereby 
having to endorse the claim that there is nothing in common 
intentionally speaking between it and us. We might perfectly share the 
same experiences without claiming that sharing these experiences puts us 
in exactly the same situation. To use Kriegel’s expression, our 
experiences, for instance, can routinely be bridged—granted that they are 
suitably caused by, or related to, reality—while the brain-in-a-vat 
experiences cannot.  
 In its strongest form, however, externalism claims that we cannot 
share anything experientially speaking with the brain-in-a-vat because the 
content of  an experience does not only depend on but is constituted by 
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what it is about, i.e., by the world. Once the world itself  is dropped, then 
the experience and its content must also be dropped. Such views, 
however, place a heavy burden on the shoulders of  its proponents. First, 
they must deny that the brain-in-a-vat scenario is possible, which seems 
unlikely. Second, they must explain away either the similarities between 
the brain-in-a-vat’s experiences and our own, or, under the assumption 
that no such cases are possible, the difference between our actual cases 
of  successful intentionality and our failed intentional states, such as 
mistaken beliefs and hallucinations.  
 The general answer given by such radical theories standardly take 
the following form: There is no such thing as a similarity between 
successful and failed intentional states to be explained because, they 
claim, either one is the bearer of  a successful intentional state and one is 
the bearer of  a genuine intentional state; or one is the bearer of  an 
altogether, non-intentional, different kind of  mental state. Such theories 
are then commonly dubbed “disjunctivist” insofar as they claim that 
there is no similarity to be explained, i.e., no common-kind, between 
successful and failed intentional states. One finds oneself  either in a 
good case and is the bearer of  an intentional state, or in a bad case, and 
is not the bearer of  an intentional state. 
 Note, first of  all, that a direct consequence of  such views is that 
they estrange us from our mental life. That is, they move the authority 
regarding what kinds of  mental states we are in from the first-person 
perspective to the third-person perspective. In these views, there is no 
need to deny that, from the first-person perspective, one cannot know 
on which side of  the disjunction one finds oneself. It is our embedment 
to a global situation that decides for us on which side of  disjunction we 
are. And, since we have no other way to access this more global situation 
than our own, first-personal, one, we will not in fact ever know on which 
side of  the disjunction we are. At best, we can now, transcendentally, that 
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we sometimes find ourselves on the good side of  the disjunction. That is 
a rather big bullet to bite.  
 Furthermore, such theories cannot simply rest content with their 
disjunctive claim. They must in addition provide a theory of  both 
disjuncts—the successful and the failed one. But once the richness of  
conscious intentional life is recognized, it seems impossible for 
disjunctivism to claim something other than the following: instances of  
the first disjunct are phenomenally identical to instances of  the second 
disjunct but they fail to put us in contact with reality. That conclusion, 
however, is identical to the one put forward by non-relational theories of  
intentionality and, at this point, it seems that the difference between non-
relational theories of  intentionality and disjunctivism verges on the 
terminological.   22
 Of  course, disjunctivism would require a much longer and 
elaborate discussion. For the time being, however, we contend that these 
two reasons provide us with a prima facie justification for the claim that 
refuting disjunctivism does not amount to a top priority. In summary, 
then, non-relational theories of  intentionality need not deny that 
intentionality appears to be a relation, nor that some instances of  
intentionality are relational. What they deny is that relationality is 
constitutive of  intentionality. What they should provide us with, hence, is 
a theory that is able to conciliate two aspects that seem contradictory: the 
fact that intentionality appears to be a relation, and the fact that 
About disjunctivism’s difficulty to provide us with an adequate account of  22
hallucinatory visual experiences, Michelle Montague, for instance, writes: “[Mike 
Martin’s] account of  hallucination is inadequate at the crucial point because it 
leaves out phenomenal particularity, which can be just as present in a 
hallucination as it is in veridical perception. And since Martin takes phenomenal 
particularity seriously in the case of  veridical perceptions, we should expect that 
he would take it just as seriously in the case of  hallucinations.” (Montague 2011: 
135)   
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intentionality is not a relation. We shall now see how they aim to achieve 
this task. 
3. The General Idea of  Adverbialism 
We shall now turn to our first non-relational contender, so-called 
adverbialism. The fundamental idea of  adverbialism as a theory of  
intentionality is that intentional properties are adverbial modifications of  
experiences. That is, for one to be an intentional subject is to instantiate 
the first-order property of  being conscious, which then instantiates a 
second-order property, an adverbial property, as of  being conscious in 
particular way—an intentional way.  
 However, before turning to the idea of  intentionality being an 
adverbial phenomenon, we shall introduce the two important theoretical 
building blocks of  adverbialism. First of  all, we shall introduce the idea 
of  adverbial truth-makers for adverbial sentences. This shall turn out 
essential as, according to adverbialism, standard intentional sentences 
such as: “John thinks about x” or “John thinks that p” are made true by 
such adverbialist truth-makers. And, secondly, we shall introduce the idea 
of  an adverbialist paraphrase of  a non-adverbial sentence as, according to 
adverbialism the first important step before providing an adverbialist 
truth-maker for intentional sentences actually is to offer a systematic 
strategy to paraphrase intentional sentences in an adverbial form. That is, 
that “John thinks about x” can be made true by an adverbialist truth-
maker makes sense only on the background that “John thinks about x” 
can be paraphrased into some adverbial sentence.  
3.1 Adverbial Truth-Makers 
In this section, we shall introduce the idea of  adverbial truth-makers for 
adverbial sentences, that is, the idea that the proposition expressed by an 
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adverbial sentence such as, “a øs F-wise”, possesses the following logical 
form:  a particular, a, instantiates a first-order property, “to ø”, which in 
turn instantiates a second-order property, the adverbial modification “F-
wise”. Accordingly, the truth-maker of  such a sentence would amount to 
the instantiation by a of  the property of  ø-ing, duly adverbially modified 
F-wise. 
 Let us start with the following example: 
 (1) John runs.  
This sentence can be taken to express a certain proposition: namely, that 
John runs. This proposition is true, let us assume, just in case John 
instantiates the property of  running. Let us, moreover, call the 
instantiation of  this property by John the fact that he is running. (1), we 
might then say, is true just in case the fact that John instantiates the 
property of  running obtains. In that intuitive sense, the fact that John 
instantiates the property of  running can be said to be the truth-maker of  
the proposition expressed by (1).   
 Let us now compare this first example with the following one:  
 (2) John runs quickly.  
Informally, the general idea behind (2) can be put as following. Running 
is an activity that can be performed in many different ways. One can run 
slowly, quickly, elegantly, effortlessly, and so on. The question, however, 
is how these ways of  doing something impinge on the nature of  less 
determinate propositions, such as the one expressed by (1), and on the 
nature of  less determinate facts, such as the truth-maker of  the 
proposition expressed by (1). In other words, what is the logical form of  
the propositions expressed by sentences that describe activities done in a 
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certain way and what is the nature of  their truth-makers? Let us try some 
options.  
 A first way one may conceive of  the proposition expressed by (2) 
is as a conjunctive proposition. As such, then, the proposition expressed 
by (2) would simply be the proposition expressed by (1) conjuncted with 
another one. This conjunctive proposition can be represented as follows: 
 (3) Run (John) & Quick (John) 
Accordingly, (3)’s truth-maker should be conceived as the fact that John 
instantiates simultaneously both the properties of  running and of  being 
quick. However, one might reasonably doubt that (3) really amounts to 
the proposition expressed by (3). Indeed, (3) could be true even if  (2) 
were to be false, e.g., if  John’s quickness was completely unrelated to his 
running, that is, if  John was generally quick at what he does though not 
running quickly. As such, then, (3) does not seem able to capture the 
intuition that the (2) describes an instance of  a certain activity, i.e., a 
running, done in a certain way, i.e., quickly. 
 An alternative would be to replace the idea that (2) expresses a 
conjunctive proposition by the claim that it expresses a simple 
proposition constituted out of  a complex monadic property, i.e., 
running-quickly. As such, then, the proposition expressed by (2) would 
amount to the following:  
 (4) Run-quickly (John) 
The truth-maker of  that sentence, moreover, would simply be John’s 
instantiation of  this complex property.  
 Once again, however, it does not seem that this corresponds to 
the correct interpretation of  (2). Indeed, in the analysis of  (2) offered by 
(4), “quickly” is a morphological component of  the predicate “running-
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quickly” but not a syntactical component. As such, then, the two 
properties “running” and “running quickly” represent, despite 
morphological similarities, two different properties and, hence, two 
different activities. For John to run quickly, however, does not seem for 
him to instantiate a monadic property that is different than the one he 
instantiates when he is running, though not quickly. Indeed, running and 
running quickly do not constitute different kinds of  activities on par 
with, say, running and sitting still. Hence, when John accelerates and 
starts to run quickly, for instance, the kind of  activity he is practicing, 
running, remains steady. It is only the way he performs this activity that 
changes. Accordingly, (4) seems to fail to capture the proposition 
expressed by (2) and the fact that John is instantiating the complex 
monadic property of  “running quickly” does not seem to be the right 
truth-maker for (2).   
 The idea of  adverbial modification enters the stage at this point. 
So far, we have attempted two different ways to capture the difference 
between (1) and (2) merely at a first-order level, that is, at the level of  
properties of  individuals such as John. The first option analyzed (2) as 
John’s instantiation of  two distinct first-order properties, “running” and 
“being quick”, while the second one analyzed it as John’s instantiation of  
a single complex first-order property, namely “running-quickly”. Each of  
these strategies, however, turned out to be unsuccessful. In other words, 
it seems that we cannot make sense of  the idea that certain activities, like 
running, can be performed in certain ways by appealing only to 
individuals and first-order properties. The starting point of  adverbialism 
is then that in order to account for the idea that activities can be 
performed in certain ways we need to move one level up and appeal to 
second-order properties, i.e., properties of  properties.  
 Adverbialism’s claim, hence, is that the difference between (1) and 
(2) is not to be accounted for by a difference in the properties 
instantiated by John himself  but, rather, by the presence of  a second-
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order property that characterizes John’s running in some way. This 
second-order property is an adverbial modification of  a first-order 
property, the property of  running. As such, then, the proposition 
expressed by (2) represents the instantiation by John of  the first-order 
property of  running, adverbially modified quick-wise. Accordingly, (2)’s 
truth-maker would amount to the complex structure of  a particular, 
John, instantiating a property, “running”, itself  instantiating a second-
order property, the adverbial modification “quick-wise.”  
 These ideas of  adverbial modifications, adverbial propositions and 
adverbial truth-makers introduced, let us now turn to the complementary 
issue of  providing adverbial paraphrases of  non-adverbial sentences.  
3.2 Adverbial Paraphrases 
The gist of  adverbialism as a theory of  intentionality is that the 
intentional character of  intentional experiences can be accounted for by 
treating them as having an adverbial nature. As we saw in the above 
example, to run quickly is for a certain activity—e.g., running—to 
instantiate a certain adverbial modification. In the same way, to be the 
bearer of  an intentional experience, according to adverbialism, is for an 
experience to be adverbially modified in some way, e.g., to think about 
some x must be treated as thinking x-wise.  
 There is, however, an important difference between examples such 
as (3) and intentional experiences. Namely, (3) explicitly is an adverbial 
sentence, and the question we tackled was how we should interpret such 
sentences. On the other hand, intentional sentences, i.e., sentences 
describing intentional experiences, are not adverbial sentences or, at best, 
not explicitly. An important task should then be to tackle the question of  
how one could provide an adverbial paraphrase of  a non-adverbial 
sentence.  
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 As we shall see, the use of  adverbial paraphrases to avoid 
metaphysical conundrum is a familiar philosophical move that is not 
unique to the theory of  intentionality, and other kinds of  problematic 
sentences can be submitted to an adverbialist treatment to avoid some 
problematic commitments. We shall then take our cue from there before 
moving to intentional sentences.  
 In his discussion of  intentionalism about perception, William Fish 
(Fish 2010: 34), for instance, discusses the following sentence: 
 (6) John wore a broad smile. 
The surface grammar of  this sentence is relational. It seems to express a 
relation, “wearing (x,y)”, that obtains between two things: John and a 
broad smile. In such a reading, however, the indefinite noun-phrase “a 
broad smile” is supposedly referential, as if  John ever wore a broad 
smile, he definitely wore a definite one. That said, the idea that there 
could be determinate smiles to which we could stand in relation turns 
out to be rather unpleasant. Indeed, what kinds of  particulars are smiles 
and how should we individuate them? But if  (6) indeed has a relational 
structure, then we would be forced to accept that there thus are smiles to 
which we can stand in relation and to which indefinites such as “a smile” 
would refer in order to account for the truth of  (6) understood as 
expressing a relational proposition.  
 In the face of  this difficulty, a popular alternative is to claim that 
(6) is true, but only non-literally so. That is, it is true because a 
paraphrase of  (6) is true. This paraphrase, moreover, is an adverbial one:  
 (7) John smiled broadly.  
(7), contrary to (6), does not feature a relational surface grammar. Rather, 
it can be parsed as the instantiation by John of  a first-order property, 
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“smile (x).” We can then treat the adverb “broadly” in the same way in 
which we treated “quickly” in the case of  (3)—to smile broadly is simply 
to smile in a particular way, to be accounted for in terms of  the presence 
of  a second-order adverbial modification of  John’s smiling. By means of  
such a treatment, all concerns regarding whether we could stand in 
relation to smiles evaporate and all concerns regarding a non-adverbial 
fact that (6) would describe disappear. What is actually meant by (6), the 
claim goes, is that John indeed smiled, though he did so in a particular 
way, namely broadly.  
 An important fact that we shall bear in mind for the upcoming 
discussion of  adverbialism is how natural the move from (6) to (7) seems 
to be. Indeed, tested against the intuitions of  native speakers, it is very 
likely that (6) and (7) would be taken to mean the same thing. In fact, one 
could even imagine that (7) be taken to reveal the meaning of  (6) to 
some benighted speakers. Indeed, upon being told (6), one could be 
unaware of  the use of  the verb “to wear” in such a non-literal context 
and imagine that (6) describes John wearing a huge manufactured smile 
pinned on his sleeve. That is, after all, the literal meaning of  the verb “to 
wear.” (7), then, can be said to provide a possibly welcome 
disambiguation of  (6) and, hence, to be a way to reveal its proper 
meaning in most usual contexts.  
 We shall remain very general as to the strategy that one should use 
in order to turn a non-adverbial sentence into an adverbial one, 
preferring examples to systematic guidelines. However, one key to 
performing such transformations, as illustrated by the passage from (6) 
to (7), seems to be the replacement of  a transitive verb, such as “to 
wear,” by an intransitive verb and the transformation of  an adjective, 
such as “broad,” into an adverb. In the next section, we shall see whether 
these elements of  paraphrasing can be applied as such to intentional 
sentences, or whether some further means must be appealed to.  
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4. Adverbial Intentionality 
Adverbialism about intentionality aims, just as the CM does, to provide a 
paraphrastic interpretation of  the FIS. An adverbial interpretation of  the 
FIS is one that substantially departs from the original schema by turning 
it into an adverbial construction from which the little word “about” has 
disappeared. The metaphysical side of  this idea is then that intentional 
sentences paraphrased in adverbialist terms possess truth-makers that 
feature a metaphysical structure similar to the one discussed above in the 
cases of  (2) and (5). In this section, we shall explain the main elements 
of  such an account of  intentionality.  
 Let us begin with a standard intentional sentence, such as the 
following:  
 (8) John thinks about Obama.  
This sentence is, of  course, not an adverbial one, and the first 
adverbialist step should be to provide an adverbialist paraphrase of  (8). 
The general idea is that we shall turn (8), which seems to describe a 
relational fact obtaining between two things, John and Obama, into an 
activity of  John’s that he can perform in a certain way.  
 According to adverbialism, this activity of  John’s should, most 
basically, be conscious. There are, however, different kinds of  conscious 
states, such as sensations, and more cognitive activities, such as thinking. 
Thus, adverbialism proposes that the kind of  activity with which John is 
busy when he is thinking about Obama is not merely being conscious, 
but rather instantiating a particular kind of  conscious property, a 
thinking property. The first part of  our paraphrase, then, is to turn the 
transitive “to think about something” into the intransitive “to think.” 
Thus, according to adverbialism, when John thinks about Obama he first 
and foremost thinks.  
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 However, if  (8) is true, then John is not merely thinking, but 
rather thinking about Obama. Here comes the second step of  the 
adverbialist transformation: the creation of  an adverbialist determination 
from the remaining parts of  (8). In the previous sub-section, we turned 
an adjective into an adverb but this time we should turn a noun, Obama, 
into an adverb, i.e., Obama-ly or, more elegantly, Obama-wise.  
 Putting these two elements together, the adverbialist treatment of  
a sentence such as (8) amounts to the following:  
 (9) John thinks Obama-wise.  
At this point, one might have an initial concern. Indeed, one might point 
to the fact that in the case of  the transition from (6) to (7), the use of  
“smile” is unproblematic because “to smile” not only is an intransitive 
construction, but is also a construction that does not imply the truth of  
a transitive one. The case, however, seems to be different with “to 
think.” Indeed, one can merely smile, but one cannot merely think; to 
think is an intentional activity. Hence, one cannot merely think but must 
always think about something. As such, then, one might worry that the 
transition from (8) to its adverbial paraphrase (9) does not run exactly as 
smoothly as the transition from (6) to (7).  
 This concern, however, is misplaced. Indeed, it seems to rely, first 
of  all, on the idea that we have a genuine grasp on intentionality that is 
independent of  adverbialism. But this is precisely what adverbialism 
argues that we do not have. Adverbialism is a theory of  intentionality 
and, if  it is true, then it is simply false that there is no reading of  the 
schema “x thinks” that does not entail an instance of  the transitive one, 
“x thinks about y.” Rather, according to adverbialism, the nature of  
intentionality would force us to say that there is no reading of  the 
schema “x thinks” that does not entail an instance of  the adverbialist 
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schema “x thinks in some way.” As such, then, this first concern simply 
seems to be begging the question with respect to adverbialism.  
 Moreover, one might also point to the fact that the sentence, 
“One can merely smile,” is ambiguous between two readings. It can be 
interpreted as meaning that the verb “to smile” does not imply a 
transitive construction, in which case it is correct, but it can also be 
interpreted in the sense that one can smile without smiling in some way, 
in which case it is simply mistaken. Indeed, one cannot smile without 
smiling in some way, i.e., broadly, shyly, expressively, ironically, and so 
forth. But from the point of  view of  adverbialism, “to smile” is then 
very much like “to think.” 
 Let us grant for the sake of  the argument that one can indeed 
successfully paraphrase intentional sentences such as (8) into adverbial 
ones such as (9). That said, one might still wonder what exactly happens 
beneath the mere linguistic transition—that is, how we should 
understand the transition from the side not of  the sentences themselves, 
but rather of  what they are taken to describe, i.e., intentional experiences.  
 Simply put, adverbialism’s claim is that intentional experiences 
have an adverbial nature. In other words, they are constituted by the 
instantiation of  a certain first-order property—namely being conscious 
or, more determinately, thinking, conceived as a conscious property—
which is then adverbially modified. Imagine, for instance, that you are the 
bearer of  a cognitive experience such as thinking about chocolate. 
According to adverbialism, this is to be understood as being conscious in 
a certain way. Being conscious is a first-order property of  yours; whereas 
thinking chocolate-wise is a second-order, adverbial modification of  that 
first-order property. The point, according to Kriegel, can be generalized 
to all instances of  intentionality. For each kind of  intentional state, there 
is an adverbial modification that corresponds to that state. In general 
terms, if  one is the bearer of  an intentional state S, then one is 
intentionally directed F-wise. As Kriegel puts it,  
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According to this adverbial theory, having a conscious thought about 
chocolate, say, does not involve (constitutively) bearing a thinking-about 
relation to the property of  being chocolate, but rather engaging in the 
activity of  thinking in a certain way–chocolate-wise. Just as in “Omar is 
moving quietly” the adverb “quietly” denotes a modification of  Omar’s 
moving, and not a relation between Omar and quiet, so in “Omar is 
thinking chocolate-wise” the adverb “chocolate-wise” denotes a 
modification of  Omar’s thinking, not a relation between Omar and 
chocolate. More generally, for any putative property F, for F to figure in 
the exp-intentional content of  a state x is not for x to bear a relation of  
intentional directedness toward F; rather, it is for x to exhibit the 
property of  intentional directedness F-wise. (Kriegel 2011: 153) 
The difference between (8) and (9) is then completely parallel to the one 
between (6) and (7). (8) has a relational structure, while (9) does not. It 
consists of  the predication of  the property “think (x)” by John. The 
adverb “Obama-wise” can then be taken as modifying the verb “to 
think” in the lines described above. As such, then, a sentence like (9) 
does not require as a truth-maker a relational fact of  the kind, “Thinks 
about (John, Obama).” Instead, it can be true if  the non-relational fact 
that John’s conscious state of  thinking instantiates the second-order 
property of  thinking Obama-wise. As such, then, adverbialism treats the 
metaphysics of  intentional experiences in a completely non-relational 
manner, and without presupposing at a fundamental level any of  the two 
key notions that we discussed in the context of  the IOM and the CM—
the one of  intentional object and the one of  representational content. 
 At this point, however, one might well wonder how come exactly 
we know that intentional experiences have such an adverbial nature. 
According to Kriegel, the plausibility of  adverbialism as a theory of  
intentionality relies heavily on realizing that the inference to adverbialism 
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is of  an adbuctive nature. That is, from the point of  view of  adverbialism, 
we have access to our intentional experiences from our first-personal 
perspective and these experiences have, as a matter of  fact, an adverbial 
nature. But this does not mean that we have direct access to their 
adverbial nature. On the contrary, that the nature of  these experiences is 
in fact adverbial is something that we have to infer later on theoretical 
grounds. As Kriegel puts it, 
When I reflect on why adverbialism seems to me perfectly intelligible, and 
how I get a sense of  grasping the property of  being directed dragon-
wise, it seems to be that it is simply introspective encounter with the 
property of  being directed dragon-wise that affords me this grasp. By 
this I do not mean that experience instructs me of  the adverbial nature 
of  exp-intentionality; merely that it instructs me of  what in fact are 
adverbial exp-intentional properties. Thus, I just now stopped writing 
and visualized a smallish (about a foot long) green dragon hovering 
motionless about a yard away from me directly in front of  my eyes. 
When I attended introspectively to this visualizing experience, I 
encountered a certain property of  the experience, a property we have 
theoretical reasons for construing as visualizing smallish-green-hovering-
dragon-wise. (Kriegel 2011: 155) 
The argument for adverbialism therefore comes in two steps. First, we 
have introspective access to our intentional experiences and to their 
intentional nature, and second, we have theoretical reasons to construct 
their nature adverbially. There is no direct access to their adverbial 
nature. We say more below, however, about the nature of  the abductive 
inference that concludes that adverbialism should be the way to go for a 
theory of  intentionality.  
 Having presented the great lines of  the adverbialist proposal, we 
shall, in the next section, see how adverbialism can be said to be able to 
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account for the six main features of  intentionality that we identified in 
Chapter 1.  
5. Adverbialism and the Seven Features of  Intentionality 
5.1 Aboutness 
According to adverbialism, aboutness is a non-relational property of  an 
experience, namely the property that Kriegel calls “intentional 
directedness F-wise.” That is, for an experience to be intentional is for it 
to instantiate a particular kind of  adverbial modification, an intentional 
one, that turns it into an intentional experience. As such, then, we can 
say that adverbialism proposes a non-literal interpretation of  the FIS that 
goes the following way: 
 Adverbialist schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x is    
 intentionally directed y-wise.”  
There are a few points to be made about this schema. A first one is that 
it seems rather intuitive that at least some intentional experiences are, as 
Kriegel puts it, “object involving” (Kriegel 2011: 163) or, as they as 
standardly called, “singular.” The intuitive idea here is that intentional 
experiences that are about particulars, such as (9), are such that they 
involve the direct presence of  a particular to the mind and not merely 
the presence of  properties of  this particular.  
 Different models are likely to account for this claim in different 
ways. The IOM, first, will account for this claim by saying that in such a 
case, the relatum of  a such an “object-involving” experience is the 
particular it is about. The CM, on the other hand, traditionally accounts 
for this distinction by relying on the distinction we discussed in Chapter 
4 between so-called general and singular truth-conditions. That is, 
experiences that are object-involving are said to have as representational 
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content a proposition that has singular truth-conditions, that is, a 
proposition whose very existence and identity depends on the particular 
it is about. While experiences that are not object involving, on the other 
hand, have as content mere specifications of  what they are about. 
Moreover, though there recently has been some debate about this issue 
(e.g., Jeshion 2010a), the CM generally claims that for one to be able to 
token such singular representational content, one must be acquainted in 
some way or other with the object upon which a singular proposition 
that serves as representational content existentially depends.  
 That said, independently of  the way this intuitive distinction is 
implemented, the idea is that there is a substantial difference between 
these experiences that are object-involving and those that are not. This 
can either be accounted for in terms of  a difference in the kind of  relata 
one is intentionally directed upon, as in the IOM, or, as in the CM, in the 
kind of  representational content a certain intentional experience is 
having.  
 Adverbialism, however, does not possess the means to account for 
this distinction. Indeed, either the IOM or the CM requires that such 
singular experiences be individuated in terms of  a relation to particulars. 
According to adverbialism, however, there is no instance of  experiences 
that, qua intentional, are thus individuated. At best, some intentional 
experiences can, as Kriegel puts it, “be bridged” (Kriegel 2011: 166) but 
this does not mean that the contents of  any experience is individuated in 
an object-involving way. 
 According to Kriegel, however, the fact that adverbialism is unable 
to account for the distinction between intentional experiences that are 
object-involving and intentional experiences that are not cannot serve as 
an objection against adverbialism. First, he points to a consequence of  
the distinction that he is unwilling to endorse. Second, he proposes to 
disentangle two different issues, namely: (i) the idea that there is a 
difference between intentional experiences that are about particulars as 
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well as properties and intentional experiences that merely are about 
properties and (ii) the idea that we must appeal to the distinction 
between object-involving and non-object-involving experiences to 
account for this distinction. As he sees the matter, (i) can be accounted 
for independently of  (ii), in terms of  a distinction between two features, 
generality and  “particularity” (Kriegel 2011: 163).  
 The first point is the following. A consequence of  the claim that 
some experiences are object-involving is that experiences that are about 
numerically distinct, phenomenally indistinguishable particulars will have 
different representational contents, as these contents will be individuated 
in terms of  the objects they are about, regardless of  the fact that they 
cannot be distinguished phenomenologically. According to Kriegel, 
however, this result is unintuitive. As he puts it: 
Let Twin-World be a possible world indistinguishable from the actual 
world in every detail but one: the laptop I am looking at right now in that 
world is a numerically distinct individual from the one I am looking at in 
the actual world. Although qualitatively indistinguishable from any actual 
laptop, it is another laptop (perhaps because it has a different haecceity, 
perphaps for some other reason—depending on one’s view of  what 
makes a concrete particular the concrete particular it is). According to 
the objector [i.e., the proponent of  a distinction between object-involving 
and non-object-involving experiences], the exp-content of  my experience 
in the actual world and in Twin-World is different. This verdict, however, 
strikes me as obviously counter-intuitive. It is much more intuitive that 
the exp-intentional content are the same—that the two experiences are 
exp-intentionally type-identical. (Kriegel 2011: 163-164) 
In other words, according to Kriegel, the distinction between object-
involving and non-object-involving experiences cannot serve as an 
objection against adverbialism because it is wedded to a so-called 
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“externalist” individuation of  the content of  intentional experiences . 23
That is, it is wedded to an account of  the individuations of  intentional 
experiences according to which the crucial facts for the individuation of  
representational contents are not how the world appears to a subject but, 
rather, facts that lie beyond such appearances. Accordingly, Kriegel’s 
thought about his laptop in the actual world and about his laptop in 
Twin-World have different contents because, despite the fact that the 
world appears to Kriegel as being the same in both cases, the two 
thoughts in fact turn out to be about different individuals. According to 
Kriegel, however, externalism is implausible as it is, as he puts it, 
“obviously counter-intuitive” that the two experiences have different 
contents. Accordingly, all contents of  intentional experiences have, as 
they are called, internalist individuation conditions, i.e., individuation 
conditions that do not tie them to the objects they are about.  
 The issue over externalism and internalism is a complex one, 
central to contemporary debates in the philosophy of  mind. Kriegel, 
however, is not alone in defending internalist conditions of  individuation 
for the content of  intentional experiences (see, inter alia, Crane 2001; 
Horgan and Tienson 2002; Farkas 2008). As such, then, we should 
discuss further the issue it but merely flag Kriegel endorsement of  
internalism.  
 Let us now turn to the second issue, namely the general intuition 
that lies behind the distinction between object-involving and non-object-
involving intentional experiences. What, first, is this general intuition that 
lies behind the distinction? Contrast the following two things: First, 
being appeared by a manifold of  properties and, second, being presented 
with a particular as through a manifold of  properties. The first 
experience would be a purely general experience of  a certain distribution 
  For a useful collection of  papers on externalism, see Goldberg and 23
Pessin 1996. 
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of  properties, the second, however, would be an experience as of  being 
appeared with a particular, as it appears to us through a certain manifold 
of  properties. The contrast between these two things, we shall contend, 
is the general intuition that lies behind the distinction between object-
involving and non-object-involving intentional experiences.  
 According to Kriegel, however, we do not need to appeal to the 
notion of  singularity to account for the contrast between these two kinds 
of  experiences. Rather, he claims, we can account for it in terms of  the 
phenomenological notion of  “particularity”, that is, the particular 
experiential character of  experiences that present us with particulars. 
Drawing on work by Michelle Montague (Montague 2011), he cashes out 
this idea as the fact that some experiences have an “object positing 
phenomenology.” Montague’s general idea is that intentional experiences 
as of  being appeared with particulars, rather than mere manifolds of  
properties, are such that they possess a thought-component that 
structures the experience into an experience as of  being presented with 
an object. It is this added layer of  thinking that turn general intentional 
experiences into ones that instead are particular. Kriegel endorses 
Montague’s idea but proposes, in addition, to turn it into an adverbial 
feature of  experiences. That is, for one to undergo an intentional 
experience as of  being appeared with a particular is for one to be the 
bearer of  an intentional experience that is intentionally directed someway 
“concrete-particular-wise.” As he puts it,  
Although I deny that exp-intentional content is characterized by 
singularity, I recognize that it is characterized by particularity, in the sense 
that its bearers often have the experiential character of  presenting 
concrete particulars. This can be accomodated by claiming that such 
experiential characters exhibit…an object-positing phenomenology, which is the 
phenomenology of  particularity, and then offer an adverbial gloss on this 
phenomenology. The adverbial gloss construes the phenomenology of  
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particularity as the experiential character of  being intentionally directed 
concrete-particular-wise. (Kriegel 2011: 164) 
As such, then, Kripke’s adverbialist interpretation of  the FIS is in fact 
more complex than the above adverbialist schema. Namely, according to 
him, we need to break down further the property of  “being intentionally 
directed x-wise.” Take, for instance, the case of  John thinking about 
Obama. According to Kriegel, this will not simply mean that John is 
intentionally directed Obama-wise. Rather, it will mean that John’s 
experience possesses a complex adverbial content composed of  (i) 
properties of  an experience as of  being presented with Obama and (ii) 
particularity. This clarification made, we shall actually stick to the above 
formulation of  the adverbialist schema, duly flagging the fact that 
Kriegel breaks down further the “y-wise” part. 
 A second point is that the adverbialist schema is, just like the CM 
schema, a reductive schema in the sense that it tries to give an account of  
the meaning of  the FIS that proceeds without the word “about.” Indeed, 
“about” has completely disappeared from the right-hand side of  the 
adverbialist schema. That said, the adverbialist schema is very different 
from the CM schema is the sense that it does not try to derive the notion 
of  aboutness from a more fundamental feature, such as semantic 
normativity. Indeed, aboutness is taken by adverbialism as a fundamental 
feature of  intentional experiences, one that needs to be understood in 
terms of  the adverbial notion of  intentional directedness.  
 Kriegel is quite clear about this point. Indeed, according to him, 
the notion of  directedness should be taken as sufficient to capture the 
notion of  aboutness. This, he thinks, can be made clearer by means of  
the following two claims that, he says, “could indirectly shed light on F-
wise directedness.” (Kriegel 2011: 154) 
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(A) Whenever an intentional state of  being directed F-wise is 
veridical, then it stands in a relation to some F; 
(B) Whenever an intentional state of  being directed F-wise is non-
veridical, it is still true of  it that if  it were veridical, it would be 
related to some F. 
That is, according to Kriegel, there is a quite clear semantic connection, 
either actual or counterfactual, between an adverbial modification, such 
as being directed F-wise, and some F. However, this connection is not 
supposed to reveal anything about the nature of  aboutness itself, as in 
the CM. Indeed, adverbialism does not aim to discharge aboutness in 
terms of  the truth of  the claims (A) and (B). On the contrary, according 
to adverbialism, we have a grasp on the aboutness of  intentional 
experiences that is independent of  the truth of  (A) and (B), in terms of  the 
notion of  “being intentionally directed F-wise.” But the truth of  (A) and 
(B) is supposed to show us that this notion is sufficient to capture 
aboutness. 
 A third point is that the disappearance of  the word “about” 
from the right-hand side of  the adverbialist schema, and this despite 
the mention of  the above two claims (A) and (B), raises some 
question about the nature of  the paraphrase of  the FIS offered by 
adverbialism. Indeed, how should we evaluate the examples of  
adverbialist paraphrases mentioned above, as well as the 
generalization of  the adverbialist paraphrasing strategy materialized 
in the adverbialist schema? Is, for instance, the above paraphrase, 
from  
 (8) John thinks about Obama, to 
 (9) John thinks Obama-wise, 
as perspicuous as the one from  
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 (10) John wore a broad smile, to 
 (11) John smiles broadly? 
Before answering that question, let us remember why we should bother 
to ask it. In accordance with the policy introduced in Chapter 3, an 
acceptable paraphrase of  the FIS should be a conservative paraphrase, 
that is, a paraphrase whose aim it is to uncover the meaning of  natural 
language sentences and that is accountable to native speakers’ intuitions. 
This certainly is the case for (6) and (7). But is it the case for (8) and (9)? 
 One concern that one might put forward is that the meaning of  
(9) taken in isolation is too thin for the theory of  intentionality. That is, 
all things considered, we understand the meaning of  (9) as being an 
adverbialist interpretation of  an intentional sentence only because we 
have an independent grasp on intentionality through sentences like (8). 
In other words, it seems that the intentional reading of  a sentence like (9) 
is parasitic on a sentence like (8), in which case (9) cannot be said to 
really provide us with the meaning of  (8) in a sense required by a 
conservative conception of  paraphrases.  
 This charge might turn out to be too quick insofar as the 
adverbialist has not yet been given the opportunity to elaborate further 
on her adverbial interpretation of  the FIS. For the time being, however, 
it marks a query to which adverbialism should be able to answer.  
 That said, all adverbialist that he is, Kriegel seems to be sensitive 
to the query. Upon being confronted with this objection in one of  his 
early papers on adverbialism, he writes:  
My response to this objection is twofold. First, if  the adverbial 
paraphrase were revisionary, it would still be quite justified. The 
alternative, after all, is to plunge into the can of  worms of  merely 
intentional objects. If  our everyday intentional talk is relational rather 
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than adverbial, then our mundane conceptual scheme is committed to 
the idea that we routinely think of  and perceive objects that either do not 
exist, or are abstract, or are mental. Any of  these commitments, it seems 
to me, is so embarrassing as to invite radicalism. It is quite probable that 
even proponents of  merely intentional objects accept the following 
conditional: if  we can avoid commitment to merely intentional objects, 
we should. It is just that they deny the antecedent. (Kriegel 2008: 91) 
Kriegel therefore seems to concede the claim that adverbial paraphrases 
of  intentional sentences might not pass the test for the qualification of  
conservative paraphrase—i.e., that (9) might not provide us with the 
meaning of  (8) in the same way that (7) can be said to provide us with 
the meaning of  (6). His answer, however, is that even if  adverbial 
paraphrases counted as revisionary, we would still be justified in 
endorsing adverbialism by a kind of  argument by elimination: all of  the 
other options are so bad that, all things considered, a revisionist 
adverbialism does not turn out to be that bad.  
 Kriegel’s remark, however, puts him in a complex dialectic. 
Indeed, first of  all, one might challenge the antecedent of  his claim, 
namely that there is no way to discharge the commitments of  the IOM 
in an acceptable way or, as he puts it, that “any of  these commitments… 
is so embarrassing as to invite radicalism.” If  one has in mind a version 
of  the IOM coupled with a version of  Meinongianism that corresponds 
to the one discussed in Chapter 3, then Kriegel’s antecedent might 
indeed have the force that he thinks it has. That said, however, as we 
shall see in the next chapter, there are other ways to discharge the 
commitments of  the IOM than the ones we elaborated in Chapter 3, and 
it is not so clear that they are as embarrassing as Kriegel himself  believes 
them to be. Second, granted that Kriegel is right about the 
embarrassment of  the IOM, his claim would go through only if  
adverbialism does not find itself  with an amount of  embarrassment 
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equivalent to the IOM. As we shall see later on, however, it is far from 
clear that adverbialism can avoid such a situation.  
  That said, in his later writings on adverbialism, Kriegel provides 
an analysis of  the property of  being directed F-wise that might be 
interpreted as an attempt to make our understanding of  an adverbialist 
paraphrase like (9) be less dependent on an intentional sentence like (8) 
for its intentional reading. 
 This problem, Kriegel claims, “calls for a phenomenological 
analysis of, or description, of  the property of  being directed 
somehow.” (Kriegel 2011: 156) According to him, the best account that we 
possess of  that notion is in terms of  the notion of  “phenomenal 
foreignness” (Kriegel 2011: 158). Simply put, the idea is the following. 
When someone like John is thinking about Pegasus, John is thinking 
Pegasus-wise and experiences this adverbial modification as foreign. In 
other words, an intentional experience with an adverbial nature is an 
intrinsic modification of  the consciousness of  a subject that presents 
something as foreign. The notion of  “aboutness,” in other words, is 
cashed out in terms of  the notion of  “foreignness.” An intentional state 
is about whatever, in an intentional experience, is presented as 
phenomenally foreign.  
 That Kriegel’s adverbialism explicitly harbors this feature makes it, 
from the point of  view of  the description of  intentional experiences, 
intrinsically superior to the CM. Indeed, in the case of  the CM, we saw 
that we had some difficulties in recollecting the intuitive sense of  
aboutness that we deemed to be captured by the universal application of  
Existential Generalization (or its Meinongian Positive Free Logic 
equivalent). One might claim, however, that the mention of  phenomenal 
foreignness is as close as it gets to capturing this feeling of  being 
presented with something that the application of  EG is claimed to 
capture so well, but without presupposing that EG can be applied along 
the lines defended by the IOM. Indeed, one might claim, talk of  being 
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mentally directed upon an intentional object can then be paraphrased as 
talk of  being presented in some way “foreignly,” where this is supposed 
to be able to account for this feeling of  being mentally directed upon 
something. This might even be regarded as a way to discharge Brentano’s 
expression of  something being “relation-ish,” mentioned earlier in this 
chapter.  
 That said, one might wonder whether this really sets adverbialism 
apart from the CM. Indeed, one could perfectly defend an augmented 
version of  the CM according to which all instances of  intentionality 
would, in addition to instantiating content, also feature phenomenal 
foreignness. Accordingly, the content would always be taken as 
presenting something foreign.  
 This claim, however, does not impinge on the one that 
adverbialism might have other advantages over the CM. One of  them 
might simply be the following. Imagine that one is thinking about an 
impossible property, F. According to the CM, this would mean that F 
would have to be featured in the content of  one’s intentional experience. 
Hence, one would be committed to impossible properties, such as F, a 
commitment that one may well prefer to avoid. Adverbialism, on the 
other hand, would not share such a commitment. Indeed, granted that 
“being intentionally directed F-wise” is not parasitic on the property F 
itself, then adverbialism could account for the intentional state being 
directed at impossible properties without being committed to them.  
5.2 Adverbialism and Aspectuality 
According to aspectuality, all instances of  intentionality are instances of  
thinking about something in some way. Adverbialism does seem to 
possess the resources to account for this feature. Indeed, there is no 
reason to deny that different intentional experiences that instantiate 
different adverbial modifications can in fact be about the same thing.   
Chapter 5  313
5.3 Adverbialism and Semantic Normativity 
Let us take an example of  an intentional experience that would feature 
semantic normativity such as, for instance,  
 (12) John judges that the morning star is a planet.  
The IOM and the CM agree on distinguishing two important features of  
an intentional experience like (12): its mode and its content. 
Adverbialism can also proceed to such a distinction, but in its own way. 
That is, to judge will correspond to a particular kind of  conscious 
experience, with a particular judging character. This experience, 
moreover, will be further determined as instantiating some further 
adverbial modifications, like judging morning-wise, star-wise, and planet-
wise. Hence, (12) will turn out to be true just in case there really is 
something that corresponds to the adverbial content of  that state.  
5.4 Adverbialism and Intentional Identity 
Adverbialism will presumably have to propose two different notions of  
intentional identity: one for intentional experiences that are about things 
that exist, and one for intentional experiences that are about things that 
do not exist. Let us begin with the latter case. Since, just like in the CM, 
there is nothing, literally, that one is thinking about when undergoing an 
experiences such as being intentionally directed upon something that 
does not exist, then there is not anything that two distinct intentional 
subjects can be said to think about. That said, these two intentional 
subjects could nonetheless be said to be intentionally identical in another, 
qualitative sense. Indeed, they could be said to both instantiate the same 
adverbial modification.  
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 When, on the other hand, the question concerns intentional 
experiences that are about things that exist, then the truth of  the above 
(A) should ensure that different subjects instantiating different tokens of  
the same adverbial modification turn out to be thinking about the same 
thing.  
5.5 Adverbialism and Generality 
Generality does not seem to create much of  a difficulty for adverbialism. 
Indeed, if  John is thinking about a man, then John is merely thinking 
man-wise—end of  story. If  adverbialism has some issues, they certainly 
are not with generality.  
5.6 Adverbialism and Non-Existence 
According to Kriegel, non-existence constitutes the main reason that we 
possess to endorse adverbialism. That is, as he made clear in a passage 
already quoted above, all of  the other options are so bad that 
adverbialism should appear as a natural option (cf., Kriegel 2008: 91). 
And, indeed, non-existence does not seem to create much of  a problem 
for adverbialism as there is no reason to think that for one to be 
intentionally directed F-wise, F must exist. That there is an adverbial 
modification of  some kind does not entail that something of  some kind 
exists that corresponds to this adverbial modification. 
6. Objections to Adverbialism, Round 1 
Kriegel recently went out of  his way to defend an adverbialist theory of  
intentionality, but he did not discover the theory. Adverbialism was 
indeed much discussed, and objected to, in the 1960s and 1970s, 
essentially under the form of  a theory of  perception. These standard 
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objections, however, carry over adverbialism taken as a theory of  
intentionality as whole. Hence, in this section we present two main 
standard objections to adverbialism, as well as Kriegel’s general rejoinder 
to both of  them. In the next section, we then turn to objections directed 
at Kriegel’s updated version of  adverbialism.  
6.1 Adverbialism and Inferences 
Frank Jackson coined a famous objection against the adverbial theory of  
perception (Jackon 1977). This objection, however, can be expended and 
treated as a generalized objection against an adverbial theory of  
intentionality along the lines proposed by Kriegel in 2011. The argument 
has two steps. The first step ends with the intermediary conclusion that 
adverbialism cannot account for basic inferences that a theory of  
intentionality should be able to countenance. The second step ends with 
the conclusion that a slightly modified account of  adverbialism can 
account for these basic inferential patterns, but only at the price of  a 
damageable loss of  compositionality. The final conclusion, then, is that 
adverbialism should be rejected.  
 The first part of  the argument starts with the following premise: 
 (1) The following two intentional experiences are not equivalent:  
 a) I am thinking about a green dragon and a purple    
  butterfly; and 
 b) I am thinking about a purple dragon and a green    
  butterfly. 
This first premise does not need discussion and can simply be assumed. 
Let us now turn to the second premise: 
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 (2) Adverbialism is not able to account for the non-equivalence of  
  a) and b);  
Unlike (1), this premise needs to be supported by means of  an argument, 
along the following lines. A basic version of  adverbialism must construe 
a) as follows:  
 a’) I think dragon-wise, butterfly-wise, green-wise, and purple-  
  wise.  
The problem, however, is that adverbialism is also bound to give the 
same answer in the case of  b). Hence, adverbialism is not able to account 
for the truth of  (1).  
 From (1) and (2), we can then conclude the following:  
 (3) Adverbialism is false.  
The derivation of  this conclusion concludes the first step of  Jackson’s 
objection. Adverbialism cannot account for the distinction between a) 
and b) and, hence, should be rejected. The second step then begins with 
the observation that the treatment of  a) and b) offered above is not 
forced upon adverbialism. Indeed, one could instead offer a more 
sophisticated version of  adverbialism that would be able to offer non-
equivalent adverbialist paraphrases of  a) and b).  
 This constitutes the gist of  the next premise:  
(4) A more sophisticated form of  adverbialism does possess the 
means to paraphrase a) and b) in  such a way that they turn 
out to be non-equivalent, namely as follows:  
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 a’’) I think green-dragon-wise and purple-butterfly-wise;   
  and: 
 b’) I think purple-dragon-wise and green-butterfly-wise.  
The two paraphrases a’) and a’’) are in fact very different. Indeed, a’) was 
constructed out of  one first-order predicate, thinking, and four second-
order predicates: dragon-wise, butterfly-wise, green-wise, and purple-
wise. On the other hand, a’’) is composed of  one first-order predicate, 
thinking, and two second-order predicates, green-dragon-wise and 
purple-butterfly-wise; and so is b’), although it is composed of  different 
second-order predicates, namely purple-dragon-wise and green-butterfly-
wise.  
 One may then think that the adding of  (4) paves the way for a 
successful version of  adverbialism, as its endorsement would be 
sufficient to account for the truth of  (1). The problem, however, is that 
the endorsement of  (4) clashes with other requirements for which an 
acceptable theory of  intentionality should be able to account. Take, for 
instance, the following inference: 
 (i) I am thinking about a green dragon; and 
 (ii) Hence, I am thinking about a dragon.  
This inference is enthymematic but it is certainly valid once we 
reconstruct it in a more explicit form, such as in:  
 (iii) I am thinking about something that is a dragon and that is   
  green; and: 
 (iv) Hence, I am thinking about something that is a dragon.  
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Indeed, reconstructed under this form, this inference looks like a 
perfectly valid instance of  conjunction elimination, and we can then 
formulate the following fifth premise:  
(5) An acceptable theory of  intentionality should be able to   
 account for some basic inferences, such as the above one   
 going from (iii) to (iv).  
The problem for adverbialism, however, is that moving away from its 
naive formulation to a more sophisticated one in order to avoid the 
problem of  distinguishing between a) and b), it is now impaling itself  on 
another problem: being unable to account for the inference from (iii) to 
(iv). Indeed, from  
 (v) I am thinking green-dragon-wise, 
it is impossible to appeal to a principle like conjunction elimination in 
order to validly infer the following:  
 (vi) Hence, I am thinking dragon-wise.  
Indeed, it is essential to point to the fact that the second-order predicates 
newly formed by the sophisticated version of  adverbialism appealed to in 
premise (4) have morphological but not syntactic components. That is, in 
the predicate “green-dragon-wise,” “green” occurs as a morphological 
and not a syntactical component. As such, then, the predicates “green-
dragon-wise” and “purple-dragon-wise,” for instance, have as much in 
common as the two words “leg” and “legitimate,” which both share the 
string of  letters “l-e-g” as a morphological component. From this, then, 
we can infer the following:  
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 (6) Sophisticated adverbialism cannot account for the validity of    
  the inference from (i) and (ii); 
And, finally, from (6) one can simply conclude that adverbialism is 
mistaken.  
 Does this objection constitute a definite rebuttal of  adverbialism? 
Kriegel (2011) offers a rejoinder to this first objection, based on the 
familiar distinction between determinables and determinates. However, 
as this answer is also the one that Kriegel offers to the second objection, 
we postpone its discussion and present first the second standard 
objection to adverbialism taken from Dermot Moran’s work.  
6.2 The Type-Similarity Objection 
In his paper “Brentano’s Thesis,” Moran offers a quick dismissal of  
adverbialism along the following lines:  
Briefly, if  intentional objects are to be construed adverbially in this 
manner, the danger is that all acts would be quite distinct from each 
other in kind, infinitely multiplying mental acts. (Moran 1996: 9) 
This objection is related, but distinct, from the previous one. It is related 
because it takes as its starting point the above premise (4). It is distinct, 
however, as it is not directly concerned with the inferential properties of  
some intentional sentences, but rather with the type-similarity of  
intentional experiences themselves. The basic idea is the following. 
Intuitively, thinking about Obama and thinking about the Queen mother 
have something in common: They are both instances of  the same kind 
of  intentional experiences by virtue of  sharing what we may call a same 
mode or attitude, namely thinking. As such, then, they can be typed 
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along in a way that cannot be shared by an instance of, say, perceiving 
Obama.  
 The problem for the sophisticated version of  adverbialism, 
however, is that it is not able to account for these intuitive type-
similarities. Indeed, since, once again, “thinking-Obama-wise” and 
“thinking-Queen-Mother-wise” have no syntactic component and 
constitute two completely distinct adverbial modifications, there is no 
basis to support the type-identification of  these two states and no reason 
to claim that “thinking about Obama” and “thinking about the Queen 
Mother” share something that they do not share with, say, “perceiving 
Obama.” From this, one may then conclude, once again, that 
adverbialism is mistaken.  
6.3 Kriegel’s Rejoinder to the Two First Objections 
In The Sources of  Intentionality (Kriegel 2011), Kriegel proposes a rejoinder 
to Jackon’s objection that can also be applied to the second objection. 
Kriegel’s aim is to find some level of  analysis in the fused treatment of  
predicates offered by sophisticated adverbialism that would be able to 
account for the validity of  some inference in the vicinity of  (iii) and (iv), 
as well as for the phenomenon of  type-similarity of  intentional 
experiences that we just discussed.  
 Kriegel’s central idea is to treat adverbial modifications as 
instantiating a determinable-determinate structure. The relation between 
determinable and determinates is best introduced by means of  examples. 
“Being colored” is a property instantiated by many things. Whatever is 
colored, however, also instantiates a more determinate property than 
simply being colored—namely, it is either red, or blue, or green, or 
whatever color. The property of  “being colored,” hence, is a 
determinable property and any determinate color stands in a 
determinable-determinate relation with that property. Note then that the 
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determinable-determinate relation goes further down the line. Indeed, 
one cannot be, say, blue, without instantiating a certain shade of  blue, 
e.g., indigo or cyan. 
 Let us now see how Kriegel thinks we can apply this distinction to 
adverbialism. Kriegel bases his rejoinder on some inferences that we 
regard as valid, such as the following:  
(vii) I am eating a strawberry. 
(viii) Hence, I am eating a berry.  
The inference that goes from (v) to (vi) appears to be valid but it is not 
certainly so on the basis of  the claim that “berry” is a syntactic 
component of  “strawberry.” Rather, the claim is that the inference runs 
through a relation that stands between the concepts “strawberry” and 
“berry,” such that anything that is a strawberry also is a berry. 
Accordingly, the above inference can be regarded as an enthymematic 
version of  the following:  
(ix) I am eating a strawberry; 
(x) Everything that is a strawberry is a berry; 
(xi) Hence, I am eating a berry.  
As Kriegel puts it, 
To me, it seems that what makes the last inference acceptable is some 
tacit principle to the effect that the property of  being a berry is a genus, 
or determinable, of  which the property of  being a strawberry is a 
species, or a determinate. So the full reasoning is something like this: I 
am kicking a strawberry; whatever is a strawberry is a berry; therefore, I 
am kicking a berry. (Kriegel 2011: 162-163) 
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The idea is that the above inference from (v) to (vi) that was treated as 
invalid can now be treated as valid once it is understood as an instance 
of  the same kind of  determinable-determinate structure used to go from 
(ix) to (xi). That is, “thinking-green-dragon-wise” can be regarded as a 
determinate of  the determinable “thinking-dragon-wise” and, hence, the 
inference can validly go through, as follows: 
(vii) I am thinking green-dragon-wise; 
(viii) Everything that is an instance of  thinking green-dragon-wise  
 is an instance of  thinking  dragon-wise; 
(ix) Hence, I am thinking dragon-wise.  
This very same idea can now also be applied to answer Moran’s 
objection. “Thinking-Obama-wise” and “Thinking-Queen-Mother-wise” 
can be said to share something that, e.g., “perceiving-Obama-wise” 
cannot share: they are both determinates of  the determinable “thinking.” 
 Kriegel’s rejoinder seems to be quite powerful as it is able to 
provide an answer to both Jackson’s and Moran’s objection. Is it sound, 
however? As we shall see in the next section, there are good reasons to 
doubt that it is.  
7. Objections to Adverbialism, Round 2 
In this section, we shall discuss two objections to adverbialism. The first 
refers to some consequences of  the endorsement of  the notion of  
phenomenal foreigness, while the second one targets Kriegel’s 
application of  the determinable-determinate distinction to adverbialism.  
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7.1 Adverbialism and the Ganzfeld Effect 
The first objection we shall mention targets the claim that phenomenal 
foreignness is sufficient to account for aboutness. It relies on the so-
called Ganzfeld effect, i.e., the experience that one undergoes when one 
is presented with a completely uniform visual field like, for instance, 
when one is stuck in a very thick fog. The experience can also simply be 
induced artificially by filling a room with smoke by means of  a smoke 
machine. 
 The description of  the Ganzfeld effect is of  course open to 
discussion, but the one that seems to be the most adequate is something 
like the following. When experiencing the Ganzfeld effect, one is 
uniformly appeared in a white way, without any sense of  depth. That is, 
one might be said to experience pure immanent whiteness, without this 
whiteness appearing to be a characteristic of  anything. Moreover, in a 
way that is much less controversial than the way in which one is appeared 
as if  everything were black when one closes one’s eyes, this experience 
of  pure whiteness is certainly experienced as being foreign. But shall we 
also say that such an experience is about something? It seems quite 
reasonable to deny that this is the case, and if  this is correct, then it 
seems that the fact that an experience instantiates an adverbial 
modification such as foreignness is sufficient for it to be intentional.  
 This formulation of  the objection presupposes that there are 
appearances that are not intentional, and one might regard that as 
problematic. Note, however, that this objection is consistent with 
everything that we have said so far in the previous chapters. Indeed, in 
Chapter 1, we said that for one to be the bearer of  an intentional state is 
for one to be appeared in some way. That said, we have not claimed that 
intentionality exhausts the realm of  appearances. 
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7.2 Adverbialism and the Determinable-Determinate 
Relation 
In an unpublished paper, Alex Grzankowski (Grzankowski 2017), 
drawing on independent work on adverbialism by Funkhouser 
(Funkhouser 2006), suggests that Kriegel’s solution does not work. 
Granzkowski’s argument rests on two truisms about the determinable-
determinate relation upon which Kriegel’s rejoinder infringes.  
 The relation between determinable and determinates has two 
directions: one that goes from the determinable to the determinate, and 
one that goes from the determinate to the determinable. Each direction 
is governed by a truism. Let us begin with the upward direction, from 
determinate to determinable.  
T1: An object instantiating a determinate also necessarily 
instantiates every determinable that that determinate falls under.  
Take the following example: “That piece of  cloth is cyan.” “Cyan” is a 
determinate of  blue. Hence, by instantiating the determinate “cyan,” 
“that piece of  cloth” also instantiates the property of  being blue.  
 T1 is not problematic for adverbialism. In fact, T1 is the very 
principle that Kriegel appeals to when arguing that adverbialism can 
account for the above inference from (v) to (vi). However, let us now 
look at the principle that rules the downward direction of  the relation, 
the one that goes from the determinable to the determinate, namely: 
T2: An object instantiating a determinable must also instantiate 
some determinate under that determinable.  
Take the following example: “That piece of  cloth is blue.” Something 
that is blue, however, cannot simply be blue but must instantiate some 
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determinate shade of  blue. Hence, whatever shade of  blue “that piece of  
cloth is,” it must instantiate some determinate of  the determinable 
“blue.”  
 T2 is problematic for adverbialism. Take the case of  thinking 
about a green dragon. According to sophisticated adverbialism, this 
instance of  intentionality must be paraphrased as follows: “I am thinking 
green-dragon-wise.”  “Thinking green-dragon-wise” is a determinate of  
“thinking dragon-wise.” But it also is a determinable of  its own, as 
sophisticated adverbialism would paraphrase thinking about a big green 
dragon as follows: “I am thinking big-green-dragon-wise.” Now, if  T2 is 
true, then one cannot certainly think green-dragon-wise without also 
thinking some determinate, such as thinking big-green-dragon-wise. But 
this only unnecessarily multiplies thoughts, as it is certainly possible for 
someone to think about a green dragon without thereby thinking about a 
big green dragon. 
 In the light of  these observations, Kriegel’s application of  the 
determinable-determinate relation to adverbialism then faces the 
following dilemma: either there are good, non ad hoc reasons to consider 
that T2 applies only to a sub-kind of  determinables and the 
determinable-determinate relation can be applied successfully to 
adverbialism; or there are no such reasons and the application of  the 
determinable-determinate relation to adverbialism is problematic. As 
Kriegel does not provide any reasons in favor of  the first disjunct, and as 
the prospects for its truth seem dim, one might be allowed, if  only in a 
prima facie way, to endorse the truth of  the second disjunct. To conclude, 
then, adverbialism does not constitute an available option for the 
proponent of  a monadic theory of  intentionality. 
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6. Conclusion 
In this chapter, we discussed a first version of  a theory of  intentionality 
that denies that the underlying metaphysical nature of  intentionality is 
that of  a relation, namely adverbialism. We saw that adverbialism as 
applied to a theory of  intentionality proceeds in two steps. First of  all, it 
proposes to systematically translate intentional sentences into adverbialist 
paraphrases. Second, it proposes to account for the truth of  these 
paraphrases in terms of  adverbialist truth-makers, i.e., conscious mental 
states, or experiences, that instantiate adverbial modifications.  
 Accordingly, an experience being intentional is cashed out 
adverbially in terms of  an adverbial modification of  being intentionally 
directed F-wise, where the intentional nature of  this modification is 
understood in terms of  the further notion of  phenomenal foreignness 
and, when required, particularity. 
 We discussed two series of  objections against adverbialism. The 
first round consisted of  two classical objections, one by Frank Jackson 
and one by Dermot Moran. As we saw, Kriegel tries to answer these 
objections by cashing out adverbialism in terms of  a determinable-
determinate structure. We raised two further objections against this 
second version. The first is that it saddles intentional experiences with 
much more thoughts than is needed. The second is that the notion of  
phenomenal foreignness is not sufficient to account for intentionality.  
Chapter 6: Polyadism 
The claim that there are non-
existent intentional objects is 
not an ontological claim. It is 
simply another way of  saying 
that we can genuinely think 
about things that don’t exist, and 
that we can think about them in 
the same way in which we think 
about existing things.   
  (Crane 2013: 5) 
1. Introduction 
So far, we have discussed three possible interpretations of  the FIS: 
the IOM, the CM, and adverbialism. Each of  them raised some 
concerns. What is the next step? In this last chapter, we discuss a 
recent new addition to models of  intentionality, proposed by Tim 
Crane in his recent The Objects of  Thought (Crane 2013). As we shall 
see, Crane tries to merge the best of  two worlds: the descriptive 
power of  the IOM and the theoretical economy of  the CM and 
adverbialism.  
 Indeed, despite their differences, the CM and adverbialism 
share a same nature that sets them apart from the IOM. Namely, they 
are representational theories of  intentionality. In other words, each of  
these two models assumes that to be the bearer of  an intentional 
experience is not to stand in relation to that upon which one is 
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intentionally directed, but rather to be the bearer of  a content that 
may or may not match the world. As such, being the bearer of  an 
intentional experience understood in such a representational way 
does not require us to provide intentional experiences with 
something, either existent or not, such that they can stand in the 
“being about” relation to that thing.  
 The IOM, on the other hand, is a non-representational theory. 
Indeed, according to the IOM, there is no possibility of  having an 
intentional state that does not match a mind-independent something 
that is somehow out there. All intentional experiences are directed 
upon something that features in the overall inventory of  what there 
is, although some intentional experiences are about things that exist 
while some others are about things that do not exist.  
 The property of  being representational alleviates many of  the 
troubles faced by the IOM as it frees the theory of  intentionality 
from the burden of  endorsing Meinongianism. But, as we saw, being 
representational is not in itself  a guarantee of  being an adequate 
model of  intentionality. That said, one might claim that 
representational theories are intrinsically better than non-
representational ones. Intuitively, they seem to get something basic 
intuitively right: Thinking about something that does not exist does 
not amount to one’s mind latching onto something that does not 
exist but is somehow still there, in a mind-independent way. The 
IOM, with its endorsement of  Meinongianism, goes astray on that 
very point.   
 Standard forms of  representationalism like the CM and 
adverbialism, however, are committed to a supplementary claim. That 
is, they do not only claim that intentional experiences are 
representational; they also claim that aboutness is a notion that is 
subject to success and failure. Indeed, even though these theories 
propose to carve a notion of  aboutness that is generally instantiated 
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by all intentional experiences, the non-technical sense of  being about 
emphasized in Chapter 4 remains instantiated only by a sub-kind of  
intentional experiences. In that sense, according to such theories, an 
intentional experience that is about something that does not exist fails 
to be about anything.  
 This supplementary claim, however, is hard to reconcile with 
an adequate description of  intentional experiences. Indeed, all 
intentional experiences are about something in the sense of  being 
directed upon something, or having a main topic—in other words, all 
intentional experiences have an intentional object. This is simply a 
basic phenomenological fact about intentional experiences. That is, 
from a phenomenological point of  view, it seems utterly mysterious 
to claim that an intentional experience may fail to be about 
something, in the intuitive sense of  being about. As Tim Crane puts 
it, 
Our mental life seems to involve the presence to the mind—or 
apparent presence to the mind—of  things in the world. These things 
can be mental or material, concrete or abstract, and—so I say— 
existent and non-existent. I believe that there are general 
characteristics of  intentionality which apply to all, or almost all, 
intentional states and episodes. One of  these is that every intentional 
state or episode has an object—something it is about or directed on. 
(Crane 2013: 4) 
The IOM is right on that point: Aboutness is not a notion subject to 
success or failure. It is, however, mistaken on the claim that 
intentionality is not representational. The distinction between these 
two points, a theory of  intentionality being representational and a 
notion of  aboutness being subject to success and failure, makes room 
for the following two questions: 
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(a) Is a literal interpretation of  the FIS bound to be non-
representational, like the IOM?; and 
(b) And if  not, can we develop a modified version of  the IOM 
that treats intentionality as representational without treating 
aboutness as a notion subject to success and failure? 
In the recent work mentioned above, Tim Crane argues that we can 
negatively answer question (a) and positively answer question (b). The 
resulting model of  intentionality is what we shall call, for reasons that 
will become clear below, polyadism.  
 The plan of  the chapter is the following. In the next section, 
we come back to the distinction between a non-representational 
theory of  intentionality and making use of  a notion of  intentional 
directedness that is not subject to success or failure. We argue that 
these two notions can be unraveled and, hence, that there is room for 
a theory that, like Crane’s, endorses the latter feature without 
endorsing the former.  
 In section 3, we introduce and explain Crane’s metaphysical 
distinction between two kinds of  properties and relations: first, 
substantial properties and relations; and, second, non-substantial 
properties and relations. As he sees the matter, the constitutive 
condition for an experience to be intentional is merely that it be a 
non-substantial relation. For a non-substantial relation to obtain, 
however, it is not necessary that there be something to which one 
stands in relation. As such, then, intentional experiences that are 
about things that do not exist can have a somewhat relational nature 
without thereby being relations to non-existent objects.  
 In section 4, we subsequently distinguish between two ways in 
which a proposition can be literally true, and explain how this 
distinction can account for the fact that sentences such as “John 
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thinks about Pegasus” can be literally true without there being an 
non-existent Pegasus to which John stands in relation. In section 5, 
we then turn to how Crane’s model is supposed to account for the six 
main features of  intentionality that we identified in Chapter 1 before, 
in section 6, discussing some problems of  polyadism.  
 2. Representation, Success, and Intentionality 
According to the IOM, all instances of  intentionality are instances of  
the following schema: 
IOM-Schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x stands in the 
relation of  ‘being about’ with an intentional object y, and for 
some content C, C presents y to x.”   
As we saw, the generalized instantiation of  this schema by each 
instance of  intentionality, including instances that are about things 
that do not exist, requires the endorsement of  Meinongianism, 
according to which there are mind-independent non-existent 
intentional objects to which we can stand in genuine relations.  
 As such, the IOM constitutes a non-representational theory of  
intentionality, in the sense that for each instance of  the above 
schema, there is an element of  the overall inventory of  what there is 
that can serve as the relata of  the “being about” relation. Take the 
case of  John thinking about Pegasus. According to the IOM, for John 
to think about Pegasus is for him to really stand in a relation to 
Pegasus, as presented under some content C. In other words, Pegasus 
itself  serves as a ground of  the truth of  this specific instance of  the 
above schema. The IOM, in sum, constitutes a non-representational 
theory of  intentionality because all intentional experiences put us in a 
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relation—a genuine relation—with a mind-independent element of  the 
overall inventory of  what there is.  
 Hence, what is characteristic of  the IOM is that some facts 
about the mental realm, i.e., that we can think about things that do 
not exist, are explained by virtue of  facts about the non-mental 
realm, i.e., that there are, in a way that is independent of  the mental, 
more things in the overall inventory of  what there is than those that 
exist and to which we can stand in relation. 
 It will become essential to what comes next to distinguish 
between this first feature of  the IOM, being non-representational, 
and an important corollary of  this claim. Indeed, some might find it 
too obvious to be emphasized, but the IOM is not only a non-
representational theory of  intentionality; it also one in which being 
intentionally directed upon something is not, unlike in the CM or in 
adverbialism, something that is subject to success or failure. That is, 
according to the IOM, whenever one is undergoing an intentional 
experience, then there is something upon which one is intentionally 
directed: an intentional object. As we saw, this is not the case for the 
CM and adverbialism, according to which only referentially successful 
intentional experiences possess this feature.  
 That said, one might be willing to ask the following question: 
What is the relation between the notion that intentionality is non-
representational, and the one that being intentionally directed upon 
something is not subject to success or failure? If  we look at the 
relation that goes from being non-representational in the sense 
defined above to not being submitted to success or failure, then it 
seems quite clear that the former entails the latter. In the IOM, there 
is no room for success or failure of  intentional directedness because 
the theory guarantees a mind-independent intentional object for each 
intentional experience. But what about the converse relation? Does 
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the claim that being intentionally directed upon something is not 
subject to success or failure also entail non-representationalism?  
 One might be forgiven for believing that the truth of  this 
second implication is as trivial as the truth of  the first one. Indeed, 
how could an account of  intentional directedness not subject to 
success and failure be cashed out independently of  the IOM? In his 
recent book The Objects of  Thought, however, Tim Crane drives a 
wedge between these two claims (Crane 2013). In a nutshell, he 
develops a model of  intentionality that both makes an irreducible use 
of  the notion of  intentional objects and rejects the IOM’s non-
representationalism. In that sense, his model constitutes a middle 
ground between the representational theories that we have already 
discussed—i.e., the CM and adverbialism—and the IOM.  
 Before addressing the details of  Crane’s proposal, let us try to 
convey the general spirit of  his position. At the core of  the problem 
of  intentionality lie sentences or propositions that feature an existent 
intentional subject, an intentional verb, and a non-existent intentional 
object, such as “John thinks about Pegasus” or “John fears 
Beelzebub.” Indeed, according to a theory of  intentionality true to 
the phenomenological facts, such sentences would have to be literally 
true. But their literal truth, or so it seems, commits us to 
philosophical monsters such as Meinongianism. Phenomenological 
sanity therefore seems to come at the price of  theoretical insanity, 
and, justifiably, we have a tendency to dump the former in order to 
save ourselves from the latter.  
 In other words, according to Crane, at the core of  the problem 
of  intentionality lies the following question:  
(Q) How can a predication, either monadic or polyadic, 
formed by means of  at least one singular term that lacks an 
existent referent be literally true?  
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Note that Crane’s account takes a slight shift from former theories of  
intentionality. Indeed, he does not start with the assumption that, in 
the IOM, intentionality is a relation to intentional objects. Nor, 
alternatively, does he begin with the idea that a correct interpretation 
of  the FIS cannot be a literal one, like the CM or adverbialism. On 
the contrary, he starts with the claim that it is a bedrock fact that 
there are literal truths about non-existent objects, and that it is part 
of  the task of  a theory of  intentionality to provide us with an 
account of  that fact. As such, then, he genuinely believes that the 
problem of  non-existence as faced by the IOM must be solved, and, 
unlike in the CM and or adverbialism, merely be dissolved.  
 Moreover, according to Crane, we take (Q) to be 
philosophically problematic—so problematic, in fact, that we 
sometimes prefer to resort to extreme means such as denying that a 
sentence like, “John thinks about Pegasus,” can be literally true—
because we believe that the following two claims are true:  
Truth 1: If  a sentence of  the form “a is F” is literally true, 
then the ground for this truth must be that there is some 
object, a, that instantiates F (and something similar holds for 
polyadic predications); and 
Truth 2: If  a does not exist, then this ground for truth 
mentioned in Truth 1 must be partly constituted by a non-
existent object, i.e., a.  
The standard dialectic as to why a sentence like “John thinks about 
Pegasus” turns out to be problematic somehow goes as follows: We 
want to stick to Truth 1 but cannot cope with Truth 2. But since our 
problem with Truth 2 merely follows from the temptation to read 
sentences such as, “John thinks about Pegasus,” in a literal way, then 
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we simply dump the claim that, “John thinks about Pegasus,” can be 
literally true and take on board a theory that makes it, at best, non-
literally true. We are then free to keep Truth 1 and we can stop 
bothering about Truth 2.  
 From Crane’s perspective, however, this dialectic is 
problematic because, despite the advantage of  the move just 
described, the intuition—or, better, the phenomenological fact—that 
sentences like, “John thinks about Pegasus,” can be literally true 
simply does not go away by sticking to Truth 1 and dumping Truth 2. 
And, decisively, we will not be able to put the theory of  intentionality 
to rest—if  ever—without having found the means to pay dues to the 
literal truth of  at least some of  such sentences.  
 Crane, however, proposes an alternative diagnosis of  the 
situation. Namely, if  we want to recognize that some simple 
sentences formed by means of  singular terms that are about things 
that do not exist can be literally true, then we are stuck with Truth 2 
only if  we unrestrictedly stick to Truth 1. If  we were somewhat able 
to account for the claim that a sentence like “a is F” can be literally 
true without this claim being theoretically tied to Truth 1, then we 
would able to bypass the problem of  having to face Truth 2. 
 The result ing theory, moreover, would count as 
representational with respect to the way in which we characterized 
this notion above. Indeed, if  a theory of  intentionality is non-
representational just in case the literal truth of  a sentence like, “John 
thinks about Pegasus,” requires that Truth 1 and Truth 2 hold, then 
Crane’s model turns out to be a representational one.  
 What, however, would be required for us to be able to let 
Truth 1 go? According to Crane, three essential building blocks are 
required, namely the following three theses:  
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(T13)  A theory of  quantification is not committed to a   
 classical logic reading of  quantifiers; 
(T14)  For a restricted range of  non-existence entailing   
 properties, Meinong’s Principle of  Independence of   
 Sosein from Sein holds; and 
(T15)  Some sentences of  the form “a is F” can be literally  
 true, without there being any ground of  truth for such  
 sentences to the form, “a that is F.” 
If  a sentence like, “John thinks about Pegasus,” is literally true, then 
it follows that some non-existent objects can be thought about. 
Hence, we need a theory of  quantification that allows us to quantify 
over non-existents. Such an account, as we saw in Chapter 3, is 
available, and in this chapter we shall simply presuppose this previous 
discussion and focus instead on (T14) and (T15).  
 Before turning to the case in favor of  them, let us try to see 
how a theory of  intentionality that takes on board (T13)-(T15) would 
look. On the predicative side, Crane proposes that we distinguish 
between two kinds of  properties: substantial and non-substantial 
ones. A restricted class of  non-substantial properties, representation-
dependent ones, are not existence entailing and can be used to make 
a restricted version of  the Principle of  Independence true. And since 
being thought about in some way counts as a representation-
dependent property, then non-existent intentional objects can be 
thought about in a way that is indifferent to their ontological status.  
 On the alethic side, Crane distinguishes between two kinds of  
truths: namely the truth of  propositions that result from the 
predication of  substantial properties, and the truth of  those that 
result form the predication of  non-substantial properties. According 
to him, only the first kind must be accounted for in terms of  Truth 1. 
True predications of  non-substantial properties can be accounted for 
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by grounds of  truth that have, to use Crane’s own metaphorical term, 
a “shape” that is different from the truth that they ground (Crane 
2013: 65). In other words, “John thinks about Pegasus,” can be 
literally true, according to Crane, without there being a ground of  
truth to the shape, “Thinks about (John, Pegasus),” even though 
there is a proposition with that shape that is literally true.  
 Moreover, this overall strategy counts as representational 
because, contrary to the IOM, it is not the case that if, say, “John 
thinks about Pegasus,” is true, then this is made true by there being a 
mind-independent non-existent intentional object to which John 
stands in relation. All of  the grounds exist and are entirely 
constituted of  things that exist. According to Crane, it is one of  these 
that, in a way that we shall discuss below, accounts for the literal truth 
of, “John thinks about Pegasus.” 
 Aiming to summarizing his overall strategy in general terms, 
Crane writes:  
It is natural to distinguish between the truth of  some sentence or 
proposition, and what we might call picturesquely (but I hope quite 
intelligibly) the ‘shape’ of  the reality described by that truth. A true 
sentence might straightforwardly mention certain kinds of  thing—a 
certain particular object, a fact, proposition, or property or some 
other kind of  thing. So it might seem as if, in maintaining the truth 
of  this sentence, we are committed to such entities. But such 
straightforward commitment can be maintained together with a 
different view about the shape of  the reality described by that truth. 
It may seem at first sight that we are committed to propositions or 
facts because of  the sentences we hold true, but the underlying 
reality need not match this commitment in any simple or 
straightforward way. (Crane 2013: 65) 
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Leaving the details aside for the time being, such an account would, 
first of  all, count as making use of  a notion of  being intentionally 
directed upon something that would not be subject to success or 
failure, as, e.g., if  John thinks about Pegasus, then, “John thinks about 
Pegasus,” would be literally true. It would, furthermore, also count as 
a representational theory of  intentionality insofar as for John to think 
about Pegasus would not amount to John standing in relation to a 
mind-independent non-existent object, but rather to John 
instantiating a complex representational structure. Having sketched 
the great lines of  Crane’s view, let us now turn to a more detailed 
discussion. 
3. Substantial vs. Non-Substantial Properties 
In this section, we tackle the issue of  (T14) and discuss Crane’s 
introduction of  the distinction between substantial and non-
substantial properties. As we shall see, the matter can only be tackled 
somewhat indirectly, through some remarks on kinds of  properties 
and on the conditions under which the introduction of  a new 
distinction between kinds of  properties is justified.  
 Theories of  properties generally specify not only that there are 
properties, but also that there are different kinds of  properties. Some 
standardly recognized kinds of  properties are logical properties, 
existential properties, categorical properties, dispositional properties, 
physical properties, mental properties, sortal properties, instantiated 
properties, non-instantiated properties, and so on. Of  course, not all 
theories of  properties recognize such a great variety of  properties, 
but they do generally recognize some varieties of  properties.  
 But who decides which kinds of  properties there are, and on 
what grounds? Whoever introduced the notion of  property into 
philosophy did not at the same time introduce all kinds of  properties. 
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Rather, over time philosophers have come to discover distinctions 
between different kinds of  properties, and have thus enlarged the list 
of  the candidate kinds of  properties. Hence, no one decides which 
kinds of  properties there are, or should be, besides the ongoing 
process of  philosophical theorizing.  
 This, however, raises a question. Under which conditions is 
one allowed to introduce a new kind of  property? This is a difficult 
question to answer, but we might apply a rule of  thumb that might 
be said to apply generally to the introduction of  any kind of  
philosophical distinction: One is allowed to introduce a new 
distinction when it allows for a real philosophical difference, i.e., 
when it allows us to say true, or at least justified, substantial things 
that we would not be able to say without that distinction. Let us 
illustrate this claim by means of  an example that pertains specifically 
to the introduction of  a new distinction between kinds of  properties. 
3.1 Lewis on Natural and Non-Natural Properties  
David Lewis is well known for holding a specific version of  class-
nominalism, i.e., the doctrine that properties can be identified with 
classes of  things. Class-nominalism, however, is beset by a simple 
objection that follows from the extensionality of  classes: If  two 
classes possess exactly the same members, then they are the same 
class. Take, for instance, the class of  the creatures that have a heart 
and the class of  the creatures that have kidneys. As it turns out, these 
two classes have exactly the same members and, as a result, having a 
heart and having a kidney turns out to be exactly the same property
—a sure proof  that class-nominalism, at least in this naive version, is 
mistaken.  
 Lewis, however, defends a more sophisticated version of  class-
nominalism. Indeed, he claims that the classes with which we shall 
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identify properties are trans-world classes of  concrete individuals 
located at different, causally isolated, concretely existing possible 
worlds, in accordance with his infamous doctrine of  “modal 
realism” (Lewis 1973, 1986). That is, classes constituted not only of  
individuals located in our worlds, but also of  numerically distinct 
individuals located in other possible worlds. Classes of  individuals 
thus conceived then allow Lewis to dismantle the co-extensionality 
objection as being based on an unjustified restricted interpretation of  
the universal quantifier. Indeed, the universally quantified sentence, 
“All creatures that have a heart also have a kidney,” is certainly true at 
our world, but it turns out to be false when “all” is allowed to be 
interpreted unrestrictedly. When unrestricted, “all” ranges over the 
totality of  possible worlds and it is simply false that in every possible 
world any creature that has a heart also has a kidney, as there is no 
metaphysical or logical impossibility in there being a possible living 
creature that, for instance, possesses a heart but no kidney. Hence, if  
the class of  the creatures that have a heart is co-extensional to the 
one of  the creatures that have a kidney at our world, the charge of  co-
extensionality collapses once we consider their corresponding trans-
world classes.  
 However, if  the machinery of  modal realism allows Lewis to 
avoid the objection of  co-extensionality, he must still face another 
objection against class-nominalism, which we may call the objection 
from over-proliferation. Indeed, even without taking on board the 
infamous axiom of  unrestricted comprehension, set theory still 
allows for the formation of  arbitrary classes. This, of  course, is not a 
problem in itself, but if  one is willing to use a theory of  classes to 
account for a nominalist theory of  properties, as Lewis does, then 
this set-theoretic generosity will cause an over-proliferation of  
properties, since to each class, independently of  any consideration 
with respect to its arbitrariness, will correspond a property. As a 
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result, one will end up with so many properties that one might 
wonder whether properties could still be said to play the substantial 
philosophical role that they are supposed to play.  
 Indeed, properties are notably said to be necessary to account 
for natural resemblances and similarities, i.e., two spheres are identical 
in kind because they share the same property of  being spherical. But 
if  we can form arbitrary classes and if, additionally, to each arbitrary 
class corresponds a property, then pretty much anything can be said 
to resemble anything else. My keyboard and the Matterhorn, for 
instance, can be said to resemble each other because they share the 
property of  being a member of  the arbitrary class π: {my keyboard, 
the Matterhorn}. This kind of  resemblance, however, has little to do 
with the one that is shared by two spheres, and the mere idea that 
properties can account for identity in kind between particulars seems 
to have been brought to a reductio.   
 Faced with this problem, one could espouse different 
solutions. For instance, one could simply give up on the identification 
of  properties with classes. Lewis, however, chooses another path. He 
settles on the identification of  properties with classes, but proposes 
to distinguish between two kinds of  classes, and hence two kinds of  
properties: natural classes and properties on the one hand, and non-
natural classes and properties on the other (Lewis 1983). 
 Equipped with this distinction, Lewis can then say that two 
spheres resemble each other in the sense of  being members of  the 
natural class of  spherical things, while my keyboard and the 
Matterhorn resemble each other in the sense of  being members of  
the non-natural class π. Natural properties can then be said to play 
the substantial role generally attributed to properties, namely carving 
out natural resemblance classes, while non-substantial properties can 
propagate themselves without the risk of  damaging Lewis’s overall 
account.  
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 We do not need to concern ourselves with the specifics of  
Lewis’s proposal here, nor with its evaluation (though, in fairness, it is 
important to note that Lewis does not think that the distinction 
between natural and non-natural classes is primitive). What matters 
for us, rather, is the fact that Lewis’s introduction of  a distinction 
between natural and non-natural classes and properties can serve as 
an example of  an introduction of  a new distinction between kinds of  
properties in a way that is, we shall assume, justified. Indeed, the 
introduction of  this distinction allows him to defend his version of  
class-nominalism, an important nominalist contender, in the face of  
the substantial over-multiplication objection mentioned above. As 
such, the introduction of  this distinction allows him to say something 
that is philosophically substantial that he would not be able to say 
otherwise.  
3.2 Crane on Substantial and Non-Substantial Properties 
This nod to Lewis gives us a first key to Crane’s treatment of  
intentionality, and in particular to the above thesis (T14). Namely, 
Lewis’s account can serve as an example of  the claim that we can, 
where it is needed and justified, introduce a new distinction between 
kinds of  properties. Crane himself, however, is not concerned with 
Lewis’s distinction between natural and non-natural properties, but 
rather with a distinction between what he calls “substantial” and 
“non-substantial” properties (Crane 2013: 66). He characterizes this 
distinction as follows: 
[The distinction between substantial and non-substantial properties 
is] the distinction between properties and relations which can be read 
simply of  the surface structure of  the sentences used to describe 
them, and the properties and relations that cannot, those that 
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characterize the nature of  real existing things. These latter properties 
are the substantial properties. (Crane 2013: 66) 
The general idea is the following. Take as a start a schema like “a is 
F.” From this schema, we can obtain a syntactic conception of  
properties by means of  generalizing on the second variable, F, as 
follows: A property is anything that can be substituted for F. This 
schema can then be freely extended to polyadic properties.  
 On the basis of  this syntactic conception, we can then 
distinguish between two kinds of  true predicative sentences along the 
following lines. For each true sentence of  the form “a is F,” we can 
infer the following: “There is an F that a instantiates.” We might, 
however, distinguish between two kinds of  such inferences. On the 
one hand, there are these inferences that we perform simply on the 
basis of  the fact that the original sentence is true. Accordingly, we do 
not commit ourselves to a substantial conception of  the property F 
in question and do not claim that a substantial empirical or 
metaphysical inquiry would deliver us the result that there is, in a 
substantial sense, a property F. Rather, we perform this inference on 
the sole ground that the original simple sentence is true. The 
predicative sentences on the basis of  which we can perform such 
inferences are the ones that are formed by means of  a non-substantial 
property.  
 On the other hand, there are those inferences that go from a 
sentence of  the form “a is F,” to one of  the form, “There is an F 
that a instantiates,” that we do not endorse simply on the basis of  the 
truth of  the original sentence. Rather, we endorse these inferences 
only after a substantial empirical or metaphysical inquiry, thereby 
committing us to the idea that such an F possesses a substantial 
nature about which a theoretic discipline can inform us. These are the 
substantial properties.  
Chapter 6  344
 Here is an example: 
(1) Obama is famous; 
(2) Hence, there is a property that Obama possesses, i.e., being 
famous.  
We know that (1) is true. How? We read the newspapers, watch TV, 
discuss with our peers, and as a result simply know that Obama is 
famous. From this, we can then infer (2). But does the inference from 
(1) to (2) commit us to there being a substantial property of  being 
famous that, qua property, would be on par with, say, the property of  
being positively charged? The idea of  a non-substantial property is 
that we do not need to be thus committed to a substantial property 
of  being famous. We might simply say that (1) is a case of  a sentence 
saying something literally true about some subject matter, without 
thereby committing us to a substantial conception of  that something 
that is said to be literally true of  some subject matter. However, this 
is not to deny that Obama also possesses substantial properties, some 
of  which, we might add, might account for the truth of  (1).  
 According to Crane, there is an important ontological 
difference between substantial and non-substantial properties: 
Namely, a true predication formed out of  a non-substantial sentence 
is not ontologically committing. As he puts it, “Ontology, the study 
of  being, is concerned with properties and relations in the substantial 
sense, not [the non-substantial sense].” (Crane 2013: 67) To recognize 
as literally true that a certain object possesses a certain non-
substantial property does not, hence, amount to making an 
ontological claim.  
 We must then make a distinction between those predicative 
sentences that are ontologically committing and those that are not. 
The former, presumably, cut the world along its real joints, i.e., they 
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cut the world along the joints that are discovered by substantial 
empirical and metaphysical inquiries. But what about the latter? Well, 
presumably, they only report truths about the way in which the world 
is experienced or represented. We experience the world as being such 
that it is literally true that Obama is famous, for instance. A denial of  
this literal truth would simply amount to an amputation of  the way in 
which we experience the world as being. But in order to accept this 
claim, we do not need to affirm that the property of  being famous is, 
qua property, a non-par with a substantial property. 
 According to Crane, the introduction of  this distinction 
between substantial and non-substantial properties constitutes a first 
step in the direction of  the truth of  the above (T14). The next crucial 
step is the claim that even though non-existent objects cannot 
instantiate substantial properties, they can, for at least some sub-kinds 
of  them, instantiate non-substantial properties. As he puts it, 
Equipped with these distinctions, we can say that non-existent 
objects can have properties and stand in relations in the pleonastic, 
non-substantial sense. Something, ‘F’, can be true of  a non-existent 
object, and in the pleonastic sense this object has that the property F. 
So I reject the claim that (in Malebranche’s words) ‘nothingness has 
no properties’. (Crane 2013: 67-68) 
In Chapter 3, we discussed Crane’s objection to Meinongianism based 
on the idea that the Characterization Principle (CP) was false because 
many properties are existence entailing ones and therefore cannot be 
instantiated by a non-existent object. Let us recall some details of  the 
objection. First, the CP is the principle that for each set of  nuclear 
properties, there is an object that corresponds to that set. According 
to the CP, then, “Pegasus is a horse,” is true, granted that Pegasus is 
characterized as a horse. According to Crane, however, this claim is 
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inconsistent with the one that there are some plausible requirements 
on being a horse that a non-existent object will never be able to 
fulfill. As such, then, Crane argues that the CP must be rejected. But 
does this mean that the mere idea that non-existent things can be the 
objects of  true predication must be rejected? 
 According to Crane, the distinction between substantial and 
non-substantial properties allows us to see that even though the CP is 
false, there is no reason to deny that non-existent objects such as 
Pegasus can still instantiate a restricted range of  properties, namely 
non-substantial ones. Indeed, if, “Pegasus is a horse,” is true, since 
Pegasus does not exist, “Pegasus is famous,” might still be true. 
 Crane distinguishes between three kinds of  sentences about 
non-existents that can be true, and hence between three different 
kinds of  properties that can be instantiated by non-existent objects. 
The first kind of  sentences is negative existential ones, such as, 
“Pegasus does not exist.” According to Crane, such a sentence is true, 
and its truth simply follows from the fact that, “Pegasus exists,” is 
false, following the doctrine that the negation of  a falsity is a truth. 
The second kind of  sentences is those of  trivial identity, such as, 
“Pegasus is Pegasus,” which, he claims, simply follows from the 
logical truth that for all x, x = x. Finally, the third kind is predicative 
sentences formed from what he calls, following Colin McGinn 
(McGinn 2001), “representation-dependent properties.” (Crane 2013: 
68) This last kind of  sentence forms the great bulk of  truths about 
non-existents objects.  
 A representation-dependent property is a property that 
depends on the fact that an object is represented in some way.  In the 
above (1), “Being famous,” obviously, is such a property. Indeed, that 
someone is famous amounts to nothing but the fact that this person 
is intensely thought or spoken about. Withdraw representation from 
the world and you thereby withdraw the property of  being famous.  
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 The strategy is then the following. We know that at least some 
sentences about non-existent objects are true. But by distinguishing 
between substantial and non-substantial properties, first of  all, and by 
almost completely restricting properties instantiated by non-existent 
objects to non-substantial ones, we are able to bypass the objection 
from nature discussed in Chapter 3 against the claim that non-
existent objects can instantiate properties. Indeed, the thought is that 
something does not need to exist to be represented somehow. For 
instance, John can think about Pegasus independently of  Pegasus’s 
ontological status.  
 As such, then, the introduction of  a distinction between 
substantial and non-substantial properties allows us to make a case in 
favor of  (T14). As such, we can account for the claim that non-
existent objects can instantiate at least some properties and relations, 
namely non-substantial ones. 
3.3 Aboutness as a Non-Substantial Relation 
Traditional theories of  intentionality distinguish between two options 
for a theory of  intentionality. Either a theory is relational, like the 
IOM or the CM, or it is monadic, like adverbialism. According to 
Crane, however, this disjunction is not exhaustive. A third option that 
is possible with the endorsement of  the distinction between 
substantial and non-substantial properties.  
 Indeed, if  we can distinguish between substantial and non-
substantial monadic properties, we can certainly also distinguish 
between substantial and non-substantial relations. Hence, the denial 
that intentionality is a relation can actually mean either one of  two 
things: either that intentionality is a monadic property, or that 
intentionality is a non-substantial relation. Crane argues that it is the 
later. As he puts it, 
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…there are many kinds of  relations, but some are substantial and 
some are not. A non-substantial relation might simply consist in the 
truth of  a relational predication. There’s no reason to deny, for 
example, that whenever a relational proposition ‘aRb’ is true, the 
relation R holds between a and b. So when I said in chapter 1 that 
intentionality is not a real relation, what I meant was that it is not a 
substantial relation. (Crane 2013: 66) 
This means the following. Intentionality is a non-substantial relation, 
or a mere polyadic predication. Sentences describing intentional 
experiences, such as, “John thinks about Pegasus,” can be literally 
true and can be taken to express propositions with the form 
“Thinking about (x,y).” However, the fact that such a polyadic 
predication obtains is not equivalent to the claim that a relation 
obtains. In other words, a sentence like, “John is thinking about 
Pegasus,” can be literally true in the sense of  being analyzed as 
“Think about(John, Pegasus),” but this is not equivalent to the claim 
that a relation obtains between John and Pegasus. 
 The distinction between substantial and non-substantial 
properties is supposed to allow a sentence like, “John is thinking 
about Pegasus,” to be literally true. But how can such a sentence be 
true if  no relation obtains between John and Pegasus? According to 
Crane, this is where we should let go of  our hold on Truth 1. This, 
however, will require a defense of  the above (T15), which will be 
discussed in the next section.  
4. Truth About Non-Existents 
The dialectic since the beginning of  this work can be summarized as 
follows. We know that some sentences like, “John thinks about 
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Pegasus,” are true, even though Pegasus does not exist. The question 
is then how such sentences can be true in light of  this fact about 
Pegasus’s ontological status. The culprit, as we discussed at length, 
lies in the interpretation of  the little word “about.” The IOM reads it 
literally as being a relation between an intentional experience and an 
intentional object, whereas the CM and adverbialism read it non-
literally, each in their own way.  
 Despite their differences, each of  these theories can 
nonetheless all be regarded as sharing a common assumption, namely 
that the thesis Truth 1 already introduced above is true, namely:  
Truth 1: If  a sentence of  the form “a is F” is literally true, 
then the ground for this truth must be that there is some 
object, a, that instantiates F (and something similar holds for 
polyadic predications). 
This endorsement leads the IOM to embrace Meinongianism and 
leads the CM and adverbialism in a rather different direction, i.e., a 
paraphrastic treatment of  the FIS with the aim of  avoiding treating 
intentional sentences as predicative ones. As we saw in the previous 
section, Crane aims to offer a third way, i.e., a literal interpretation 
that remains very close to the IOM without presupposing that 
intentionality is a relation. Indeed, he distinguishes between 
substantial and non-substantial properties and relations, and argues 
that intentionality is an instance of  the latter.   
 A non-substantial relation is not a monadic property insofar as 
it remains syntactically polyadic. It is also not a relation, in the sense 
that it does not require a relational fact as a ground of  truth. Well, 
good enough, one might say, but what does this exactly mean? Our 
interpretative strategy shall be to take Crane’s strategy as having two 
parts: one part about meaning and one part about truth.  
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 The part about meaning is the following. The metaphysical 
work achieved by the distinction between substantial and non-
substantial properties offers new opportunities for the analysis of  
intentional sentences, i.e., we no longer need to choose between 
analyzing a sentence like, “John thinks about Pegasus,” either as a 
relation of  “being about” along the lines of  the IOM, or under the 
form of  a paraphrase, like the CM or adverbialism. The game is now 
a three-way one: either it is a relation, or a monadic property, or a 
non-substantial relation. That is, we can now say that a sentence like, 
“John thinks about Pegasus,” expresses a proposition of  the form 
“Thinks about (John, Pegasus),” without thereby meaning that 
intentional experiences are relations to intentional objects.  
 Second, the part about truth is that not all sentences that are 
literally true need to have a ground of  truth with exactly the same 
shape as the proposition that they express. For instance, a predicative 
sentence of  the form “a is F” expressing a sentence of  the form 
“F(a)” does not necessarily need to be made true by a ground of  
truth with the shape, “There is an object a that instantiates the 
property F.” Indeed, recall the passage already quoted above:  
It is natural to distinguish between the truth of  some sentence or 
proposition, and what we might call picturesquely (but I hope quite 
intelligibly) the ‘shape’ of  the reality described by that truth. (Crane 
2013: 65) 
As introduced in Chapter 3 in our discussion of  predication, the 
notion of  literal truth is the following: A sentence with a predicative 
grammatical form can be said to be literally true if, and only if, (i) it 
expresses a predicative proposition and (ii) this proposition is true. 
Note, however, that we did not explicitly build more than that into 
the notion of  literal truth. In particular, we did not build any idea 
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about the grounds for such literal truths. Accordingly, we can 
distinguish between two ideas: first, that a natural language sentence S 
can have a literal interpretation; and second, that this literal 
interpretation is true by virtue of  a principle such as Truth 1.  
 Crane’s claim about truth must then be that a sentence of  the 
form “a is F” can be literally true even if  there is no ground for this 
truth with a similar shape as that of  the proposition expressed by this 
sentence. We must then reconfigure the notion of  literal truth so that 
some sentences can be literally true without necessarily fitting Truth 
1. Crane’s fundamental idea in that area is that this alternative notion 
of  literal truth should appeal to the idea of  a possible “reductive 
explanation” of  truths (Crane 2013: 124).  
 The idea is the following. It is common ground in philosophy 
that we want some sentences to be true without, as Crane puts it, 
“wanting to commit ourselves to the entities which these claims 
apparently talk about.” (Crane 2013: 122) The standard way to do this 
is to appeal to a paraphrase strategy. But, he claims, this is not the 
only available strategy. One can also try to provide a reductive 
explanation of  a truth in a way that does not appeal to the entities 
that we have identified as problematic. This can be achieved by 
explaining, or “making intelligible,” (Crane 2013: 122) how certain 
truths about something ontologically problematic can be true by 
appealing only to non-problematic ontological facts.  
 What is the difference between a paraphrase and a reductive 
explanation, however? We have already discussed the question of  
paraphrases several times. Take, once again, sentences like, “I did it 
for John’s sake,” or, “John wore a broad smile.” Let us assume that 
these sentences are true. That said, we are not willing to recognize 
that there are entities like sakes or smiles to which we can stand in 
relation. The paraphrase strategy then consists of  claiming that these 
sentences are true, but only non-literally. That is, they are true in 
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virtue of  a paraphrase being true. This paraphrase, moreover, can 
either be conservative or revisionary, but assuming a descriptive 
picture according to which they must be conservative, then such 
paraphrases must then be evaluated in terms of  native speakers’ 
linguistic intuitions. A good conservative paraphrase can then be 
taken to capture the meaning of  the original sentence that it 
paraphrases. 
 As such, then, the paraphrase strategy, understood as a 
descriptive strategy, is committed to a central claim about meaning. 
The paraphrase is taken to capture the meaning of  the original 
sentence and, since it is not committed to any entity to which we will 
not want to be committed, we can conclude that the original sentence 
is not, in fact, committed to anything problematic either. In other 
words, a paraphrase strategy deflates our ontological problems by 
means of  fixing the meaning of  a problematic sentence. As Crane 
puts it,  
What we do in these cases is to provide a paraphrase or translation 
of  the original claim, to show that we can mean what we mean by it 
without committing ourselves to sakes [or smiles]. (Crane 2013: 122–
italics added) 
The major difference between a paraphrase and a reductive 
explanation as conceived by Crane is that the latter strategy does not 
start by trying to fix the meaning of  a problematic sentence in order 
to make some ontological problem disappear. Rather, it embraces the 
literal meaning of  a sentence, and tries to ease its potential 
ontological problem in two steps: First, where possible, we turn 
substantial predications into non-substantial ones; and second, we 
find a reductive ground of  truth for this sentence—that is, a ground 
of  truth that is unproblematic and from which we “make intelligible” 
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(Crane 2013: 122) why the original sentence is literally true. In sum, if  
one tries to give a reductive explanation of  a problematic sentence, 
one is not saying that there is a problem with the literal meaning of  
that sentence and therefore with it being literally true. Rather, one is 
saying that a problematic sentence can have its literal meaning and be 
literally true without thereby being committed to problematic entities 
that make it true. Crane explains it as follows: 
…in other (more interesting) kinds of  cases, we do not provide 
translations, but rather attempt to describe the world in a way that 
makes intelligible why the claim is true, while not committing us to 
entities which we are talking about. (Crane 2013: 122) 
The notion of  reductive explanation is introduced by means of  
examples. Crane’s main example relies on a sentence like the 
following:  
(3) Our society puts too much value on making money for its 
own sake, and it should instead  emphasize the value of  
learning, culture, sport, and good health.  
Let us admit that (3) is true. Not everyone, however, is a realist about 
societies. Methodological individualists, for instance, are not. It is not 
the place and time, however, to ponder methodological individualism 
and for the present issue, the following rough and ready 
characterization will suffice: It is, in a nutshell, the idea that any 
feature of  a society can ultimately be explained in terms of  the 
actions and intentional states of  atomized agents. In Margaret 
Thatcher’s famous words, “[a]nd, you know, there is no such thing as 
society. There are individual men and women, and there are families.” 
(Quoted in Crane 2013: 122) 
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 The truth of  (3) creates a problem for methodological 
individualism. Indeed, are methodological individualists forced to 
claim that (3) is only non-literally true, i.e., that it is true only because 
a paraphrase—presumably either a big disjunction of  names of  
people putting too much emphasis on making money or, alternatively, 
an existentially very complex and long statement—is true? 
 According to Crane, this is too strong. There is no need for a 
proponent of  methodological individualism to claim that (3) is true 
only because a paraphrase from which the word “society” has 
disappeared is true. Indeed, she could well stick to the thesis that (3) 
is literally true, and not true in virtue of  a paraphrase being true, and 
explain why it is true in a way that does not presuppose more than 
atomized individuals, their actions, and their intentional states. As 
Crane puts it, 
What I want to emphasize here is that it is perfectly coherent to say 
that when someone insists on the truth of  the claim ‘society places 
too much value on making money’, they do not have to be construed 
as saying something that means that people in society tend to place to 
much value on making money. Even if  this latter claim is a 
consequence of  what they say, this does not imply that there is any 
way of  translating claims about societies into claims about people. 
Rather, it’s that the claim about people explains why the claim about 
society is true. (Crane 2013: 123) 
This quote nicely illustrates the contrast that Crane tries to paint. 
There are two ways in which one can account for the truth of  a 
sentence without necessarily being committed to what one seemingly 
talks about. One can either provide a paraphrase that captures the 
meaning of  the original sentences while avoiding any problematic 
commitments or, alternatively, one can stick with the literal meaning, 
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and truth, of  the original sentence but explain how it can be true 
without being committed to any problematic entity. For instance, a 
methodological individualist could try to explain why (1) is true while 
limiting herself  to making use only of  the actions and intentional 
states of  atomized individuals.  
 The case of  (3) is one that concerns the domain of  what 
exists. The idea is that the literal meaning of  true sentences does not 
always line up with our ontological commitments. When such is the 
case, we can try to provide a reductive explanation of  a truth. 
According to Crane, this idea straightforwardly also applies to the 
realm of  what does not exist. Literal truths about non-existent 
objects appear to be problematic because, in virtue of  Truth 1, they 
lead us to Truth 2. But the idea of  a reductive explanation of  truths 
can allow us to account for truths about non-existents in a way that 
does not appeal to Truth 1 and, then, does not lead us to Truth 2. In 
a nutshell, by making use of  the notion of  the reductive explanation 
of  a truth, we can try to explain why a truth about a non-existent 
object is true by appealing only to existent grounds of  truth. 
Accordingly, a sentence like, “John thinks about Pegasus,” can be 
literally true without the need to endorse a Meinongian theory of  
objects that would supply us with a mind-independent Pegasus as a 
ground of  that truth.  
 What would a reductive explanation of  a sentence like, “John 
thinks about Pegasus,” look like? According to Crane, the existent 
ground of  truth for such a sentence is not hard to find: It is simply 
the existence of  John’s intentional experience as of  thinking about 
Pegasus, and that experience’s representational content. No more, no 
less. According to Crane, we must then make a distinction between 
how the world is and how we represent the world as being. The world 
is such that there is no relation between John and Pegasus. The only 
thing there is is an intentional experience of  John such that we 
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describe it as being about Pegasus. But it would be a mistake to 
discard how we represent the world as being in order to align our 
theory of  intentionality with the way the world is. By first drawing a 
distinction between substantial and non-substantial properties, and by 
subsequently reconfiguring the notion of  literal truth in order to 
dispose of  Truth 1, we can take at face-value the fact that John is 
thinking about Pegasus while accounting for this truth merely in 
terms of  John undergoing an intentional experience that is not itself  
relational. As Crane writes,  
  
To explain the truths about the non-existent, we need to appeal to 
facts about the representational content of  those truths, or about the 
ideas they involve. (Crane 2013: 121) 
The moral of  Crane’s account can then be put as follows. A theory 
of  intentionality that wants to make an irreducible use of  the notion 
of  intentional object should start with the bedrock claim that some 
truths about non-existent objects are literally true. It should, however, 
try to prevent the fact that the endorsement of  the possibility of  
there being such truths creates insuperable philosophical troubles. 
This can be done, first, by endorsing a distinction between substantial 
and non-substantial properties and, second, by rejecting an unbridled 
endorsement of  Truth 1.  
 In fact, there is even more to the theory. According to Crane, 
we can then use this conception of  intentionality to account for more 
truths about non-existents than truths of  intentional sentences. Take, 
for instance, Pegasus. He does not exist; hence, he cannot possess any 
substantial properties. There are, however, many truths about him. 
For instance, he is a mythical character. But that something is a 
mythical character does not entail that it exists. For something to be a 
mythical character, it is only required that it be represented in some 
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way, i.e., in myths and in episodes of  thoughts about those myths. 
The truth of  the non-intentional predication, “Pegasus is a mythical 
character,” is then reductively explained in terms of  the existence of  
some representational facts.  
 In the next section, we discuss how this model of  
intentionality is supposed to account for the six main features of  
intentionality that we introduced in Chapter 1 before, in a final 
section, discussing some objections to Crane’s account.  
5. Crane’s Model and the Six Main Features of  
Intentionality 
5.1 Crane’s Model and Aboutness 
Crane’s model is structurally similar to the IOM, in that it starts from 
the thought that intentional experiences should irreducibly be 
described in terms of  the notion of  intentional object. It is, however, 
distinct from the IOM because it does not treat intentionality as a 
relation. Building on the discussion of  Chapter 2,  Crane’s 
interpretation of  the FIS can then be put as follows: 
Polyadism schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x stands in a 
non-substantial relation of  ‘being about’ to an intentional 
object y, and for some content C, C presents y to x.” 
As we saw, however, we must distinguish between the claim that this 
schema gives the meaning of  the FIS, and the claim that this schema 
gives us the conditions under which an instance of  “x is about y” is 
true. The only thing that Crane’s interpretation gives us is the former. 
For the latter, we have to resort to the notion of  reductive 
explanation and analyze case by case whether a certain instance of  
the FIS really obtains. 
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5.2 Crane’s Model and Aspectuality 
Crane recognizes the need for the introduction of  the notion of  
content in order to account for aspectuality. His notion of  content, 
however, is not the notion of  representational content of  the CM, as 
Crane recognizes that some intentional experiences are non-
propositional. Hence, as a general rule, one cannot identify Crane’s 
notion of  intentional content with a proposition. According to 
Crane, generally speaking the notion of  content is the way in which 
an intentional object is presented. Just like in the IOM, Crane’s 
notion of  content is not independent of  the notion of  intentional 
object. That we need such a notion of  content simply follows from 
the truth that there is more than one way to think about an 
intentional object.  
  
5.3 Crane’s Model and Semantic Normativity 
What we said about the IOM will, mutatis mutandis, be applicable to 
Crane’s model. That is, some intentional experiences can be 
semantically evaluated —e.g., John’s desire that Federer retires can be 
satisfied or dissastisfied—because at least some intentional 
experiences have propositional contents.  
5.4 Crane’s Model and Intentional Identity 
According to Crane’s model, just like in the CM and adverbialism but 
unlike in the IOM, we have to distinguish between two notions of  
intentional identity: one that applies to cases in which we think about 
things that exist, and the other to cases in which we think about 
things that do not exist. When we think about things that exist, we 
can stand in substantial relation to intentional objects, and such 
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intentional objects have criteria of  identity. On that basis, we can say 
that two different intentional subjects can be intentionally directed 
about the same thing.  
 In a case in which what we think about does not exist, 
however, the matter is different. Indeed, according to Crane, we do 
not have the means to say whether my Pegasus is the same as your 
Pegasus. In fact, we do not have the means to say that the Pegasus I 
thought about yesterday is the same Pegasus I am thinking about 
today. Why? Because there is no way to evaluate such judgments 
without a criterion of  identity, and no such criterion of  identity is 
available for non-existent objects.  
 It is not the time and place to ponder the criterion of  identity 
of  existent objects, but it seems quite obvious that for any object that 
has a criterion of  identity, this criterion is not one that depends on 
representational-dependent properties. On the contrary, we generally 
say that two different intentional experiences can be said to be about 
the same object by virtue of  the object’s substantial properties—its 
essence, its causal origin, or whatever else counts as relevant to 
determine its criterion of  identity. But since non-existent objects do 
not have such substantial properties, they cannot have any such 
criterion of  identity.  
 That said, it certainly seems to us as if  we are thinking about 
the same thing when we are thinking about Pegasus at different times 
or, say, when we are thinking about a non-existent object that is said 
to have more than one name, such as, e.g., Hermes and Mercury, who 
turn out to be the same god. How can we then account for these 
facts? 
 According to Crane, we can do so without presupposing 
numerical identity. Qualitative similarity shall be sufficient. His idea is 
that when we undergo intentional experiences that are about 
particular things, either existent or not, we treat information about 
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them in a particular way. That is, we bundle this information together 
and do not treat it as determining what our thought is about. In 
short, we open so-called non-descriptive mental files, as discussed in 
Chapter 4. We have, for instance, a file for Pegasus that contains 
information. If  our respective files labeled “Pegasus” contain the 
same information, or a significant overlap of  information, we can 
then be said to think about the same thing. Similarly, if  we have two 
files, one labeled “Hermes” and one labeled “Mercury,” and both 
contain the same information, or a significant overlap of  
information, then Hermes and Mercury can be said to be the same 
god.  
 This appeal to mental files is of  course reminiscent of  
something that we discussed in Chapter 4: the account of  thoughts 
about non-existent particulars offered by a non-descriptivist such as 
François Recanati, and implemented with the CM. Indeed, according 
to Recanati, to think about, say, Pegasus is a matter of  tokening a 
non-descriptive mental file that is about Pegasus. As he sees the 
matter, such thoughts have a singular vehicle, a mental file, but no 
content.  
 Crane’s appeal to mental files is, however, different from 
Recanati’s. Indeed, in Recanati’s account, for a thought to be about, 
e.g., Pegasus, is for the intentional subject to token a non-descriptive 
mental file that is about Pegasus. As such, Recanati is faced with the 
phenomenological problem that his analysis of  such thoughts merely 
seem to amount to what Crane characterizes as “airing an empty 
vehicle.” (Crane 2013: 161) Such thoughts, however, have, just like 
any other thought, an intentional object and an intentional content. 
Recanati’s account, hence, cannot be correct. As Crane puts it, 
  
Although I agree with a lot of  what Recanati and Taylor say, I cannot 
put things entirely in their terms. Recanati describes thought-episodes 
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as ‘vehicles’ and his view of  singular thought-content means that 
when Le Verrier says to himself  ‘the discovery of  Vulcan will make 
me famous’, the thought has no content. Yet the content of  
someone’s thought is what they are thinking, and how can it be that 
Le Verrier was not thinking anything, merely airing an empty 
‘vehicle’? Similarly, Taylor describes a thought’s purported singularity 
as an aspect of  the ‘form’ of  a thought rather than its content. But 
what Le Verrier thinks, I maintain, cannot be characterized simply in 
terms of  its ‘form’, as if  what was going on in him was something 
without content, in the sense of  what is thought. (Crane 2013: 161) 
That said, this does not mean that mental files cannot play another 
important role for intentionality. Namely, they play an important, 
albeit slightly metaphorical, role in explaining how we treat 
information about particulars, either existent or not. This treatment 
of  information is sub-conscious. That is, whenever we think about, 
say, Obama we do not bring up all of  the information that we 
possess on Obama. This information, rather, is stored sub-
consciously in a file and we can bring it up if  such a demand is 
triggered.  
5.5 Crane’s Model and Generality 
Let us take the following example:  
 (7) John desires a bottle of  wine.  
As we saw in Chapter 2, the IOM faces some difficulties in 
accounting for the truth of  such a sentence. Indeed, first of  all, there 
is no indefinite object such as “a bottle of  wine” and, secondly, 
describing John’s desire as a desire for an indeterminate object seems 
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simply mistaken. He wants something from which one can drink and, 
presumably, one can only drink from a determinate bottle of  wine.  
 The IOM’s solution is to interpret (7) by means of  a 
paraphrase. That is, what (7) in fact means is that John desires that he 
have a bottle of  wine. John’s desire is then not intentionally directed 
at a bottle of  wine but, rather, at a fact.  
 According to Crane, however, it is doubtful that this really 
constitutes a phenomenologically faithful description of  John’s desire. 
Indeed, John’s desire does not seem to be directed at a fact but, 
rather, at a bottle, that is, something that is object-like. Indeed, an 
intentional object, according to Crane, is nothing but something 
“thrown before experience” (Crane 2013: 92), and, presumably, what 
is thrown before John’s experience is nothing but a bottle of  wine. 
Nothing more, nothing less. 
 Crane’s model, however, can accommodate this fact in a way 
that is barred to the IOM: Granted that it is true that there cannot be 
a substantial relation between John and a bottle of  wine, there is no 
reason, however, to deny that there is a non-substantial relation 
between John and a bottle of  wine, granted that this is what is 
“thrown before” John’s experience. As Crane writes, 
My concern… has been to preserve the appearances: to maintain that 
certain ordinary phenomenological claims are true, while giving an 
account of  them, perhaps in terms that are somewhat different from 
what these truths might seem to presuppose. In particular, I aim to 
preserve certain truths about intentional objects. It is literally true 
that when I want a bottle of  inexpensive burgundy, this is the 
intentional object of  my thought. (Crane 2013: 132)  
As with non-existence, the key here is to be able to provide a 
reductive explanation of  such literal truths. In the case at hand, this 
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means being able to explain such a truth in terms of  the features of  
representations themselves. According to Crane, this can be done in a 
rather standard way, by appealing to the idea that desires have 
conditions of  satisfaction. A desire like John’s has conditions of  
satisfaction with existentially quantified truth-conditions, and this 
explains why John’s desire can be satisfied by any bottle of  wine. This 
is a fact about the nature of  John’s desire, which exists. But there is a 
difference between saying that, “John desires a bottle of  wine,” 
means the same thing as, “John desires that he have a bottle of  
wine,” and saying that the latter sentence only states the truth-
conditions of  such a desire, not its content.  
5.6 Crane’s Model and Non-Existence 
We already touched on Crane’s solution to non-existence above. That 
is, a sentence like, “John thinks about Pegasus,” can be literally true 
without there being a relation between John and Pegasus. Such a 
sentence is instead treated as describing a non-substantial relation 
between John and Pegasus, and its truth must be explained 
reductively. 
 According to Crane, however, we must clearly distinguish 
between two ways to understand the way John’s intentional 
directedness upon Pegasus could be explained:  
(i)  “John thinks about Pegasus” is literally true, because 
Pegasus can be ontologically reduced to the content John’s 
experience. 
(ii) “John thinks about Pegasus” is literally true, because the 
literal truth of  this sentence can be explained reductively.  
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Crane insists that it is (ii) that he is after, not (i). As he sees the 
matter, it would be mistaken to think that we can ontologically reduce 
Pegasus to John’s experience. Indeed, Crane claims that John’s 
experience could be the same whether or not Pegasus existed. That is, 
this experience could possess exactly the same intentional properties 
and would be phenomenally indistinguishable, whether or not 
Pegasus existed. Both would be about Pegasus, i.e., they would have a 
content—a Pegasus-content—and an intentional object, namely 
Pegasus. The non-existent Pegasus and the existent Pegasus, however, 
cannot be numerically identical.  The objection then goes as follows: 24
if  there is a claim as to the determination of  an intentional object by 
the content of  its intentional experience, then two token of  a same 
kind of  intentional experience should determine the same intentional 
object. But the non-existent and the existent Pegasus cannot be the 
same object. Hence, (i) cannot be true. As Crane puts it: 
To explain the relationship between truths about non-existing 
intentional objects and existing things, the notion we need is not 
supervenience, but explanatory reduction: we need an explanation of  
why it is true that [John thinks about Pegasus], which appeals only 
to what does exist. So I will not talk of  ‘ontological reduction’… 
since I reserve this phrase for the identification of  a domain of  
entities as a sub-domain of  another. And non-existent objects are 
not, of  course, entities of  any kind. (Crane 2013: 134) 
What then would explains the truth of  “John thinks about Pegasus?” 
Well, according to Crane, the answer to that question is pretty simple. 
“Thinking about” is a non-substantial relation. Hence, John can think 
 Note that they could be if  we were able to endorse something like a 24
Meinongian doctrine of  natures, but we rejected such a theory in Chapter 3.
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about Pegasus even if  Pegasus does not exist. The only thing that is 
required for “John thinks about Pegasus” to be literally true is an 
intentional experience as of  being directed upon Pegasus. As a result, 
the non-substantial relation of  “thinking about” obtains between 
John and Pegasus, and Pegasus instantiates the non-substantial 
property of  being an object of  thought.  
 In that sense, since, “John thinks about Pegasus” is literally 
true, we are allowed to infer, unlike in the CM and in adverbialism, 
that there is something about which John is thinking, namely Pegasus. 
In that sense, Crane’s model cannot be accused of  making use of  a 
notion of  intentional directedness that is subject to success or failure.  
 That said, one might wonder what are the conditions under 
which an existentially quantified sentence such as, say, “There is 
something about which John is thinking” is true. Indeed, in the case 
of  the IOM, the truth-conditions of  such a sentence were clearly 
statable. Namely, the Meinongian theory of  objects fills up the overall 
domain of  quantification with so-called pure objects, in a way that is 
independent of  us. A sentence such as, “There is something about 
which John is thinking” can then said to be true iff (i) John is indeed 
thinking about something and (ii) there is an element of  the overall 
domain such that it can serve as a witness of  this quantified sentence. 
The Meinongian theory of  objects, however, guarantees that if  
condition (i) is met, then condition (ii) is also met. Crane, however, 
rejects the idea of  a Meinongian theory of  objects. What, therefore, 
does account for the truth of  a sentence like, “There is something 
about which John is thinking?” 
 What we said above already provided us with a hint of  Crane’s 
answer. By virtue of  the fact that a non-substantial relation obtains 
when John is thinking about Pegasus, Pegasus instantiates the 
property of  being an object of  thought. According to Crane, then, a 
true quantified sentence such as “There is something that John is 
Chapter 6  366
thinking about” can be validly inferred and from a sentence like 
“John thinks about Pegasus” because there is an object of  thought, 
Pegasus, that can serve as a witness for the quantified expression: 
“∑(x) Think about (John, x).”  
 According to Crane, however, such a solution enjoins us to 
reject a classical conception of  domains of  quantification. He 
summarizes this conception as follows:  
This is one way to describe my departure from the standard view: for 
many who hold the standard view want to explain representation in 
terms of  an antecedent conception of  domains of  quantification, and 
relations defined on these domains. (Crane 2013: 41-42) 
The idea is the following. A traditional understanding of  domains of  
quantification takes them to be sets of  entities. These entities may all 
exist, as in classical logic, or may not exist, as in a Meinongian outer-
domain of  quantification. The key idea, however, is that members of  
domains are entities and that we understand intentional experiences 
in terms of  these entities—as well as relations to them—, and not the 
other way around, i.e., we do not understand domains—as well as 
some predicative operations over them—in terms of  intentional 
experiences.  
 According to Crane, we should reject this traditional 
conception and replace it by the idea that what is relevant for the 
evaluation of  quantified sentences such as: “∑(x) Think about (John, 
x)” are not entities but, rather, objects of  thoughts, that is, these 
things that are relevant for the description of  the way we think and 
talk. As he puts it:  
In one traditional terminology, the domain of  quantification was called 
the universe of  discourse. This term gives a hint as to how we should 
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think of  quantification metaphysically if  we are going to make literal 
sense of  sentences [that existentially quantify over things that do not 
exist]. The universe of  discourse contains all the items we assume or 
stipulate to be relevant to our discourse. An item here is simply 
something which can be thought or spoken about: an object of  thought 
or discourse, in the sense I introduced above. The domain of  
quantification consists of  just those objects of  thought relevant to the 
truth or falsehood of  the quantified claim. (Crane 2013: 38) 
As such, then, if  John is thinking about Pegasus, then we can infer 
that there is something that John is thinking about, namely Pegasus. 
Hence, we can say that Pegasus can serve as the value of  the variable 
in: “∑(x) Think about (John, x).” 
 However, as we will see in the upcoming critical part of  this 
chapter, such a conception of  domains of  quantification is not 
without problems.  
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6. Some Questions About Polyadism 
6.1 Circularity 
An adequate theory of  intentionality should be one that is able to 
account for the feature that we called “non-existence.” As we just 
saw, Crane thinks that he has provided an account that meets this 
demand. For one to think about a non-existent intentional object is 
for one to stand in the non-substantial relation of  “being about” to a 
non-existent intentional object. In other words, if  Crane is correct, 
then a sentence describing an intentional experience such as  
 (8) John thinks about Pegasus 
can be literally true because there is a non-substantial relation 
between John and Pegasus. 
 But what are the conditions under which (8) is true? According 
to Crane, we do not necessarily need to look for a ground of  truth 
that shares exactly the shape of  the proposition expressed by (8). 
What we should be looking for is merely the fact that John is 
undergoing an intentional experience that we may describe as making 
(8) true.  
 How, however, should one spell out the conditions under 
which (8) is true? Well, a good candidate seems to be the following:   
 (9) John thinks about Pegasus.  
But this look quite circular, does it not? Saying that (9) explains (8) 
does really look like (8) is explaining itself. How can this constitute a 
satisfying account of  non-existence? 
 Crane explicitly recognizes that his account is circular, but 
takes it as meaning one thing: The notion of  representation must be 
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taken as basic. In other words, there is no way to understand how 
John can think about Pegasus can be true but in the terms of  the 
truth of, “John thinks about Pegasus.” That is, we cannot explain this 
fact about John’s representational powers in terms of  a causal relation 
between John and Pegasus or a non-causal relation between John and 
a proposition that represents Pegasus. If  John thinks about Pegasus, 
then “John thinks about Pegasus” is literally true because of  the fact 
that John is undergoing an experience to be described in just that way 
is a basic truth about representation.  
 That said, it is important that we do not appeal to non-
representational facts to explain this feature of  representations and, 
in particular, that we do not appeal to there being mind-independent 
non-existent intentional objects that our experiences can somehow 
target. On the contrary, there is a non-existent Pegasus because it has 
the non-substantial property of  being thought about by John, a 
property that it can have indifferently to its ontological status. As 
Crane puts it, 
This is not really a vicious circle, since what I mean by 
‘understanding the non-existent’ really amounts to understanding 
truths, understanding how they can be true, and understanding what 
makes them true. What makes these truths true are certain facts 
about representation. (Crane 2013: 168) 
As Crane sees the matter, then, his account is only available to those 
who are ready to regard representation as being basic. This is a price 
that one needs to be ready to pay to be able to account for the 
phenomenological fact that (8) can be literally true without endorsing 
some form of  Meinongianism.  
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6.2 Phenomenological Adequacy 
In their respective reviews of  Crane (2013), Anthony Everett and 
Michelle Montague independently point—quite ironically—to a 
concern with respect to the phenomenological adequacy of  Crane’s 
model. Here is Montague’s version of  the objection: 
Tom’s thought about Vulcan is made true by Tom’s thought about 
Vulcan. Yes, but what does that truth-maker consist in? Asking this 
may provide another way of  trying to understand, perhaps indirectly, 
what Tom’s thought about Vulcan consists in. Vulcan, in so far as it 
has properties, has properties like being a postulated planet. So is Tom’s 
thought about a postulated planet? Surely that is not how it seems to 
Tom (suppose he knows it’s postulated and thinks the postulation is 
also true). For Tom, his thought seems to be about a planet. Note, 
our thoughts often get things wrong about the world, but in the case 
of  Tom, according to Crane’s theory, he’s wildly wrong about the 
object of  his thought. Imagine someone asking me what I’m thinking 
about and I say, “I’m thinking about a mountain, you know, the 
golden mountain” and I’m met with the response “You’re definitely 
not thinking about a mountain”. The question is, how seriously do 
we take our claims about what we are thinking about? (Montague 
2015: 337) 
The objection seems to be the following. In a case like the one of  
Tom’s thought about Vulcan, Tom is thinking about something, 
Vulcan, that possesses the property of  being a postulated planet. 
Hence, it is true that Tom is thinking about a postulated planet. Tom, 
however, would not describe his intentional experience as being 
about a postulated planet but, rather, as being about a planet. Hence, 
the objection goes, how are we to reconcile these two claims? Should 
Chapter 6  371
not we say that what John is in fact thinking about is a planet, and not 
a postulated planet?  
 And here is Everett’s version: 
My second reservation concerns whether Crane can provide an 
adequate account of  all talk and thought which purports to be about 
the non-existent. For Crane, while non-existent objects may have 
pleonastic properties, they cannot have genuine substantial 
properties. Vulcan has various pleonastic properties, such as being 
thought about by Le Verrier, and being a postulated planet. But 
Vulcan cannot have the property of  being a planet. The property of  
being a planet is a substantial property and only existing things can 
have substantial properties.  
 However suppose that Le Verrier has just posited Vulcan. 
Consider the following report:  
 (10) Le Verrier is thinking about a planet.  
Intuitively (10) seems correct. However, for Crane, while it is correct 
to say Le Verrier’s thought has an object, Vulcan, this object is not a 
planet. So on Crane’s account (10) should count as false, for (10) 
characterizes Le Verrier as thinking about a planet when he is not.  
 These sorts of  cases bring out the fact that we may report 
thoughts ‘about’ the non-existent from two perspectives. We may 
report them from an external perspective in which we explicitly mark 
the things they are ‘about’ as mythical or fictional or otherwise non-
existent, as we do with (11):  
 (11) Le Verrier is thinking about a postulated planet.  
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However it is usually far more natural to adopt an internal 
perspective where we talk and think as if  thoughts ‘about’ the 
non-existent were directed towards real objects which have 
substantial existence entailing properties. I suggest this is what 
is going on with (10). We talk and think as if, we make-believe 
that, the world contains not merely the things that really exist 
but also a planet towards which Le Verrier’s thought is 
directed. (Everett 2015: 1276) 
Everett’s version, contrary to Montague, explicitly brings in a 
distinction between two perspectives: an internal and an external one. 
The idea is that from an internal perspective, Tom’s—or Le Verrier’s
—thought about Vulcan is about planet. Hence, from the internal 
perspective, Everett’s (10) is true. However, from an external 
perspective, i.e., from the perspective of  someone who knows that 
Pegasus does not exist, then (10) is false and must be replaced by 
Everett’s (11). Now, Everett’s point is slightly different from 
Montague’s. Namely, he claims that the problem with Crane’s account 
is that it is more plausible to describe his (10) as being a case in which 
John engages into a make-believe activity that concerns a real planet 
rather than as being a case in which John thinks about a non-existent 
postulated planet. 
 The two objections are very close but most nonetheless be 
answered separately. We suggest that Montague’s point can be 
answered merely by appealing to the distinction between intentional 
object and intentional content. Indeed, a same intentional object can 
be presented under different contents and there is no reason to be 
alarmed by the fact that a content presents an object in a wildly 
mistaken manner. To answer Montague’s question, one could simply 
answer: “Look, I know that the golden mountain is a postulated 
planet. However, I can think about the golden mountain as a planet 
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and as a postulated planet. When I am telling you that I am thinking 
about the golden mountain, I am not fooling myself  into thinking 
that I am thinking about a real golden mountain. I know that there is 
no such mountain, and that what I am intentionally directed upon 
merely is a postulated planet. But right now I am thinking about it as 
a planet. Why? Maybe because of  the kind of  imaginative project I 
am engaged in. That is, I am imagining that the golden mountain is a 
planet because, say, I am imagining climbing it. And one can only 
climb a real planet, not a postulated one.” 
 At this point, however, it seems that Everett’s point kicks in. 
Indeed, one might well take in this answer to Montague’s objection 
but answer, alongside Everett, that in such a case one would be better 
off  with describing one’s intentional experience in terms of  a make-
believe activity of  thinking about a real planet rather than as an 
intentional experience directed upon a postulated planet. What 
should a proponent of  polyadism say at this point? 
 Three elements of  answer can be mentioned. The first one is 
that it does not seem that Everett’s objection makes polyadism 
extensionally inadequate. In other words, it does not seem that 
Everett’s objection makes it such that there are instances of  
intentional experiences that polyadism cannot account for. Indeed, 
the distinction between intentional content and intentional object is 
sufficient to account for the distinction between (10) and (11). 
Everett, however, concedes this point as his objection only appeals to 
idea that it is “far more natural” to describe the difference between 
his (10) and (11) in his terms rather than in polyadism’s ones. His 
claim, hence, is really one of  naturalness and not of  extensionality. 
Everett certainly agrees with that, but this shall turn out important 
for what comes next.  
 The second point is that, contrary to polyadism, Everett’s 
account does seem to be extensionally inadequate, and on two 
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different counts. First, according to Everett, all truths about non-
existents—including truths like his (10), but also non-intentional ones
—must be explained in terms of  make-believe. For instance, if  
“Sherlock Holmes lives on 221B Baker Street” is true, then it is true 
only because we make-believe that it is true, i.e., it is true under a 
certain intensional embedding, such as: “According to the Holmes 
fiction, Sherlock Holmes lives on 221B Baker Street.” Such a truth, 
however, is not a literal truth. It is, rather, only a “make-believe 
truth,” i.e., a truth that is true in virtue of  some make-believe 
activities.  
 Take, however, a sentence such as “Sherlock Holmes is more 
famous than any living detective; for example, Sherlock Holmes is 
more famous than Sir Ian Blair” (Crane 2013: 135). This sentence is 
true. However, can we find an intensional embedding that makes it 
true? That is, is there an operator such as: “According to the fiction, 
…” that make it true? It does not seem to be the case as there is no 
fiction or anything similar of  which both Sherlock Holmes and Sir 
Ian Blair are characters that could make it true. Hence, Everett’s 
strategy cannot be extensionally adequate as a general way to account 
for the truth about non-existents. 
 Of  course, one may try something along the following lines: 
“According to what people say, Sherlock Holmes is more famous 
than Sir Ian Blair” or “According to what people think, Sherlock 
Holmes is more famous than Sir Ian Blair.” This, however, would get 
things the wrong way around. Indeed, that Sherlock Holmes is more 
famous than Ian Blair is not a truth about what people say or people 
think. It is not like, say, the truth that people generally say that cold 
water cools down hot water, even if  we know that the contrary is 
true. Indeed, that Sherlock Holmes is more famous than Sir Ian Blair 
is a genuine truth about the world, not about what people say or 
think. That said, it is nonetheless true that it is the case that Sherlock 
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Holmes is more famous than Ian Blair because of  the way people talk 
and think. Indeed, it is because people talk and think more about 
Sherlock Holmes than Ian Blair that the former is more famous than 
the latter. But this is a fact that speaks in favor of  polyadism, not of  
Everett’s account. 
 Second, Everett must claim that if  true, “John thinks about 
Pegasus” can be true only by virtue of  some kind of  make-believe 
activity. This, however, seems to get something wrong about the 
phenomenology of  such intentional experiences. The make-believe 
strategy should analyze this sentence along the following way: 
“According to John’s make-believe activity, John is thinking about 
Pegasus.” But this would claim that, when John is thus thinking about 
Pegasus, he is not, as a general rule, really trying to engage with our 
world but, rather, with the world of  his make-believe activities. This 
seems wrong. At least in some cases, thinking about Pegasus should 
indeed count as a way to try to engage with our world, and not with 
something else.  
 Accordingly, we can return the charge of  phenomenological 
adequacy back to Montague and Everett: it might sound weird that 
intentional subjects, purportedly or not, sometimes engage with 
intentional objects whose nature they deeply misconceive, as in 
Montague’s above objection. But it seems even weirder to claim that 
such cases should be analyzed as engagement with objects that really 
have the properties represented in the experience, though only 
according to some make-believe activity, as in Everett’s alternative 
proposal. 
6.3 Existent Intentional Objects 
Presumably, at least some of  the things about which we think exist. 
How does Crane’s model account for these cases? Are such cases also 
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instances of  non-substantial relations? If  so, how do they manage to 
hit their existent targets?  
 Crane’s answer is quite simple: Some intentional experiences 
are instances of  substantial relations. For instance, one may think 
about Obama and manage not only to think about Obama, but also 
to refer to him, where reference is to be understood as a real relation. 
But one should distinguish between two questions:  
(a) If, e.g., John manages to refer to Obama, does reference 
serve as a constitutive condition on John’s experience being 
intentional? 
(b) If, e.g., John manages to refer to Obama, does reference help 
determine what is the object of  John’s intentional 
experience? 
According to Crane, it is essential to distinguish between these two 
questions. Indeed, one can say that the answer to (b) is positive while 
the answer to (a) is negative. In other words, that John stands in a 
substantial relation to Obama does not play any constitutive role on it 
being an intentional experience, defined as an experience having an 
intentional object. Were this relation not to obtain, John’s experience 
could still be said to have an intentional object.  
 What is important, according to Crane, is that we realize that 
there is more than one way for an intentional experience to have an 
intentional object. One of  them is to be a substantial relation. But 
this is only one way for an intentional experience to have an 
intentional object. Another way is simply to be a non-substantial 
relation. We should simply not hope for a systematic answer to the 
question, “How does an intentional experience get its intentional 
object?” He explains this as follows: 
Chapter 6  377
There are many varieties of  intentionality, and we should not expect 
there to be one account that unifies all these different varieties, which 
will explain, for any kind of  mental representation whatsoever, why it 
is that some object rather than another is the real object of  a given 
intentional state. Intentionality is irreducible. (Crane 2013: 115) 
That said, one might be willing to ask a further question. In a 
counterfactual situation in which Obama does not exist, can we say 
that John’s intentional experience of  thinking about Obama in our 
world and the one in the counterfactual situation are about the very 
same object? As we saw above, Crane denies that this answer can be 
positive. Indeed, non-existent intentional objects cannot flank non-
trivial identity sentences. Take the following identity sentence, where 
“Obama” stands for Obama and “Obamaw” stands for John’s 
intentional object in the counterfactual situation: “Obama is a human 
being, and has parents. Obamaw, on the other hand, is not a human 
being, and does not have parents.” These two things cannot, then, be 
identical. The two thoughts, however, have an intentional object.  
6.4 Meaning 
Another concern focuses on Crane’s account of  the meaning of  the 
proposition expressed by a sentence like (8). According to him, it can 
be modeled as “Think about (John, Pegasus),” where “thinking 
about(x, y) should merely be conceived as a non-substantial relation. 
Moreover, he is pretty explicit about the conditions that a theory 
should meet in order to be able to account for the semantic content 
of  such a sentence.  
 First, since this theory should be able to account for 
meaningful non-referential singular terms, it should not be cashed out 
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in terms of  a classical logic. The logic that we need here is a free 
logic. Second, since such a proposition is taken to be true, then the 
free logic that we need cannot be a negative one. Indeed, according to 
negative free logic, all simple sentences formed by means of  a non-
referential singular term turn out to be meaningful but false. Hence, 
negative free logic cannot account for the fact that “Think about 
(John, Pegasus),” is true. The logic that we need, then, should be a 
positive free logic, i.e., one that accounts for true simple sentences 
involving non-referential singular terms.  
 Beyond the mere logical requirements, it is also quite clear that 
the semantic content of  such a proposition can be neither an 
existentially quantified content nor a Millian content. Indeed, if  the 
former were the case, then (8) could not have the literal meaning 
Crane claims it possesses and, similarly, if  the latter were the case, 
then presumably there should be Meinongian non-existent objects or, 
worse, we should give up on a great scale to the feature we called 
non-existence.  
 In sum, then, Crane is committed to a non-descriptive, non-
Millian semantic account of  a proposition like the one expressed by 
(8), to be couched in a positive free logic, but he does not tell us 
much more than that. His account dramatically lacks any positive 
claim with respect to semantic content. That we can really understand 
the content of  such propositions is then conditional on the 
availability of  a systematic account for the semantic content of  such 
propositions.  
    
6.5 Quantification 
Crane directs the following objection against his understanding of  
domains of  quantification: 
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It might be objected, however, that thinking of  the members of  a 
domain of  quantification as objects of  thought gives rise to 
paradox. An object of  thought is just something thought about. 
But surely we can quantify over things that have never been 
thought about: for example, we can say ‘some things have never 
been thought about’. This surely must be true. But if  so, how can 
the domain of  quantification consist of  objects of  thought? (Crane 
2013 : 39) 
The objection can be reconstructed as follows:  
1) The members of  the domain of  quantification are objects of  
thought; 
2) The sentence  : “Some things have never been thought 
about” is true; 
3) If  this sentence if  true, then there are objects that can make 
an existentially quantified  sentence true and yet they 
are not objects of  thoughts; 
4) Hence, contra 1), there are members of  domain of  
quantification that are both objects of  thought and not 
objects of  thought.  
According to Crane, however, this objection does not go through 
because 3) is false. Indeed, that some objects have never been 
thought about does not mean that they are not objects of  thought. It 
merely mean that they are objects of  thought that have never been 
thought about except by means of  an existentially quantified thought 
with the content: 
 (10) Some things have never been thought about.  
Chapter 6  380
As he sees the matter, what needs to be endorsed in order to avoid 
this objection is the claim that quantifying over something is a way of  
thinking about something. As he puts it :  
I can use a quantified noun phrase to ‘talk about’ things, even if  
those things cannot be talked about in other ways. It might seem 
paradoxical to say ‘some things have never been talked about’, but 
if  we agree that quantified noun phrases are ways of  talking about 
things, then we should understand this as conveying the following: 
some things have never been talked about except by being talked 
about in this way. This is comparable to what one should say to 
Berkeley when he says that one cannot conceive of  an unconceived 
tree. Of  course, by conceiving of  a tree as unconceived, what one 
means is that it is not conceived in any way other than in this act. If  
there is a paradox here, it is not one which is specific to the view of  
quantification defended here. (Crane 2013 : 39) 
Let us assume that Crane’s rejoinder to this objection is correct. Does 
it mean that his account of  domains of  quantification is without 
further problem? One further concern that may be raised goes as 
follows. Take the following sentence: 
 (11) Every things have been thought about . 25
It should be pretty obvious that (11) is false. Indeed, there are many 
things that have not been thought about—recalling, e.g, Pascal’s 
double infinity, it is in fact highly probable that there are more things 
that have not been thought about than things that have been thought 
 Note that Crane explicitly endorses a binary reading of  the quantifiers in 25
Chapter 2 of  Crane 2013. 
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about. According to Crane’s account of  domains, however, (11) turns 
out to be trivially true. Indeed, if  quantifying is way of  thinking about 
something, then quantifying over everything is a way of  thinking 
about everything. Hence, by thinking a thought with (11) as content, 
then one manages to make it true. But (11) is clearly false. Hence, 
Crane’s account must be false.  
 Of  course, Crane possesses an easy way out of  this 
objection. Namely, he could simply claim that (11) is ambiguous, and 
true according to one reading and false according to another one. A 
first difficulty is that it does not seem that (11) is ambiguous. Let us, 
however, admit that this is the case. According to this rejoinder, (11) 
would be presumably be true when interpreted as ranging over 
objects of  thoughts. Indeed, trivially, all objects of  thoughts in 
Crane’s sense can be said to have been thought about. Hence, under 
that first reading, (11) is true. But what about the reading that turns 
(11) into a falsity? It seems that the content of  this second reading 
should rely on the truth of: “Some things have not been thought 
about.” But since, as he puts it, “Some things have not been thought 
about” is way of  thinking about things, then it would follow that, in 
fact, every things have been thought about. Hence, both readings 
would in fact make (11) true.  
7. Conclusion 
In this last chapter, we discussed what we called polyadism. Recently 
defended by Tim Crane, this model tries to account for the 
phenomenological fact that each intentional experience must be 
described in terms of  the notion of  intentional object without 
thereby endorsing some form of  Meinongianism. 
 As we saw, this requires that three main theses be endorsed: 
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(T13)  A theory of  quantification is not committed to an   
 objectual reading of  quantifiers; 
(T14)  For a restricted range of  non-existence entailing   
 properties, Meinong’s Principle of  Independence of   
 Sosein from Sein holds;  
(T15)  Some sentences of  the form “a is F” can be literally  
 true, without there being any ground of  truth for such  
 sentences to the form, “a that is F.” 
(T13) was endorsed on the basis of  the discussion of  quantification 
provided in Chapter 3. (T14) was defended in terms of  a distinction 
between two kinds of  properties: substantial and non-substantial 
properties. The only truths that hold of  non-existent objects, with 
the exception of  negative existentials and trivial identities, are truths 
that result from the predication of  a particular kind of  non-
substantial properties: representation-dependent one.  
 (T15), on the other hand, results from the rejection of  a 
principle we called Truth 1. 
Truth 1: If  a sentence of  the form “a is F” is literally true, 
then the ground for this truth must be that there is some 
object, a, that instantiates F (and something similar holds for 
polyadic predications). 
This principle was rejected on the ground that we must distinguish 
between two ways in which a sentence can be literally true: either it is 
true by virtue of  the conditions stated in Truth 1, or it is true by 
virtue of  a reductive explanation, where this is to be distinguished 
from a paraphrase.  
 The rejection of  Truth 1, then, paved the way for the rejection 
of  Truth 2. 
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Truth 2: If  a does not exist, then this ground for truth 
mentioned in Truth 1 must be partly constituted by a non-
existent object, i.e., a.  
As such, then, there can be truths about the non-existent, intentional, 
and non-intentional truths, all to be explained in terms of  existent 
representational facts. 
 Crane’s proposition, we claimed, allows us to substantially 
reconfigure the logical space of  the theories of  intentionality. Indeed, 
with the availability of  the polyadism’s schema as an interpretation of  
the FIS, we are able to distinguish between two different issues. First, 
whether a certain theory of  intentionality is representational. Second, 
whether a certain theory of  intentionality uses a notion of  aboutness 
that is not subject to success or failure. Without an interpretation of  
the FIS like polyadism’s schema, it seems that the price to pay for 
defending a theory of  intentionality that uses a notion of  aboutness 
that is not subject to success or failure is to endorse a relational 
theory of  intentionality. The endorsement of  polyadism schema, 
however, allows one to defend a theory of  intentionality that uses a 
notion of  aboutness that is not subject to success or failure without 
thereby collapsing into some form of  Meinongianism. This is a new 
and interesting development for the theory of  intentionality.  
 However, we saw that polyadism is not without problems of  
its own. First, it should be complemented by an explicit account of  
the semantic content of  propositions expressed by literal truths such 
as: “John thinks about Pegasus.” Another worry concerned Crane’s 
interpretation of  domains of  quantification, as we saw that his 
account made a sentence like: “Every things have been thought 
about” trivially true.  
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 Concluding Remarks 
 In this dissertation, our general aim was to inquire into the way one 
should describe what sentences such as “John thinks about Pegasus” 
or “John thinks that Pegasus is a horse” describe, namely—as we 
defended the claim in Chapter 1—intentional experiences. 
 Our starting hypothesis was that all intentional experiences are 
instances of  the fundamental intentional schema (FIS): “x is about y.” 
We claimed that the task of  a theory of  intentionality should be to 
provide an interpretation of  this schema in such a way that it can be 
taken to account for six main features of  intentionality: aboutness, 
aspectuality, semantic normativity, intentional identity, generality, and 
non-existence. 
 The first interpretation of  that schema we focussed on, 
discussed in Chapter 2, was the one of  what we called the intentional 
object model (IOM), namely: 
IOM schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x stands in the 
relation of  ‘being about’ an intentional object y, and for some 
content C, C presents y to x.”  
As we saw, such an interpretation of  the FIS must be wedded to a 
Meinongian theory of  objects since it must account for the following 
two theses:  
 (i) Some intentional objects do not exist; and:  
 (ii) Non-existent intentional objects can be the relata of  the 
relation of  “being about.”  
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A useful slogan to characterize this first interpretation could be the 
following: “In all cases, explain how an intentional experience can be 
intentionally directed upon something in terms of  truths about mind-
independent intentional objects.” Indeed, according to the IOM, the 
key to an adequate theory of  intentionality is that it should be 
conceived within the (rather generous) boundaries of  a Meinongian 
theory of  objects according to which there are, in a completely mind-
independent way, more things than those that exist. However, we 
argued in Chapter 3 that there are good grounds not to commit 
oneself  to Meinongianism and, consequently, that this first 
interpretation of  the FIS does not seem to be an adequate one.  
 In Chapter 4, we then moved to a second interpretation of  the 
FIS that aimed to avoid the problems faced by the IOM schema by 
providing a different kind of  interpretation of  the FIS, namely a 
paraphrastic one:  
The CM schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x represents y”; and 
x can be said to represent y just in case there is a representational 
content C that either is, or could be, true of  y.  
A paraphrase denotes a relation between two things, an original 
sentence S and a paraphrase S’ of  S. As we saw, there are two ways to 
conceive of  the relation between S and S’. One can either try to use a 
paraphrase S’ to clarify the natural meaning of  S or, alternatively, one 
can try to use a paraphrase S’ to align the meaning of  S with 
independently determined theoretical commitments. We interpreted 
the CM as trying to provide an interpretation of  the first kind. The 
resulting theory can be summarized by means of  the following 
slogan: “In all cases, explain how an intentional experience can be 
intentionally directed upon something in terms of  the semantic 
properties of  its representational content.” 
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 We then argued that neither does the CM schema constitute a 
good interpretation of  the FIS. First, we argued that a theory of  
intentional experiences should countenance the existence of  both 
objectual and propositional intentional experiences. The CM schema, 
however, applies only to intentional experiences with a propositional 
representational content. Hence, it is extensionally inadequate. 
Second, its analysis of  aboutness is not strong enough to account for 
the intuitive notion of  aboutness that characterizes the FIS.  
 In Chapter 5, we turned to a third option, adverbialism, as 
recently defended anew by Uriah Kriegel. Unlike the IOM, but like 
the CM, adverbialism offers a paraphrastic analysis of  the FIS along 
the following lines:  
 Adverbialist schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x is 
intentionally directed y-wise.”  
A slogan we could use to summarize this schema could be the following: 
“In all cases, explain how an intentional experience can be intentionally 
directed upon something in terms of  adverbial modifications of  
consciousness.” 
 This third schema presents some advantages over the previous 
ones. Indeed, despite the fact that adverbialism eschews talking in terms 
of  intentional experiences being intentionally directed upon intentional 
objects, Kriegel’s use of  the idea of  foreignness constitutes a step in the 
direction of  uniformly describing all intentional experiences in terms of  
“the presence to the mind—or apparent presence to the mind—of  
things in the world” (Crane 2013: 4).  
 There are nonetheless good reasons to believe that the adverbialist 
schema does not constitute an adequate interpretation of  the FIS. First, 
the determinable-determinate framework that is used by Kriegel to avoid 
standard objections to adverbialism saddles intentional experiences with 
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too much contents than required. Second, the notion of  phenomenal 
foreignness is not strong enough to properly delineate the extension of  
the class of  all intentional experiences, as some experiences instantiate 
foreigness, though they only doubtfully could be dubbed “intentional.” 
 Finally, we turned to a last interpretation of  the FIS, the one 
provided by polyadism. According to polyadism, the IOM’s appeal the 
notion of  intentional object as a necessary conceptual component of  an 
adequate description of  intentional experiences is fundamentally correct. 
However, what is required for a theory of  intentionality that irreducibly 
appeals to such a notion is to be able to disentangle this claim from the 
IOM’s endorsement of  Meinongianism. As we saw, Crane proposes to 
do just this in terms of  the following schema:  
Polyadism Schema: “x is about y” amounts to “x stands in a 
non-substantial relation of  ‘being about’ to an intentional 
object y, and for some content C, C presents y to x.” 
According to Crane, the key idea to understand how this schema can be 
said to universally apply to intentional experiences without presupposing 
Meinongianism is that we shall primarily focus on the notion that all 
instances of  the FIS—including those that describe intentional 
experiences, either propositional or not, that are about things that do not 
exist—are literally true. Second, the notion of  literal truth must be 
divorced from the idea that if  a sentence of  form “a is F” is literally true, 
then there must be a ground of  truth for that sentence that instantiates 
what Crane metaphorically calls a “similar shape.”As such, then, 
polyadism can be summarized by means of  the following slogan: “In all 
cases, explain how an intentional an intentional experiences can be 
intentionally directed upon something in terms of  the literal truths of  
sentences used to describe intentional experiences—and, crucially, 
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distinguish between a literal truth and the shape of  the reality described 
by that truth.” 
 As we argued, Crane’s proposal allows us to reconfigure the logical 
space of  theories of  intentionality in a substantial way. Indeed, his 
account allows to distinguish between, on the one hand, relational and 
representational theories of  intentionality and, on the other hand, 
theories of  intentionality that use a notion of  aboutness submitted to 
conditions of  success and failure and theories that do not. His 
development of  polyadism allows a representational theory of  
intentionality to be one that, contrary to the CM and adverbialism, does 
not make use of  a notion of  aboutness that is subject to conditions of  
success and failure.  
 Crane’s account, then, seems to offer us quite a lot. As such, it 
seems to go a long way towards allowing us to make sense of  the 
following passage of  Husserl’s fifth Logical Investigations: 
If  I represent the god Jupiter, this god is my presented object, he is 
‘immanently present’ in my act, he has ‘mental inexistence’ in the latter, or 
whatever expression we may use to disguise our true meaning. I represent 
the god Jupiter: this means that I have a certain presentative experience, the 
presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in my consciousness. This 
intentional experience may be dismembered as one chooses in descriptive 
analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be found in it. The 
‘immanent’, ‘mental object’ is not therefore part of  the descriptive or real 
make-up (deskriptiven (reellen) Bestand) of  the experience, it is in truth not 
really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does 
not exist at all. This does not prevent our-idea-of-the-god-Jupiter from 
being actual, a particular sort of  experience or particular mode of  
mindedness (Zumutesein), such that he who experiences it may rightly say 
that the mythical king of  the gods is present to him, concerning whom 
there are such and such stories. If, however, the intended object exists, 
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nothing becomes phenomenologically different. It makes no essential 
difference to an object presented and given to consciousness whether it 
exists, or is fictitious, or is perhaps completely absurd. I think of  Jupiter as I 
think of  Bismarck, of  the tower of  Babel as I think of  Cologne Cathedral, 
of  a regular thousand-sided polygon as of  a regular thousand-faced solid. 
(Husserl 2002: 99—modified translation, see footnote 23 below). 
If  one regards this passage of  Husserl as providing us a particularly 
sharp description of  the general nature of  intentional experiences, then 
Crane’s interpretation of  the FIS turns out to be a particularly interesting 
one. If  one does not regard this passage of  Husserl in this way, then 
maybe a second look would help.  
 However, we saw that Crane’s account is not without problems. 
We mentioned a handful of  issues, and several others certainly loom 
around. Further work, hence, is require to complete and develop the 
view. Asked to answer the question: “What’s philosophy?”, Anthony 
Appiah answers: “Everything is much more complicated than you first 
thought.” After these six chapters, we cannot say that we just started to 
think about intentionality. What seems pretty obvious, however, is that 
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intentionality is in fact much more complex that what we thought so 
far.   26
  I modify Findlay’s translation of  the Logical Investigations which I find faulty. In 26
the original, Husserl writes: “Stelle ich den Gott Jupiter vor, so ist dieser Gott 
vorgestellter Gegenstand, er ist in meinem Akte "immanent gegenwärtig", hat in 
ihm "mentale Inexistenz", und wie die in eigentlicher Interpretation verkehrten 
Redeweisen sonst lauten mögen. Ich stelle den Gott Jupiter vor, das heißt, ich 
habe ein gewisses Vorstellungserlebnis, in rmeinem Bewußtsein vollzieht sich 
das Den-Gott-Jupiter-Vorstellen. Man mag dieses intentionale Erlebnis in 
deskriptiver Analyse zergliedern, wie man will, so etwas wie der Gott Jupiter 
kann man darin natürlich nicht finden; der "immanente", "mentale" Gegenstand 
gehört also nicht zum deskriptiven (reellen) Bestande des Erlebnisses, er ist also 
in Wahrlheit gar nicht immanent oder mental. Er ist freilich auch nicht extra 
mentem, er ist überhaupt nicht. Aber das hindert nicht, daß jenes Den-Gott-
Jupiter-Vorstellen wirklich ist, ein so geartetes Erlebnis, eine so bestimmte Weise 
des Zumute- seins, daß, wer es in sich erfährt, mit Recht sagen kann, er stelle 
sich jenen mythischen Götterkönig vor, von dem dies und jenes gefabelt werde. 
Existiert andererseits der intendierte Gegenstand, so braucht in 
rphänomenologischer Hinsicht nichts geändert zu sein. Für das Bewußtsein ist 
das Gegebene ein wesentlich Gleiches, ob der vorgestellte Gegenstand existiert 
oder ob er fingiert und vielleicht gar widersinnig ist. Jupiter stelle ich nicht 
anders vor als Bismarck, den Babylonischen Turm nicht anders als den Kölner 
Dom, ein regelmäßiges Tausendeck nicht anders als einen regelmäßigen 
Tausendjlächner.” (Husserl, Logische Untersuchungen, V, §11) 
 Findlay, however, translates as: “If  I have an idea of  the god Jupiter, 
this god is my presented object, he is 'immanently present' in my act, he has 
'mental inexistence' in the latter, or whatever expression we may use to disguise 
our true meaning. I have an idea of  the god Jupiter: this means that I have a 
certain presentative experience, the presentation-of-the-god-Jupiter is realized in 
my consciousness. This intentional experience may be dismembered as one 
chooses in de- scriptive analysis, but the god Jupiter naturally will not be found 
in it. The 'immanent', 'mental object' is not therefore part of  the descriptive or 
real make-up (deskriptiven reel/en Bestand) of  the experience, it is in truth not 
really immanent or mental. But it also does not exist extramentally, it does not 
exist at all. This does not prevent our-idea-of-the-god-Jupiter from being actual, 
a particular sort of  experience or particular mode of  mindedness (Zumutesein), 
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